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Abstract
The number of regional trade agreements (RTAs) has risen sharply in the past 
decade. This has resulted in a new global trade landscape where a great proportion of 
trade is carried through preferential arrangements rather than on a most-favoured­
nation basis. This prompts concerns over how such trade agreements should be 
managed. Importantly, developing countries are increasingly taking part in the current 
RTA proliferation. This thesis therefore sets out to identify the challenges facing 
developing countries when they negotiate and form such trade arrangements with 
their developed-country trade partners and among themselves, and seeks to deal with 
these challenges through the WTO rules and mechanisms pertaining RTA 
supervision.
To do so, the thesis first surveys the general trends and characteristics of the 
current RTA proliferation, and examines three bodies of literature, which are 
supplemented with the author’s personal participation in RTA negotiations and 
interviews with trade negotiators, in order to identify the challenges facing developing 
countries. It then evaluates the WTO rules governing the formation of an RTA, 
namely, GATT Article XXIV, the Enabling Clause, and GATS Article V. It is argued 
that these rules are problematic and inadequate to deal with the challenges. In 
response, the thesis proposes a variety of interpretative solutions. Lastly, 
acknowledging the practicality of the proposed substantive reforms, the thesis 
explores whether there are other less contentious means that may complement and 
strengthen the existing WTO rules and mechanisms with regard to RTA supervision. 
These include promulgation of code of best practices, revision of the WTO 
surveillance mechanism, and technical assistance for developing countries in relation 
to RTAs.
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Introduction
On 14 of November 2010, the BBC news reported that “leaders of the 21- 
member Asia-Pacific Co-operation (APEC) forum have pledged to move towards 
creating a regional free-trade area. The agreement was announced at the end of a two- 
day summit in Yokohama, Japan. The move would link the world’s three biggest 
economies- the United States, Japan, and China.”1 This is but one example of the 
many regional trade agreements (RTAs) that have been proliferating on the global 
trade landscape since the establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 
1995, and the rate of proliferation is continuing unabated.2
To date, the number of RTAs notified to the WTO, which are in force, is at 
288 agreements.3 More importantly and crucial for the purposes of this thesis, it 
emerges that more and more developing countries are taking part in the current RTA 
proliferation, by forming RTAs either with their developed-country trade partners or 
among themselves. This trend appears in all regions from Latin America to the 
Middle East and from Africa to Asia.4
Given the sheer numbers of RTAs in force, signed, and being negotiated, no 
developing countries are likely to be left untouched by the current wave of RTA 
proliferation.5 Furthermore, as major developed countries such as the United States, 
the European Union (EU), and Japan have adopted RTAs as one of their main trade 
policies, developing countries will find it hard to stay outside the playing field. This is 
particularly the case for those developing countries whose main competitors have 
concluded RTAs with their main developed-country trade partners. Under such 
circumstances, the non-member developing countries may have to respond by 
forming RTAs of their own with these developed countries or by applying for the 
membership of the existing ones.6
1 See http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-l 1751933 (last accessed 15 November 2010).
2 See J-A Crawford and RV Fiorentino, 'The Changing Landscape of Regional Trade Agreements' 
(Discussion Paper No8, WTO, Geneva 2005), p. 3.
3 See http://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicAllRTAList.aspx (last accessed 15 November 2010). It should be 
noted that the agreements that encompass both goods and services trade are notified twice under the 
WTO framework and therefore counted twice.
4 See R Fiorentio, L Verdeja and C Toqueboeuf, 'The Changing Landscape of Regional Trade 
Agreements: 2006 Update' (Discussion Paper No 12, WTO, Geneva 2006), pp. 13-25.
5 See Chapter 1.
6 This will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 3.
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For some developing countries, RTAs are seen as an offensive trade strategy. 
For example, Singapore, a city state that does not have many natural resources, has 
been using RTAs as a way to widen its export markets and make it more attractive as 
a place for businesses.7 For others, RTAs are seen as a way to achieve economic 
development through economies of scale and increased competition.8 Such objectives 
are often associated with RTAs formed among neighbouring developing countries, for 
example the Mercado Comun del Sur (Mercosur).
Regardless of the motivations which drive them to form RTAs, it appears that 
developing countries have fully embraced such trade arrangements. The proposed 
APEC free-trade area for example, if formed, will encompass more than ten 
developing countries in the region.9 However, one may wonder whether developing 
countries will in fact benefit from these agreements.
In Viner’s 1950 seminal work, The Customs Union Issue, he argued, contrary 
to the accepted wisdom at the time which favoured RTAs in all cases, that the 
formation of an RTA is not a priori beneficial to the member countries.10 All depends 
on whether the RTA results in net trade creation or trade diversion.11 Since then, a 
body of literature has been developed in order to understand more completely the 
economic effects that RTAs are likely to have.12 Although one cannot predict in 
advance with certainty that an RTA will improve the welfare of the member countries, 
the literature has identified a number of factors that are influential to the success of 
such trade arrangements. These include the initial trading patterns between the 
member countries and the restrictiveness of the rules of origin adopted.13
Nevertheless, it is not an easy endeavour for developing countries, as a 
prospective RTA member, to make sure that they benefit from the formation of an
7 See SM Thangavelu and M-H Toh, 'Bilateral 'WTO-Plus' Free Trade Agreements: The WTO Trade 
Policy Review of Singapore 2004' (2005) 28 World Economy 1211. See also http://www.bbc.co.uk/ 
news/business-11671839 (last accessed 15 November 2010).
8 This will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 2.
9 See http://www.apec.org/apec/member_economies.html (last accessed 17 November 2010).
10 See J Viner, The Customs Union Issue (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, New York 
1950).
11 This will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 2.
12 For a collection of important works in this area, see C Freund, The WTO and Reciprocal Preferential 
Trading Agreements (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham 2007).
13 For example, see P Wonnacott and M Lutz, 'Is There a Case for Free Trade Areas?' in JJ Schott (ed) 
Free Trade Areas and US Trade Policy (Institute for International Economics, Washington, DC 1989), 
p. 6, and K Krishna and A Krueger, 'Implementing Free Trade Areas: Rules of Origin and Hidden 
Protection' in A Deardorff, J Levinsohn and R Stem (eds), New Directions in Trade Theory (University 
of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor 1995), World Trade Organization., Rules o f  Origin Regimes in Regional 
Trade Agreements (World Trade Organization, Geneva 2002), respectively.
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RTA. Although the ability to analyse all the factors involved is very crucial for a 
successful outcome, developing countries often have constraints on such analytical 
capacity.14
Knowing how to maximize the potential benefits and minimize the potential 
costs of an RTA is only half of the story, however. Given that trade negotiations are 
mercantilist in nature and involve exchanges of trade concessions between the parties, 
developing countries will have to secure those that are favourable to their economies. 
A crucial factor here is the relative bargaining powers between the member countries. 
If they are on equal footing, one would expect the outcome to be satisfactory to all of 
the parties involved. On the other hand, if they are not, the outcome may be biased 
towards the more powerful partner.15 The latter scenario is more likely in the case of 
RTAs formed between developed and developing countries. Thus, negotiating 
capacity on the part of developing countries is also very important.
In an RTA, the member countries grant to one another trade preferences 
without extending them to the rest of WTO membership. Given this inherently 
discriminatory nature, the literature shows that non-members are likely to be 
adversely affected by the formation of an RTA.16 As mentioned earlier, their options 
are to form RTAs of their own with their main trade partners or apply for the 
membership of the existing ones.
The crucial point is that the successful use of RTAs by developing countries as 
a part of their growth and development strategies is not guaranteed and may depend 
on factors over which they have little control. Analytical and negotiating capacities, 
for example, are not something that they can improve very easily, especially in the 
short-run. In addition, given that non-members are excluded from the negotiating 
process, non-member developing countries will not be able to do much to protect their 
interests. Thus, there is a case for an international framework for RTA supervision 
that addresses challenges facing developing countries when forming these 
agreements.
14 For further discussion on the role of research in trade negotiations, see D Tussie, The Politics of 
Trade: The Role of Research in Trade Policy and Negotiation' in D Tussie (ed) The Politics o f  Trade: 
The Role o f  Research in Trade Policy and Negotiation (International Development Research Centre, 
Ottawa 2009).
15 See FR Pfetsch, 'Symmetry and Asymmetry in International Negotiations' (2000) 5 International 
Negotiations 21, pp. 37-40.
16 For example, see R Pomfret, The Economics o f  Regional Trading Arrangements (Clarendon Press, 
Oxford 1997), pp. 196-201.
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The thesis therefore embarks upon two tasks. The first task is to find out what 
specific challenges do developing countries face amid the current RTA proliferation 
when they negotiate and form such trade arrangements with their developed-  
country trade partners and among themselves? The second task is to determine to 
what extent do the existing WTO rules pertaining RTA supervision address these 
challenges and are there any ways to improve the rules and mechanisms so that the 
challenges can be better addressed? The thesis sets out to answer these questions.
1. Challenges Facing Developing Countries
In order to accomplish the first task, the thesis will review three broad bodies 
of literature. First, and most importantly, there is a body of economic literature on 
RTAs which encompass a wide range of various economic frameworks including neo­
classical liberalism, new growth theory as well as development economics.17 This 
body of literature seeks to identify and explain the potential benefits and potential 
costs of the formation of an RTA, in terms of its aggregate welfare effects. For 
example, an RTA may result in net trade creation and improved terms of trade, which 
in turn will increase the welfare of the member countries. Or, it may result in net trade 
diversion, which is harmful to both the member countries and non-members alike. 
The formation of an RTA may also result in economies of scale, knowledge and 
technology transfer, and an increase in competition and foreign direct investment 
(FDI), all of which can potentially benefit the members’ economies. Second, the 
thesis will also review the findings of another body of literature, which considers the 
political economy dimension of RTAs. This body of literature seeks to understand the 
implications of the formation of an RTA on the member governments and their trade 
policies, and how domestic vested interests may respond to such agreements and/or
17 These frameworks make different assumptions. For example, a neo-classical economic framework 
assumes that competition is perfect while a framework based on new growth theory assumes that 
competition is not perfect and factors of production such as capital can accumulate over time and can 
have significant impact on economic growth. A framework based on development economics, by 
contrast, puts an emphasis on the difference in market conditions prevailing in merging economies, 
such as idle capacity, as compared to those in developed countries’ economies generally assumed by 
the other economic frameworks.
attempt to influence their contents. It also seeks to predict how non-member 
governments may react to the formation of an RTA.18 Third, the thesis will also 
examine those works which look at negotiating dynamics of the formation of an RTA, 
particularly those concerning prospective developing-country members, as well as 
how the membership of an RTA or the prospect of forming one may affect developing 
countries at the multilateral level.19
It should be noted that the review of these bodies of literature is supplemented 
with the author’s personal participation in RTA negotiations and the interviews 
conducted with trade negotiators during these trade negotiations.20 The exposure to 
such negotiations and the interviews conducted provided the author with practical 
insights which are not available from purely document-based research.
One limitation of the thesis, therefore, is that it does not consider the effects of 
the formation of an RTA, which fall outside these three bodies of literature reviewed. 
As is well known, the creation of an RTA may have an effect on security and social 
dimensions and other domestic concerns that may include indirect effects on 
education and health care. For example, the formation of an RTA may help reinforce 
political support for a military conflict, e.g. the US-Republic of Korea free trade 
agreement (FTA) and its impact on the relationship between the latter and North 
Korea;21 an RTA may foster social and/or cultural integration between the member 
countries, e.g. the EU member states;22 and a regional integration agreement may 
provide a group of countries faced with a common health crisis with the necessary 
finances, infrastructure and expertise to address such crises, e.g. the outbreak of the 
avian flu  and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).23 Such issues are
18 For example, the theory of domino effect was first introduced by Baldwin in the early 1990s. See R 
Baldwin, A Domino Theory o f Regionalism (National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA 
1993).
19 For example, see M Diego-Femandez, Trade Negotiations Make Strange Bedfellows' (2008) 7 
World Trade Review 423 and JP Singh, 'Coalitions, Developing Countries, and International Trade: 
Research Findings and Prospects' (2006) 11 International Negotiations 499.
20 This will be discussed in more detail below under the heading of Methodology and Sources
21 For example, see Y-S Lee, 'The Beginning of Economic Integration Between East Asia and North 
America?-Forming the Third Largest Free Trade Area Between the United States and the Republic of 
Korea' (2007) 41 Journal of World Trade 1091.
22 For further discussion, see S Zetterholm (ed), National Cultures and European Integration: 
Exploratory Essays on Cultural Diversity and Common Policies (Berg Publishers, Oxford 1994).
23 For more detail, see R Coker and S Mounier, 'Pandemic Influenza Preparedness in the Asia-Pacific 
Region' (2006) 368 The Lancet 886.
not addressed in this thesis. In other words, the thesis does not attempt to deal with the 
fu ll  analysis of all possible impacts of RTAs on members and non-members.24
Nevertheless, it is argued that the specific challenges facing developing 
countries that will be discussed and identified in Chapters 2 and 3 are serious and 
worthy of study in their own right. For example, it is clear from the literature that 
trade diversion can and does harm the economies of developing countries. This is true 
both for members of the RTA in question, and for developing countries which are not 
members of it since the RTA may result in competitor countries undercutting their 
access to lucrative export markets. For example, Thai farmers whose products were 
used to produce rubber and tyres were seriously affected by the formation of the 
Japan-Malaysia Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) because their Malaysian 
counterparts could sell their products to Japanese firms at cheaper prices as a result of 
the agreement. Such consequences prompted Thailand to negotiate and form its own 
EPA with Japan, which was signed a year after the Japan-Malaysia EPA came into 
force. It is crucial, therefore, to understand the forces which lead to the creation of 
trade-diverting rather than trade-creating RTAs, and to assess whether international 
law can make a contribution to the challenge of addressing them.
Confronted with the challenge of constraints on analytical and negotiating 
capacities, developing countries are likely to find it difficult to make the most out of 
the formation of an RTA. Not only will they not benefit from such trade arrangements 
as much as they should, they may be in fact worse off as a result of having to make 
commitments that may have adverse effects on their economies, and hence their 
people. For example, many commentators criticize the proposed EPAs between the 
EU and the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries on the basis that they do 
not offer adequate protection for food security in the latter, which could affect 
millions of people whose lives and livelihoods depend on affordable food prices and 
agricultural sector.25
It is noteworthy that although the bodies of literature described above can help 
one better understand how developing countries, like Thailand, can make use of RTAs 
as a means to achieve economic development through economic growth and trade
24 This is not to say that developing countries’ trade negotiators do not need to take the full effects of 
the formation of an RTA into account. In fact, they should and it is very important that they do. 
However, as will be discussed in Chapter 2, developing countries may often lack the necessary 
analytical and negotiating capacities, and as a result, are disadvantaged in RTA negotiations.
25 For example see http://www.oxfam.org/en/node/251 (last accessed 8 November 2010).
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liberalization more effectively, this is not to say that economic development can be
pursued solely through RTAs. Other trade policies are also important, particularly
• 26those concerning distribution of wealth created through trade expansion.
So far, I have referred to the challenges which RTAs pose for developing 
countries. It may legitimately be objected that developing countries are not 
homogeneous, that their interests differ, and that they each may face a different set of 
challenges. The term developing countries does encompass a wide range of countries 
at different stages of development, economic or otherwise. This is reflected in the 
diverse interests among these countries. Not only do such diverse interests weaken 
their position in the WTO on certain issues, but they also make it extremely complex 
to design uniform solutions for their needs and difficulties when integrating into the 
global economy. Notably, there are no definitions of developed and developing 
countries within the WTO framework. In practice, Members determine for themselves 
whether they are one or the other although other Members can challenge the decision 
of a Member to make use of provisions available to developing countries.
The thesis nevertheless argues that there are some common challenges facing 
developing countries amid the current RTA proliferation. It argues that, in terms of 
these specific challenges, the differences between developing countries primarily 
affect their degree of severity rather than their existence per se. That said, wherever 
possible, the thesis also takes the heterogeneity of developing countries into account 
when it seeks to offer solutions to the shortcomings of the WTO rules and 
mechanisms pertaining RTA supervision.
Although the thesis does not categorically define the term developing 
countries, the working definition primarily corresponds to the three groups of 
countries classified by the World Bank as low income, lower middle income, and 
upper middle income.28 Gross national income (GNI) per capita29 will be used as the 
main criterion to deal with the issue of heterogeneity- by further dividing developing 
countries into three subgroups comparable to the World Bank’s classification, each of
26 For further discussion, see D Rodrik, 'Globalization, Social Conflict and Economic Growth' (1998) 
21 The World Economy 143.
27 See http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/dlwho_e.htm (last accessed 23 August 2009). For 
further discussion, see F Cui, 'Who Are the Developing Countries in the WTO?' (2008) 1 The Law and 
Development Review 123.
28 See http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-classifications (last accessed 1 December 2010).
29 GNI per capita is the dollar value of a country’s final income in a year divided by its population. It 
reflects the average income of a country’s citizens.
which would be subject to different treatments under the proposals. The three 
subgroups are: the least-developed countries (LDCs), comprising of the countries with 
per capita incomes below $900; the lower middle income developing countries 
(LMIDCs) which includes countries with GNI per capita between $901 and $3,035; 
and the upper middle income developing countries (UMIDCs) which includes those 
countries with GNI per capita between $3,035 and $9,3 85.30 Given that such a 
criterion has been adopted by the World Bank as its main criterion for classifying 
countries for operational and analytical purposes, it represents at present the closest 
thing to an internationally accepted benchmark in this area.31 It should be noted that in 
this thesis the Republic of Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore are considered as advanced 
developing countries despite the fact that they fall within the high income group 
classified by the World Bank.32
It is, however, acknowledged that such a criterion is not perfect for dealing 
with the challenges facing developing countries amid the current RTA proliferation. 
For example, although GNI per capita is a good criterion since a country’s analytical 
and negotiating capacities are generally related in an approximate fashion to its size 
and level of economic development, it may not have a direct correlation with how 
influential domestic vested interests are over the member governments and/or how 
high the implementation and adjustment costs will be for developing-country RTA 
partners. Nevertheless, it will be argued that a subdivision of developing countries in 
advance (as opposed to on an ad hoc basis) for the purposes of incorporating special 
and differential treatment principle into the WTO rules would strike the right balance 
between the individual needs of developing countries and predictability (and 
practicality) of RTA negotiations while a truly country-specific approach for special 
and differential treatment could be adopted with regard to the proposed technical 
assistance provided for developing countries.33
30 See Chapters 4, 5, and 6.
31 See http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-classifications (last accessed 16 November 2010).
32 One reason for this is to highlight the fact that although these countries were considered as 
developing countries at the end of the Second World War, they have achieved high level of economic 
development and raised the standards of living of their peoples. In addition, Singapore is a member of 
ASEAN, which in 2004 formed an RTA with China and notified it under the Enabling Clause. Given 
that only goods RTAs formed among developing countries are allowed to notify under the Enabling 
Clause, it seems that the countries involved consider Singapore as a developing countries. Similarly, 
the Republic of Korea is also a signatory of the Global System of Trade Preferences among Developing 
Countries (GSTP).
33 This will be discussed in more detail in Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7.
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2. Proposals for the Improved WTO Oversight of RTAs
In order to accomplish the second task- namely, to evaluate the existing WTO 
regulatory framework- the thesis will primarily examine the WTO rules pertaining 
RTA supervision in light of the challenges identified in Chapters 2 and 3, so that they 
can be updated and revised in light of contemporary developments. As will be seen in 
Chapters 4, 5, and 6, the rules are a product of years of development in response to the 
evolving global trading system, with the result that represents a complicated and 
ambiguous framework, ill adapted to the present day needs of developing countries.34
Within the WTO legal framework, RTAs are an exception to the most­
favoured-nation (MFN) obligation, the non-discriminatory principle often described 
as a core pillar of WTO law. They are an exception because the member countries are 
allowed to grant to one another trade preferences without having to extend them to the 
rest of the WTO membership, provided only that they comply with the relevant WTO 
provisions. In the goods context, the provisions are primarily contained in Article 
XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). For developing- 
country Members, they also have an additional route to form a goods RTA among 
themselves through the provisions under the Decision of 28 November 1979, entitled 
“Differential and More Favourable Treatment Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of 
Developing Countries” (the Enabling Clause). Article V of the General Agreement on 
Trade in Services (GATS), on the other hand, sets out the requirements with which 
WTO Members have to comply in order to form a services RTA with one another.
Historically, the application and enforcement of these rules has been 
extremely weak. There are two ways through which they can be enforced. The first is 
the reviewing mechanism (as reformed by the Decision on the Transparency 
Mechanism for Regional Trade Agreements 2006 (the 2006 Mechanism)) conducted 
by the Committee on Regional Trade Agreements (CRTA) and the Committee on 
Trade and Development (CTD);35 and the second is the WTO dispute settlement 
mechanism (DSM) carried out by panels and the Appellate Body. Over the years, 
these rules, particularly those contained in GATT Article XXIV, have been subject to
34 GATT Article XXIV was enacted in 1947, the Enabling Clause in 1979, and GATS Article V in 
1995.
35 The CRTA is responsible for those RTAs which are notified to the WTO under GATT Article XXIV 
and GATS Article V; whereas, the CTD is responsible for those notified under the Enabling Clause.
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debates among WTO Members (and GATT CONTRACTING PARTIES before them) 
and discussion in a limited number of case law. Despite (or perhaps because of) this 
lack of rigorous enforcement, the rules are full of ambiguity and in need of 
clarification.
While there is considerable literature on these provisions, it has so far mostly 
been confined to technical legal analysis of the relevant GATT/WTO jurisprudence, 
without explicit reference to the development dimension of RTAs and how they can 
be used by developing countries to achieve their economic development. In addition, 
discussion is mostly limited to GATT Article XXIV while the rules contained in the 
Enabling Clause and GATS Article V have received comparatively little attention.36
Thus, the thesis seeks to supplement the existing literature with the insights 
obtained from the bodies of literature described above, as supplemented by the 
author’s personal participation in RTA negotiations and interviews conducted during 
these trade negotiations, and to determine how the existing rules and mechanisms can 
be improved in ways that benefit developing countries. To put it differently, the thesis 
attempts to draw on the three bodies of literature in order to construct a framework for 
analysis that can be used to identify the challenges facing developing countries amid 
the current RTA proliferation (the first task); then use it to critically evaluate the three 
sets of WTO rules and existing mechanisms and guide the proposals made in response 
to the shortfalls of the WTO regulatory framework (the second task).
As a result of the way that I have framed this second task, one question which 
may arise is whether, and if so why, the WTO is the appropriate international body to 
oversee and guide the process of RTA formation by developing countries. The answer 
to this question is in two parts. First, and most briefly, it is important to reiterate that 
there is a need for some international framework for RTA supervision that addresses 
the challenges facing developing countries amid the current RTA proliferation. 
Experience has shown that developing countries cannot reasonably be expected to 
adequately address the challenges they face on their own, without the assistance of an
36 The main works on GATT Article XXIV include KW Dam, The GATT: Law and International 
Economic Organization (University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1970), chapter 16 and JH Mathis, 
Regional Trade Agreements in the GATT/WTO: Article XXIV and the Internal Trade Requirement 
(T.M.C. Asser Press; Sold and distributed by Kluwer Law International, The Hague, Norwell, MA 
2002). As far as GATS Article V is concerned, only few works discuss it in detail, for example, see S 
Stephenson, Hegional Agreements on Services in Multilateral Disciplines: Interpreting and Applying 
GATS Article V' in S Stephenson (ed) Services Trade in the Western Hemisphere: Liberalization, 
Integration, and Reform (Brookings Institution Press, Washington, DC 2000).
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appropriate international framework. This is particularly true in respect of capacity 
constraints, as well as in respect of the adverse effects which RTAs have on non­
members, which by definition are not amenable to negotiated resolution among 
parties to an RTA.
Second, the question remains whether the WTO is the most appropriate 
international venue for international oversight of RTAs. This thesis chooses to focus 
primarily on the existing WTO rules and mechanisms for two practical reasons. The 
first concerns obligations of states under general public international law. States are 
essentially free to enter into any agreement of any kind and content. Equality of states 
entails the power to choose partners, and to discriminate against others. There are 
hardly any limitations in customary international law on engaging in preferential or 
discriminatory treatment, beyond the principles and rules enshrined in the Charter of 
the United Nations; neither is there a general obligation to treat all states alike.37 
Thus, it seems that the only way in which the current RTA proliferation can be 
supervised is through specific treaty provisions. The WTO rules pertaining RTA 
supervision, which bind its 153 Members- covering the vast majority of trading 
countries- are the primary relevant framework already in existence, and therefore of 
paramount importance in light of the increasing number and complexity of such 
agreements. Another reason is that the WTO’s existing mechanisms mean any 
reforms proposed to the WTO rules can be enforced. For example, in Chapter 7 it will 
be proposed that a code of best practices with regard to the formation of an RTA 
should be established by the WTO since such a code would be used by the 
CRTA/CTD in the reviewing process and/or by panels and the Appellate Body 
through the DSM. A similar code of best practices established by other international 
organizations may not be as readily applicable or enforceable within the WTO 
framework.
Although it is open to debate whether the WTO at present has the institutional 
capacity to supervise RTAs effectively, with the membership of 153 countries 
coupled with the existing rules and mechanisms, it is arguably in a better position to
37 See T Cottier and M Foltea, 'Constitutional Functions of the WTO and Regional Trade Agreements' 
in L Bartels and F Ortino (eds), Regional Trade Agreements and the WTO Legal System (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford; New York 2006), p. 43.
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supervise the current RTA proliferation than any other international organization.38 
This is, however, not to say that the WTO has the sole responsibility to address the 
challenges faced by developing countries as a result of RTA proliferation. A full 
solution would require a multi-pronged approach, which may imply cooperation and 
coordination between the WTO and other existing international organizations such as 
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the 
Advisory Centre of WTO Law (ACWL) or even new ones that could be established in 
order to deal with the current wave of RTA proliferation such as an Advisory Centre 
on Regional Trade Agreements (ACORTA).39
Nevertheless, given that the WTO agreements, in fact, contain three sets of 
rules pertaining RTA supervision and establish mechanisms through which they can 
be enforced, it is arguably easier to amend and reform existing rules and mechanisms 
than to create new ones. The thesis does recognize the stalemate in the Doha Round of 
negotiations and how difficult it would be to carry out the proposed substantive 
reforms. That is why Chapter 7 will look at other less contentious means, which may 
complement and/or strengthen the existing WTO rules and mechanisms with regard to 
RTA supervision.
Structure of the Thesis
The structure of this thesis is as follows. Chapter 1 reviews the general trends 
and characteristics of the current RTA proliferation.40 It is evident that the number of 
RTAs notified to the WTO has increased dramatically in the past decade, and the rate 
at which they are being notified is unprecedented. The RTAs in the current 
proliferation appear to be formed on a bilateral rather than plurilateral basis, many of 
which are formed between countries from different continents. Commitments made in
38 For further discussion on institutional capacity of the WTO as an international organization, see M 
Footer, An Institutional and Normative Analysis o f  the World Trade Organization (Nijhoff, Leiden 
2005).
39 This will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 7.
40 Note that although I only rely on primary sources to a limited extent, the secondary sources I use are 
produced by the WTO and the World Bank. These reports and working papers should provide reliable 
and accurate information on the current RTA proliferation.
these RTAs also tend to cover trade in services as well as trade in goods. More 
interestingly, there has been a significant increase in the number of RTAs between 
developed and developing countries, which stresses how important it is for the WTO 
regulatory framework to give due account to the challenges they face when forming 
such trade arrangements. This chapter aims to paint an overall picture of a global 
trade landscape criss-crossed by a complicated and expanding array of RTAs.
Chapter 2 investigates and identifies the challenges facing developing 
countries amid the current RTA proliferation from the perspective of a prospective 
member country. As a prospective RTA member, developing countries will arguably 
wish to make the most out of the agreement they have decided to sign. Therefore, they 
will try to promote the potential benefits and manage the potential costs which are 
induced by the agreement. In order to identify the challenges, Chapter 2 first 
examines how a developing-country partner may gain from an RTA and whether it 
may incur any costs in the process. It then identifies three main challenges which 
include domestic vested interests, high implementation and adjustment costs, and the 
lack of analytical and negotiating capacities on the part of developing countries.
Chapter 3, on the other hand, investigates whether there are any challenges 
that developing countries may face from two other perspectives, namely, as a non­
member and as a WTO Member amid the current RTA proliferation. By its very 
nature, an RTA is designed and negotiated between the member countries. Non­
members are however excluded from this process and will be discriminated against as 
a result of trade preferences granted between the member countries. Thus, it is 
important that one examines whether an RTA has any adverse effects on a non- 
member developing country and how they may respond to these effects. Concerns 
have also been raised that RTAs individually and as a collective group may have 
implications on the multilateral trading system and multilateral trade negotiations. If it 
is accepted that developing countries benefit from the multilateral framework offered 
by the WTO due to possible coalitions and a more rule-based dispute settlement 
process, anything that undermines the WTO should be considered harmful to 
developing countries. Thus, the effects of RTAs on the multilateral trading system and 
multilateral trade negotiations are also explored in this chapter.
Chapters 4, 5, and 6 embark upon the existing WTO rules pertaining RTA 
supervision, namely, GATT Article XXIV, the Enabling Clause, and GATS Article V, 
respectively. In these chapters, the existing framework of each set of rules are
explained and then evaluated in light of the challenges facing developing countries 
identified in Chapters 2 and 3. In response to the shortcomings revealed from the 
evaluation, the chapters propose a number of ways in which improvement can be 
made in accordance with the analytical framework as well as customary rules of 
interpretation of public international law and the available GATT/WTO jurisprudence 
on these rules.
Chapter 4 proposes that some form of special and differential treatment should 
be incorporated into GATT Article XXIV through the interpretation of the 
substantially all the trade requirement (a.k.a. the SAT requirement) in terms of the 
threshold levels and transitional periods so as to afford developing countries some 
flexibility. It also proposes that the emphasis should be placed on the duty half of the 
SAT requirement rather than the ORRC (other restrictive regulation of commerce) 
half in light of other WTO commitments.
By contrast, Chapter 5 argues that rules under the Enabling Clause are so 
lenient that they result in excess flexibility, which may not necessarily translate into 
trade/economic benefits for developing countries in practice. Furthermore, since the 
Enabling Clause only applies to South-South RTAs, and is not available to developing 
countries forming RTAs with their developed-country trade partners, the existence of 
the Enabling Clause creates undesirable complication and inconsistency in the 
treatment of goods RTAs which have developing-country Members as parties. In 
addition, the two sets of rules may create two types of South-South RTAs, namely, 
those notified under GATT Article XXIV and those under the Enabling Clause, the 
legal consequences of which are not clear and may result in discrepancy. Thus, 
Chapter 5 proposes that there should be a single set of rules for the formation of goods 
RTAs, i.e. GATT Article XXIV but only if the special and differential treatment 
proposed in Chapter 4 is incorporated into it.
Upon examining GATS Article V, Chapter 6 illustrates that the adoption of 
the criteria which are based on GATT Article XXIV may have resulted in undesirable 
complication due to services-specific problems, and have made the implementation of 
GATS Article V extremely difficult. Given the nature of barriers to trade in services 
and rules of origin, the magnitude of trade diversion induced by the formation of a 
services RTA may not be as major a concern as in the case of goods RTAs. This 
renders the criteria which in the latter case aim at minimizing trade diversion 
somewhat less significant. In addition and more importantly, services liberalization-
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may it be at the bilateral/regional or multilateral level- raises unique challenges 
(besides those identified in Chapters 2 and 3) for developing countries, particularly 
those concerning regulation and movement of natural persons. GATS Article V 
arguably fails to deal with them explicitly. Nevertheless, Chapter 6 proposes that its 
existing architecture, namely, provisions on special and differential treatment and 
rules of origin, could be used to help developing countries tackle these unique 
challenges as well as those identified in Chapters 2 and 3, at least to a certain extent.
It should be noted at this juncture that the proposals made in Chapters 4, 5, 
and 6 intend to provide developing countries with controlled, rather than unfettered, 
flexibility so as to deal with the challenges they face. This is especially the case in 
Chapter 5 where it is argued that the rules under the Enabling Clause give excess 
flexibility to developing countries forming (goods) RTAs among themselves. In other 
words, any special and differential treatment available to developing countries should 
strike the right balance between the flexibility needed to address the challenges and 
the potential trade/economic costs which may result from excess flexibility.
The proposals made in Chapters 4, 5, and 6 aim at substantive reforms of the 
existing rules. However, they will not be easy to execute as almost all WTO Members 
are a party to one or more RTAs. While non-members are likely to benefit if these 
rules are clarified and enforced strictly and rigorously, their own current and future 
RTAs may be at risk of violating them. There is a conflict of interests here. Chapter 7, 
therefore, explores whether there are other less contentious means that may 
complement and/or strengthen the existing WTO rules and mechanisms pertaining 
RTA supervision. These include promulgation of code of best practices, revision of 
the WTO surveillance mechanism, and technical assistance for developing countries 
in relation to RTA negotiations. It is argued that together with the proposals made 
with regard to the enforceable rules, these other means can be complementarily used 
to supervise the current RTA proliferation in such a way that addresses the challenges 
facing developing countries.
Methodology and Sources
The methodology used for the first task of the thesis is primarily document- 
based. Secondary sources have been used as the basis for preliminary research and 
also as the basis of the analytical framework. The secondary sources include the 
works of publicists in the fields of international economics, international political 
economy, international trade negotiations, and those published by a number of non­
governmental organizations such as the South Centre and Oxfam International.
This is supplemented by empirical research into the practices of ASEAN 
members, particularly Thailand’s, with regard to their RTA negotiations. The material 
was gathered by means of interviews with delegates from the original six ASEAN 
members and the ASEAN Secretariat.41 These interviews were conducted during the 
RTA negotiations in which the author participated over the period between April 2007 
and June 2010.42 These negotiations are for the Thailand-Japan EPA, the ASEAN- 
Republic of Korea FTA, the ASEAN-India FTA, and the ASEAN-EU FTA. A total of 
20 separate interviews were conducted with 20 individuals. In some cases, if further 
clarifications from the interviews were necessary, they were obtained through 
electronic mail. The interviews took place prior to, during, or at the end of the RTA 
negotiations. For all cases, the author was introduced to the interviewees as part of the 
Thai delegation by a senior Thai trade negotiator. Such introduction, the author 
believes, helped gain trust and allowed the interviewees to answer the questions more 
freely. All of them were asked the same set of questions but were allowed to speak 
and elaborate their answers at their own pace. The interviewees gave their answers in 
confidence and most of them preferred to remain anonymous.
Additional research for the first task includes facilitated access as part of the 
Thai delegation at various rounds of RTA negotiations mentioned in the previous 
paragraph. It also includes facilitated access at meetings among the Thai government 
departments and ministries, which sometimes involved the private sectors as well.
It is acknowledged that the interviews and facilitated access were confined to 
negotiators from and RTA negotiations involving the ASEAN countries. As a result,
41 The original six are Brunei, Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand, and Singapore.
42 The interviews can be considered as elite interviews. See JM Berry, 'Validity and Reliability Issues 
in Elite Interviewing' (2002) 35 Political Science and Politics 679.
the practical insights may be somewhat biased towards these countries. Nevertheless, 
secondary sources are used to compare and confirm these insights with what 
developing countries from other regions experience with their RTA negotiations.
The methodology used for the second task is based on a careful study of 
primary GATT/WTO documents in the public domain that have been published in the 
GATT and WTO Series of Basic Instruments and Selected Documents {BISD) as well 
as WTO documents which are available online through the WTO website. These 
include materials available on the electronic database on RTAs published by the 
Secretariat in 2009. GATT/WTO case law and jurisprudence are reviewed and cited 
to support certain facts or arguments. Secondary sources have also been used for the 
second task as the basis for preliminary research and as the basis of the analytical 
framework. The secondary sources include the works of publicists in the fields of 
international economic law and GATT/WTO law, and public international law.
Terminology
In this thesis, the term RTA is used to mean a trade arrangement between two 
or more countries by which they agree to trade with one another more freely than with 
the world in general and is or is required to be notified to the WTO under GATT 
Article XXIV, the Enabling Clause, and/or GATS Article V.43 RTAs are traditionally 
formed between neighbouring countries within the same region, hence the word 
regional, but in recent years the world has witnessed a surge in trade agreements 
between countries from different continents, i.e. cross-regional RTAs. Thus, the term 
RTA can be misleading under certain circumstances. In addition, the term PTA 
(preferential trade agreement) is sometimes used to describe such trade arrangements. 
This is because by definition an RTA is discriminatory as the members give 
preferential treatments to one another and non-members are excluded. Nevertheless, 
the thesis adopts the term RTA since it is the terminology used by the GATT and 
subsequently the WTO.
43 See J Black, A dictionary o f  economics (2nd edn Oxford University Press, Oxford 2002), p. 395.
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When the term RTA is used in the context of goods RTAs, it encompasses both 
customs unions (CUs) and free trade agreements/areas (FTAs).44 In a CU, tariffs and 
non-tariff barriers (NTBs) are eliminated among the members, and common external 
tariffs (CETs) and trade policy are agreed in relation to non-members. In an FTA, on 
the other hand, only the internal tariffs and NTBs are eliminated while the members 
retain their respective external trade barriers in relation to non-members. It should be 
noted that sometimes the terms such as EPA (economic partnership agreement) and 
CERTA (closer economic relations trade agreement) are used by the members. 
Nevertheless, a trade arrangement is an FTA (or a CU) if it meets the definition given 
above.
The thesis also uses the term RTA as including partial scope agreements. A 
partial scope agreement refers to an agreement between developing countries which 
only concerns trade in goods and provides for reduction and/or elimination of tariffs 
and non-tariff measures on a limited number of products. Such agreements are 
notified to the WTO under the Enabling Clause. It is partial because under the 
Enabling Clause developing countries are allowed to partially liberalize trade among 
themselves. This is contrary to the obligation under GATT Article XXIV, which 
requires RTA members to liberalize trade between themselves on a substantially all 
the trade basis.
When the term RTA is used in the context of an arrangement for services trade, 
i.e. a services RTA, no distinction is made between a CU, an FTA, and a partial scope 
agreement. This is due to the fact that GATS Article V does not distinguish between 
these different arrangements.
44 In this thesis, the terms free-trade area and free trade agreement are interchangeable. It should be 
noted that generally the term free-trade area does not describe an area where goods can be truly trade. 
The member countries, in most cases, still maintain some barriers, particularly non-tariff measures.
Chapter 1
The Current Regional Trade Agreements Proliferation: 
General Trends and Characteristics
1.1 Introduction
Customs union and FTA are not new phenomena and have been around for 
hundreds of years. For instance, a CU of the provinces of France was proposed in 
1664; Austria signed FT As with five of its neighbours during the 18th and 19th 
centuries; and the colonial empires were based on preferential trade arrangements. 
Customs unions were also precursors to or were embodied in the creation of new 
states in, for instance, Germany (the Zollverein), Italy, and the United States.45 
However, as time changes, so do CUs and FTAs.
During the 1930s, there was a great fragmentation of the world trading system 
as governments struggled with the slump in demand without the benefit of global 
economic institutions, which exist today, to provide cooperative focal points. Trade 
preferences were adopted as one of the means to protect domestic economies 46 
Although the exact causal relationship between restricted trade and declining incomes 
during this period is still not clear, fragmentation into closed trading blocs may 
arguably have fostered inefficiency and frustrated recovery from the Great 
Depression.47 At the end of the Second World War, countries came together and 
established the GATT where equal treatment of all partners (non-discrimination) was 
seen as a fundamental principle of the multilateral trading system. Exceptions were
45 See MW Schiff and LA Winters, Regional Integration and Development (The World Bank, 
Washington DC 2003), p. 4.
46 Ibid.
47 For general background of the world economy then, see JN Bhagwati, Termites in the Trading 
System: How Preferential Agreements Undermine Free Trade (Oxford University Press, Oxford; New 
York 2008), chapter 1.
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permitted, both on pragmatic grounds and for reasons of principle. Among these 
exceptions was the ability to create trade blocs- CUs as well as FTAs.48
After the Second World War, there have arguably been three periods during 
which the world witnessed a surge in RTAs. The first period occurred towards the end 
of the 1950s and lasted until around the mid-1970s.49 The formation of the European 
Community (EC) was initiated in 1958. Subsequently, RTAs also spread throughout 
Africa, Latin America and other parts of the developing world although it is 
noteworthy that Asia was somewhat immune to these series of RTA negotiations and 
aspirations.50 The United States was then one of the few main supporters of the 
multilateral trading system. In addition, RTAs in this period were formed either 
between developed countries (North-North RTAs) or between developing countries 
(South-South RTAs).51 By the end of this period, however, the attempts at forming 
RTAs among developing countries had failed.52 Thus, while the world was indeed 
filled with proposals for RTAs, they were not successfully carried through and 
disappeared by the end of the period, except for the original EC, which later evolved 
into the EU, and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA).
The second period started around the mid-1980s. It was dominated by the 
EU’s activities: it underwent a number of enlargements and approaching a true 
economic union. Such activities led to two concerns among the rest of the world: first, 
that the EU would be less interested in pursuing multilateral trade negotiations within 
the GATT; and secondly, a fear of Fortress Europe- the idea that the EU would 
become less open to trade with non-members.53
Parallel to this, the United States was no longer an idle player in the field. It 
began its RTA policy by concluding an FTA with Israel in 1980 and Canada in 1989. 
This was followed by the negotiations and conclusion of the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994 with Canada and Mexico. There were other
48 See Schiff and Winters, p. 5.
49 See T Carpenter, 'A Historical Perspective on Regionalism' in R Baldwin and P Low (eds), 
Multilateralizing Regionalism: Challenges fo r  the Global Trading System (Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge 2009), p. 17.
50 Asian countries remained either inward-oriented or fairly closed to the outside {e.g. India and China), 
or they adopted growth strategies based on exports and sought to expand their access to foreign 
markets {e.g. Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the Southeast Asian countries).
51 See R Faini, Multilateralism and Regionalism after the Uruguay Round (Macmillan, Basingstoke 
1997), chapter 6.
52 See J Bhagwati, 'Regionalism and Multilateralism: an Overview' in J de Melo and A Panagariya 
(eds), New Dimensions in Regional Integration (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1993), p. 28.
53 See Carpenter, p. 20.
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regional integrations in the Americas, including the formation of Mercosur in 1991, 
and the resurrection of the Andean Pact and the Central American Common Market 
(CACM) in 1991 and 1993, respectively.54
In this period, Asia appeared to embrace RTAs. It started in 1992 where the 
ASEAN countries, after 25 years of political cooperation with limited trade 
cooperation, formed the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA).55 Regional integration 
was also prevalent in Africa. In West Africa, the trade blocs, which were formed and 
failed at the end of the first period, re-formed in more liberal and more tightly 
organized blocs. The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) 
replaced the previous preferential arrangements,56 and many of its members also took 
part in the Cross-border Initiative (CBI). The Southern African Development 
Coordination Conference (SADCC) transmogrified into the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC), which is a trade and economic cooperation 
association rather than a defence organization.57 Similarly, East African Cooperation 
(EAC) sprang up where the East African Community had failed.58 In North Africa, 
the Mahgreb and Mashraq groups renewed their integration efforts.59
Unlike in the first period, RTAs formed during the second period did not 
disappear and most of them continue to be active in the third period, which has 
occurred since the conclusion of the Uruguay Round and lasted until today.60 It is 
noteworthy that compared to the first and second periods, RTAs between developed 
and developing countries (North-South RTAs) are much more common in the third. 
Moreover, the pace at which RTAs are being initiated is more rapid. The main new 
feature in this period compared with the second is the sheer number of countries that 
pursue RTAs as their trade policy alternative to multilateral trade liberalization. For 
example, the EU is engaging in the negotiations for EPAs with the ACP countries;61 
the United States has initiated and concluded 15 bilateral FTAs, particularly with
54 Ibid., p. 21.
55 See http://www.aseansec.org/19585.htm (last accessed 10 March 2010).
56 See http://about.comesa.int/lang-en/overview (last accessed 10 March 2010).
57 See http://www.sadc.int/ (last accessed 10 March 2010).
58 See http://www.eac.int/about-eac.html (last accessed 10 March 2010).
59 See Schiff and Winters, p. 6.
60 See Carpenter, p. 22.
61 See http://ec.europa.eu/trade/wider-agenda/development/economic-partnerships/ (last accessed 10 
March 2010).
developing countries;62 and many Asian countries are negotiating RTAs both with 
countries from other regions and among themselves.63
There is no sign that the momentum towards RTAs will die out as in the first 
period. In other words, RTAs are here to stay. Thus, it is high time that RTA 
supervision were taken more seriously by the WTO and its Members. Before 
embarking directly upon an in-depth discussion on RTAs and how they can be 
supervised under the WTO regulatory framework, it is useful to begin by setting the 
scene in some detail. Although such a survey can be rather descriptive, it should 
illustrate the true nature of the current RTA proliferation and how this phenomenon 
raises concerns with regard to developing countries. This chapter therefore reviews 
the general trends and characteristics of the current RTA proliferation.
1.2 General Trends and Characteristics
When one looks at the statistics and what they may represent, one should bear 
in mind that although a lot of attention is drawn to the numbers of RTAs, in force, 
signed, or under negotiation, it is the proportion of international trade covered by such 
agreements that is more important.64 Thus, given the size of their economies, RTAs 
which involve the United States and the EU are likely to have greater impact on non­
members and the multilateral trading system than RTAs between small economies.
As will be shown in more detail below, there are a number of trends and 
characteristics which can be drawn from the statistics. First, it is apparent that the 
number of RTAs notified to the GATT/WTO has increased dramatically and the rate 
of proliferation is unprecedented. Secondly, FTA is by far the preferred form of RTAs 
notified to the WTO and they tend to be on a bilateral rather than regional basis. 
Thirdly, there is a pattern of expansion and consolidation of existing RTAs: on the 
one hand, there is a clear proliferation of cross-regional RTAs, which account for a
62 See http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Section_Index.html (last accessed 1 August 2009).
63 See R Sen, '"New Regionalism" in Asia: A Comparative Analysis of Emerging Regional and 
Bilateral Trading Agreements involving ASEAN, China and India1 (2006) 40 Journal of World Trade 
553.
64 See Crawford and Fiorentino, p. 2.
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large proportion of the total increase in RTAs; on the other hand, existing continent- 
wide RTAs are being replaced by more modem ones which involve deeper integration 
and expanded membership. Fourthly, the coverage of recent RTAs has gone beyond 
the traditional trade in goods: many cover trade in services and issues such as 
intellectual property rights (IPRs), investment, and competition policy. Finally, there 
is an increase in reciprocal RTAs between developed and developing countries, which 
is evidence of decreased reliance of some developing countries on non-reciprocal 
schemes such as the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP).
1.2.1 Numbers o f RTAs
Compared to the period between the late 1950s and early 1960s, many more 
RTAs are being concluded today. Since 1990, the number of RTAs in force rose from 
50 to 214 agreements in 2006 (see Figure 1). By December that year, 367 RTAs had 
been notified to the GATT/WTO. Of these, 243 were notified after the creation of the 
WTO in January 1995.65 Interestingly, of the 124 RTAs notified during the GATT 
years, only 36 remained in force. This may reflect, in most cases, the evolution over 
time of the agreements themselves as they were superseded by more modem 
agreements between the same signatories or by their consolidation into wider 
groupings.66
The proliferation of RTAs during the last ten years has also taken place at an 
unprecedented rate. Between 1 January 1995 and December 2006, 243 new RTAs 
were notified to the WTO, nearly double the number notified during the GATT years 
(see Figure 2). In part, the increase in notifications reflects the increase in WTO
( \ 7 •membership, which has doubled since its creation. This coincides with the increase 
in RTA notification. However, what is more important is the rate at which RTAs are 
being notified. The annual average of notification is 20 notifications under the WTO 
whereas it was less than three under the GATT. Although the new notification
65 For a list of RTAs notified to the WTO, see http://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicMaintainRTAHome.aspx 
(last accessed 1 August 2009).
See Crawford and Fiorentino, p. 3 and Fiorentio, Verdeja and Toqueboeuf, p. 4.
67 As of 23 July 2008, there are 153 WTO Members. See http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis 
_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (last accessed 1 August 2009).
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obligations under the WTO agreements may also have contributed to the increase in 
notifications,68 it is obvious that the rate of RTA proliferation is continuing 
unabated.69 This supports the position that RTAs have become a significant part of the 
global trade landscape.
Figure 1: All Notified RTAs to the GATT/WTO (1948-2006), by Entry into Force
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The black line, ‘cumulative active RTAs’, best supports the position that RTAs are here to stay as it illustrates the number of 
cumulative active RTAs between 1948 and 2006. Note that the dip in 2004 is a result of the EU enlargement which consolidated 
many bilateral agreements between the EU (15) and the ten new member states into one regional trade agreement.
Figure 2: Notified RTAs to the GATT (pre 1995) and WTO (post 1995)
200
180
160
3 140
1-tr 120
T3o 100
s
oc 80
>1o 60
oz 40
20
1947-1995
WTO
a^-LJ
1995-2006
I
■  Enabling C lau se
■  Article V
□  Article XXIV
In f o r c e  I n a c t iv e In f o r c e  I n a c t iv e
Source: Fiorentino, Verdeja and Toqueboeuf, p. 5
It can be seen that after the WTO establishment in 1995, the number of RTAs notified has increased dramatically. This is 
especially the case for RTAs notified under GATT Article XXIV as can be seen from the size of light blue column.
68 Since the establishment o f the WTO, Members are required to notify services RTAs as well as those 
concerning trade in goods. For example, GATT Article XXIV:7 and GATS Article V:7.
69 See Fiorentio, Verdeja and Toqueboeuf, p. 5.
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1.2.2 Typology o f  RTAs
As far as the typology of RTAs is concerned, the most common category is 
FTA, which accounted for 84 per cent of all RTAs in force as of December 2006 (see 
Figures 3 and 4). During the same period, partial scope agreements70 and CUs 
accounted for 8 per cent, respectively. Of the RTAs not yet in force 92 per cent were 
FT As; 7 per cent were partial scope agreements; and one per cent were CU 
agreements.71 Thus, in the near future, FTAs are likely to account for an even greater 
proportion of RTAs in force.
It should be noted that when the distinction between a CU and an FTA is 
material, i.e. for goods RTAs,72 the typology of RTAs is important since it determines 
the legal requirements RTA members must meet in order to make the RTA in 
question WTO-compatible. An FTA and a CU notified under GATT Article XXIV 
are subject to different sets of requirement.73
Figure 3: Notified RTAs in Force, as o f December 2006, by Type o f Agreement
■  C u s to m s  U n io n
■  P a rt ia l S c o p e
84%
Source: Fiorentino, Verdeja and Toqueboeuf, p. 6
70 For the definition o f a partial scope agreement, see Introduction. Such agreements must be notified 
under the Enabling Clause. This will be discussed in Chapter 5.
71 See Crawford and Fiorentino, pp. 5-6.
72 As far as trade in services and GATS Article V are concerned, the distinction between CU and FTA 
is immaterial. This is due to the nature of barriers to services trade. This will be discussed in Chapter 6.
73 For example, members o f a CU will have to comply with paragraphs 5(a) and 8(a) o f GATT Article 
XXIV; whereas, members o f an FTA will have to comply with paragraphs 5(b) and 8(b).
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Figure 4: RTAs Signed, under Negotiation and Proposed, as of December 2006, by Type of Agreement
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Source: Fiorentino, Verdeja and Toqueboeuf, p. 6
1.2.3 RTA Configuration
RTA configuration refers to how RTA negotiations are arranged. For example, 
if there are two parties to the agreement, the RTA is said to be conducted on a 
bilateral basis. As of December 2006, bilateral agreements accounted for 75 per cent 
of all RTAs notified and in force and for almost 90 per cent o f those under negotiation 
(see Figure 5). The fact that countries prefer to form RTAs on a bilateral rather than 
plurilateral basis may be associated with the trend that FTAs are preferred to CUs 
since plurilateral (and regional) configuration is more typical of the latter.
RTA configuration may also have some implications on how difficult 
negotiations will be in terms of the number of parties involved. Other things being 
equal, a bilateral trade negotiation should be less complex than a plurilateral one.74 It 
should be noted that there are proposals of RTAs whose parties are distinct RTAs 
themselves.75 This may simply reflect the growing consolidation of established 
trading relationships. However, the fact that several of such RTAs have been under 
negotiation for some time, but that very few, so far, have been concluded suggests 
that such RTAs are extremely complex to negotiate, especially where there is a lack 
of institutional capacity in the relevant RTAs.76
74 Note that other factors such as trade coverage also affect how complex an RTA negotiation will be.
75 For example, the proposed ASEAN-EU FTA.
76 In the proposed ASEAN-EU FTA in which I was a participant, the EU delegates often sarcastically 
complained that the EU had to negotiate the content o f the FTA effectively with the 10 ASEAN
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Figure 5: RTA’s Configuration, as of December 2006
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Source: Fiorentino, Verdeja and Toqueboeuf, p. 8
1.2.4 Geography o f  RTAs
Traditionally, RTAs were formed between the so-called natural trading 
partners, geographically contiguous countries with already well-established trading 
patterns.77 The CERTA between Australia and New Zealand, NAFTA, the EU, EFTA, 
and the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) provide good examples. 
Indeed, most countries often sign their first RTA with one or several neighbouring or 
regional partners. This is supported by the Southeast Asian countries’ participation in 
ASEAN, Sub-Saharan African groupings such as the Economic and Monetary 
Community of Central Africa (CEMAC) and the Southern African Customs Union 
(SACU), and the Americas groupings such as the Caribbean Community and 
Common Market (CARICOM), the CACM and Mercosur. However, once a country 
has exhausted its strictly regional prospects, it may begin to look further afield for 
non-contiguous preferential partners. Cross-regional RTAs, therefore, seem to be the 
next natural step, assuming that RTAs are considered as a preferred trade policy. 
Figure 6 shows that as of December 2006 more than 40 per cent of RTAs under
members rather than with one trade partner, i.e. ASEAN, as each member frequently inserted 
reservations for its own commitments and ASEAN as a group did not seem to have clear common 
positions.
77 See P Krugman, 'Regionalism versus Multilateralism: Analytical Notes’ in J de Melo and A 
Panagariya (eds), New Dimensions in Regional Integration (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 
1993), pp. 63-4; and L Summers, 'The Regionalism and the World Trading System' (1991) Economic 
Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City 295, pp. 297-9.
_ _______ __________________________________ ____ . . . . .  •
2Z
□  Bilateral 
■  Plurilateral
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negotiation and more than half of RTAs proposed were cross-regional. This represents 
a sharp contrast with current RTAs in force, of which less than 20 per cent were 
cross-regional. The trend is most evident in countries of the Americas, Europe and 
increasingly Asia-Pacific.
Figure 6: Cross-Regional RTAs, as a Percentage o f Total RTAs as o f December 2006
Proposed 
Signed/Neg  
In Force
0 % 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Source: Fiorentino, Verdeja and Toqueboeuf, p. 9
1.2.5 Breadth and Depth o f  RTAs
The breadth and depth of each RTA differs considerably from one another, 
with some providing for the exchange of tariff preferences on a limited range of 
products and others being highly comprehensive in coverage and including wide- 
ranging trade regulatory regimes.79
The breadth and depth of an RTA (along with other factors such as the 
developed/developing-country status of the RTA members) determine what set of 
WTO requirements the parties have to meet. For instance, partial scope agreements 
falling under the legal cover of the Enabling Clause concern exclusively agreements 
among developing countries and in many cases they tend to have limited product 
coverage. FT As and CUs falling under the legal cover of GATT Article XXIV, on the 
other hand, are more comprehensive in scope and especially the most recent 
agreements often encompass NTBs on trade in goods, services liberalization, and new
78 See Crawford and Fiorentino, pp. 8-15.
79 See J Whalley,'Recent Regional Agreements: Why so many, so fast, so different and where are they 
headed?' (Working Paper No9, The Centre for International Governance Innovation 2006).
■  Intra-Regional 
□  Cross-Regional
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80issues such as IPRs, investment, and competition policy. Commitments on these 
issues are often referred to as WTO-plus commitments. Thus, recent RTAs tend to 
cover issues, which have not been agreed on at the WTO, as well as commitments, 
which go further than the members’ WTO commitments (both in terms o f coverage 
and deeper commitments).81 As noted in a study by the World Bank, the inclusion of 
such commitments is especially marked in North-South RTAs, perhaps reflecting the 
importance that developed countries place on these issues (see Table l) .82
Table 1: The Coverage o f RTAs besides Merchandise Trade
Customs Intellectual Dispute
Standards Transport Cooperation Services Property Investment Settlement Labor Comprtition
VS.
U.S.-Jordan No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
U.S.-Chile Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
U.S.-Singapore Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
U.S.-Australia Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
U.S.-CAFTA Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
U.S.-Morocco Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
NAFTA Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
EUt
EU-South Africa No No No No Yes No Yes No Yes
EU-Mexko Yes* Yes Yes* Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes
EU-Chile Yes* Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Euro-Med.
Agreements No No No No Yes No Yes N o Yes*
South-South
MERCOSUR Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Andean Conununirv Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
CARICOM Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
AFTA Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No No
SADC Yes Yes Yes No Yes
COMESA Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other
Japan-Singapore Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Canada-Chile No No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Chile-Mexico Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Source: The Global Economic Prospects: Trade Regionalism, and Development, p. 35
t  While EU agreements mention cooperation in most of the subject areas, only those in which specific commitments are under 
taken receive a “Yes” rating.
* Implementation steps are to be agreed on at a later date (as of January 2005).
80 See Crawford and Fiorentino, p. 5.
81 For example, see M Roy, J Marchetti and H Lim,'Services Liberalisation in the New Generation o f 
Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs): How Much Further than the GATS?' (Staff Working Paper 
WTO, 2006).
82 See World Bank, 'The Global Economic Prospects: Trade, Regionalism, and Development' (World 
Bank, Washington, DC 2005), p. 35.
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1.2.6 Types o f RTA Partners
One interesting and more important feature of the RTAs in the third period for 
the purposes of this thesis is the dramatic increase in the participation of developing 
countries in both North-South and South-South RTAs.83 Figure 7 shows that as of 
December 2006, 57 per cent of goods RTAs notified to the WTO involved developing 
countries;84 whereas Figure 8 shows that 77 per cent of services RTAs notified to the 
WTO involved developing countries.85 Given such a dramatic increase in the 
participation of developing countries, it is argued that not only should RTAs be 
supervised, but they should also be supervised in such a way that accommodates the 
challenges that developing countries face when forming an RTA.
It is noteworthy that, as far as a preferential trade relationship between 
developed and developing countries is concerned, there are two options namely 
reciprocal and non-reciprocal trade arrangements. RTAs notified under GATT Article 
XXIV and GATS Article V are underpinned by criteria such as reciprocity and 
comprehensive trade liberalization86 as opposed to the non-reciprocal system of 
preferences under schemes like the GSP and other unilateral initiatives such as the 
Cotonou Agreement,87 Everything but Arms (EBA),88 and the Caribbean-Canada 
Trade Agreement (CARIBCAN), which are under the legal cover of waivers granted 
by WTO Members.
83 See Fiorentio, Verdeja and Toqueboeuf, pp. 10-13.
84 57 is the sum of percentage of the light blue (25%), purple (27%), and green (5%) areas in Figure 7.
85 77 is the sum of percentage of the light blue (33%), purple (44%), and green (0%) areas in Figure 8.
86 Given that the legal cover o f the Enabling Clause only applies to goods RTAs concluded among 
developing countries, North-South goods RTAs can only fall under GATT Article XXIV and subject to 
the more demanding requirements therein.
87 For further discussion, see FAST Matambalya and S Wolf, 'The Cotonou Agreement and the 
Challenges o f Making the New EU-ACP Trade Regime WTO Compatible' (2001) 35 Journal o f World 
Trade 123.
88 For further discussion, see P Brenton, 'Integrating the Least Developed Countries into the World 
Trading System: The Current Impact of European Union Preferences Under "Everything But Arms'" 
(2003) 37 Journal of World Trade 623.
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Figure 7: Notified RTAs in Goods by Type of Partner (as of December 2006)
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Source: Fiorentino, Verdeja and Toqueboeuf, p. 11
Figure 8: Notified RTAs in Services by Type o f Partner (as o f December 2006)
■ Developed only
■ Developing only
□ Developed-Developing
■ Developing-Transition
□ Developed-Transition
■ Transition only
Source: Fiorentino, Verdeja and Toqueboeuf, p. 11
1.3 Conclusion
The overview of the general trends and characteristics of the current RTA 
proliferation paints a picture of how RTAs have altered the global trade landscape. It 
is apparent that the alteration has been made, arguably permanently. According to the 
survey, countries tend to see bilateral FTA as a preferred form of RTA.89
89 The predominance o f FTAs over CUs is probably due to the fact that they are faster to conclude and 
require a lower degree o f policy coordination among the parties since in an FTA each party maintains 
its own trade policy in relation to non-members. A CU, on the other hand, requires the establishment of 
CETs and harmonization o f external trade policy, implying a greater loss o f trade autonomy o f the 
members and longer and more complex negotiations and implementation periods. Moreover, while
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Geographical proximity appears to be less crucial as more and more RTAs are cross- 
regional. In addition, contents of recent RTAs tend to encompass areas such as 
services trade, IPRs, investment, and competition policy as well as traditional trade in 
goods. This implies new and experimental rules which may have yet to be agreed at 
the multilateral level. Furthermore, the types of RTA partners seem to have changed. 
While in the first period of RTA proliferation, North-South RTAs were non-existent, 
they are much more common today.
Many countries from every continent have concludes RTAs and/or in the 
process of negotiating one or more. It is clear that RTA proliferation has become a 
global phenomenon and perhaps a global problem. As far as developing countries are 
concerned, many have concluded RTAs with their developed-country trade partners 
such as the United States, the EU, and Japan. In parallel, they also pursue RTAs with 
one another, both with those from the same region as can be seen in the Americas, 
Asia, and Africa, as well as those from different continents.90
Having examined the general trends and characteristics of the current RTA 
proliferation, it can be seen that a great number of developing countries from around 
the globe are becoming embedded in the ever denser web of RTAs containing new 
and experimental rules. This raises concerns on how such trade arrangements should 
be supervised. The thesis argues that not only should RTAs be supervised, but they 
must also be supervised in such a way that gives due account to the challenges facing 
developing countries when forming an RTA. Given the increased participation of 
developing countries in the current RTA proliferation, it is imperative to do so. While 
this chapter sets out the scene of the current RTA proliferation in some detail, 
Chapters 2 and 3 will discuss and identify these challenges from three different 
perspectives.
many FTAs are cross-regional, CUs tend to be bounded by geographical proximity that plays a pivotal 
role in defining the objective of economic (and often political) integration among the members.
90 For more detail, see http://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicMaintainRTAHome.aspx (last accessed 9 
November 2010).
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Chapter 2
Challenges Facing Developing Countries amid the Current 
RTA Proliferation: as a Prospective RTA Member
2.1 Introduction
Chapter 1 illustrates that RTAs have changed over time and agreements in the 
current RTA proliferation have certain features which raise concerns over how such 
agreements should be supervised. If the increase in developing countries’ 
participation is accepted as a fact and a starting point, the question that should be 
asked is whether the existing WTO rules and mechanisms address the challenges they 
face amid the current RTA proliferation. In order to answer this, one first has to 
investigate what these challenges may be. The thesis seeks to conduct the 
investigation from three different perspectives. The first is when a developing country 
is a prospective RTA member; the second is when it is excluded from an RTA, i.e. as 
a non-member; and the third is considered from a perspective of a developing country 
as a WTO Member amid the current RTA proliferation. This chapter deals with the 
first and the other two are explored in the next chapter.
As a prospective RTA member, developing countries will wish to promote 
potential benefits and manage potential costs which are induced by the agreement. In 
order to identify the challenges they face in the attempt to achieve this, it is necessary 
that one examines how a developing-country partner may gain from an RTA and 
whether it may incur any costs in the process.
The chapter is therefore divided into two sections. The first section reviews 
the potential benefits and potential costs induced by the formation of an RTA with an 
emphasis on implications for the developing-country partner, and the second section 
discusses possible challenges it may face in the attempt to promote the benefits and 
manage the costs.
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2.2 Benefits & Costs
2.2.1 Potential Benefits
Theories on RTAs are frequently interpreted as beginning de novo with 
Viner’s 1950 seminal work, The Customs Union Issue?' Prior to Viner, an RTA was 
simply considered beneficial to the members as it stimulated trade between them.92 
By introducing the concepts of trade creation and trade diversion, Viner illustrated 
that although an RTA generally increases trade between its members, this does not 
necessarily lead to an increase in the members’ welfare.93 The key question he asked 
is whether the formation of an RTA creates or diverts trade. Viner argued that:
[W]here the trade-creating force is predominant, one of the members at least must
benefit, both may benefit, the two combined must have a net benefit, and the world at
large benefits; but the outside world loses, in the short-run at least, and can gain in the
long-run only as the result of the general diffusion of the increased prosperity of the
customs union area. Where the trade-diverting effect is predominant, one at least of the
member countries is bound to be injured, both may be injured, the two combine will
94suffer a net injury, and there will be injury to the outside world and the world at large.
To understand Viner’s theoretical framework, imagine a hypothetical example, 
using Mexico, Chile, and Thailand. Thailand is a low-cost producer of rice ($4 per 
ton), Chile a medium-cost producer ($6 per ton), and Mexico a high-cost producer ($8 
per ton). Both Mexico and Chile maintain tariffs against all rice imports. If Mexico 
forms an RTA with Chile, the tariff against Chilean, but not Thai, rice will be 
removed. Is this good or bad for Mexico? To answer this, consider two cases.
First, suppose that Mexico’s initial tariff was high enough to exclude rice 
imports from both Chile and Thailand. For example, with a tariff of $5 per ton it 
would cost $9 to import Thai rice and $11 to import Chilean rice, so Mexican 
consumers would buy $8 Mexican rice instead. When the tariff on Chilean rice is
91 See Viner.
92 See Pomfret, pp. 177-80.
93 See Viner, pp. 43-4.
94 Ibid.
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eliminated, imports from Chile will replace Mexican production. From Mexico’s 
point of view, this is a gain because it costs $8 to produce a ton of rice domestically, 
while Mexico needs to produce only $6 worth of export goods to pay for a ton of 
Chilean rice.
On the other hand, suppose the tariff was lower, for example, $3 per ton, so 
that before forming the RTA Mexico bought its rice from Thailand (at a cost to 
consumers of $7 per ton) rather than producing its own rice. When the RTA is 
established, consumers will buy Chilean rice at $6 rather than Thai rice at $7. So, 
imports of rice from Thailand will cease. However, since Thai rice is actually cheaper 
than Chilean rice, Mexico will have to devote more resources to exports to pay for its 
rice imports and will be worse off rather than better off.
From the hypothetical example, trade creation occurs when Chile’s production 
of rice displaces the higher-cost production of Mexico as a result of the tariff removal 
between the two countries while trade diversion occurs if Chile’s production displaces 
the lower-cost imports from Thailand as the tariff removal makes it cheaper to do so. 
Trade creation is considered welfare-improving because real resources are saved by 
shifting the production to the lower-cost producers within the preferential area, and 
consumers benefit from facing lower prices; whereas, when trade diversion occurs 
real resources are wasted since the production is shifted away from the lower-cost 
producers located outside the RTA to the higher-cost producers located within, hence 
resulting in a welfare reduction.
According to Viner, the extent of trade creation depends on the difference 
between the partner country’s (Chile) and domestic production (Mexico) costs after 
the tariff has been removed. The bigger the difference, the greater trade creation will 
be. The extent of trade diversion, on the other hand, depends on two conditions.95 
First, trade diversion can occur only if Mexico has a tariff on imported rice from 
Thailand. The cost of trade diversion cannot exceed the height of this external tariff. 
Secondly, trade diversion arises only if production costs in Chile are out of line with 
costs and prices in Thailand. In other words, if there is no difference between the 
production costs of RTA partners and the rest of the world, the substitution of goods 
from outside the preferential area by those produced within will not have much 
impact on the partners’ welfare, other things being equal. These factors can make the
95 For further discussion, see M Schiff and L Winters, Regional Integration and Development (World 
Bank, Washington, DC 2003), pp. 33-6.
change in the sourcing of imports less sharp. As a result, they may mitigate the costs 
of trade diversion but may also reduce the gains of trade creation.
It should be noted that in the hypothetical example it is assumed that Mexican, 
Chilean, and Thai rice are perfectly substitutable and what matters to the consumers is 
the price (with or without tariff). This was indeed assumed by Viner.96
To determine whether an RTA results in net trade creation or diversion is 
extremely difficult in practice since an RTA will create trade in some products and 
divert in others. The outcome depends on the relative magnitudes of all trade-creating 
and trade-diverting effects caused by the RTA in the member countries.97 This can be 
calculated on a national basis or the RTA as a whole. One is nevertheless required to 
examine all of the products from which tariffs have been removed. This is a 
challenging task as an RTA may cover several thousands of tariff lines.98 This raises 
the question of whether it is possible to identify certain features such that RTAs which 
have those features are necessarily welfare-improving. In response, Kemp and Wan 
show that if trade with non-members is fixed and external tariffs are allowed to adjust 
following the formation of an RTA, the preferential area will be welfare-improving.99 
The logic, Kemp and Wan argue, is that if tariffs are lowered to the extent that 
external trade is maintained at the same level as the pre-formation level, any 
additional internal trade that results from the formation of an RTA must be a product 
of trade creation. However, it should be noted that the practical implications of this
96 See Viner, p. 43. Although Viner’s concepts of trade creation and trade diversion caused a paradigm 
shift in the way in which RTAs are perceived, the theoretical framework itself is not infallible. For 
instance, Viner’s model has been extended to three-country-two-product and three-country-three- 
product models. Despite new insights that such models give to how RTAs operate, the conclusions can 
differ depending on assumptions made. For example, see M Kemp, A Contribution to the General 
Equilibrium Theory o f  Preferential Trading (North-Holland, Amsterdam 1969) and PJ Lloyd, ' 3 x 3  
Theory o f Customs Unions' (1982) 12 Journal of International Economics 41, respectively.
97 Meade points out that the relative magnitudes of trade creation and trade diversion alone are 
insufficient to determine the welfare effect of an RTA because benefits of preferential tariff 
liberalization depend not only on the extent of trade creation, but also on the magnitude by which costs 
are reduced on each unit of newly created trade. Similarly, losses are determined not just by the amount 
of trade diversion but also the magnitude of the increase in costs due to trade diversion. See J Meade, 
The Theory o f  Customs Unions (North-Holland Publishing Company, Amsterdam 1955), pp. 34-43. 
Some of Viner’s assumptions have also been criticized. For instance, Gehrels views the assumption of 
zero demand elasticity in the domestic market as unrealistic and Michaely shows that Viner neglected 
demand changes and was inconsistent and ambiguous about whether production costs were constant or 
increasing. See F Gehrels, 'Customs Unions from a Single Country's Viewpoint' (1956-57) 24 Review 
of Economic Studies 61 and M Michaely, 'The Assumptions of Jacob Viner's Theory of Customs 
Unions' (1976) 6 Journal of International Economics 75.
98 For example, see the Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement between India and 
Singapore, Annex 2A, Schedule of India, available at http://www.fta.gov.sg/ceca/annex%202a%20- 
%20tariff%20schedule%20of%20india.pdf (last accessed 24 March 2010).
99 See M Kemp and H Wan, 'An Elementary Proposition Concerning the Formation of Customs 
Unions' (1976) 6 Journal of International Economics 95.
- 4 8 -
result are not clear since external tariffs tend to be set by a combination of welfare 
concerns, domestic political constrains, and multilateral negotiations.100
The welfare of each member is not necessarily improved although their 
combined welfare is if an RTA results in net trade creation (calculated on the basis of 
the RTA as a whole).101 Consequently, if a developing country is to benefit from trade 
creation, it has to ensure that its national welfare is improved regardless of the net 
outcome of the RTA.102 In addition, it has been argued that an RTA between two 
small developing countries tends to generate only trade diversion and no trade 
creation.103 This can be seen most clearly in the case of homogeneous goods. Since 
small countries will typically not be able to supply all of their partners’ needs for 
imports, each member will continue to import some quantity of most goods from the 
rest of the world. For these goods, domestic consumer prices will continue to be fixed 
at the world price plus the import tariff. Since neither of these changes with 
integration, consumption does not change. Production of these goods, however, 
increases because each country can now sell to the partner without paying tariffs. 
Thus, each member country replaces cheaper imports from the rest of the world with 
more expensive imports from the RTA partner. The outcome is trade diversion and a 
welfare loss for the member countries.104
Another factor that is relevant to the magnitude of trade creation and trade 
diversion is whether the RTA members are natural trading partners. The logic is that 
countries that trade disproportionately more with each other are less likely to cause 
trade diversion since the RTA will be reinforcing natural trading patterns, not 
artificially diverting them.105 Recall the hypothetical example. If prior to the 
formation of an RTA, Mexico only trades with Chile, and not Thailand (due to 
geographical proximity or Mexicans’ preference of Chilean rice for example), the 
RTA will only create more trade between Mexico and Chile and will not divert trade
100 See C Freund and E Ornelas, 'Regional Trade Agreements' (CEP Discussion Paper No961, Centre 
for Economic Performance, London School o f Economics and Political Science, London 2009), p. 5.
101 For example, Mexico’s welfare may increase 10 per cent due to the Mexico-Chile RTA while 
Chile’s welfare may decrease 5 per cent. The combined welfare is still improved.
102 If the RTA results in net trade creation, the world at large benefits as world resources are being used 
more efficiently, and vice versa.
103 For example, see A Panagariya, 'The Regionalism Debate: an Overview' (1999) 22 The World 
Economy 477, p. 483.
104 For further discussion, see M Schiff, 'Small Is Beautiful: Preferential Trade Agreements and the 
Impact of Country Size, Market Share, Efficiency, and Trade Policy' (Policy Research Working Paper 
No 1668, World Bank, Washington, DC 1996), pp. 8-13.
105 See Wonnacott and Lutz, p. 69.
away from Thailand since it did not exist in the first place. Summers calculates the 
ratio of actual trade shares to those that geographically neutral trade would predict for 
major industrial countries.106 He concludes that the most seriously contemplated 
efforts at regional integration involving industrialized countries, e.g. the EU, cement 
what are already large and disproportionately strong trading relationships. To this 
extent, they are likely to be trade-creating rather than trade-diverting.107 Krugman 
takes Summers’ argument further with an economic model that assumes prohibitively 
high transportation costs between continents.108 He finds that if an RTA is formed 
between geographically contiguous countries, the magnitude of trade diversion is 
reduced. However, Frankel, Stein, and Wei, by assuming that transportation costs are 
neither so high as to be prohibitive nor zero, conclude that Krugman’s finding would 
be less accurate and the magnitude of trade diversion would be greater.109 It is 
noteworhty that Frankel, Stein, and Wei’s assumption is arguably more realistic than 
Krugman’s due to improved means of transportation, which lower transportation 
costs.
Besides the concept of natural trading partners, rules of origin are also relevant 
to the magnitude of trade creation and trade diversion.110 Rules of origin play a crucial 
function in the case of an FTA, as opposed to a CU. In an FTA, the members retain 
their national tariffs and external trade policy; whereas in a CU, the members agree on 
CETs and coordinate their external trade policy.111 Consequently, imports from non- 
member countries destined to a high-tariff member may enter through a low-tariff 
member. Or more subtly, entrepreneurs in the low-tariff country may import a product 
in almost finished form, add a small value to it and export it to the high-tariff country 
free of duty.112 To avoid this trade deflection, FTAs almost, if not, always include 
rules of origin according to which products receive the duty-free status only if they
106 See Summers, p. 298.
107 Ibid.
108 See Krugman, pp. 63-4. Note that Viner assumed that transportation costs are zero.
109 See JA Frankel, E Stein and S-J Wei, Trading Blocs and the Americas: The Natural, the Unnatural, 
and the Super-natural' (1995) 47 Journal o f Development Economics 61.
1,0 For example, see Krishna and Krueger, World Trade Organization., and A Estevadeordal, 'Rules of 
Origin in FTAs in Europe and in the Americas: Issues and Implications for the EU-Mercosur Inter- 
Regional Association Agreement' in A Valladao and R Bouzas (eds), Market Access fo r  Goods & 
Services in the EU-Mercosur Negotiations (Chaire Mercosur de Sciences Po, Paris 2003).
111 The purpose of rules of origin in a CU is simply to determine the extent of preferential treatment for 
fellow members.
112 See K Krishna,Understanding Rules o f Origin' (Working Paper Series, National Bureau of 
Economic Research (NBER), 2005), p. 1.
meet the conditions set therein.113 The proliferation of criss-crossing FTAs alone can 
lead to a replacement of the non-discriminatory MFN tariffs by criss-crossing rules of 
origin whereby tariffs vary according to the ostensible origin of the product.114 It 
should be noted that in the case of trade in services, rules of origin tend to deal with 
the origin of services providers rather than the traded services and may not have the 
same effects as those that deal with trade in goods.115
Krueger offers a theoretical model of rules of origin as protectionist devices, 
showing that such rules effectively extend protection from high-tariff members of an 
FTA to low-tariff members.116 In order to be eligible for FTA treatment of their 
exports to the high-tariff partner, producers in the low-tariff partner may divert their 
imports (of intermediate inputs) from lower-cost non-member sources to the high- 
tariff partner. As a result, the production costs of these exports may increase. Thus, 
rules of origin can significantly reduce the extent of liberalization actually involved in 
FTAs. This, in turn, is likely to lessen trade-creating effects. Furthermore, rules of 
origin can also generate cumbersome paperwork for exporters that becomes 
increasingly costly as multiple agreements are signed, each with unique rules at the 
product level.117 As discussed in Chapter 1, in the current RTA proliferation countries
1 to
tend to form bilateral FTAs, as opposed to a plurilateral FTA or a CU. This trend is 
likely to further aggravate the problems with criss-crossing rules of origin.
Apart from the welfare gains induced by trade creation, by its very nature the 
formation of an RTA implies that the member countries have preferential access to 
the other’s market. For developing countries, preferential access to a lucrative market 
is often considered as one of the most important reasons why they form RTAs with
113 The criteria adopted in rules of origin for trade in goods can take a variety of forms. One simple and 
frequently-used rules of origin is that, in order to qualify as originating in the partner country, the item 
must change tariff classifications. Another is that a specified percentage of the commodity’s sales price 
must consist of value added in the partner country and the third form of rules of origin specifies a 
percentage of purchased parts and components that must be purchased from RTA members. For more 
detail, see A Estevadeordal and K Suominen, Trapping and Measuring Rules of Origin Around the 
World' in O Cadot and others (eds), The Origin o f  Goods: Rules o f  Origin in Regional Trade 
Agreements (Oxford University Press and CEPR, Oxford 2006), pp. 72-6.
1,4 For further discussion, see R Baldwin, 'Multilateralizing Regionalism: Spaghetti Bowls as Building 
Blocs on the Path to Global Free Trade' (2006) 29 World Economy 1451.
115 This will be discussed in Chapter 6 in the context of GATS Article V.
116 See A Krueger, 'Free Trade Agreements as Protectionist Devices: Rules o f Origin' in JR Melvin, JC 
Moore and R Riezman (eds), Trade Theory and Econometrics: Essays in Honor o f  John S Chipman 
(Routledge, London 1999).
117 For further discussion costs o f rules of origin, see C Carrere and J de Melo, 'Are Different Rules of 
Origin Equally Costly? Estimates from NAFTA' (Discussion Paper No4437, Centre for Economic 
Policy Research (CEPR), 2004).
118 See Chapter 1.
their developed-country counterparts.119 Preferential access provides the developing- 
country partner with an advantage over non-members. Consequently, it can export 
more to its RTA partner. This, in turn, is likely to improve its terms of trade and is 
considered as beneficial. By using simulation in a three-country world in which two 
small developing countries can reduce protection either multilaterally or bilaterally 
(either with a large developed country or with a small developing-country neighbour), 
Puga and Venables suggest that a North-South RTA is likely to offer better prospects 
than a South-South RTA because of better overall net market access; for each 
developing-country partner, multilateral liberalization is less desirable because 
competition in the developed country is stiffer when the other developing country also 
has market access.120 For example, a developing country would benefit from a 
preferential access to the US market where its products are cheaper compared to those 
imported from non-members. Given that a developed country is likely to provide 
developing countries with a more lucrative market than a fellow developing country, 
there is a case for a North-South, as opposed to South-South, RTA. This may explain 
why many developing countries have formed or in the process of forming an RTA 
with the United States, the EU, and Japan.121
So far, we have learnt that: a) based on Viner’s model, whether an RTA will 
be welfare-improving depends on the extent of its trade-creating and trade-diverting 
effects; that b) this is extremely difficult to measure; but that c) trade creation is more 
likely to occur for developing countries when RTAs are formed between natural 
trading partners, and where rules of origin are not too complex and cumbersome; and 
that d) independent from the concepts of trade creation and trade diversion, 
preferential market access to a lucrative market is a very important consideration for 
developing countries. The discussion only focuses on the static effects of the 
formation of an RTA, according to this model. That is, how an RTA may affect the 
members’ welfare and their terms of trade at a point o f  time, i.e. when tariffs are 
removed. However, there may be other benefits induced by the formation of an RTA, 
which are more dynamic in nature.122 In other words, over time an RTA may have an 
impact on the structure and environment of the members’ economies. These dynamic
119 See Panagariya, p. 489.
120 See D Puga and A Venables, 'Trading Arrangements and Industrial Development' (1998) 12 World 
Bank Economic Review 221.
121 See Chapter 1.
122 For technical definitions of static and dynamic efficiencies, see BA Balassa, The Theory o f  
Economic Integration (RD Irwin Inc., Homewood, Illinois 1961), p. 13.
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effects can contribute to net trade creation/di version and/or the overall growth of the 
members’ economies.
The formation of an RTA can facilitate economies of scale, which in turn 
result in lower costs of production. By discarding the assumption of perfect 
competition assumed by Viner,123 Corden shows that the formation of an RTA can 
result in dynamic gains from economies of scale.124 The extent of these economies of 
scale depends on the size of the markets prior to the formation of an RTA. That is if 
the individual markets were small, the combined market allows a larger scale of 
production, hence enabling scale economies; whereas if the initial size already allows 
scale economies, the subsequent formation of an RTA may not have much impact or 
even leads to diseconomies of scale.125 It is noteworthy that competition and scale 
economies do not necessarily go hand in hand. This is because in a small market 
there may be only one or two firms which can exploit scale economies and drive other 
smaller firms out of the market. Such scenario can lead to monopoly or oligopoly in 
the long-run, which are generally associated with inefficiency and abuse of market 
power. Since an RTA combines the members’ markets, the number of firms which 
can achieve scale economies is likely to increase. Thus, the formation of an RTA can 
promote economies of scale as well as competition, which results in efficiency and 
competitive gains.127 Moreover, the members’ firms may benefit from external scale 
economies stemming from regional clusters of companies that can reap synergetic 
effects, e.g. because they can share infrastructure or they have access to a larger pool 
of skilled labour.128
123 For the relationship between economies of scale and imperfect competition, see Pomfret, pp. 208-
1 1 .
124 See W Corden, 'Economies of Scale and Customs Union Theory' (1972) 80 Journal o f Political 
Economy 465. Note that the concepts of trade creation and trade diversion remain relevant in Corden’s 
model. See Corden, p. 469. The scale economies in Corden’s model refer to ‘internal’ scale economies 
that arise as companies produce more identical or similar products. For more detail, see P Krugman and 
M Obstfeld, International Economics: Theory and Policy (5 edn Addison-Wesley Publishing 
Company, Reading, Massachusetts 2000), pp. 119-21.
125 Diseconomies of scale occur when an increase in production results in higher costs o f production. 
See Krugman and Obstfeld, International Economics: Theory and Policy
126 See Corden, pp. 471-2.
127 It should be noted that the actual gains from economies of scale and competition do not necessarily 
meet the predicted levels prior to the formation of an RTA. For instance, it was projected that the 
efficiency and competitive gains from the Single European Programme (SMP) would be up to a 5 per 
cent increase of GDP; the ex post evidence shows that an increase of 1 to 1.25 per cent of GDP was in 
fact achieved. See Schiff and Winters, Regional Integration and Development, pp. 50-61.
128 See V Zahmt, 'How Regionalization Can Be a Pillar of a More Effective World Trade Organization' 
(2005) 39 Journal o f World Trade 671, p. 673.
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As far as developing countries with small domestic markets are concerned, the 
formation of an RTA will be beneficial if it helps them to achieve economies of scale. 
This was, in fact, perceived as an important benefit of a South-South RTA during the 
first period of RTA proliferation.129
Another dynamic effect is knowledge and technology transfer between RTA 
members. Knowledge and technology is said to play a crucial role in industrialization 
process. If a country accumulates knowledge and technology over time, its 
productivity is likely to increase. This can, in turn, promote the country’s long-term 
economic growth. Knowledge and technology can be effectively transferred from one 
country to another through international contacts and trade.131 Thus, since the 
formation of an RTA increases intra-bloc trade, knowledge and technology transfer 
should take place more frequently. Notably, this is independent from trade-creating 
and trade-diverting effects.
Given that most developing countries are not major producers of scientific or 
technical knowledge, it is important that they pursue trade policy which enhances the 
acquisition of knowledge and technology from abroad. Although RTAs can be used to 
promote this through trade, the choice of partner can play a crucial role. In an 
industry-level analysis, Schiff, Wang, and Olarreaga show that developing countries’ 
total factor productivity (TFP)132 responds more strongly to North-South trade than to 
South-South trade.133 In other words, North-South trade appears to increase the level 
of productivity of the developing-country partner more than South-South trade. 
Furthermore, they find that research-and-development (R&D)-intensive industries in 
the developing country learn mainly from trade with the developed-country partner 
and that industries with low R&D intensities learn mainly form trade within the 
developing-country partner.134 Thus, the formation of a North-South RTA is arguably
129 For more detail, see C Vaitsos, 'The Crisis in Economic Co-operation among Developing Countries' 
(1978) 6 World Development 719. Discussion on South-South RTAs will be carried out in more detail 
in Chapter 5.
130 For further discussion, see J Mayer, 'Globalization, Technology Transfer and Skill Accumulation in 
Low-income Countries' in SM Murshed (ed) Globalization, Marginalization and Development 
(Routledge, London 2002).
131 See Schiff and Winters, Regional Integration and Development, p. 123.
132 Total factor productivity addresses any effects in total output not caused by inputs or productivity.
133 See M Schiff, M Olarreaga and Y Wang, 'Trade-Related Technology Diffusion and the Dynamics of 
North-South and South-South Integration' (Policy Research Working Paper No2861, World Bank, 
Washington, DC 2002).
134 Ibid.
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better for the developing-country partner on the ground of knowledge and technology 
transfer.
The formation of an RTA can attract more FDI to the preferential area. FDI is 
likely to increase where expected returns from investment are greater or more 
probable.135 While the enlarged market tends to be associated with increased demand, 
scale economies and competition tend to drive production costs down, hence larger 
profit margins. In addition, it has been argued that preferential access to the 
developed-country partner’s market in a North-South RTA may increase FDI flowing 
into the developing-country partner.136 Furthermore, firms can take the advantage of 
cheaper labour in the developing-country partner by concentrating labour-intensive 
activities there and at the same time benefit from the preferential access to the 
developed-country partner’s market. The case in point is Mexico and NAFTA. 
Following the creation of NAFTA, there is evidence that Japan redirected part of its 
FDI from the United States and Canada towards Mexico.137 This is supported by the 
fact that FDI to Mexico rose from $4.3 billion in 1993 to $11 billion in 1994, the year 
NAFTA came into force.138 Thus, developing countries can benefit from the 
formation of an RTA if it attracts more FDI. On this basis, there may be a case for a 
North-South RTA.
It should be noted that FDI and investment in general can be diverted. Like 
trade, the formation of an RTA may create or divert investment139 depending on 
whether it leads to an overall investment creation or investment diversion- investment 
creation is likely to contribute to trade creation and conversely investment diversion 
to trade diversion.140 Investment can be divided into two broad categories, namely
135 See R Pomfret, 'Trade Preferences and Foreign Investment in Malta' (1982) 16 Journal of World 
Trade Law 236.
136 See W Ethier, 'Regionalism in a Multilateral World' (1998) 106 Journal o f Political Economy 1214, 
pp. 1229-32. In a survey conducted by Japan’s Ministry o f  International Trade and Industry (MITI) on 
the motives behind Japanese manufacturing FDI in Asia, North America, and Europe, 70 per cent of 
respondents cited local sales as a major factor. See M Kawai and S Urata, 'Trade Imbalances and 
Japanese Foreign Direct Investment: Bilateral and Triangular Issues' (Discussion Paper Series F-52, 
Institute of Social Science, University o f Tokyo, Tokyo 1996).
137 See U.S. International Trade Commission., The Impact o f  the North American Free Trade 
Agreement on the U.S. Economy and Industries: A Three-Year Review (USITC Publication, 
Washington, DC 1997).
138 See The World Bank., World Development Indicators (World Bank, Washington, DC Various 
years).
139 Hereinafter, the word investment when used in the context of investment creation and investment 
diversion shall encompass both FDI and investment in general.
140 See R Fernandez, 'Returns to Regionalism: An Analysis of Nontraditional Gains from Regional 
Trade Agreements' (1998) 12 The World Bank Economic Review 197, p. 202.
market-seeking (or market-based) investment and efficiency-seeking (or factor-based) 
investment.141 Market-seeking investment is undertaken in order to supply the host 
and other markets in the preferential area. Efficiency-seeking investment, on the other 
hand, is driven by the desire to gain competitive advantages that provided by the 
home economy.14,2 Market-seeking investment can take two forms: tariff-jumping 
investment or investment triggered purely by tariff preferences, and investment driven 
by the market enlargement effect of the RTA. The former is likely to result in 
investment diversion and the latter investment creation.143 Efficiency-seeking 
investment, on the other hand, is driven by the desire to gain competitive advantages 
that provided by the home economy. Thus, any form of efficiency-seeking investment 
is likely to result in investment creation.144 The overall result of the formation of an 
RTA on FDI and investment in general depends on the forms of investment which the 
RTA induces. If the effect of tariff-jumping investment exceeds those of efficiency- 
seeking investment and investment driven by market enlargement, the formation of an 
RTA is likely to result in investment diversion, hence a contribution to trade 
diversion, and vice versa.
On the grounds of preferential market access, knowledge and technology 
transfer, and FDI, developing countries may benefit more from North-South than 
South-South RTAs. However, since the term developing country encompasses a range 
of countries at different stages of development and with different economic 
backgrounds, such a general observation may not always be accurate. A developing 
country can form a South-South RTA with fellow developing countries which have 
complementarities between their economies. For example, it has been argued that an 
RTA between ASEAN and China can be very beneficial where the former provide 
natural resources and intermediate goods, and the latter manufactured goods, capital 
and a preferential access to the Chinese market.145 Similarly, an RTA with advanced 
developing countries such as the Republic of Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore should
141 For general discussion, see J Neary, 'Foreign Direct Investment and the Single Market' (Discussion 
Paper No3419, Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR), Oxford 2002).
142 See P-C Athukorala and J Menon, 'AFTA and the Investment-Trade Nexus in ASEAN' (1997) 20 
World Economy 159, p. 160.
143 Ibid., pp. 161-2.
144 Ibid., p. 163.
145 See JL Tongzon, 'ASEAN-China Free Trade Area: A Bane or Boon for ASEAN Countries?' (2005) 
28 World Economy 191 and S Inama, 'The Association of South East Asian Nations - People's 
Republic of China Free Trade Area: Negotiating Beyond Eternity With Little Trade Liberalization?' 
(2005) 39 Journal of World Trade 559
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facilitate knowledge and technology transfer in the less advanced developing-country 
partner. In addition, a study by UNCTAD shows that FDI outflows from developing 
countries increased from $5.2 billion in 1990 to $14.3 billion in 2006.146 This means 
that more and more developing countries have now become new sources of FDI. The 
heterogeneity of developing countries means that each individual RTA can be vastly 
different from one another. The choice of RTA partner is therefore crucial to the 
extent developing countries can benefit from the formation of an RTA.
2.2.2 Potential Costs
Although developing countries can benefit from RTAs, this does not come 
without costs. The potential costs can arguably be divided into two types: the first is 
implementation costs; and the second is adjustment costs. An implementation cost 
refers to a cost that the developing-country partner directly incurs as a result of 
implementing an RTA commitment; whereas, an adjustment cost refers to a cost that 
it subsequently incurs as it attempts to respond to the effects of the implementation of 
the RTA commitment.
Apart from the welfare losses induced by trade diversion, a direct result of the 
tariff removal between RTA members is tariff revenue losses.147 This is an 
implementation cost. The extent of the losses depends on the MFN tariff rates set 
prior to the formation of an RTA.148 A developing-country partner is likely to incur 
greater revenue losses if its MFN rates are high; whereas a country with very low 
MFN rates is likely to incur negligible revenue losses. Given that tariff removal is 
carried out over a period of time as products are generally subject to different tracks 
of liberalization,149 the losses borne by the developing country may not be so 
immediate.150 It should be noted that by eliminating tariffs (and other NTBs), an RTA
146 See http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/wir2006_en.pdf (last accessed 1 August 2009).
147 See Viner, pp. 65-6.
148 Recognizing the possible differences between bound and applied rates.
149 For example, see the tariff commitments agreed in Thailand-Australia Free Trade Agreement, 
available at http://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/negotiations/aust-thai/tafta_annexes_sideletters_index.html 
(last accessed 18 March 2010).
150 Note that the loss of tariff revenue is less significant in the case of services trade because barriers to 
such trade are mostly in the form of domestic regulation and other NTBs.
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could reduce the flexibility on the part of developing countries to protect their 
domestic markets from foreign competition and to promote their infant industries.151 
Arguably, the inability to do so may have an effect of locking the existing competitive 
structure in trade between developed and developing countries where the former are 
able to export more sophisticated, high value-added manufactured products and 
services, and the latter are limited to primary goods and relatively cheaper, labour- 
intensive products and services- creating large imbalances in trade gains between the 
two groups of countries.
Trade creation is considered welfare-improving because real resources are 
saved by shifting the production to the lower-cost producers within the preferential 
area and consumers benefit from the resulting lower prices. However, the shift of 
production also implies that the higher-cost producers will be forced out of the market 
and/or to move to new industries/sectors. These high-cost producers are the losers 
from the formation.152 Although this is considered a good thing from the welfare 
perspective, these uncompetitive producers are often unable to move to new 
industries/sectors. The government may have to step in and help, especially when this 
happens on a large scale. This is likely to be the case in developing countries as their 
workforce is arguably less flexible.153 The adjustment costs involved in provisions of 
training programme and the likes can be very high for developing countries.154 In 
addition, the welfare gains from trade creation may be illusionary where the cheaper 
imports are not produced by lower-cost producers but cheaper because of protectionist 
measures imposed by the RTA partner. This has been raised particularly in the context 
of agriculture where a North-South RTA may expose farmers in the developing- 
country partner to direct and unfair competition with highly subsidised producers in
151 While many economists criticize the validity of the infant industry argument, the development 
history of some of the most successful developing countries, such as the Republic of Korea, shows that 
the combination of infant industry promotion and aggressive foreign export policy can contribute to 
successful economic development. See Y-S Lee, Reclaiming Development in the World Trading 
System (Cmabridge University Press, New York 2006).
1 2 Note that this also applies to trade liberalization in general.
153 For estimates of adjustment costs potentially incurred by the ACP countries in the proposed EPAs 
with the EU, see C Milner,'An Assessment of the Overall Implementation and Adjustment Costs for the 
ACP Countries of Economic Partnership Agreements with the EU' (School of Economics, University 
of Nottingham, Nottingham 2005), pp. 28-32.
154 Ibid., p. 33-9.
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the developed-country partner.155 Such exposure can threaten food security and the 
livelihoods of the rural population in the developing country.156
It is important that governments in developing countries do not underestimate 
the potential consequences of the formation of an RTA, especially where those who 
are most adversely affected are poor and incapable of improving their own situations. 
Unlike in developed countries, the welfare state in developing countries is often 
limited and accounts for a smaller proportion of the country’s annual budget.157 
Consequently, programmes such as unemployment benefits may not be readily 
available to the losers from the formation. Furthermore, once lost their jobs, these 
people are likely to find it difficult to afford basic health care, particularly where 
health services are provided mainly by the private sector. The same applies to housing 
and other basic needs. Under such circumstances, the costs of the formation of an 
RTA may go well beyond economic costs and involve extreme human costs, which 
can be extensive and morally unacceptable.158
Given their stage of development, comprehensive services liberalization may 
not yet be suitable for many developing countries’ economies. This is arguably why 
their enthusiasm at the WTO is rather moderate.159 When an RTA covers trade in 
services, the developing-country partner may be faced with high implementation costs 
given the initial stage of its economy. For example, a robust regulatory framework is 
arguably a prerequisite for the development of any sector/subsector in services. 
Committing to services liberalization in an RTA would require the developing- 
country partner to put in place regulatory frameworks for the sectors/subsectors 
included in the liberalization.160 This is particularly important in essential services 
such as provision of water, gas, and electricity. Otherwise, private companies could
155 See Oxfam International, Unequal Partners: How EU-ACP Economic Partnership Agreements 
(EPAs) Could Harm the Development Prospects of Many of the World's Poorest Countries' (Oxfam 
Briefing Papers, Oxfam Great Britain, Oxford 2006), p. 2.
156 See Oxfam International, 'Song of the Sirens: Why the US-Andean FTAs Undermine Sustainable 
Development and Regional Integration' (Oxfam Briefing Paper, Oxfame Great Britain, Oxford 2006), 
pp. 6-9.
157 For further discussion, see N Rudra, 'Globalization and the Decline of the Welfare State in Less- 
Developed Countries' (2002) 56 International Organization 411.
158 Human costs have been one of the major concerns with regard to the proposed EU-ACP EPAs. For 
example, see Actlonaid International, Trade Traps: Why EU-ACP Economic Partnership Agreements 
Pose a Threat to Africa's Development' (Actlonaid International, Johannesburg 2004), pp. 9-19, 
available at http://www.actionaid.org.uk/doc_lib/trade_traps.pdf (last accessed 9 June 2010).
159 For example, see C Akamanzi, 'Development at Crossroads: The Economic Partnership Agreement 
Negotiations with Eastern and Southern African Countries on Trade in Services' (Research Papers, 
South Centre, Geneva 2007), pp. 12-3.
160 See Ibid., p. 21.
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cherry-pick the most profitable market segments and leave out those with low profit 
margins.161 Although such a robust regulatory framework is beneficial to the 
developing-country partner in theory, it may involve high implementation and 
adjustment costs, which can affect the country’s overall fiscal resources. This boils 
down to whether comprehensive services liberalization is appropriate for the 
developing country given its stage of development or whether its limited resources 
should be allocated to other priorities. In addition, like in the case of trade in goods, 
there are likely to be losers from services liberalization, with which the government 
may have to deal, and hence incurring further adjustment costs.
In Chapter 1, it is observed that many agreements in the current RTA 
proliferation, particularly those between developed and developing countries, tend to 
include WTO-plus commitments, which encompass those on IPRs, investment, and 
competition policy, for example. Whether their inclusion in an RTA is good or bad for 
the developing-country partner is a very complex question, one which goes beyond 
the ambit of this section.162 Nevertheless, for the purposes o f this thesis, such 
commitments are likely to intensify the implementation and adjustment costs incurred 
by the developing-country partner.
So far, the discussion illustrates that developing countries can benefit from the 
formation of an RTA in various ways. However, it is also important to recognize that 
the potential gains are not guaranteed and there are many factors which can affect the 
extent of their success. In addition, forming an RTA is not without costs. Developing 
countries are likely to incur tariff revenue losses, which for some can severely limit 
their government spending.163 Although a North-South RTA appears to be more 
beneficial to the developing-country partner on the grounds of preferential market 
access, knowledge and technology transfer, and FDI, the developed-country partner 
may be able to negotiate and include services liberalization in the agreement, which
161 See Oxfam International, 'Partnership or Power Play?: How Europe Should Bring Development into 
Its Trade Deals with African, Caribbean, and Pacific Countries' (Oxfam Briefing Paper, Oxfam Great 
Britain, Oxford 2008), p. 22.
162 For further discussion on IPRs, investment, and competition policy and developing countries, see 
CM Correa, Intellectual Property Rights, the WTO, and Developing Countries: the TRIPS Agreement 
and Policy Options (Zed Books, New York 1999), chapter 2, A Waldkirch, 'The New Regionalism and 
Foreign Direct Investment: the Case of Mexico' (2003) 12 Journal o f International Trade and Economic 
Development 151, and O Solano and A Sennekamp,'Competition Provisions in Regional Trade 
Agreements' (Trade Policy Working Papers No31, OECD, Paris 2006).
163 See South Centre, 'Fact Sheet No3: Trade Liberalization and the Difficult Shift Towards Reciprocity 
in the EPAs' (Analytical Note, South Centre, Geneva 2007), pp. 15-19.
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can impose high implementation and adjustment costs on the developing country.164 
For example, with the exception of its FTA with Israel all of the RTAs that the United 
States has formed with developing countries include provisions on services trade.165
2.3 Challenges Facing Developing Countries as a Prospective RTA Member
In the previous section, the discussion is on potential benefits and potential 
costs of the formation of an RTA. In order to make the most out of an RTA, a 
prospective developing-country partner will have to promote the potential benefits 
and manage the potential costs induced by the agreement. This section investigates 
whether developing countries face any challenges when they try to do so.
From the discussion on trade creation and trade diversion, whether an RTA 
will result in net trade creation or diversion depends on how the RTA is designed and 
implemented: for example, whether it only liberalizes sectors that result in trade- 
creating effects; whether it is formed between natural trading partners; and whether it 
has liberal rules of origin (in the case of an FTA). Viner himself viewed this as an 
empirical rather than a theoretical question.166 While in principle RTAs can generate 
either net trade creation or diversion, it is important to recognize that participation in 
any RTA is in the end a political decision made by the member governments. If they 
simply aimed to maximize national welfare, there would be no reason for concern. 
That is, only trade-creating (welfare-improving) RTAs would be formed. 
Unfortunately, governments also have other motivations, and can be influenced by 
various domestic vested interests.167
164 As noted in a study by the World Bank, the inclusion of these areas is especially marked in North- 
South RTAs, perhaps reflecting the importance that developed countries place on them. See World 
Bank, p. 35.
165 See http://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicSearchByMemberResult.aspx?enc=BGNDAo9i 1 u5NEK0fWo0Yn 
3kUaluo9yEpugxdmYSUOgU= (last accessed 20 May 2010).
166 See Viner, p. 52.
167 In reality, trade policy including a decision to form an RTA takes place within a political-social 
milieu and is influenced by individuals and groups who feel that they will be better off with restricted 
trade even though the country as a whole may be worse off. As such, although reducing trade barriers 
may make the country better off, as the corresponding structural adjustments are made, some 
individuals will be made better off and some worse off. Politicians (hence the government) will find 
themselves confronted with a vast array of groups attempting to influence trade policy, and
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Grossman and Helpman assume that when evaluating a possible RTA, each of 
the member government will consider the impact of the agreement on the average 
voters while being influenced by the domestic industries through campaign 
contributions.168 When an RTA results in net trade creation, average voters will 
benefit as they face lower prices whereas import-competing sectors may be adversely 
affected due to the shift of production to lower-cost producers in the partner country. 
However, if the government values campaign contributions more than it does the 
average voters, domestic producers will have more influence in the RTA decision, and 
as such they are likely to oppose to situations where they would be made worse off. 
Thus, Grossman and Helpman argue that to the extent that it is free to do so, each 
member government would wish to exclude those products or sectors whose inclusion 
to the RTA would impose on it the greatest political costs.169 In other words, member 
governments are unlikely to include those products and sectors that would result in 
trade-creating effects precisely because import-competing sectors will lose out. 
According to this view, the dynamics of interest group politics at the national level 
tend to push in the direction of trade-diverting rather than trade-creating RTAs.
Krishna develops his analysis in a different framework where member 
governments form an RTA based only on its impact on the profits of the domestic 
firms.170 He finds that if the RTA does not generate trade diversion, firms from each 
member country will obtain only little or no net profit because although they obtain 
higher market shares (and hence profits) in the other member’s market, they lose 
domestic profits as competition increases. However, if the RTA allows firms within 
the preferential area to displace those outside, the RTA will enhance profits for all 
members’ firms, at the expense of firms located outside the preferential area. In other 
words, as far as domestic firms are concerned, a trade-diverting RTA is to be 
preferred.
The message from these analyses is that RTAs are likely to be politically 
viable exactly when they are trade-diverting, and hence welfare-reducing. Thus, 
although a trade-creating RTA is preferable from the welfare perspective, and hence
consequently, economic rationales are often compromised or even ignored. For further discussion, see 
D Appleyard and A Field, International Economics (4 edn McGraw-Hill, Boston 2001), pp. 323-9.
168 For further discussion, see G Grossman and E Helpman, The Politics of Free Trade Agreements' 
(1995) 85 American Economic Review 667.
169 Ibid., p. 687.
170 For further discussion, see P Krishna, 'Regionalism and Multilateralism: A Political Economy 
Approach' (1998) CXIII Quarterly Journal of Economics 227.
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beneficial to the developing-country partner, this may not be easy to achieve in 
practice. Governments in developing countries will be faced with competing domestic 
vested interests, which may in the end influence them to form a trade-diverting 
(welfare-reducing) RTA.
As far as preferential access to a lucrative market is concerned, developing 
countries do not seem to have much control over it. Once a developing country 
concludes an RTA with its trade partner, its advantage depends on whether the partner 
will form new agreements with other countries. If it does so, the preferences will be 
eroded. The erosion is greatest where the new RTAs are formed with countries that 
export similar products and services to the partner. By the same token, the preferences 
can also be eroded if the partner decides to make similar commitments at the 
multilateral level, essentially extending the preferences to the rest of WTO Members.
Although developing countries may benefit from the dynamic gains, it is 
important to note that they are conditional in nature. For instance, the extent of the 
potential gains derived from increased economies of scale and competition is not 
certain. For the gains to be fully capitalized, the members’ economies must have well- 
functioning markets as well as well-established legal systems to allow scale 
economies to take place and to enforce competition laws, for example. The formation 
of an RTA will adversely affect knowledge and technology transfer if it switches 
imports from richer to poorer sources, for example in a South-South RTA. This, in
171turn, may reduce the developing-country partner’s long-term economic growth. The 
extent of gains from increased FDI is conditional on whether the RTA results in net 
investment creation or diversion. Furthermore, other macroeconomic policies may 
influence the extent of these dynamic gains. For example, even though tariffs are 
removed between the RTA members, other domestic regulations which are 
protectionist and inefficient can reduce the extent of these gains. Thus, they are likely 
to be subject to further qualifications and cannot be taken for granted.172
The costs involved in the formation of an RTA appear to be an inevitable 
result of the RTA commitments agreed to by the member countries. In other words, 
the benefits and costs are two sides of the same coin. Tariff revenue losses are 
incurred because tariff removal is a prerequisite for trade creation (in the case of trade
171 See Schiff and Winters, Regional Integration and Development.
172 For further discussion, see P Dee, 'East Asian Economic Integration and its Impact on Future 
Growth' (2007) 30 World Economy 405.
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in goods).173 By the same token, the adjustment costs involved in helping domestic 
higher-cost producers move to new industries are also a result o f trade liberalization 
between the RTA members. In fact, trade creation occurs precisely because they are 
displaced by lower-cost producers located in the partner country. Similarly, once a 
developing country decides to liberalize trade in services, it is likely to incur certain 
implementation and adjustment costs. The key here is whether the costs will outweigh 
the benefits offered by the RTA.
In order to answer this question, a developing country which is contemplating 
to form an RTA with its trade partner will have to conduct ex ante preparatory 
research.174 In this preparatory work, all of the potential benefits will have to be 
balanced against the potential costs induced by the formation. However, it is far from 
easy to accurately estimate the potential benefits and costs of an RTA. Even for 
relatively simple trade barriers such as tariffs or those that can be expressed as tariff 
equivalents, measurement of their effects and the effects of their removal is not 
always straightforward and requires a relatively specialized set of economic analytical 
skills.175 In addition, to determine whether an RTA results in net trade creation or 
diversion, one is required to examine all of the products from which tariffs have been 
removed. Furthermore, given that the extent of trade-creating and trade-diverting 
effects can also be influenced by other factors such as trading patterns prior to the 
formation of an RTA, transportation costs, and rules of origin, they have to be taken 
into account also. This can be a very challenging task. By the same token, the 
dynamic effects induced by economies of scale, competition, knowledge and 
technology transfer, and FDI, have to be aggregated from all products and industries 
affected by the formation of an RTA. This is equally, if not more, complex.
The problem with measurement is further complicated when RTAs go beyond 
the simple dismantling of border barriers to trade in goods and cover NTBs and trade 
in services. The balancing exercise for such agreements can be extremely difficult. 
While the effects of tariff removal (e.g. tariff revenue losses) are relatively visible, 
those of services liberalization (e.g. implementation and adjustment costs) are less
173 Discussion on trade creation and trade diversion in relation to trade in services will be conducted in 
Chapter 6.
174 This is what happened in the preparation towards the Japan-Thailand Economic Partnership 
Agreement, which I had an opportunity to participate.
175 See J Rollo, The Challenge of Negotiating RTA's for Developing Countries: What Could the WTO 
Do to Help?1 (Conference on Multilateralising Regionalism, WTO, Geneva 2007), p. 3.
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clear and much more difficult to estimate.176 The same logic applies to WTO-plus 
commitments.
Given that the developing country will have to rely on its preparatory work in 
the ensuing RTA negotiations, its accuracy is very important as it provides the scope 
within which the possible trade-offs can be made with the prospective RTA partner. 
Inaccurate and inadequate information can result in the developing country making 
commitments that will damage its economy and long-term economic development. 
Thus, developing countries have to conduct accurate research on the potential benefits 
and potential costs induced by the formation of an RTA so that they can 
comprehensively set out the objectives for their RTAs and what they can or cannot 
commit themselves to in the ensuing RTA negotiations.177 The success of such 
endeavour depends on the analytical capacity of the developing country in question. It 
should be noted that domestic vested interests will seek to influence the contents of 
this preparatory work.178
Once the developing country sets out its objectives for the formation of an 
RTA, the question is whether it will achieve them in the subsequent RTA 
negotiations. This depends on the negotiating capacity of the developing country. 
Given that trade negotiations are mercantilist in nature and involve exchanges of trade 
concessions between the parties, a crucial factor is their relative bargaining powers. If 
they are of equal bargaining powers, one would expect the outcome to be satisfactory 
to all of the parties involved. However, if they are not, the outcome may be biased 
towards the more powerful partner.179
Bargaining power can be affected by a country’s share of market power. In a 
bilateral RTA for instance, one party may be a major trade partner of the other, but the 
reverse may not be true. An example of this is NAFTA. While the United States is 
Mexico’s largest trade partner and sources of FDI, the reverse is not true.180
176 For example, see P Bhatnagar and C Manning, Regional Arrangements for Mode 4 in the Services 
Trade: Lessons from the ASEAN Experience' (2005) 4 World Trade Review 171, Roy, Marchetti and 
Lim, and M Jansen, 'Services Trade Liberalization at the Regional Level: Does Southern and Eastern 
Africa Stand to Gain From Economic Partnership Agreement Negotiations?' (2007) 41 Journal of 
World Trade 411.
177 For further discussion on the role of research in trade negotiations, see Tussie.
178 Private sectors were consulted by the Thai government prior to its RTA negotiations with Japan. At 
this stage, private firms voiced their concerns and stated their positions in relation to the possible RTA 
commitments which were acceptable to them.
179 See Pfetsch, pp. 37-40.
180 See http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/north-american-free-trade-agreeme 
nt-nafta (last accessed 13 April 2010).
Consequently, one would expect the United States to have more bargaining power 
than Mexico when it comes to RTA negotiations.181 In other words, a country with a 
large domestic market to which other countries want access or on which other 
countries are already dependent in terms of trade and investment, is in a better 
position to get its wishes in trade negotiations.182
Both analytical and negotiating capacities are underpinned by well-functioning 
domestic institutions. They can enable a country to gather, distribute, and analyse 
information relating to its trade, economic and business performance as well as 
similar information about other countries.183 These institutions include government’s 
trade bureaucracy, business organizations (such as a national chamber of commerce), 
and individual corporations. The networks of these institutions can be facilitated and 
strengthened if there is a body which acts as a focal point of communication.184
Human capital is also important to a country’s analytical and negotiating 
capacities. Its importance can be seen throughout different stages of negotiation. Prior 
to the negotiating stage, competent experts- be they economists or otherwise- are 
necessary for the preparatory work on which the ensuing negotiations will be based. If 
the country in question does not have adequate experts to produce reliable preparatory 
work, i.e. lack of analytical capacity, its trade negotiators are unlikely to make 
informed decisions during the negotiating stage. Human capital also plays a crucial 
part in the negotiations since skilled and experienced trade negotiators are more likely 
to secure the set objectives than those that are not.
So, what are the implications for developing countries when it comes to RTA 
negotiations? The developing country in question cannot do much in terms of its 
market size and market power in relation to its prospective RTA partner. It can, 
nevertheless, try to improve its analytical and negotiating capacities. However, this is 
easier said than done.
181 See AO Mena, 'Getting to "No": Defending against Demands in NAFTA Energy Negotiations' in JS 
Odell (ed) Negotiating Trade: Developing Countries in the WTO and NAFTA (Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge 2006).
182 See P Drahos, When the Weak Bargain with the Strong: Negotiations in the World Trade 
Organization' (2003) 8 International Negotiations 79, p. 82.
183 Ibid., p. 83.
184 For example, in the case of Thailand, the Department of Trade Negotiations (DTN), the Ministry of 
Commerce, has become the main body which takes the lead in RTA negotiations and acts as a focal 
point of communication between relevant domestic institutions. Note that the DTN did not perform 
these functions exclusively when Thailand first embraced RTAs as its alternative trade policy. For 
example, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was in charged in the negotiations of the Japan-Thailand EP A 
while the DTN was in charge in the negotiations of the Thailarid-Australia and Thailand-New Zealand 
RTAs. See http://www.thaifta.com/english/index_eng.html (last accessed 21 May 2010).
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A country’s analytical and negotiating capacities are generally related in an 
approximate fashion to its size and level of economic development.185 Given limited 
resources and stage of development, developing countries may not have well- 
functioning domestic institutions or simply cannot afford to finance them. By the 
same token, they may find it difficult to increase and improve their human capital. In 
any event, improvements are likely to take time and developing countries will have to 
utilize what they already have in the short-run. In addition, developing countries 
which take part in both WTO and RTA negotiations may find their human capital 
stretched since both are often carried out by the same staffs.186 Similarly, where 
developing countries simultaneously engage in several RTA negotiations, their human 
capital can be spread even thinner. An example of this is Thailand prior to the 2006 
political crisis where many rushed and concurrent FTA negotiations severely 
stretched its human capital and negotiating resources.187
Compared to their developed-country counterparts, developing countries will 
generally have less analytical and negotiating capacities, and as a result find it harder 
to achieve their objectives in North-South RTA negotiations. Therefore, the final 
outcome of such agreements may, in fact, be rather one-sided as developing countries 
become an agenda-taker. For example, it is observed that Japan in its RTAs with the 
ASEAN countries tends to pursue a high level of market opening in manufacturing, 
services, and investment, while resisting the liberalization of agriculture or 
fisheries;188 and the developing countries forming an FTA with the United States tend 
to commit themselves to TRIPS-plus commitments.189 Consequently, developing 
countries may have to accept commitments which do not offer many benefits and
185 See D Tussie and D Glover, The Developing Countries in World Trade: Policies and Bargaining 
Strategies (Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, Colo 1993), p. 231.
186 See S Laird, Regional Trade Agreements: Dangerous Liaisons?' (1999) 22 World Economy 1179, p. 
1187.
187 For more detail, see R Sally, Thai Trade Policy: From Non-discriminatory Liberalisation to FTAs' 
(2007) 30 World Economy 1594.
188 For example, see Japan EPAs with Brunei, Chile, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, and Thailand, 
available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/fta/index.html (last accessed 11 April 2010); see 
also G Hufbauer and J Schott, Pitting Asia-Pacific agreements into the WTO system' in R Baldwin and 
P Low (eds), Multilateralizing Regionalism: Challenges fo r  the Global Trading System (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge 2009), p. 562.
189 For example, patent drugs for disease such as HIV can be made less affordable due to the stringent 
IPRs regime. For further discussion, see FM Abbott, 'Intellectual Property Provisions of Bilateral and 
Regional Trade Agreements in Light of U.S. Federal Law' (ICTSD Project on IPRs and Sustainable 
Development, UNCTAD, Geneva 2006) and South Centre, 'Intellectual Property in Investment 
Agreements: The TRIPS-Plus Implications for Developing Countries' (Analytical Note, South Centre, 
Geneva 2005). See also http://www.oxfam.org/en/node/144 (last accessed 12 April 2010).
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incur high implementation and adjustment costs. The purpose of forming an RTA 
would be defeated if the costs actually exceed the benefits.
As noted above, it should again be recalled that since the term developing 
country encompasses a range of countries at different stages of development and with 
different economic backgrounds, a generalization of their position with regard to 
analytical and negotiating capacities has to be qualified. Advanced developing 
countries like the Republic of Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan are likely to have high 
analytical capacity while developing countries with big markets such as Brazil, China, 
and India are likely to have greater bargaining powers than those with medium or 
small markets.190 In addition, the relative analytical and negotiating capacities 
between prospective RTA partners will vary on a case-by-case basis.191 Asymmetries 
between the partiers may be greater in some RTAs than in others. For example, the 
proposed EPAs between the EU and the ACP countries involve trade negotiations 
between some of the most developed and some of the poorest countries in the 
world.192 By contrast, asymmetries between the parties in the Chile-Mexico FTA may 
be less as they are more similar economically.193
2.4 Conclusion
As a prospective RTA member, developing countries arguably wish to make 
the most out of the RTA they have decided to form. Therefore, they will try to 
promote the potential benefits and manage the potential costs induced by the 
agreement. In order to identify the challenges they face, the chapter first examines
190 For example, Brazil withstood the pressure from the United States in the Free Trade Area of the 
Americas. For more detail, see R Bouzas, The "New Regionalism" and the Negotiation of a Free Trade 
Area of the Americas' (2007) 12 International Negotiations 333.
191 Dent finds that less advanced developing countries which lack technocratic, industrial, and 
institutional capacities are likely to be exploited by their developed-country counterparts more than the 
more advanced developing countries. See CM Dent, New Free Trade Agreements in the Asia-Pacific 
(Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, Hampshire; New York 2006), pp. 246-53.
192 For more detail on the 77 members of the ACP group of countries and their economies in relation to 
the EU, see L Fontagne, C Mitaritonna and D Laborde,'An Impact Study of the EU-ACP Economic 
Partnership Agreement (EPAs) in the Six ACP Regions' (Directorate General for Trade, Commission 
of the European Union, 2008), pp. 26-31.
193 See http://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicShowMemberRTAIDCard.aspx?enc=s60d4vDej8KdMOYro/zINx 
0DPw3reQX9YGM2L6m2dr8= (last accessed 11 April 2010).
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how a developing-country partner may gain from an RTA and whether it may incur 
any costs in the process. The discussion on potential benefits and potential costs also 
help inform and provide insights to how the WTO regulatory framework may work in 
practice and how it can be improved.
Developing countries can benefit from trade creation, preferential access to the 
partner’s market, and the dynamic effects, namely increased economies of scale, 
competition, knowledge and technology transfer, and FDI. On the other hand, they are 
likely to incur implementation and adjustment costs as a result of complying with 
RTA commitments. The key for developing countries is how to ensure that the 
benefits outweigh the costs. This is far from simple in practice.
In order to do so, developing countries have to set out the objectives for their 
RTAs and what they can or cannot commit themselves to in the ensuing RTA 
negotiations. This requires analytical capacity on the part of developing countries. 
Their governments are also likely to be influenced by domestic vested interests, which 
may increase the likelihood of a trade-diverting agreement.
Given that the final content of an RTA is a product of trade negotiations, the 
success of developing countries depends also on their negotiating capacity. Thus, 
even if they know exactly what the most optimal agreement for their economies is, the 
final content (and hence the benefits and costs) will be subject to the ensuing 
negotiations. The constraints on both analytical and negotiating capacities may be a 
handicap that affects the extent that developing countries can optimize their 
participation in an RTA.
Not only do developing countries face challenges as a prospective RTA 
member, but they also do as a non-member and a WTO Member amid the current 
RTA proliferation. Thus, in order to have a complete picture, the next chapter will 
look at the possible challenges faced by developing countries from these two 
perspectives.
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Chapter 3
Challenges Facing Developing Countries amid the Current 
RTA Proliferation: as a Non-member and a WTO Member
3.1 Introduction
Developing countries can gain from the formation of an RTA although the net 
outcome depends on various factors and the potential costs they may incur. 
Accordingly, the previous chapter looks at the challenges they face from the 
perspective of a prospective RTA member. However, RTAs do not only affect the 
member countries, but may also have effects on the outside world. This chapter, 
therefore, investigates whether there are any challenges that developing countries may 
face from two other perspectives, namely, as a non-member and as a WTO Member 
amid the current RTA proliferation.
By its very nature, an RTA is designed and negotiated between the member 
countries. As discussed in the previous chapter, they will seek to make the most out of 
the agreement. Non-members, on the other hand, are excluded from this process and 
will be discriminated against as a result of trade preferences granted between the 
member countries. In order to identify the challenges that developing countries face in 
such situation, it is necessary that one first examines whether an RTA has any adverse 
effects on a non-member developing country.
Concerns have been raised that RTAs individually and as a collective group 
may also have implications on the multilateral trading system and multilateral trade 
negotiations.194 If it is accepted that the WTO provides advantages for developing 
countries through its multilateral trading framework and respectable DSM, anything 
that undermines the WTO may in principle undermine developing countries’ interests 
as well. Thus, it is also necessary that the relationship between RTAs and the WTO is
194 See Bhagwati, 'Regionalism and Multilateralism: an Overview'.
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investigated in order to identify whether there are any challenges facing developing 
countries as a WTO Member whose interests may be affected as more and more trade 
negotiations and rule-making are being conducted through RTAs rather than the 
WTO.
The chapter is therefore divided into three sections. The first section looks at 
the challenges that developing countries may face as a non-member. The second 
section examines the relationship between RTAs and the WTO and discusses whether 
developing countries face any challenges as a WTO Member amid the current RTA 
proliferation. The final section concludes the discussion and determines whether the 
WTO has any role to play in addressing the challenges faced by developing countries 
in the context of the current RTA proliferation.
3.2 Challenges Facing Developing Countries as a Non-member
As discussed in the previous chapter, one benefit from the formation of an 
RTA is trade creation. However, it is also pointed out that an RTA can also result in 
trade diversion. This occurs when the lower-cost producers from outside are displaced 
by the higher-cost producers located within the preferential area as a result of trade 
preferences granted between the member countries. Trade diversion is therefore 
welfare-reducing and considered bad for the member countries.
Parallel to this, trade diversion can also affect countries which are 
discriminated against due to the preferences granted between the member countries. 
RTAs are, by definition, exclusive and discriminatory clubs. Every country in the 
world is excluded from nearly every RTA in the world, and every RTA excludes 
nearly every country. Thus, discrimination against non-members is inevitable and can 
adversely affect their economies. Although trade diversion is not necessarily harmful 
to non-members, it will be injurious under two situations: the first, when non­
members tax their international trade (e.g. by imposing tariffs); and the second, when
non-members’ export prices fall as a result of falling demand from the RTA 
members.195
The first situation is caused by the fact that exporters located inside the 
preferential area may find it more profitable to export within the RTA due to freer 
intra-bloc trade. Other things being equal, imports from RTA members to non- 
members are likely to fall as a result. Consequently, as non-member governments 
impose tax on imports, they will incur revenue losses. In the second situation, due to 
the discrimination in favour of intra-bloc trade, consumers within the RTA may find it 
cheaper to buy goods and services produced within the RTA as compared to those 
imported from non-members. This is likely to result in falling demand for imports 
from non-members.
Thus, trade diversion can have an immediate and direct effect on the exports 
o f excluded countries- they fall. This is frequently taken as sufficient evidence of 
harm since it worsens non-members’ terms of trade in relation to the RTA 
members.196 It is not, however, as simple when one turns to the welfare of non­
members. Other things being held constant, a reduction in a country’s exports would 
improve its economic welfare because the goods and services- or the resources used 
to produce them- could be reallocated to the domestic market.197 In reality, however, 
things cannot be held constant. Non-members’ loss of exports reduces their ability to 
buy imports. The losses their consumers incur as they cut back on imports must be 
balanced against their gains from consuming the resources that were to be exported. 
However, these components will not necessarily be perfectly offset since a unit of 
exports may generate more welfare than would alternative domestic uses of the 
resources taken to produce it. Consequently, losing exports can result in a reduction in 
real income and the welfare of non-members.198
Falling exports are not the only concern for non-members. An RTA can have a 
significant effect on the prices at which non-member firms sell their products abroad. 
For example, Chang and Winters find that the creation of Mercosur was associated
195 See Schiff and Winters, Regional Integration and Development, p. 210.
196 See Pomffet, The Economics o f  Regional Trading Arrangements, pp. 196-201. Note that the exports 
will fall more sharply if  the non-member in question exports similar products to the preferential area as 
the partner country.
197 See Schiff and Winters, Regional Integration and Development, pp. 213-4.
198 For further discussion, see J Haaland and V Norman, 'Global Production Effects of European 
Integration' in L Winters (ed) Trade Flows and Trade Policy after 1992 (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge 1992).
- 7 2 -
with significant declines in the prices of non-members’ exports to the group.199 The 
extent of this depends on the size of the RTA in question. Schiff and Winters argue 
that small RTAs will rarely matter since they almost never affect the prices at which 
trade occurs, but some RTAs, such as those involved the United States and the EU, 
may be large enough to affect world prices.200 Thus, such an RTA can have 
significant implications for non-members regardless whether or not they deal directly 
with the RTA itself.201 In addition, falling exports can affect the prices at which 
products are sold within non-members. Recall the hypothetical example of Mexico, 
Chile, and Thailand. In the scenario where there is trade diversion and Thai rice 
producers cannot compete with Chilean rice producers due to the formation of an 
RTA between Mexico and Chile, Thai rice producers will have to sell their rice 
elsewhere. If they cannot export the excess amount to other countries, they will have 
to sell it domestically. This, in turn, increases the supply of rice in the Thai market 
and is likely to drive the prices down. Consequently, Thai rice producers will earn less 
as a result of falling exports (and export prices) and falling domestic prices.
Like trade, FDI and investment in general can be diverted due to the formation 
of an RTA.202 If an RTA results in net investment diversion, non-members are likely 
to receive less FDI. This, in turn, can have adverse effects on their long-term 
economic growth and development.203 Investment diversion can be worsened if a hub- 
and-spoke system is formed. This occurs when a country has formed RTAs with a 
number of countries that maintain barriers between each other. This hub country 
becomes the preferred location for investment as firms can reach more markets tariff- 
free than they can from any of the other locations, i.e. spoke countries. This will tend 
to bid up factor prices and raise real income in the hub.204 In other words, the hub 
country is likely to gain artificial competitive advantages due to the mere fact that it 
has concluded more RTAs than the spoke countries.205 The world’s largest hub is the 
EU, which has separate RTAs with nearly all other European and many
199 See W Chang and A Winters, How Regional Blocs Affect Excluded Countries: The Price Effects of 
MERCOSUR' (2002) 92 American Economic Review 889.
200 Schiff and Winters, Regional Integration and Development, p. 215.
201 Ibid.
202 See Chapter 2.
203 For further discussion, see H Hansen and J Rand, 'On the Causal Links between FDI and Growth in 
Developing Countries' (2006) 29 The World Economy 21.
204 For further discussion, see S Chong and J Hur, 'Small Hubs, Large Spokes and Overlapping Free 
Trade Agreements' (2008) 31 The World Economy 1625.
205 See Zahmt, p. 673.
Mediterranean countries, most of which do not grant each other free trade.206 This will 
be worsened when the proposed EPAs between the EU and the ACP countries are 
concluded. Thus, hub-and-spoke systems can result in further investment diversion, 
and hence worsening trade diversion.
From the discussion, it is more likely that non-members will be adversely 
affected due to trade and investment diversion. These adverse effects represent costs 
of non-participation and arguably get higher as more and more countries form RTAs 
with one another, implying further trade and investment diversion. In response, non- 
members may apply for membership of existing RTAs and/or form new ones with 
their trade partners. The theory of domino effect, first introduced by Baldwin, can be 
used to explain this.207
The domino effect starts with a positive model of membership in an RTA and 
proceeds in two stages: the immediate impact of an idiosyncratic deepening of 
integration in the RTA; and the knock-on impact implied by bloc enlargement.208 The 
starting point is that a country’s decision to join or form an RTA is determined by its 
domestic political equilibrium that balances pro-membership and anti-membership 
forces. Export sectors tend to associate with the former and import-competing sectors 
the latter. The reason is that an RTA membership is thought to be beneficial to 
exporting firms as it provides a preferential access to new markets; whereas it is 
thought to be detrimental to import-competing firms as it leads to new competition 
from the RTA partner. Given an initial political equilibrium membership in the RTA, 
an idiosyncratic shock that deepens the RTA’s integration generates new political 
economy forces in non-members as non-member exporters now have a greater stake 
in membership- they face more discrimination if their country stays out and greater 
market access if it joins. Anti-membership forces are also strengthened in non­
members as the liberalization implied by membership is heightened.209 It has been 
argued that exporting firms tend to be more organized and politically more influential 
than import-competing firms.210 As a result, the idiosyncratic shock is likely to raise 
the pro-membership forces more than the anti-membership forces. Thus, for non­
206 See Chapter 1.
207 For more detail, see Baldwin, A Domino Theory o f  Regionalism.
208 See Baldwin, 'Multilateralizing Regionalism: Spaghetti Bowls as Building Blocs on the Path to 
Global Free Trade', pp. 1466-71.
209 Ibid., p. 1467.
2,0 Ibid., p. 1468.
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members that previously found it politically optimal to stay outside of the RTA, these 
changes shift the domestic political economy equilibrium towards pro-membership.
The second stage is triggered if a non-member country actually succeeds in 
joining the RTA. The RTA enlargement implies that discrimination facing the 
remaining non-members expands and this again heightens the pro-membership 
political economy forces in non-members, potentially producing a further membership 
application. Baldwin proposes that insofar as entry into the RTA is allowed, the cycle 
will repeat itself until a new political equilibrium membership in the RTA is 
reached.211 However, Yi criticizes Baldwin’s assumption and shows that existing 
RTA members will ultimately have incentives to restrict entry.212 Andriamananjara 
confirms this and demonstrates that as an RTA expands, the potential benefits gained 
from the formation by the members first rise, reach a maximum, and then decline.213 
This is, in fact, what happens in practice. Countries in the current RTA proliferation 
tend to conclude new bilateral FTAs rather than to apply for membership of the
214existing ones.
An illustration of the domino effect is Japan and its RTAs with the ASEAN 
countries. Japan concluded its first RTA ever with Singapore in 2002,215 and 
expressed interests in negotiating further RTAs with ASEAN as a whole and/or on a 
bilateral basis with the member countries.216 Given that Japan is one of the region’s 
main trade partners both in terms of export market and sources of FDI, its newly- 
found interests in RTAs within the region raised opportunities and concerns among 
the ASEAN countries.217 Since non-members are likely to be adversely affected as a 
result of trade and investment diversion, the decision not to negotiate an RTA with 
Japan can be detrimental to the ASEAN countries, especially if the others choose to
2,1 Ibid., p. 1469.
212 See S Yi, 'Endogenous Formation of Customs Unions under Imperfect Competition: Open 
Regionalism Is Good' (1996) 22 Journal of International Economics 153. Note that Baldwin does 
recognize the possibility that RTA member countries may have an incentive to block entry in his later 
work, see Baldwin, 'Multilateralizing Regionalism: Spaghetti Bowls as Building Blocs on the Path to 
Global Free Trade', pp. 1468-9.
213 See S Andriamananjara, 'On the Size and Number of Regional Integration Arrangements: A 
Political Economy Model' (Policy Research Working Paper No2117, World Bank, Washington, DC 
1999).
214 See Chapter 1.
215 See http://rtais.wto.org/ui/PubIicShowMemberRTAIDCard.aspx?enc=GPbUmeAae9dRWFg5kN2y 
uaTlPNrPUn6jt8HkZ5qr998= (last accessed 7 April 2010).
216 See the speech by the Prime Minister of Japan Junichiro Koizumi, 14 January 2002, available at 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/pmv0201/speech.html (last accessed 7 April 2010).
217 See http://www.aseansec.Org/5740.htm#l (last accessed 7 April 2010).
do so, hence an increase in costs of non-participation.218 For example, assume that 
Malaysia and Indonesia export similar products to Japan. Once the Japan-Malaysia 
RTA is established while Indonesia decides not to form an RTA with Japan, its 
products will be more expensive in the Japanese market and cannot compete with its 
Malaysian counterparts. The situation is likely to be worsened for Indonesia when the 
other ASEAN countries decide to form bilateral RTAs with Japan.
Thus, the theory of domino effect can be used to explain how the formation of 
the Japan-Singapore RTA and the prospects of other ASEAN countries forming RTAs 
with Japan may have generated new pro-membership political economy forces within 
the ASEAN countries.219 In reality, Malaysia and Thailand formed an RTA with 
Japan in 2006 and 2007, respectively. To date, Japan has concluded seven bilateral 
RTAs with the ASEAN countries, and one with ASEAN as a whole.220
Costs of non-participation can also originate from the fact that a developing 
country may choose to form an RTA in order to secure or avoid losing trade 
preferences previously provided by a non-reciprocal trade arrangement with a 
developed country. The proposed EPAs between the EU and the ACP countries are 
the case in point.
The EPA negotiations have been triggered by the expiry of previous trade 
agreements between the EU and the ACP countries. Since 1976, political and 
economic relations between these two blocs have been governed by a series of five- 
year agreements, known as the Lome Conventions.221 These conventions provided the 
ACP countries with trade preferences and preferential access to the EU market 
without requiring them to reciprocate.222 The last Lome Convention (Lome V) ended 
in 2000, and was replaced by the Cotonou Agreement.223 As part of the Cotonou 
Agreement, the EU and the ACP countries agreed to conclude new trade
218 Such concerns were raised among Thai trade negotiators during the Japan-Thailand EPA 
negotiations and were used as a justification for compromises made with their Japanese counterparts.
219 For further discussion, see L Low, 'Policy Dilemmas in Singapore's RTA Strategy' (2003) 16 The 
Pacific Review 99.
220 See http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/fla/index.html (last accessed 7 April 2010).
221 For more detail, see http://ec.europa.eu/development/geographical/cotonou/lomegen/lomeitoiv_en. 
cfm (last accessed 7 April 2010).
222 Note that the conventions violated WTO rules as they established unfair discrimination between 
developing countries. As such, the WTO Members agreed to grant a waiver to the EU to continue 
providing non-reciprocal preferences until the end of 2007. See http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/ 
minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_acp_ec_agre_e.htm (last accessed 10 April 2010).
223 For more detail, see http://ec.europa.eu/development/geographical/cotonouintro_en.cfm (last 
accessed 7 April 2010).
arrangements which are reciprocal in nature.224 In effect, the ACP countries have to 
negotiate an RTA with the EU if they are to retain their existing trade preferences and 
preferential access to the EU market. However, under the proposed EPAs, they will 
have to give the EU trade preferences and preferential access to their markets as 
well.225 Thus, for the ACP countries, the costs of non-participation in the EPAs will 
be the loss of trade preferences and preferential access to the EU market.226 Like the 
case of Japan and the ASEAN countries, the more ACP countries have concluded the 
proposed EPAs with the EU, the more pressure the remaining countries have to 
finalize their negotiations with the EU.227
Although developing countries may have a choice whether to form an RTA 
with their trade partners, the costs of non-participation can influence or even dictate 
their decision. Thus, it is arguable whether developing countries do have a real choice 
here. The fact that they increasingly form RTAs with their developed-country 
counterparts and among themselves suggests that they view the costs of non­
participation as exceeding the potential costs that they may incur as an RTA 
member.228
Therefore, the main challenge that developing countries face as a non­
member is how to reduce the adverse effects caused by trade and investment 
diversion. It is very unlikely that, if left to themselves, prospective RTA members will 
take into account such adverse effects. Notably, the members’ firms benefit most 
precisely when the RTA results in trade diversion.229 More importantly, non-members 
are excluded from the negotiation process. Thus, there is little, if anything, non- 
member developing countries can do to curb trade and investment diversion. If they 
choose to respond by applying for membership of existing RTAs or forming new ones 
with their trade partners, they will nevertheless face with the challenges discussed in 
the previous chapter. Furthermore, as the theory of domino effect suggests, other non­
member developing countries will be pressured to do the same, especially when their
224 See the Cotonou Agreement, Articles 34-38.
225 This is to satisfy the conditions set in GATT Article XXIV. See Fontagne, Mitaritonna and Laborde, 
pp. 41-44.
26 It should be noted that the ACP countries can still benefit from the existing GSP schemes offered by 
the EU but they will have to compete with other developing countries which are also eligible for such 
schemes.
227 For further discussion, see ‘Oxfam Warns o f  Dire Consequences o f  EU's Rushed Trade Deals’, 
available at http://www.oxfam.org/en/node/240 (last accessed 12 April 2010).
228 See Chapter 2.
229 Ibid.
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main trading partners have formed RTAs with their competitors. This is likely to 
result in an increase in the number of RTAs, and hence their impact on the outside 
world. In addition, as more and more RTAs are formed, it arguably becomes more 
and more imperative for developing countries to jump on the bandwagon?20 This, in 
turn, can result in non-member developing countries more willing to accept fewer 
gains and accept greater costs. To put it differently, the fact that other developing 
countries have embraced RTAs as an alternative trade policy may reduce the 
bargaining power of those which are yet or about to negotiate an RTA. This is likely 
to affect non-member developing countries’ negotiating capacity.231
Therefore, the thesis argues that something must be done to curb trade and 
investment diversion in order to reduce the costs of non-participation, which in turn 
should allow non-member developing countries to use RTAs as a positive means to 
achieve economic development rather than as a defence against trade and investment 
diversion.232
3.3 Challenges Facing Developing Countries as a WTO Member
The WTO arguably provides developing countries with a number of 
advantages.233 There are two advantages which are directly relevant in the context of 
RTAs and their proliferation: the first derives from the multilateral trading framework 
offered by multilateral trade negotiations; and the second from the WTO DSM. 
Coalitions among small and less powerful countries are common practice in 
international negotiations and the limited bargaining power of developing countries 
makes coalitions an especially crucial instrument for their success in the international
230 For more detail, see M Solis, B Stallings and SN Katada, Competitive Regionalism: FTA Disffusion 
in the Pacific Rim (Palgrave Macmillan, Bashingstoke 2009).
231 See Chapter 2.
232 In the case of the proposed EPAs between the EU and the ACP countries, the costs of non­
participation do not derive from trade and investment diversion as such, but from the possibility of 
losing trade preferences previously provided by a non-reciprocal trade arrangement with the EU. 
Consequently, their main challenges will be those discussed in the previous chapter.
233 On general discussion of how developing countries make use of the GATT and later the WTO, see 
C Michalopoulos, Developing Countries in the WTO (Palgrave, Basingstoke 2001).
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arena.234 In multilateral trade negotiations, developing countries can cooperate in 
order to form a coalition against external pressures and protect their common 
interests, for example the G77.235 By contrast, in a bilateral or regional setting, a large 
and powerful country can arguably assert its economic and political leverage over a 
small and less powerful country more easily.236 This is often viewed as the reason 
why developing-country partners in North-South RTAs tend to make WTO-plus
237commitments.
Developing countries also benefit from the WTO dispute settlement system as 
can be seen from their successes in using the DSM to protect their WTO rights.238 It 
has been argued that the WTO DSM is more advantageous for developing countries 
because it is less power-based and more rule-based than RTA dispute settlement 
mechanisms.239 While RTAs may be concluded between trade partners of roughly 
equal size and power, they often include parties that vary to a great degree in relative 
size and power. NAFTA and the proposed EPAs between the EU and ACP countries 
provide prime examples, as are almost any RTA entered into by the Unite States or 
the EU for that matter. Although many RTAs may appear to adopt dispute settlement 
provisions similar to those under the DSU, they often in fact exhibit aspects of power-
234 For a general discussion, see Diego-Femandez.
235 See http://www.g77.org/ (last accessed 1 August 2009). One caveat on such multilateral cooperation 
among developing countries is that they do not always unite on all issues. Given the heterogeneity 
among developing countries, they often have diverse interests depending on their individual 
circumstances and stage of development. Thus, the success of a coalition among developing-country 
Members is not a given and will depend on many factors. For further discussion, see A Narlikar, 
International Trade and Developing Countries: Coalitions in GATT and WTO (Routledge, London 
2003).
236 This does not mean that asymmetries do not matter in WTO negotiations. It is simply argued that 
they matter less in the multilateral setting due to consensus and possible coalition among developing 
countries. See Singh. It should be noted that the new species of RTAs whose parties are distinct RTAs 
themselves, for example the proposed ASEAN-EU FTA, may allow the developing countries involved 
to form a coalition and better protect their interests. This was certainly the case in when I was taking 
part in the ASEAN-EU FTA negotiations.
For example, see J Whalley, 'Regional Trade Arrangements in North America: CUSTA and 
NAFTA' in J de Melo and A Panagariya (eds), New dimensions in regional integration (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge 1993). It should be noted that the new species of RTAs whose parties are 
distinct RTAs themselves, for example the proposed ASEAN-EU FTA, may allow the developing 
countries involved to form a coalition and better protect their interests. This was certainly the case in 
when I was taking part in the ASEAN-EU FTA negotiations.
238 For example, Thailand recently won its anti-dumping case against the United States. See WTO 
Appellate Body Report, US-Shrimp (Thailand), WT/DS343/AB/R, WT/DS345/AB/R, adopted 1 
August 2008. For further discussion, see W Davey, 'The WTO Dispute Settlement System: How Have 
Developing Countries Fared?' in Z Drabek (ed) Is the World Trade Organization Attractive Enough for  
Emerging Economies?: Critical Essays on the Multilateral Trading System (Palgrave Macmillan, 
Basingstoke 2010).
239 On the desirability of an adjudicative or rule-based approach to dispute settlement, as opposed to 
power-based or negotiation approach, see JH Jackson, 'Governmental Disputes in International Trade 
Relations: A Proposal in the Context o f GATT' (1979) 13 Journal of World Trade 1.
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based dispute settlement. For example, Mexico has had difficulty in obtaining 
compliance from the United States in the two NAFTA Chapter 20 cases it brought.240 
While the same power asymmetries exist in the WTO, they are arguably more 
effectively offset in a multilateral setting than in a bilateral or regional one.241
It is however recognized that the WTO DSM is not without criticism when it 
comes to developing-country Members’ participation and success in the dispute 
settlement process. For example, it has been argued that the special and differential 
treatment provisions contained in the DSU are rather vague and ineffective.242 The 
costs of litigation can also be prohibitively high particularly for small developing- 
country Members.243 In addition, developing-country Members may be constrained by 
their lack of human resources and administrative structures to detecting possible 
inconsistencies with the WTO agreements.244 It is noteworthy that these criticisms are 
not necessarily exclusive to the WTO DSM, and can arguably be exacerbated in a 
bilateral or regional setting.245 Given that the WTO DSM operates in a more rule- 
based fashion and developing countries are building the capacity to use it more
240 In the Broomcom case, the safeguard at issue was imposed on 28 November 1996: 61 Federal 
Register 64431 (4 December 1996). The NAFTA panel found the safeguard to violate NAFTA rules in 
the case of Mexico on 28 January 1998. See NAFTA Chapter 20 Panel Report, US Safeguard Action 
Taken on Broomcom Brooms from Mexico, 30 January 1998. The safeguard was terminated on 3 
December 1998, officially because the US industry failed to take adjustment measures as required by 
US law: 63 Federal Register 67761 (8 December 1998). No mention was made of the NAFTA panel 
report in the termination decision. In the Trucking case, the decision was issued on 6 February 2001. 
See NAFTA Chapter 20 Arbitral Panel Report, Cross-Border Trucking Services. The report remains 
unimplemented.
241 For further discussion, see W Davey, 'Dispute Settlement in the WTO and RTAs: A Comment' in L 
Bartels and F Ortino (eds), Regional Trade Agreements and the WTO Legal System (Oxford University 
Press, Oxford; New York 2006), pp. 354-7.
242 See AH Qureshi, 'Participation of Developing Countries in the WTO Dispute Settlement System' 
(2003) 47 Journal of African Law 174, pp. 189-93.
243 See CP Bown and BM Hoekman, 'WTO Dispute Settlement and the Missing Developing Countries 
Cases: Engaging the Private Sector' (2005) 8 Journal o f International Economic Law 861, pp. 863-4. 
Note that the establishment of the Advisory Centre on WTO Law may have improved the situation to 
some extent. For further discussion, see CP Bown and R McCulloch, Developing Countries, Dispute 
Settlement, and the Advisory Centre on WTO Law' (2010) 19 The Journal of International Trade & 
Economic Development 33.
244 See JLP Gabilondo, Developing Countries in the WTO Dispute Settlement Procedures: Improving 
Their Participation' (2001) 35 Journal of World Trade 483, pp. 484-5.
245 For further discussion on a comparison between the WTO and RTA DSMs, see J Pauwelyn, 'Going 
Global, Regional, or Both? Dispute Settlement in the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC) and Overlaps with the WTO and Other Jurisdictions' (2004) 13 Minnesota Journal o f Global 
Trade 231.
effectively,246 it is therefore in principle a problem if it is undermined as an avenue for 
them in the future.
If it is accepted that the WTO provides advantages for developing countries 
through its multilateral trading framework and respectable DSM, anything that 
undermines these aspects of the WTO’s operation may in principle undermine 
developing countries’ interests to that extent as well. Thus, it is necessary that the 
relationship between RTAs and the WTO is examined in order to identify whether 
there are any challenges facing developing countries as a WTO Member whose 
interests may be affected as more and more trade negotiations and rule-making are 
being conducted through RTAs rather than the WTO. So, do RTAs complement or 
undermine the WTO and multilateral trade liberalization?
Since the early 1990s, the focus has shifted away from effects of an RTA on 
the member countries and focused more on the relationship between such agreements 
and the multilateral trading system- whether RTAs can reduce countries’ support for 
the multilateral trading system and multilateral trade liberalization. In other words, 
even if RTAs are net trade-creating, they may still have long-term systemic effects on 
the extent of multilateral trade liberalization (e.g. reduction of MFN tariff rates), 
which can be achieved through the GATT/WTO. This shift appears to coincide with 
the second and third periods of RTA proliferation discussed in Chapter 1. Such a shift 
makes sense because as more and more RTAs are formed, their individual and 
collective impact on the multilateral trading system arguably grows.
The question is whether RTAs affect the viability and/or sustainability of the 
multilateral trading system. The key issue here is that RTAs may render infeasible an 
otherwise feasible multilateral trade agreement. The underlying logic is that the 
political support for multilateral trade liberalization may be reduced as a result of fear 
on the part of domestic vested interests that the gains already obtained through RTAs 
would be eroded. For example, Levy argues that a bilateral FTA is more likely to 
undermine political support for multilateral trade liberalization because it may provide 
disproportionate gains to the countries’ average voters and they will not want the 
gains to be eroded by broader trade liberalization.247 Krishna, focusing on domestic
246 For more detail, see W Davey.'The WTO Dispute Settlement System: How Have Developing 
Countries Fared?' (Illinois Public Law Research Paper No05-17, University of Illinois College of Law, 
2005).
247 See P Levy, 'A Political-Economic Analysis of Free-Trade Agreements' (1997) 87 American 
Economic Review 509.
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firms and their influence on the member governments, reaches a similar conclusion as 
he finds that RTAs will only be politically viable when they create artificial gains for 
the domestic firms as a result of trade diversion; and that as these domestic firms do 
not want to lose such gains, they will oppose to future multilateral trade 
liberalization.248 Other theoretical studies, however, point to the opposite conclusion. 
For example, Omelas argues that if an FTA leads to a contraction of import- 
competing sectors within the member countries, their influence over the governments 
is likely to decline. Given that such sectors tend to have vested interests in retaining 
protectionist measures and resisting further trade liberalization, the decline in their 
influence over the governments should facilitate multilateral trade liberalization.249
To determine whether RTAs are good for the multilateral trading system, 
many studies focus on how RTAs affect countries’ incentives to alter their MFN tariff 
rates. The logic is that if the formation of an RTA is accompanied by reductions in 
MFN rates (bound or applied), the arrangement is more likely to have positive effects 
on multilateral trade liberalization and improve aggregate world welfare without 
harming non-members. By contrast, if the RTA members raise MFN rates against 
non-members, diversion of external trade to RTA members is greater and more likely, 
which as already discussed can harm non-members as well as the members 
themselves. According to this approach, the welfare effects of RTAs on the outside 
world depend on the members’ MFN rates after the formation of an RTA. In order to 
determine this, the literature looks at the optimal tariff response of members after the 
formation of an RTA.
A number of theoretical studies find that optimal tariffs are more likely to go 
up in a CU.250 For example, Bagwell and Staiger present a model of CUs which 
predicts that once a CU is fully implemented, the members will gain greater market 
power and the CU as a whole will face a greater incentive to defect to higher MFN
248 See Krishna, Regionalism and Multilateralism: A Political Economy Approach' and Chapter 2.
249 See E Omelas, 'Endogenous Free Trade Agreements and the Multilateral Trade System' (2005) 67 
Journal of International Economics 471.
250 See K Bagwell and R Staiger, 'Multilateral Tariff Cooperation During the Formation of Customs 
Unions' (1997a) 42 Journal of International Economics 91, C Syropoulos, 'Customs Unions and 
Comparative Advantage' (1999) 51 Oxford Economic Papers 239, C Freund, 'Multilateralism and the 
Endogenous Formation of Preferential Trade Agreements' (2000) 52 Journal of International 
Economics 359, and E Bond, C Syropoulos and A Winters, 'Deepening of Regional Integration and 
Multilateral Trade Agreements' (2001) 53 Journal of International Economics 335.
rates.251 On the other hand, it is found that in the absence of enhanced market power, 
members are likely to reduce their MFN rates after forming an FTA.252
However, when political economy effects are taken into account, the results 
are less conclusive. For example, Richardson finds that, following the initiation of an 
FTA, lobbying will decline and MFN rates will fall as the import-competing sectors 
contract.253 The same result is found in a more recent work of Cadot, de Melo, and 
Olarreaga.254 By contrast, Panagariya and Findlay show that countries in an FTA will 
raise MFN rates because lobbying in favour of tariffs against the partner country will 
be diverted to lobbying for greater MFN rates.255 It should be noted that it is not only 
existing RTAs that matter. In their later work, Bagwell and Staiger illustrate that the 
mere potential for a future trade agreement may reduce the extent of current tariff 
reduction that can be negotiated at the multilateral level.256
Alternatively, RTAs may be viewed in a more benign light, merely as a result 
of the progress made at the multilateral level. The logic is that if WTO Members have 
gone as far as they can during multilateral trade negotiations, RTAs may be the next 
step for the minority of countries that want further and deeper integration. For 
example, Freund argues that countries have a greater incentive to form RTAs in order 
to promote deeper integration when MFN rates are low.257 Thus, the decline in MFN 
rates since the founding of the GATT has arguably increased the incentive for 
countries to form RTAs.258 Similarly, Ethier illustrates that the lower MFN rates have 
resulted in a rise in North-South RTAs as developing countries see them as a means to 
attract FDI.259
251 See Bagwell and Staiger, p. 118.
252 See K Bagwell and R Staiger, 'Multilateral Tariff Cooperation During the Formation of Free Trade 
Areas' (1997b) 38 International Economic Review 291 and E Bond, R Riezman and C Syropoulos, 'A 
Strategic and Welfare Theoretic Analysis o f Free Trade Areas' (2004) 64 Journal o f International 
Economics 1.
253 See M Richardson, 'Endogenous Protection and Trade Diversion' (1993) 34 Journal o f International 
Economics 309.
254 See O Cadot, JD Melo and M Olarreaga, 'Can Bilateralism Ease the Pains of Multilateral Trade 
Liberalization' (2001) 45 European Economic Review 27.
255 See A Panagariya and R Findlay, 'A Political-Economy Analysis o f Free-Trade Areas and Customs 
Unions' in R Feenstra, G Grossman and D Irwin (eds), The Political Economy o f Trade Policy: Papers 
in Honor o f  Jagdish Bhagwati (MIT Press, Cambridge, MA 1996).
256 See K Bagwell and R Staiger, 'Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Bilateral Opportunism and the Rules 
of GATT/WTO' (2004) 63 Journal of International Economics 1.
257 See Freund, 'Multilateralism and the Endogenous Formation of Preferential Trade Agreements'.
258 Ibid., p. 375.
259 See Ethier.
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The empirical work on the effects of RTAs on the multilateral trading system 
and multilateral trade liberalization is, however, in its infancy with the focus on post- 
formation MFN rates.260 This is understandable since they are arguably more visible 
and less problematic empirically than political economy effects induced by the 
formation of an RTA. For example, Foroutan provides a general account of how 
countries forming RTAs have adjusted their MFN rates.261 She uses data on trade and 
trade policy to compare two groups of countries: the first includes countries that have 
been a member of an effective RTA; and the second includes countries that are not a 
member of an RTA or have been in an ineffective one.262 However, she does not find 
any clear differences in their MFN tariff reduction policy between the two groups, 
suggesting that RTAs are relatively benign.263
Other studies offer different conclusions. For example, by using trade and 
tariff data from Argentina, the second biggest member (to Brazil) in Mercosur, 
Bohara, Gawande, and Sanguinetti empirically prove the hypothesis that following the 
initiation of an FTA, lobbying will decline and MFN rates will fall as the import 
competing sector contracts.264 At the opposite end, Limao finds that the United States 
was more reluctant to lower its MFN rates in the Uruguay Round for products that 
offered high preferences.265 His result implies that RTAs may lead to less MFN tariff 
reduction at the multilateral level. Extending the criteria beyond MFN rates, Hindley 
and Masserlin find that in the EU the internal liberalization was accompanied by more 
vigorous anti-dumping against non-member countries.266
From the literature, while the theoretical work on the impact of RTAs on the 
multilateral trading system and multilateral trade liberalization has generated a 
number of interesting insights, it remains largely inconclusive. For economists, when 
faced with opposing theoretical results, the solution is typically to scrutinize the
260 See Freund, The WTO and Reciprocal Preferential Trading Agreements, p. xvi.
261 See F Foroutan, 'Does Membership in a Regional Preferential Trade Arrangement Make a Country 
More or Less Protectionist?' (1998) 21 World Economy 305.
262 Foroutan develops criteria to determine which RTA is effective and which is not. See Ibid., pp. 306- 
11 .
263 Ibid., pp. 317-27.
264 See A Bohara, K Gawande and P Sanguinetti, 'Trade Diversion and Declining Tariffs: Evidence 
from Mercosur' (2004) 64 Journal o f International Economics 65. Note that the study is conducted 
based on the data when Mercosur was still operating as an FTA, i.e. no CETs.
265 See N Limao, 'Preferential Trade Agreements as Stumbling Blocks for Multilateral Trade 
Liberalization: Evidence for the United States' (2006) 96 American Economic Review 896.
266 See B Hindley and P Masserlin, 'Guarantees of Market Access and Regionalism' in K Anderson and 
R Blackhurst (eds), Regional Integration and the Global Trading System (Harvester-Wheatsheaf, 
Hemel Hempstead 1993).
divergent predictions empirically. However, the question whether RTAs complement 
or undermine the WTO is such that it does not lend itself easily to testing. This is 
because at any point in time, only a single realization of WTO negotiations is 
observed. It is therefore very difficult to prove that multilateral trade negotiations
•jfLn
would have been any faster (or easier), had there been fewer (or more) RTAs. This 
is arguably why the empirical work is rather limited. In addition, given that the surge 
in the number of RTAs has only begun towards the end of the 20th century and their 
impact on the multilateral trading system and multilateral trade liberalization is being 
realized, the empirical literature in this area is still being developed. Perhaps, an 
eventual conclusion of the Doha Round will offer more data to subsequent empirical 
studies.
It is also important to note that the focus of existing empirical studies usually 
revolves around tariffs and tariff reduction. This is arguably inadequate given the 
broader coverage of RTAs in the current proliferation, which encompasses NTBs on 
trade in goods, services liberalization, and new issues such as IPRs, investment, and 
competition policy.268 In addition, these agreements tend to contain provisions on 
trade remedies such as bilateral/regional safeguard measures, and have their own 
dispute settlement procedures.269 Consequently, such RTAs may in effect create 
separate trade regimes, albeit only applicable between the member countries, which 
are distinguished from that of the WTO. The existence of multiple trade regimes 
could result in fragmentations of the regulatory framework for international trade. 
Further research on the effects of these comprehensive agreements on the multilateral 
trading system is necessary in order to better understand the relationship between 
RTAs and the WTO.
Thus, the challenge facing developing countries as a WTO Member amid the 
current RTA proliferation is not clear. Given that both theoretical and empirical 
literature is not conclusive, it is difficult to take a decisive position on whether RTAs 
complement or undermine the WTO and multilateral trade liberalization. The fact that 
the possible effects of RTAs on the extent of multilateral trade liberalization are long­
term and systemic also makes them less visible and more difficult to deal with.
267 For more detail, see Freund and Omelas,'Regional Trade Agreements', pp. 30-1.
268 See Chapter 1.
269 For example, see Article 2.12 of the Panama-Singapore RTA for a provision on bilateral safeguard 
measures, and Chapter 17 of the Thailand-New Zealand RTA for provisions on RTA dispute settlement 
procedures.
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Although developing countries may have a stake in the smooth functioning of the 
WTO, their immediate concerns are likely to lie in the adverse effects caused by trade 
and investment diversion and/or how they can make the most out of the RTA that they 
have decided to form.270 It is unrealistic to expect prospective RTA members to 
design their RTA in such a way that would not undermine the WTO and multilateral 
trade liberalization. Nevertheless, if trade and investment diversion can be curbed to a 
significant extent, the costs of non-participation will be lower. Consequently, non- 
members may not feel the need to apply for membership of existing RTAs or form 
new ones with their trade partners. This would, in turn, slow the rate at which RTAs 
proliferate and perhaps bring the attention back to the WTO and multilateral trade 
liberalization.
Thus, as far as the challenges facing developing countries amid the current 
RTA proliferation are concerned, the attention should be given to those they face from 
the perspectives of a prospective member and a non-member. There are no doubt 
many other challenges that developing countries are confronted with as a result of the 
current RTA proliferation. The list does not purport to be exhaustive. However, the 
bodies of literature reviewed and recent practical experience and interviews with trade 
negotiators make clear that the challenges that are identified in the previous and 
present chapters are serious, and should be prioritized. For this reason, they are 
selected as the primary set of challenges to be addressed in the remainder of the 
thesis.
3.4 A Role for the WTO?
In Chapters 2 and 3, it can be seen that developing countries are confronted 
with a number of challenges, particularly from the perspectives of a prospective 
member and a non-member. As a prospective member, developing countries will wish 
to make the most out of the agreements they have decided to form. In order to do so,
270 Although the trade negotiators that I interviewed were aware of the debate on the relationship 
between RTAs and the WTO, their primarily focus was on the RTAs they were assigned to and how 
they could further their national interests through these agreements.
they have to promote the potential benefits and manage the potential costs. 
Ultimately, they have to ensure that the benefits outweigh the costs. Although the 
logic is simple, it is not so easily achievable in practice. Their key challenges include 
domestic vested interests, high implementation and adjustment costs, and their lack of 
analytical and negotiating capacities.
As a non-member, developing countries tend to be adversely affected by trade 
and investment diversion. Given that RTA members, if left to themselves, are unlikely 
to take these adverse effects into consideration, non-member developing countries 
may attempt to mitigate these effects by applying for membership of existing RTAs or 
forming new ones with their trade partners. This can worsen trade and investment 
diversion even further and force other non-members to react.
From the perspective of a WTO Member amid the current RTA proliferation, 
although it is not clear whether RTAs undermine the WTO, to the extent that they do, 
developing countries are likely to be disadvantaged as more of their trade negotiations 
will take place in an environment where they are unable to form coalitions against 
large and more powerful trade partners. In addition, if more of their trade is being 
governed by RTA rules, any disputes arising from them will be settled through the 
relevant RTA DSMs, which may not be as advantageous for developing countries as 
the WTO DSM.
The increase in developing countries’ participation in the current RTA 
proliferation suggests that they see these agreements as an alternative trade policy to 
multilateral trade liberalization achieved through the WTO- either as a means to 
positively achieve economic development or as a response to trade and investment 
diversion. It can be seen that the efforts on the part of developing countries to deal 
with these challenges, although necessary, may be limited and conditional to their 
resources and positions in the global economy. Their efforts arguably need to be 
complemented by some form of international framework for greater effectiveness. As 
a result, one may have to turn to someplace else. The WTO, an international 
organization which deals with global trade and trade liberalization, naturally comes to 
mind.271
The WTO Agreements, in fact, contain rules which govern how RTAs are to 
be formed. These are GATT Article XXIV, the Enabling Clause, and GATS Article
271 For further discussion on why the thesis chooses the WTO framework to address the challenges 
facing developing countries amid the current RTA proliferation, see Introduction.
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V. GATT Article XXIV governs the formation of goods RTAs; the Enabling Clause 
relates to inter alia the formation of goods RTAs whose members are exclusively of 
developing-country status; and GATS Article V governs the formation of services 
RTAs. Furthermore, it also has in place the mechanisms to supervise RTAs, i.e. the 
reviewing process conducted by the CRTA/CTD, and a possible use of the WTO 
DSM to enforce the rules.272 Although it is open to debate whether the WTO has the 
institutional capacity and feasibility to supervise RTAs effectively,273 with the 
membership of 153 countries coupled with the existing rules and mechanisms, it is 
arguably in a better position to supervise the current RTA proliferation than any other 
international organizations.274
However, it is not clear to what extent these rules and mechanisms address the 
challenges facing developing countries. Given the dramatic increase in North-South 
and South-South RTAs, I believe that not only does the WTO have a role to play in 
RTA supervision, but it must also supervise these agreements in such a way that 
addresses the challenges. This is supported by the Doha Ministerial Declaration275 
which states that:
We [WTO Members] stress our commitment to the WTO as the unique forum for global 
trade rule-making and liberalization, while also recognizing that regional trade 
agreements can play an important role in promoting the liberalization and expansion o f  
trade and in fostering development (emphasis added);276 and
We [WTO Members] also agree to negotiations aimed at clarifying and improving
disciplines and procedures under the existing WTO provisions applying to regional trade
agreements. The negotiations shall take into account the developmental aspects o f
277regional trade agreement (emphasis added).
In light of the challenges identified and the insights provided by the bodies of 
literature on RTAs as supplemented with the empirical research, Chapters 4-6 will
272 This will be discussed in Chapter 7.
273 The capacity and feasibility o f the WTO to supervise RTAs and their proliferation will be discussed 
in the context of the existing mechanisms, i.e. the reviewing mechanism through the CRTA and the 
WTO DSM. This will be discussed in Chapter 7.
274 Note that other international organizations could play a supporting role in RTA supervision. See 
Chapter 7.
275 See the Doha Ministerial Declaration, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, adopted 14 November 2001.
276 See Ibid., para. 4.
277 See Ibid., para. 29.
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examine the extent to which the existing WTO rules address these challenges and 
whether there are any ways to improve them so that the challenges can be better 
addressed. Chapter 4 will look at GATT Article XXIV, Chapter 5 the Enabling 
Clause, and Chapter 6 GATS Article V. Given that any substantive reforms to the 
rules may not be easily executed, Chapter 7 will explore whether there are other less 
contentious means that may complement and strengthen the existing WTO rules and 
mechanisms. These include promulgation of code of best practices, revision of the 
WTO surveillance mechanisms, and technical assistance for developing countries in 
relation to RTAs.
Chapter 4
GATT Article XXIV
4.1 Introduction
GATT Article XXIV was in the original GATT 1947 and subsequently 
incorporated into GATT 1994. Its primary function is to provide a defence for the 
MFN principle formally inserted in GATT Article I. Under GATT Article XXIV, 
WTO Members can give trade preferences to one another without having to extend 
them to the rest of the WTO membership. This can be carried out through two types 
of arrangement, namely, customs unions and free-trade areas?1* Although RTAs are 
supposed to be exceptions to the non-discriminatory principle, the foundation on 
which the GATT/WTO were built, they are becoming the rule themselves due to the 
current RTA proliferation.279
The GATT’s origin lies in the US State Department’s Suggested Charter for  
an International Trade Organization (ITO), released in September 1946.280 At the 
start of the negotiations that led to GATT 1947, although the United States assertively 
supported multilateralism and repudiated bilateral/regional trade preferences, it 
recognized the legitimacy of an exception for CUs for economic and political
A O I
reasons. On economic ground, Clair Wilcox, the then Director of the Office of 
International Trade Policy, the US Department of State, stated that “a customs union 
creates a wider trading area, removes obstacles to competition, makes possible a more 
economic allocation of resources, and thus operates to increase production and raise 
planes of living.”282 On political ground, CUs were seen as a necessary means to 
achieve European integration. Given that the unification of Western Europe was one
278 For general definitions of customs unions and free-trade areas, see Introduction.
279 See Chapter 1.
280 See K Chase, 'Multilateralism Compromised: the Mysterious Origins of GATT Article XXIV' 
(2006) 5 World Trade Review 1, p. 3.
281 See JH Jackson, World Trade and the Law o f  GA TT (Bobbs-Merrill, Indianapolis 1969), pp. 576-7.
282 See C Wilcox, A Charter fo r  World Trade (Macmillan Co., New York 1949), pp. 70-1.
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of the United States’ central foreign policy goals, banning such trade arrangements 
became inconceivable.283 Thus, from the start CUs were to be added to GATT 1947, 
providing an exception to the MFN obligation.
Free-trade areas, on the other hand, were not initially included in the drafting 
of GATT Article XXIV.284 In subsequent negotiations, a number of developing 
countries from Latin America and the Middle East had however expressed 
dissatisfaction with the demanding requirements imposed on CU members, 
particularly the need to harmonize tariffs and external trade policies. While their 
request for permission to form partial scope agreements was rejected, FTAs were 
added to GATT Article XXIV, with the support from the United States, at Havana 
during the first session of GATT CONTRACTING PARTIES.286 Drawing from 
archival records, Chase however illustrates that the United States’ support for the 
inclusion of FT As was driven by its secret trade treaty with Canada rather than by a 
desire to make a compromise with the developing countries.287 Thus, the problematic 
text of GATT Article XXIV is a result of many factors, encompassing economic, 
political, and strategic ones.
Although GATT Article XXIV provides WTO Members with the right to form 
an RTA with one another, it is conditional and sets out a number of requirements. If 
the RTA members satisfy them, they can rely on the article as a defence against 
GATT violations.288 However, the wording of GATT Article XXIV has long been 
subject to criticism as it is anything but clear.289
The validity of an RTA under GATT Article XXIV arose before a GATT 
panel for the first time in EC-Citrus Products.290 Although the Panel considered that
283 See M Hogan, The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction o f  Western Europe, 
1947-1952 (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1987), pp. 57-60.
284 See Chase, pp. 3-6.
285 See Mathis, pp. 37-40.
286 See FA Haight, 'Customs Unions and Free-Trade Areas under GATT: A Reappraisal ' (1972) 6 
Journal o f World Trade Law 391, pp. 394-7.
287 For further discussion, see Chase, pp. 12-6.
288 Reversing the Panel’s decision that GATT Article XXIV could be used as a defence only against 
GATT Article I, the Appellate Body in Turkey-Textiles held that “Article XXIV may, under certain 
conditions, justify the adoption of a measure which is inconsistent with certain other GATT provisions, 
and may be invoked as a possible defence to a finding of inconsistency.” See WTO Appellate Body 
Report, Turkey-Textiles, WT/DS34/AB/R, adopted 19 November 1999, paras. 42-5.
289 For more detail on the history of GATT Article XXIV and GATT practices, see S Cho, 'Breaking 
the Barrier between Regionalism and Multilateralism: A New Perspective on Trade Regionalism' 
(2001) 42 Harvard International Law Journal 419, pp. 435-43.
290 See GATT Panel Report, EC-Citrus Products, L/5776, 7 February 1985, (Report not adopted).
GATT Article XXIV was within its terms of reference,291 it was of the view that the 
lack of consensus among the CONTRACTING PARTIES with regard to the 
conformity of the RTAs in question suggested that their legal status remained open 
and so refrained from ruling on it.292
Since then, there have been two major developments: a legislative 
development was made in the form of the Understanding on the Interpretation of 
Article XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (the 1994 
Understanding); and a judicial development was made in 1999 with Turkey-Textiles. 
Nevertheless, GATT Article XXIV remains ambiguous and needs further 
clarification. Given the current RTA proliferation and the increased developing 
countries’ participation, not only should GATT Article XXIV be clarified, but due 
account should also be given to the challenges facing them. This chapter attempts to 
do so within the premises of Chapters 1,2, and 3.
The chapter is divided into two sections. The first section presents the existing 
framework of GATT Article XXIV, and the second section examines the article, 
specifically paragraphs 4, 5, and 8, in order to determine the extent to which GATT 
Article XXIV addresses the challenges facing developing countries amid the current 
RTA proliferation and whether there are any ways to improve the provisions so that 
the challenges can be better addressed.
4.2 Existing Framework
The underlying rationale behind GATT Article XXIV is that RTAs are only 
allowed as a reward for fully-fledged liberalization, in the form of either a CU or an 
FTA, among the member countries. Thus, it is important to note at the very outset 
that GATT Article XXIV does not make any exception for RTAs that fall short of a 
fully-fledged CU or FTA beyond a certain period of time. Partial scope agreements
291 Ibid., para. 4.5.
292 Ibid., para. 4.10.
293 See S-H Park, 'Regionalism, Open Regionalism and Article XXIV GATT: Conflicts and Harmony' 
in F Snyder (ed) Regional and Global Regulation o f  International Trade (Hart Publishing, Oxford 
2002), p. 276.
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will not suffice. The main substantive provisions of GATT Article XXIV are 
contained in paragraphs 4-8.
It is perhaps logical to start with paragraph 4 which sets out the objectives of 
the formation of an RTA. It states that:
[...] the purpose of a customs union or of a free-trade area should be to facilitate trade
between the constituent territories and not to raise barriers to the trade o f  other
* 294contracting parties with such territories (emphasis added).
Prior to Turkey-Textiles, it was not clear whether paragraph 4 merely set out the 
objectives of GATT Article XXIV and was precatory in nature, or actually imposed a 
separate legal obligation on RTA members.295 The Appellate Body in Turkey- 
Textiles, however, clarified this and held that:
Paragraph 4 contains purposive, and not operative, language. It does not set forth a 
separate obligation itself but, rather, sets forth the overriding and pervasive purpose for
Article XXIV which is manifested in operative language in the specific obligations that
296are found elsewhere in Article XXIV (emphasis added).
In other words, the legal requirements as expressed in the other provisions control and 
give effect to the objectives expressed in paragraph 4. This arguably makes paragraph 
4 an interpretative anchor for the provisions contained in GATT Article XXIV.
Paragraph 5 restricts members of a CU or an FTA from raising trade barriers 
in relation to non-members. In the case of a CU, subparagraph 5(a) specifies that:
with respect to a custom union, or an interim agreement leading to a formation of a 
custom union, the duties and other regulations of commerce imposed at the institution of
294 GATT Article XXIV:4.
295 This issue was first discussed in depth during the examination of the Treaty of Rome stabling the 
European Economic Community in 1957. The EEC’s representatives held that the paragraph was 
merely laying down a general principle that was translated into legal requirements in subsequent 
paragraphs. See GATT., Analytical Index o f  the GATT Guide to GATT Law and Practices (GATT, 
Geneva 1994), pp. 796-7. However, most of members of the Sub-Group were not prepared to accept 
this interpretation and argued that consistency with paragraph 4 was something to be checked 
separately. See GATT, ‘Report Submitted by the Committee on Treaty of Rome to the Contracting 
Parties’, L/778, 29 November 1957, Annex I, para. 3. For further discussion, see Z Hafez, 'Weak 
Discipline: GATT Article XXIV and the Emerging WTO Jurisprudence on RTAs' (2003) 79 North 
Dakota Law Review 879, pp. 890-1.
296 See WTO Appellate Body Report, Turkey-Textiles, para. 57. This is also supported by the Preamble 
of the 1994 Understanding which reaffirms the text of paragraph 4.
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any such union or interim agreement in respect of trade with contracting parties not 
parties to such union or agreement shall not on the whole be higher or more restrictive 
than the general incidence of the duties and regulations of commerce applicable in the 
constituent territories prior to the formation of such union or the adoption of such interim 
agreement, as the case may be;
In the case of an FTA, subparagraph 5(b) specifies that:
with respect to free-trade area, or an interim agreement leading to the formation of a free- 
trade area, the duties and other regulations of commerce maintained in each of the 
constituent territories and applicable at the formation of such free-trade area or the 
adoption of such interim agreement to the trade of contracting parties not included in 
such area or not parties to such agreement shall not be higher or more restrictive than the 
corresponding duties and other regulations of commerce existing in the same constituent 
territories prior to the formation of the free-trade area, or interim agreement as the case 
may be;
Subparagraph 5(c) states that “any interim agreement referred to in subparagraphs (a) 
and (b) shall include a plan and schedule for the formation of such a customs union or 
of such a free-trade area within a reasonable length of time.”
The difference in the rule for CUs and FTAs is necessary for practical reasons. 
A CU by definition involves elimination of each member’s individual schedule of 
duties and other regulations of commerce (ORCs) and substituting them with a regime 
of duties and ORCs common to all CU members. Unless the members have identical 
tariff schedules to begin with, the harmonization of their schedules will inevitably 
mean that the rates for each of the CU members will go up for some products and 
down for others. The same logic applies to individual ORCs and their harmonization. 
Subparagraph 5(a) requires that the common regime resulting from this harmonization 
does not on the whole impose higher duties or more restrictive ORCs on non­
members. By contrast, because the formation of an FTA by definition does not 
involve creating a common external regime for the members to apply to non- 
members, there is no process of adjusting each member’s external regime upward and 
downward to reach a common target. Instead, each FTA member maintains its own 
regime for trade with non-members, and under subparagraph 5(b) the duties and 
ORCs in each of these individual regimes cannot be higher or more restrictive after 
the formation of the FTA.
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Paragraph 5 has been clarified to some extent by the 1994 Understanding. It 
states that the calculation to assess whether the post-formation level of duties 
outweighs pre-formation ones shall be based on an overall assessment of weighted 
average tariff rates as well as applied (as opposed to bound) tariffs.297 In addition, it 
defines the term reasonable length o f time, with regard to subparagraph 5(c) interim 
agreements, as ten years and allows additional time only in exceptional cases with an 
obligation to provide full explanation.298
In order to deal with the possibility that the substitution of a regime of duties 
common to all CU members may cause the rates of each of the member to go up for 
some products and down for other products, paragraph 6 establishes the procedure 
which aims to compensate for adverse effects on non-members induced by any 
increase in bound rates of duty on the part of CU members. It reads:
[I]f, in fulfilling the requirements of subparagraph 5(a), a contracting party proposes to 
increase any rate of duty inconsistently with the provisions of [GATT] Article II, the 
procedure set forth in Article XXVIII shall apply. In providing for compensatory 
adjustment, due account shall be taken of the compensation already afforded by the 
reduction brought about in the corresponding duty o f the other constituents of the union.
A failure to properly carry out this procedure and/or compensate for the adverse 
effects can result in an affected non-member initiating the dispute settlement 
procedures under GATT Articles XXII and XXIII,299 It should be noted that the 1994 
Understanding clarifies and elaborates how paragraph 6 procedure is to be carried out 
by CU members.300
297 The assessment o f weighted average tariff rates and of customs duties will be based on import 
statistics for a previous representative period to be supplied by the customs union, on a tariff-line basis 
and in values and quantities, broken down by WTO country of origin. The Secretariat will compute the 
weighted average tariff rates and customs duties collected in accordance with the methodology used in 
the assessment o f tariff offers in the Uruguay Round. Note that for this purpose, the duties and charges 
to be taken into consideration are the applied, as opposed to bound, rates. See the 1994 Understanding, 
para. 2.
Ibid., para. 3.
299 For example, see GATT Panel Report, EEC-Oilseeds, L/6627-37S/86, adopted 25 January 1990, 
paras. 142-54.
00 See the 1994 Understanding, paras. 4 and 5. Arguably, as a result of the clarification, the procedure 
under paragraph 6 following the EC’s enlargements of 1995 and 2004 were carried out without 
subsequent complaints from non-members. For the agreement under GATT Article XXIV:6 between 
the EC and the United States following the EC’s enlargement to include Austria, Finland, and Sweden 
in 1995, see U.S. Trade Compliance Center, European Union Enlargement Compensation Agreement, 
22 July 1996. A similar agreement was reached following the EC’s enlargement to include Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Hungary, Cyprus, and Malta in
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Paragraph 7 imposes notification obligations on the part of RTA members 
(note the changes made by the 2006 Mechanism).301 It states:
(a) Any contracting party deciding to enter into a customs union or free-trade area, or an 
interim agreement leading to the formation of such a union or area, shall promptly notify the 
CONTRACTING PARTIES and shall make available to them such information regarding 
the proposed union or area as will enable them to make such reports and recommendations 
to contracting parties as they may deem appropriate.
(b) If, after having studied the plan and schedule included in an interim agreement referred to in 
paragraph 5 in consultation with the parties to that agreement and taking due account of the 
information made available in accordance with the provisions of subparagraph (a), the 
CONTRACTING PARTIES find that such agreement is not likely to result in the formation 
o f a customs union or of a free-trade area within the period contemplated by the parties to 
the agreement or that such period is not a reasonable one, the CONTRACTING PARTIES 
shall make recommendations to the parties to the agreement. The parties shall not maintain 
or put into force, as the case may be, such agreement if they are not prepared to modify it in 
accordance with these recommendations.
(c) Any substantial change in the plan or schedule referred to in paragraph 5(c) shall be 
communicated to the CONTRACTING PARTIES, which may request the contracting 
parties concerned to consult with them if the change seems likely to jeopardize or delay 
unduly the formation of the customs union or of the free-trade area.
Prior to Turkey-Textiles, paragraph 7 was relied on by RTA members in an attempt to 
prevent an affected non-member from bringing a case under GATT Article XXIII- 
arguing that the special procedure under paragraph 7 was more appropriate and its 
initiation barred Article XXIII procedure.302 However, by referring to paragraph 12 of 
the 1994 Understanding, the Panel in Turkey-Textiles confirmed that the WTO 
dispute settlement procedures can be used to challenge any matters arising from the 
application of the provisions of GATT Article XXIV, notwithstanding the initiation of 
a paragraph 7 procedure.303
2004, see Press Release, U.S. Trade Representative, United States and European Communities Reach 
Agreement on Enlargement Compensation Package, 30 November 2005.
301 This will be discussed in Chapter 7.
302 For example, see GATT Panel Report, EC-Citrus Products, paras. 3.11 and 3.19.
303 See the 1994 Understanding, para. 12 and WTO Panel Report, Turkey-Textiles, WT/DS34/R, 
adopted 19 November 1999, paras. 9.49-51.
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Paragraph 8 contains provisions which define the terms customs union and 
free-trade area under the WTO legal framework. It reads:
For the purpose of this Agreement:
(a) A customs union shall be understood to mean the substitution of a single customs 
territory for two or more customs territories, so that
(i) duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce (except, where necessary, 
those permitted under [GATT] Articles XI, XII, XIII, XIV, XV and XX) are 
eliminated with respect to substantially all the trade between the constituent 
territories of the union or at least with respect to substantially all the trade in 
products originating in such territories, and,
(ii) subject to the provisions of paragraph 9, substantially the same duties and other 
regulations of commerce are applied by each of the members of the union to the 
trade of territories not included in the union;
(b) A free-trade area shall be understood to mean a group of two or more customs 
territories in which the duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce (except, 
where necessary, those permitted under [GATT] Articles XI, XII, XIII, XIV, XV and 
XX) are eliminated on substantially all the trade between the constituent territories in 
products originating in such territories.
Members of a CU or an FTA are required to eliminate duties and other restrictive 
regulations of commerce (ORRCs) on a substantially all the trade basis among 
themselves. An exceptions clause in the rule provides that where necessary, members 
of a CU or an FTA are not required to eliminate those duties and ORRCs, which are 
permitted under GATT Articles XI, XII, XIII, XIV, XV, and XX. In the case of a CU 
or an interim agreement leading to it, members are also required to have substantially 
the same duties and ORCs as each other applied to their trade with non-members.
An important development made by the Appellate Body in Turkey-Textiles is 
the creation of a two-step test which the WTO Member relying on GATT Article 
XXTV as a defence against GATT violations has to pass. Having analysed the text of 
GATT Article XXIV, particularly the chapeau of paragraph 5, the Appellate Body 
held that:
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First, the party claiming the benefit of this defence [Article XXIV] must demonstrate that 
the measure at issue is introduced upon the formation of a customs union that fully meets 
the requirements of subparagraphs 8(a) and 5(a) of Article XXIV. And, second, that party 
must demonstrate that the formation of that customs union would be prevented if it were 
not allowed to introduce the measure at issue.304
The test would presumably apply to free-trade areas mutatis mutandis. The first part 
of the test requires the member to demonstrate that its RTA is compatible with the 
requirements set out in paragraphs 8 and 5. While the Panel was of the view that the 
CRTA was a more suitable WTO body for the task,305 the Appellate Body discarded 
the Panel’s view and held that panels and itself were capable of making the 
assessment of GATT Article XXIV compatibility, and they must do so before 
applying the second part of the test.306 It is noteworthy that both the Panel and the 
Appellate Body agreed that the assessment was an economic test.307 The second part 
of the test requires the member to demonstrate that the individual measure at issue is 
necessary for the formation of its RTA.
The two-step test was followed in a subsequent case. The Panel in US-Line 
Pipe Safeguard considered the requirements in subparagraphs 8(b) and 5(b), and 
found that NAFTA was in conformity with GATT Article XXIV.308 However, this 
was not upheld on a subsequent appeal. Having explained why it was redundant to 
look at the Panel’s findings with regard to GATT Article XXIV,309 the Appellate 
Body declared them “moot” and as having “no legal effects”.310 The sequence of 
examination can also be drawn from the parties’ arguments in Brazil-Tyres although 
in the end the Panel did not make a ruling on the compatibility of GATT Article 
XXIV as it exercised judicial economy.311
304 Ibid., para. 58.
305 See WTO Panel Report, Turkey-Textiles, para. 9.52. Note that in the end the Panel held that in order 
to address the claims of India, and in light o f the principle of judicial economy, it was not necessary to 
assess the compatibility of the Turkey-EC customs union agreement itself with Article XXIV, paras. 
9.52-55.
306 See WTO Appellate Body Report, Turkey-Textiles, paras. 59-60.
307 See Ibid., para. 55.
308 See WTO Panel Report, US-Line Pipe Safeguard, WT/DS202/R, adopted 8 March 2002, para. 
7.144.
309 See WTO Appellate Body Report, US-Line Pipe Safeguard, WT/DS202/AB/R, adopted 8 March 
2002, para. 198.
3.0 Ibid., para. 199.
3.1 See WTO Panel Report, Brazil-Tyres, WT/DS332/R, adopted 17 December 2007, paras. 4.387- 
4.424. Both Brazil and the EC followed the sequence of the two-step test in order to make their cases. 
Brazil argued that it had satisfied subparagraphs 8(a)(i) and (ii), and subparagraph 5(a) as it was using
It can be seen that the existing framework of GATT Article XXIV does 
provide some basis for RTA supervision. Paragraph 4 sets out the objectives of the 
formation of an RTA. Paragraph 5 imposes an obligation on the part of RTA members 
not to raise trade barriers in relation to non-members, which I will call third-party 
obligation. Paragraphs 6 and 7 establish procedures that promote transparency and 
allow RTA members and non-members to deal with effects of the formation of an 
RTA. Finally, paragraph 8 imposes an obligation on the part of RTA members to 
liberalize intra-RTA trade, which I will call intra-RTA obligation. Despite all this, 
GATT Article XXIV has long been criticized by many commentators as vague and 
ambiguous.312 Although the 1994 Understanding and the judgments in Turkey- 
Textiles help clarify the provisions to some extent, there are several ambiguities that 
still plague GATT Article XXIV. For example, the terms substantially all the trade 
and other restrictive regulations o f commerce have not been defined. As a result, the 
applications of GATT Article XXIV are not clear. The fact that very few cases on 
GATT Article XXIV are brought to the WTO DSM makes it difficult for panels and 
the Appellate Body to clarify the existing ambiguities. Even when they are, panels 
and the Appellate Body have managed to find a way not to make any judgment on the 
article.313
It is perhaps unlikely that WTO Members will bring GATT Article XXIV 
cases to the WTO DSM in the future. With the exception of Mongolia, all WTO 
Members are a party to one or more RTAs.314 There is, therefore, a conflict of 
interests here. While non-members would benefit if GATT Article XXIV (and the 
other sets of rules) were clarified and enforced strictly and rigorously, their own 
current and future RTAs would be at risk of violating it. In other words, the status quo 
where the provisions are unclear and their enforcement is weak is preferred by those 
Members whose RTAs would potentially have been WTO-incompatible otherwise. 
The absence of affirmative recommendation on the part of the GATT working parties 
and the CRTA suggests that this could be the case for most RTAs notified to the
GATT Article XXIV as a defence; while the EC argued to the contrary. For Panel’s decision to 
exercise judicial economy, see para. 7.456.
312 For example, see G Curzon, Multilateral Commercial Diplomacy: the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade and Its Impact on National Commercial Policies and Techniques (Michael Joseph, London 
1965), p. 64, Dam, p. 275, and Bhagwati, 'Regionalism and Multilateralism: an Overview', p. 44.
3,3 For example, see WTO Panel Report, Brazil-Tyres, para. 7.274 and WTO Appellate Body Report, 
Brazil-Tyres, WT/DS332/AB/R, adopted 17 December 2007, para. 256.
314 See Chapter 1.
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GATT/WTO.315 This conflict of interests, which results in the lack of political will on 
the part of WTO Members (and GATT CONTRACTING PARTIES before them), has 
arguably played a crucial role in the failure to make substantive reforms to GATT 
Article XXIV.
Besides the existing ambiguities, textually the article does not distinguish 
between developed and developing countries contemplating to form an RTA, unlike 
the Enabling Clause and GATS Article V.316 Neither does it appear to give any due 
account to the challenges facing by developing countries amid the current RTA 
proliferation, identified in Chapters 2 and 3. Thus, the following sections will 
examine the article, specifically paragraphs 4, 5, and 8, in order to determine the 
extent to which GATT Article XXIV addresses these challenges and whether there are 
any ways to improve the provisions so that the challenges can be better addressed.
4.3 GATT Article XXIV and the Challenges Facing Developing Countries
Recall, developing countries are confronted with a number of challenges amid 
the current RTA proliferation, particularly from the perspectives of a prospective 
RTA member and a non-member. As a prospective member, developing countries 
will wish to make the most out of the agreements they have decided to form. In order 
to do so, they have to promote the potential benefits and manage the potential costs. 
However, this is easier said than done. The key challenges include domestic vested 
interests, high implementation and adjustment costs, and their lack of analytical and 
negotiating capacities.317 On the other hand, the key challenge facing non-member 
developing countries is the adverse effects caused by trade and investment 
diversion.318 The following sections will be discussed in light of these challenges and 
the need to address them.
3,5 This will be discussed in Chapter 7.
316 See Chapters 5 and 6.
3.7 See Chapter 2.
3.8 See Chapter 3.
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4.3.1 Purpose o f GATT Article XXIV as Contained in Paragraph 4 and the 
Challenges
According to paragraph 4, the purpose of an RTA should be to facilitate trade 
between the member countries, and not to raise trade barriers in relation to non­
members. From the texts of paragraphs 5 and 8, one could argue that the requirements 
set out in paragraph 8 aim to facilitate trade between the member countries while 
those in paragraph 5 aim to prevent trade barriers in relation to non-members from 
being raised, although the texts do not state so explicitly.
To what extent does paragraph 4 deal with the challenges? The first sentence 
of paragraph 4 states:
[T]he contracting parties recognize the desirability of increasing freedom o f  trade by the 
development, through voluntary agreements, o f closer integration between the economies 
of the countries parties to such agreements (emphasis added).
With the phrases such as increasing freedom o f trade and closer integration between 
the economies, this sentence seems to support the position that RTA members can and 
should benefit from the formation of an RTA as a result of gains from trade creation 
and the dynamic effects, which derive from the elimination of trade barriers between 
the member countries.319 Thus, to the extent that the objective to facilitate trade 
between the member countries can be read to promote these gains, it can be used to 
guide the interpretation of the requirements set out in paragraph 8.
The objective not to raise trade barriers in relation to non-members is, on the 
other hand, more problematic. As discussed in Chapter 3, non-members are likely to 
be adversely affected as a result of trade and investment diversion, which is caused by 
the formation of an RTA.320 The only way that trade diversion can be totally avoided 
is to allow external trade barriers to adjust following the formation so that trade with 
non-members is fixed at the pre-formation level.321 The logic is that if external trade 
is maintained at the pre-formation level, any additional internal trade that results from
319 See Chapter 2.
320 See Chapter 3.
321 See Kemp and Wan, 'An Elementary Proposition Concerning the Formation o f Customs Unions'.
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the formation must be a product of trade creation.322 Article XXIV seeks to protect 
non-members by ensuring that trade barriers are not raised with respect to them. 
However, this falls short of dealing with trade diversion in the entirety. The objective 
not to raise trade barriers in relation to non-members can only be read as a standstill 
obligation since trade can be diverted as result of preferences granted between the 
member countries without trade barriers in relation to non-member being raised. In 
addition, paragraph 4 does not suggest any adjustment of external trade barriers to 
maintain external trade at the pre-formation level. Thus, certain amount of trade 
diversion is bound to exist.
As far as investment diversion is concerned, it occurs as a result of tariff- 
jumping investment.323 This can be worsened if a hub-andspoke system is formed.324 
Since this type of investment is triggered purely by tariff preferences, the greater the 
margin of preference between members and non-members is, the worse investment 
diversion will be. Although the objective not to raise trade barriers in relation to non- 
members may ensure that the margin of preference is not widened after the formation 
of an RTA, it does not reduce the margin of preference which is initially created by 
the formation. Thus, the second objective contained in paragraph 4 appears to deal 
with trade and investment diversion only to a limited extent. Nevertheless, given that 
preferential treatment is intrinsic in how RTAs operate, the stand-still nature of 
paragraph 4 second objective (and the third-party obligation under paragraph 5) is 
arguably inevitable. Further mitigation of trade and investment diversion may have to 
be pursued at the multilateral level or unilaterally.325
It is important to note that there is nothing in paragraph 4 that makes any 
reference to developing countries. The objectives appear to apply to North-North, 
North-South, and South-South RTAs on an equal basis. In other words, GATT Article 
XXIV does not distinguish between developed and developing countries. This is 
contrast with paragraph 3 of GATS Article V which explicitly incorporates the special 
and differential treatment principle into the article. The absence of an explicit 
incorporation of such principle into GATT Article XXIV makes it more difficult to
322 However, the practical implications of this result are not clear since external tariffs tend to be set by 
a combination of welfare concerns, domestic political constrains, and multilateral negotiations. See 
Chapter 2.
323 See Chapter 2.
324 See Chapter 3.
325 This will be discussed below.
326 This will be discussed in Chapter 6.
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deal with the challenges since it would have provided one with a legal basis for 
different interpretations of the provisions. Nevertheless, the remainder of the chapter 
will explore whether there are certain ways that the requirements contained in 
paragraphs 5 and 8 can be interpreted in order to address the challenges.
4.3.2 Intra-RTA Obligation and the Challenges Facing Developing Countries from  
the Perspective o f  a Prospective Member
The intra-RTA obligation contained in paragraph 8 aims to achieve paragraph 
4 first objective. Essentially, RTA members have to make sure that they liberalize 
trade between themselves on a substantially all the trade basis. Thus, the main focus 
of this section is the SAT requirement.
The duty half of the SAT requirement
What does the term substantially all the trade mean? During the GATT years, 
some CONTRACTING PARTIES held that the SAT requirement only contained 
quantitative component while others advocated for a case-by-case approach. For 
example, during the examination of the Treaty of Rome, the European Economic 
Community (EEC) took a quantitative approach and argued that 80 per cent of the 
total trade should qualify as substantially all the trade.327 Other members of the 
Working Party disagreed as they were of the view that every CU or FTA needed to be 
considered on its merits, and it would be improper to fix a percentage of trade which 
must be liberalized internally.328 Until now, WTO Members are yet to agree on the 
matter.
The decision in Turkey-Textiles has however shed some light over the SAT 
requirement. Both the Panel and the Appellate Body were of the view that the word 
substantially in subparagraph 8(a) had both quantitative and qualitative
327 See supra note 295, Annex IV, para. 30.
328 Ibid., Annex IV, para. 34.
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components.329 In addition, with regard to subparagraph 8(a)(ii) where the word 
substantially qualifies the word same, the Appellate Body held that “something 
closely approximating sameness” was required by subparagraph 8(a)(ii) and the 
standard of “comparable trade regulations” suggested by the Panel would not 
suffice.330 This means that the word substantially, at least in the context of 
subparagraph 8(a)(ii), implies something very close to the word that it qualifies. By 
analogy, in the context of subparagraphs 8(a)(i) and (b), the word substantially would 
imply something very close to the word all. While these judgments help clarify the 
meaning of the word substantially, it does not say exactly when the SAT requirement 
is satisfied.
Besides the Panel and the Appellate Body’s judgments, it is useful to look at 
what has been tabled by WTO Members as well. One of the most active Members in 
this area is Australia. It has proposed to the WTO Negotiating Group on Rules that the 
term substantially all the trade be defined as eliminating all duties on a minimum of 
95 per cent of tariff lines at the six digit level of the Harmonized System (HS-6) and 
that RTA members would have the flexibility of a ten-year transitional period as well 
as the ability to exclude from commitments five per cent of tariff lines provided that 
at least 70 per cent of tariffs at the six digit level are eliminated on entry into force of 
an RTA.331 This tariff-line-based approach is a quantitative approach to the SAT 
requirement. It aims to ensure a comprehensive coverage of all major sectors and pre­
empt the exclusion of some sectors in which little trade takes place. However, on its 
own the tariff-line-based approach does not reflect the actual goods which are traded 
between the RTA members. This, in turn, can result in a situation where few but 
heavily-traded tariff lines are left out of the coverage of liberalization, which would 
greatly reduce the impact of the agreements.332
Another quantitative approach to the SAT requirement is a method based on a 
share of the volume of trade. Instead of relying on tariff lines, this trade-volume-based 
approach relies on a quantitative benchmark of a percentage of trade volume being
329 See WTO Appellate Body Report, Turkey-Textiles, para. 49.
330 See WTO Appellate Body Report, Turkey-Textiles, para. 50.
331 See WTO Negotiating Group on Rules, ‘Submission on Regional Trade Agreements by Australia’, 
TN/RL/W/180 (13 May 2005), paras. 4-6.
332 See Background survey by the Secretariat, ‘Coverage, Liberalization Process and Transitional 
Provisions in Regional Trade Agreements’, WT/REG/W/46 (5 April 2002).
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traded between the RTA members.333 For example, 90 per cent of trade between the 
members must be subject to tariff elimination commitment. While this approach 
would reflect the reality, it does not take into account the potential trade, which does 
not exist and might have existed but for the tariff peaks between the member 
countries.
Given that both quantitative approaches have their own advantages and 
disadvantages, a combination of the two methods has been proposed. In its latest 
submission, Australia introduces the concept of highly traded products which should 
complement its tariff-line-based approach.334 Highly traded products are defined as 
those that represent more than 0.2 per cent of the total imports from the RTA partner, 
at the HS-6 level;335 or alternatively they are defined as the top 50 imports of each 
RTA member at the HS-6 level that are traded between the RTA partners. Tariffs on 
these products would have to be eliminated upon entry into force of the agreement or 
within ten years. The tariff-line-based approach coupled with the concept of highly 
traded products would arguably mitigate the situation where few but heavily-traded 
tariff lines are left out of the coverage of liberalization. Furthermore, in order to deal 
with the products which would have been traded but for the tariff peaks, Australia 
introduces the concept of significant exports. These are defined as HS-6 level 
products that represent for each party at least two per cent of their exports to the 
world. Tariffs on such significant exports would have to be subject to elimination 
commitment whether or not they represent a significant share of the current trade 
between the members.336
It can be seen that Australia’s proposal goes further than the Panel and the 
Appellate Body’s judgments in Turkey-Textiles by specifying the numerical 
benchmark at which the duty half of the SAT requirement is to be satisfied. The 
proposal seems to combine the two quantitative methods, hence their strengths, in a
333 This trade-volume based approach has traditionally been adopted by the EU in most of its RTAs. 
For more detail, see R Lang, 'Renegotiating GATT Article XXIV- a priority for African countries 
engaged in North-South trade agreements' (Work in Progress No33, African Trade Policy Centre, 
Addis Ababa 2006), p. 27.
334 See supra note 331, paras. 12-5.
335 Given that there are approximately 5600 HS-6 lines, each line count as roughly 0.0002 per cent of 
the total. The Australian proposition therefore amounts to selecting the products for which the trade is 
approximately 100 times superior to the simple average repartition.
3 See supra note 331, paras. 16-7.
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qualitative fashion. This is in line with the judgment that the word substantially in 
subparagraph 8(a) has both quantitative and qualitative components.337
With regard to the timeframe for the SAT requirement, Australia has called for 
70 per cent liberalization of all tariff lines upon the entry into force of RTAs. This is 
rather front-loaded,338 The remaining 25 per cent must be liberalized within ten years. 
To put it differently, Australia proposes to limit what RTA members can do in staging 
their liberalization commitments. Moreover, Australia argues that the practice where 
WTO Members provide implementation periods for tariff phase-in commitments 
(often longer than ten years) for those RTAs which are not notified as interim 
agreements under subparagraph 5(c) of GATT Article XXIV has no legal basis.339 
Thus, according to its proposal only those agreements which are notified as interim 
agreements would be entitled to the ten-year transitional period.340
Having examined Australia’s definition of and timeframe for the duty half of 
the SAT requirement, one is faced with a dilemma. On the one hand, the proposal 
clarifies how the SAT requirement is to be complied with and arguably gives an 
alternative solution to the long-standing quantitative-qualitative debate. Such 
improvements would significantly help the CRTA with its reviewing process, and 
panels and the Appellate Body with the first part of the two-step test. On the other 
hand, the proposal does not distinguish between developed and developing countries. 
Consequently, it would impose on the latter rather demanding obligations. This has 
been criticized as going against the latter’s interests.341
A demanding definition of and a tight timeframe for the SAT requirement 
means that developing-country partners have less flexibility with regard to their trade 
policy space. This, in turn, may limit their ability to promote the potential benefits and 
manage the potential costs induced by the formation of an RTA. As discussed in
337 See WTO Appellate Body Report, Turkey-Textiles, para. 49.
338 Front-loaded tariff liberalization progress refers to a situation where the RTA member eliminates 
duties on the majority of its tariff lines early on during the transitional period; whereas, back-loaded 
progress, on the other hand, refers to a situation where the RTA member eliminates duties on the 
majority o f its tariff lines later on during the transitional period. It is noteworthy that the tariff 
liberalization process on the part of the developing-country partners tends to be back-loaded as they 
may need more time to adjust to the consequences of tariff elimination, e.g. loss of tariff revenue. 
Given the relatively higher MFN rates, revenue losses incurred by the developing-country partners are 
likely to be greater than those incurred by their developed-country counterparts.
339 On the general practice with regard to interim agreements under subparagraph 5(c), see L Bartels, 
"Interim Agreements' under Article XXIV GATT' (2009) 8 World Trade Review 339.
340 See supra note 331, paras. 18-21.
341 For example, see CMO Ochieng, 'The EU-ACP Economic Partnership Agreements and the 
Development Question': Constraints and Opportunities Posed by Article XXIV and Special and 
Differential Treatment Provisions of the WTO' (2007) 10 Journal o f International Economic Law 363.
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Chapter 2, developing countries are likely to need greater flexibility, particularly in 
North-South RTAs because they need to unlock the existing competitive structure in 
trade between themselves and their developed-country counterparts where the latter 
tend to export more sophisticated, high value-added manufactured products and 
services, and the former are limited to primary goods and relatively cheaper, labour- 
intensive products and services- creating large imbalances in trade gains between the 
two groups of countries.342 Furthermore, full liberalization may also involve high 
implementation and adjustment costs. If developing countries are allowed to eliminate 
tariffs over a longer period of time and/or stage their liberalization commitments more 
freely, they should be able to manage these costs better. Thus, with a high threshold of 
95 per cent of tariff lines and a front-loaded elimination obligation coupled with a ten- 
year transitional period under Australia’s proposal, developing countries would find it 
much more difficult to manage the potential costs induced by the formation of an 
RTA.
However, I propose that a demanding definition of and a tight timeframe for 
the SAT requirement can be beneficial to developing-country partners, specifically in 
North-South RTAs, provided that it is accompanied by special and differential 
treatment for them.343 As mentioned in Chapter 2, developing countries generally tend 
to have less bargaining power compared to their developed-country counterparts. 
Consequently, a large and powerful country like Japan can protect its agriculture by 
abusing the currently ill-defined SAT requirement. For example, it is doubtful that in 
a bilateral RTA with Japan a developing-country partner would be able to force it to 
comprehensively liberalize its agricultural sectors. This is, in fact, what happened in 
the RTAs formed between Japan and the ASEAN countries.344 Under such 
circumstances, developing countries may have to make a trade-off for the inclusion of 
agriculture in the RTA- for example, by committing to services liberalization. Such a 
trade-off might not be suitable for their stage of development and result in 
unnecessary implementation and adjustment costs.
342 See Chapter 2.
343 In line with the Panel and the Appellate Body’s judgments in Turkey-Textiles, the word 
substantially in subparagraphs 8(a)(i) and (b) should have both quantitative and qualitative 
components. In addition, a high threshold of the SAT requirement with regard to the duty half coupled 
with a tight timeframe similar to Australia’s proposal should be adopted. Given that the word 
substantially qualifies the word all, such an approach is arguably supported by the text. The logic is 
similar to how the Appellate Body interpreted the word substantially in the context of subparagraph 
8(a)(ii). See WTO Appellate Body Report, Turkey-Textiles, para. 50.
344 See Chapter 3.
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If what proposed here is accepted, developed-country partners will not be able 
to exclude major sectors such as agriculture from goods RTAs. For example, faced 
with Australia’s proposal for the SAT requirement, Japan would find it more difficult 
not to open at least some of its protected sectors on a timely basis since it would have 
to eliminate 95 per cent of its tariff lines within a period of ten years, with 70 per cent 
of all tariff lines eliminated upon the entry into force of its RTA. Thus, if developed- 
country partners were already required by GATT Article XXIV to eliminate a very 
high proportion of their tariffs on a timely basis, they would have fewer bargaining 
chips to lure developing-country partners to make inappropriate trade-offs. This, in 
turn, would allow developing countries to negotiate RTAs more effectively to their 
advantage. In other words, the lesser the SAT requirement allows flexibility, the 
lesser the large and powerful partner can exploit its bargaining power. This should 
level the playing field for developing countries to some extent and allow them to 
make better deals in RTA negotiations.
Besides promoting a level playing field, the proposed high threshold and strict 
timeframe for the SAT requirement may deter developed countries from forming 
RTAs with developing countries in the first place since they would be required to 
open more of their sensitive sectors and could gain less from the trade-offs. This is 
arguably desirable since if an RTA is to be formed between developed and developing 
countries, the latter should not be exploited due to its lack of analytical and 
negotiating capacities. Under the proposal, North-South RTAs which were concluded 
would be more mutually beneficial and allow developing-country partners to use 
RTAs as a positive means to achieve their policy objectives. Furthermore, the more 
stringent SAT requirement may also reduce enthusiasm on the part of prospective 
RTA members and slow down the rate at which RTAs proliferate- bringing attention 
back to multilateral trade negotiations.
Despite the proposed demanding definition of and timeframe for the SAT 
requirement, flexibility can nevertheless be provided for developing countries if the 
special and differential treatment principle is incorporated into GATT Article XXIV. 
The ACP countries have put forward a number of ways in which this can be achieved. 
It is proposed that for the duty half of the SAT requirement, favourable methodology 
and/or lower threshold levels in the measurement of trade and product coverage
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should be applicable for developing-country partners.345 For example, under 
Australia’s proposal, developing-country partners would be allowed to eliminate less 
than 95 per cent of their tariff lines; and/or they may be exempt from the applications 
of highly traded products and significant export. With regard to the timeframe for the 
SAT requirement, the ACP countries propose that the maximum length of the 
transitional period permissible should not be less than 18 years.346
The incorporation of the special and differential treatment principle may 
arguably have a basis under the Preamble of the Marrakesh Agreement where it is 
recognized that “there is need for positive efforts designed to ensure that developing 
countries, and especially the least developed among them, secure a share in growth in 
international trade commensurate with the needs of their economic development.”347 
Alternatively, the special and differential treatment principle could be incorporated 
into GATT Article XXIV on the basis of Part IV of GATT 1947.348 It is true that the 
Panel in EEC-Bananas //rejected the EEC’s claim that GATT Article XXIV read in 
light of Part IV of GATT 1947 could be used as a defence against a violation of 
GATT Article I because the Lome Convention did not constitute an FTA under 
GATT Article XXIV: 8(b). However, it did not rule out the possibility that GATT 
Article XXIV could be interpreted in light of Part IV of GATT 1947.349 For example, 
an interpretation of the SAT requirement that allows some sort of semi-reciprocity 
between developed and developing-country partners should give the latter the 
flexibility to promote the potential benefits and manage the potential costs induced by 
the formation of an RTA.
Although the ACP submission is to be welcomed and it may be possible to use 
the special and differential treatment principle to afford some flexibility for 
developing countries, it is very important to have some limits. This is because too 
much flexibility on the part of developing-country partners may have unintended and 
undesirable consequences. For example, if a developing-country partner is subject to a
345 See WTO Negotiating Group on Rules, ‘Submission on Regional Trade Agreements by the ACP 
Group of States’, TN/RL/W/155 (28 April 2004), para. 11.
346 It is noteworthy that the incorporation of the special and differential treatment principle proposed by 
the ACP countries is to apply to all developing-country Members alike. In other words, the report does 
not propose a country-specific approach to the special and differential treatment principle. See Ibid.
347 See the Marrakesh Agreement, Preamble.
348 See GATT Article XXXVI:8, which states that “[T]he developed contracting parties do not expect 
reciprocity for commitments made by them in trade negotiations to reduce or remove tariffs and other 
barriers to the trade of less-developed contracting parties.”
349 See GATT Panel Report, EEC-Bananas II, DS38/R, 11 February 1994 (Report not adopted), paras. 
159-62.
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very low threshold of the SAT requirement and a very long transitional period, it may 
lose sight of its initial goals (e.g. to liberalize trade in order to benefit from efficiency 
and competitive gains) as governments and circumstances change over time.
Another important undesirable consequence is that if a developing-country 
partner is allowed too much discretion to pick and choose which products or 
industries to protect, domestic vested interests may be able to lobby the government to 
exclude those that would result in trade-creating effects. As discussed in Chapter 2, 
RTAs are likely to be politically viable exactly when they are trade-diverting, and 
hence welfare-reducing.350 In addition, non-member developing countries can be 
adversely affected as a result of trade diversion induced by such agreements. Thus, 
too much flexibility can undermine the commitments made by developing-country 
partners, which can harm both themselves and non-member developing countries. 
Furthermore, excess flexibility may have implications on the predictability of how a 
developing-country partner liberalizes the intra-RTA trade. With a wide discretion, it 
would be very difficult for non-members to predict how much and when the 
developing-country partner would liberalize its intra-RTA trade. On the other hand, if 
the SAT requirement, as incorporated with special and differential treatment, is still 
kept sufficiently demanding, non-members would know what to expect and could 
respond accordingly. Therefore, I believe that the flexibility afforded for developing 
countries must be provided within certain limits.
Given the high stake and conflict of interests involved in the reform of GATT 
Article XXIV, it is hard to contemplate that any extreme proposals will be accepted 
by WTO Members. If any substantive changes were to be made, there must be a 
compromise. It is noteworthy that Australia and the EU are willing to discuss how the 
special and differential treatment principle can be incorporated into GATT Article 
XXIV.351 I propose that the special and differential treatment should be in the form of 
a lower threshold level in the measurement of trade and product coverage, as opposed 
to different methodology. This way, it would be simpler and would not require WTO 
Members to agree on two separate methodologies. In addition, if future research and 
experience warrants, the threshold levels (both for developed and developing
350 See Grossman and Helpman, and Krishna, 'Regionalism and Multilateralism: A Political Economy 
Approach'.
35 See supra note 331, para. 22, and WTO Negotiating Group on Rules, ‘Submission on Regional 
Trade Agreements by the European Community’, TN/RL/W/179 (12 May 2005), para. 16(a), 
respectively.
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countries) can be adjusted so that trade creation is maximized and at the same time 
developing-country partners are granted sufficient flexibility. As trade diversion is 
discouraged, non-member developing countries should benefit as well.
The way in which the SAT requirement is calculated can be used as a means 
to incorporate the special and differential treatment principle into GATT Article 
XXIV. One can define the SAT requirement as an inclusion of certain percentage of 
the combined tariff lines of the RTA members. The tariff-line-based approach can be 
calculated in aggregation rather than in separation with the assumption that the 
developed-country partner will take on greater responsibility and liberalize more. For 
example, if the average threshold is set at 90 per cent of the combined tariff lines, in a 
bilateral North-South RTA the developed-country partner can eliminate 100 per cent 
of its tariff lines and the developing-country partner 80 per cent- together an average 
o f 90 per cent of tariff lines between the members is eliminated. This way, GATT 
Article XXIV will still result in some sort of a semi-reciprocal relationship between 
developed and developing countries in North-South RTAs. Alternatively, the tariff- 
line-based approach can be calculated in separation with a lower threshold for the 
developing-country partner, e.g. 90 per cent o f its tariff lines as compared to 95 per 
cent for the developed-country partner, for example.
It should be noted that the aggregation approach would allow the RTA 
members to negotiate mutually acceptable thresholds for the SAT requirement for 
themselves as long as the required average is met; whereas, the separation approach 
would specify (by the WTO) a priori the thresholds the members have to meet. In my 
view, the separation approach is more preferable than the aggregation approach since 
developing countries may be forced to accept a higher threshold in the latter approach, 
given their limited negotiating capacity. In other words, the aggregation approach 
permits special and differential treatment for developing countries, but it does not 
require it. One would have to reply on peer review (through the CRTA’s reviewing 
mechanism) and self-imposed responsibility on the part of the developed-country 
partner. The separation approach, on the other hand, guarantees special and 
differential treatment for developing countries. However, it is acknowledged that for 
WTO Members to agree on one threshold level for the SAT requirement is likely to 
be very difficult already let alone two.
In line with the idea of staging liberalization, the transitional period for 
developing countries may be divided into stages. For example, upon entry into force
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of a North-South RTA, the developing-country partner would have to eliminate 40 per 
cent of its tariff lines; another 30 per cent would have to be eliminated within ten 
years; and further 20 per cent would have to be eliminated within 15 years. Such 
staged and back-loaded liberalization commitments would allow the developing 
country to manage implementation and adjustment costs induced by the formation and 
at the same time force it to carry out the commitments on a timely basis rather than 
leave everything to the end of the transitional period. As for the developed-country 
partner, it can be subject to Australia’s proposal, for example. Thus, from this 
illustration, the developing-country partner is committed to eliminate duties on 90 per 
cent of its tariff lines in three stages over a period of 15 years, and the developed- 
country partner 95 per cent in two stages over a period of ten years (the SAT 
requirement is calculated in separation in this example). In addition, since the 
percentages of tariff lines and the time in which they are subject to liberalization 
commitments are set out, non-members would be better informed and able to react or 
deal with possible adverse effects induced by the formation of an RTA.
It is also argued that something similar to the concepts of highly traded 
products and significant exports should be adopted in order to compliment the tariff- 
line-based approach so as to mitigate its defects. Such concepts should apply to all 
WTO Members on an equal basis to ensure that RTA members are encouraged to 
liberalize intra-RTA trade. The application of the concept of highly traded products 
would reinforce the existing trade between RTA members. This is in line with the 
theory of natural trading partners, discussed in Chapter 2.352 The concept of 
significant exports, on the other hand, would ensure that major exports of each 
member country are included in the agreement. If a country is a major exporter of 
certain products to the rest of the world, it is likely that the country has comparative 
advantage in these products, i.e. producing them most cheaply. Thus, the inclusion of 
such products in the RTA would be more likely to promote trade creation in the 
preferential area.
From the proposal put forward, the transitional period for developing-country, 
partners would be available only if they notify their RTAs as interim agreements (i.e. 
similar to Australia’s submission). The length of the transitional period for 
developing-country partners by default falls within exceptional cases and could be set
352 See Chapter 2.
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at 15 years, for example. This would only be available to developing countries.353 
Such a moderately strict timeframe and the obligation to provide plan and schedule 
would encourage developing countries to set out targets and take their commitments 
more seriously. In addition, availability of plan and schedule would increase 
transparency, which in turn would benefit non-members as well.
It is important to note that the figures in the previous paragraphs (in relation to 
the threshold levels, stages of liberalization, and transitional periods) are chosen for 
illustrative purposes only. Research should be conducted in order to set out the exact 
and optimal numerical benchmarks and transitional periods (including different stages 
of liberalization) for the duty half of the SAT requirement.
The proposed approach to the duty half of the SAT requirement is not far from 
reality. Scollay finds that if the transitional period is ten years and if the SAT 
requirement is defined as an inclusion of 95 per cent of the combined tariff lines of 
the partners, three out of 14 RTAs354 reviewed fail to meet this definition.355 If this 
definition is applied to each member on an individual basis, the three RTAs still fail to 
meet this definition. Given the same ten-year transitional period, if the SAT 
requirement is instead defined as an inclusion of 90 per cent of the combined tariff 
lines of the partners, only one RTA fails to meet this definition; whereas, if it is 
defined as 90 per cent of the tariff lines of each RTA member on an individual basis, 
only two RTAs do not comply with the definition.356 However, if the transitional 
period is allowed to exceed ten years, all agreements comply with the definition. In 
addition, if the SAT requirement takes the trade-volume-based approach and the 
transitional period exceeds ten years, Scollay finds that there are very few cases where 
excluded products account for more than ten per cent of the trade between the 
partners.357 Thus, the proposal is pragmatic in the sense that to a large extent it 
reflects what already occurs in practice. This reflection would ease the tension on the
353 This way, developed-country partners would have to commitment themselves to genuine 
liberalization process. Similar position is also proposed by China. See WTO Negotiating Group on 
Rules, ‘Submission on Regional Trade Agreements by China’, TN/RL/W/185 (22 July 2005), para. 11.
354 The RTAs are: US-Chile, US-Jordan, US-Australia, US-Singapore, Singapore-Japan, Singapore- 
Australia, Singapore-New Zealand, Thailand-Australia, Thailand-New Zealand, Korea-Chile, Canada- 
Costa Rica, Canada-Chile, Mexico-Chile, EU-Chile, EU-South Africa, EU-Morocco, EU-Czech 
Republic, and EU-Lithuania.
355 See R Scollay, "'Substantially All Trade": Which Definitions Are Fulfilled in Practice? An 
Empirical Investigation' (APEC Study Centre, Melbourne 2005), pp. 11-3.
356 Ibid.
357 Ibid., pp. 14-6. The WTO meanwhile observed that FTA coverage rarely falls below 50 per cent, was 
higher than 75 per cent but with most notified under GATT Article XXIV having over an estimated 85 
per cent coverage. See supra note 332.
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debate whether the result from the Doha Round negotiations would apply 
retroactively to existing RTAs.
The proposals made so far are arguably in line with the first objective set out 
in paragraph 4, i.e. to facilitate trade between the member countries. The demanding 
definition of and tight timeframe for the SAT requirement would ensure that sufficient 
trade between the member countries are liberalized on a timely basis. The high 
threshold levels would leave less room for domestic vested interests to influence the 
governments and ensure that products and industries, which would result in trade- 
creating effects, are subject to liberalization commitments. Furthermore, the proposed 
differences in the threshold and timeframe for developed and developing countries 
would level the playing field between them as the former have less room to 
manoeuvre.
On the other hand, some flexibility can be given to developing countries 
through the incorporation of the special and differential treatment principle into 
GATT Article XXIV. The proposed different applications of the SAT requirement to 
developed and developing countries in terms of the percentage of liberalized tariff 
lines, staging of liberalization commitments, and transitional periods, would ensure 
that the former cannot exclude certain products or industries, e.g. agriculture, from 
liberalization commitments and have to carry them out on a timely basis. This, in turn, 
should allow the latter to negotiate the agreement more effectively and afford them 
the flexibility needed to promote the potential benefits and manage the potential costs 
induced by the formation of an RTA.
The proposed special and differential treatment would be generalized and 
available to all developing countries alike. However, given the heterogeneity of 
developing countries, a more country-specific approach to the proposals could be 
developed in order not to afford flexibility for those which do not need it. One way to 
do this is to further divide developing-country WTO Members into subgroups.358
For example, in a proposal for a new approach to special and differential 
treatment in the agricultural negotiations by the International Food and Agricultural
358 On general discussion of the special and differential treatment principle and a need to clarify it, see 
BM Hoekman, C Michalopoulos and A Winters, 'More Favourable and Differential Treatment of 
Developing Countries: Toward a New Approach in the World Trade Organization' (Policy Research 
Working Paper No3107, World Bank, Washington, DC 2003).
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Trade Policy Council (the IPC proposal) for the Doha Round,359 developing-country 
Members were to be divided into three categories: the LDCs, comprising of the 
countries with per capita incomes below $900, weak human resources and vulnerable 
economies;360 the lower middle income developing countries, including countries with 
gross national income per capita361 between $901 and $3,035; and the upper middle 
income developing countries, including those countries with GNI per capita between 
$3,035 and $9,385. Such a criterion is also used by the World Bank as the criterion to 
classify countries for operational and analytical purposes. Consequently, the 
threshold of and timeframe for the SAT requirement could be adjusted accordingly- 
that is a higher threshold and a tighter timeframe for the UMIDCs and more lenient 
requirements for the LMIDCs and LDCs. Under this method, any self-proclaimed 
developing countries that have higher GNI per capita than $9,385 would not be 
eligible to the special and differential treatment.363 Not only would such 
differentiation offer a more nuanced approach to special and differential treatment for 
developing countries in the case of North-South RTAs, it would also make it fairer in 
the case of South-South RTAs notified under GATT Article XXIV where the member 
developing countries are different in terms of size, income and stage of development.
It should be noted that the thesis does not suggest that the IPC proposal is the 
best way to categorize developing countries. Better and more sophisticated methods 
or criteria might exist or could be further developed.364 Nevertheless, given that a 
country’s analytical and negotiating capacities are generally related in an approximate 
fashion to its size and level of economic development, GNI per capita is arguably a 
good criterion. In addition, the IPC proposal also suggests that “countries should also 
be able to petition for classification into the next lower income category if their per
359 See International Food and Agricultural Trade Policy Council, 'An IPC Position Paper; A New 
Approach to Special and Differential Treatment' (International Food and Agricultural Trade Policy 
Council, Washington, DC 2004), available at http://www.agritrade.org/Publications/Position%20Papers 
/13%20SND.pdf (last accessed 16 July 2010).
360 Note that in the IPC proposal, the LDCs defined include more countries than those under the UN 
definition of LDCs. See Ibid. and http://www.unctad.org/templates/Page.asp?intItemID=3641&lang=l 
(last accessed 16 July 2010).
361 GNI per capita is the dollar value of a country’s final income in a year divided by its population. It 
reflects the average income of a country’s citizens.
362 See http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-classifications (last accessed 16 November 2010).
363 For example, Singapore whose GNI per capita in 2009 is $35,294 would not be eligible. See 
http://www.singstat.gov.sg/stats/themes/economy/hist/gnp.html (last accessed 17 July 2010).
364 For further discussion, see Cui.
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capita income does not reflect their unique vulnerabilities.” Something similar 
could be adopted here. For example, the empirical work conducted by the Trade 
Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM) could be used as a basis for such petition or even 
for the differentiation of the three subgroups in the first place.
Given that circumstances and conditions change over time, a review 
mechanism for graduation is also important to move developing countries up (or 
down) the subgroups. For example, an LMIDC must graduate to a UMIDC once its 
GNI per capita improves, and hence subject to more demanding requirements.
Despite its benefits, how realistic is this sharper differentiation of developing 
countries? On the one hand, a more nuanced approach to special and differential 
treatment is likely to be welcome by developed-country WTO Members as advanced 
developing countries like the Republic of Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan, or big 
developing countries like Brazil, China, and India can arguably compete with them on 
a more equal footing. On the other hand, these countries may oppose to such 
differentiation as they would be subject to more demanding requirements. Given the 
conflict of interests and the resulting lack of political will on the part of WTO 
Members, any attempt to incorporate the special and differential treatment principle 
into GATT Article XXIV is not going to be easy. It may well be the case that a 
generalized approach to special and differential treatment is a first and necessary step 
before a more comprehensive country-specific special and differential treatment 
regime can be further developed.
The ORRC half of the SAT requirement
In the previous section, the discussion is on the duty half of the SAT 
requirement. Paragraph 8, however, requires RTA members to eliminate other 
restrictive regulations o f commerce on a substantially all the trade basis as well. To 
apply the SAT requirement, one has to know what the term ORRCs means.
365 According to the IPC proposal, “unique vulnerabilities” could be judged by the proportion of 
population undernourished according to the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), or if the 
country is a single commodity exporter. See International Food and Agricultural Trade Policy Council, 
p. 3.
- 11 6-
Unfortunately, its meaning has yet to be agreed by WTO Members.366 Neither did the 
Panel and the Appellate Body in Turkey-Textiles take the opportunity to clarify it. 
Although the exact meaning of the term ORRCs is still unsolved, it must arguably 
refer to a sub-group of NTBs between RTA members. Or to put it in the terms of 
paragraph 4 first objective, RTA members are required to eliminate certain non-tariff 
barriers {i.e. ORRCs) between themselves on a substantially all the trade basis in 
order to facilitate intra-RTA trade.
As an integral part of the SAT requirement, the definition of the term ORRCs 
is crucial to how the requirement operates. If a wide definition were adopted, 
developing-country partners would be required to eliminate a large number of non­
tariff barriers falling within the definition on a substantially all the trade basis. On the 
one hand, this would reduce their trade policy space, which in turn might restrict what 
they could do to promote the potential benefits and manage the potential costs 
induced by the formation of an RTA. For example, subsidies can be used by 
developing-country partners to mitigate the effects of increased competitions from 
their RTA partners. On the other hand, such elimination would ensure that trade 
between the members were liberalized as much as possible. This, in principle, would 
enhance the static and dynamic gains induced by the formation. Thus, a desirable 
situation is where the term is defined in such a way that maximizes the gains induced 
by the formation and at the same time does not impose so burdensome an obligation 
that developing countries cannot meet and/or do not have the flexibility they need. Is 
this possible?
As discussed in Chapter 2, effects of non-tariff barriers and their removals are 
much less visible compared to those of tariffs. The literature, in fact, primarily focuses 
on the latter.368 Furthermore, by definition NTBs can cover any trade measures other 
than tariffs. Thus, even though the term ORRCs may refer to a sub-group of NTBs, it 
is still extremely difficult to define it precisely. Given that the proposals made in the 
WTO Negotiating Group on Rules only deal with the duty half of the SAT
366 For the drafting history of GATT Article XXIV and the 1994 Understanding in connection with 
ORRCs and ORCs, see Background Note by the Secretariat, ‘Systemic Issues Related to ‘Other 
Regulations of Commerce” , WT/REG/W/17/Rev. 1 (5 February 1998). For a useful review of the 
approach taken to these terms by working parties during the GATT years, see Background Note by the 
Secretariat, ‘Systemic Issues Related to ‘Other Regulations of Commerce” , WT/REG/W/17/Add. 1 (5 
November 1997).
367 See Chapter 2.
368 Ibid.
requirement, one is left with the impression that WTO Members find this to be the 
case as well.369 In addition, some non-tariff measures such as measures failing under 
GATT Article XX do have legitimate social objectives other than to restrict trade 
between the member countries. Consequently, it would be unreasonable to require 
RTA members to eliminate them. This is arguably why the exceptions list was 
inserted to subparagraphs 8(a)(i) and (b) in the first place.
There is also disagreement whether the list is exhaustive or not.370 This adds 
complication to the ORRC half of the SAT requirement. Thus, in order to make the 
SAT requirement workable, I argue that it would make more sense to separate the 
ORRC half from the duty half for the application of the SAT requirement. In other 
words, RTA members would be subject to the demanding definition of and tight 
timeframe for the duty half of the SAT requirement, albeit the proposed special and 
differential treatment available for developing countries, while the ORRC half would 
be enforced separately with less rigour. The concern with this proposal is whether 
intra-RTA trade would be sufficiently facilitated in accordance with paragraph 4 first 
objective.
As discussed earlier, paragraph 4 first objective encourages RTA members to 
eliminate trade barriers- be they tariff or non-tariff- between themselves so that they 
benefit from the static and dynamic gains induced by the formation of an RTA. 
However, the effects of their removals on these gains may not be the same in light of 
other WTO commitments.
The starting point is that tariffs are imposed on imported foreign products but 
not domestically produced ones. As a result, tariffs distort trade since they artificially 
increase the prices of imports, and hence reducing access to the domestic market. 
According to GATT Article I, WTO Members are however required not to 
discriminate between these foreign products, i.e. the MFN obligation. In other words, 
WTO Members are allowed to discriminate (through tariffs) between foreign and 
domestic products, but not between foreign products. The formation of an RTA, on
369 For example, see the proposals made by Australia, supra note 332, and the ACP group of States, 
supra note 345.
37 For detailed discussion on the exceptions list, see R Hudec and J Southwick, 'Regionalism and 
WTO Rules: Problems in the Fine Art of Discrimination Fairly' in M Rodriguez Mendoza and P Low 
(eds), Trade Rules in the Making: Challenges in Regional and Multilateral Negotiations (Brookings 
Institution Press, Washington, DC 1999), pp. 63-72. On whether GATT Article XIX and the 
Safeguards Agreement fall within the exceptions list, see J Pauwelyn, The Puzzle of WTO Safeguards 
and Regional Trade Agreements' (2004) 7 Journal o f International Economic Law 109.
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the other hand, requires the member countries not to discriminate between products 
imported from the partner country and domestic ones. Consequently, when RTA 
members eliminate tariffs between themselves (on a substantially all the trade basis 
or entirely), they remove the distortion from which the static and dynamic gains 
derive.371
By contrast, as far as NTBs are concerned, WTO Members are also required 
not to discriminate between foreign and domestic like products. For examples, 
internal taxation and regulation are subject to the national treatment obligation 
contained in GATT Article III; and NTBs concerning sanitary and phytosanitary 
(SPS) and technical barriers to trade (TBT) measures are subject to similar non- 
discriminatory obligations as well.372 In light of these commitments, the existing 
distortion (between foreign and domestic products) caused by NTBs is arguably 
mitigated. On this basis, the potential gains from the formation of an RTA would 
principally derive from tariff elimination. Thus, the strict enforcement of the duty half 
of the SAT requirement should be sufficient to achieve paragraph 4 first objective.
This is not to say that the elimination of ORRCs on a substantially all the 
trade basis would not result in the static and dynamic gains. It is simply argued that 
given the difficulties involved in defining the term ORRCs and the smaller margin of 
preference between foreign and domestic products created by them in light of other 
WTO commitments, WTO Members should make more efforts to agree on the duty 
half and make the SAT requirement workable by separating the two. In addition, 
without a clear definition of the term ORRCs, special and differential treatment for 
developing countries would only be in the form of a longer transitional period and not 
a lower threshold of the SAT requirement, unlike the duty half. Here, a numerical 
benchmark is much trickier to establish, if at all possible. One would be required to 
identify all the ORRCs existing prior to the formation of an RTA and then determine 
whether a substantial number of them have been eliminated by the end of the
371 It should be noted that the extent of the gains also depends on other factors, for example the 
magnitudes of trade-creating and trade diverting effects. See Chapter 2.
372 See the SPS Agreement, Article 2.3: “Members shall ensure that their sanitary and phytosanitary 
measures do not arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate between Members where identical or similar 
conditions prevail, including between their own territory and that of other Members. Sanitary and 
phytosanitary measures shall not be applied in a manner which would constitute a disguised restriction 
on international trade.” See also the TBT Agreement, Article 2.1: “Members shall ensure that in respect 
of technical regulations, products imported from the territory of any Member shall be accorded 
treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like products of national origin and to like products 
originating in any other country.”
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transitional period. In order to do this, one would need to know what the term ORRCs 
actually encompasses. Furthermore, given that each ORRC may have different impact 
on trade between the member countries, it may make no sense to establish such a 
numerical benchmark in the first place. The fact that there are fewer prospects for 
special and differential treatment coupled with the difficulties involved in defining the 
term ORRCs means that a precise substantive requirement is more problematic here 
(than the duty half) and lax enforcement is arguably more pragmatic.
Nevertheless, further clarification to the definition of the term ORRCs and its 
application to the SAT requirement would be welcome. One could start with 
exploring whether there are any non-tariff measures which discriminate between 
foreign and domestic products and are not captured by the national treatment 
obligation and the likes, for example tariff quotas. If there are, they should be covered 
by the term ORRCs and RTA members should be required to eliminate them on a 
substantially all the trade basis. This would contribute to the achievement of 
paragraph 4 first objective. In any case, special and differential treatment in the form 
of longer transitional periods should be adopted for developing countries similar to 
what proposed for the duty half of the SAT requirement.
4.3.3 Third-party Obligation and the Challenge o f Trade and Investment Diversion
The third-party obligation contained in paragraph 5 aims to achieve paragraph 
4 second objective. Essentially, RTA members have to make sure that the post­
formation duties and other regulations o f commerce in relation to non-members are 
not higher or more restrictive than before the formation.373 This is in line with the 
stand-still nature of paragraph 4 second objective.
Given that the 1994 Understanding deals with the duty aspect of the 
obligation, the difficulty lies in the term ORCs,374 The term appears in both 
paragraphs 5 and 8. Under subparagraph 8(a)(ii), it is an integral part of the 
requirement that CU members have to harmonize their tariff and non-tariff measures
373 Note the difference between obligation for CU and FT A members discussed earlier.
374 See the 1994 Understanding, para. 2.
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applied to their trade with non-members. The term ORCs under paragraph 5, on the 
other hand, is an integral part of the third-party obligation.
The Panel in Turkey-Textiles interpreted the term ORCs in the context of 
paragraph 5 quite broadly to include “any regulation having an impact on trade (such 
as measures in the fields covered by WTO rules, for example SPS, customs valuation, 
anti-dumping, TBT; as well as any other trade-related domestic regulation, for 
example environmental standards, export credit schemes).”375 However, CU members 
are required to have substantially the same ORCs. As mentioned earlier, the Appellate 
Body in Turkey-Textiles interpreted this requirement rather strictly.376 The broad 
interpretation of the term ORCs and the strict interpretation of the term substantially 
the same, would impose a heavy burden on developing-country CU members.
So, one is left with an overwhelming sense that the Panel’s definition of ORCs 
must either be limited to paragraph 5 considerations, or since the identical term is 
used in both paragraphs 5 and 8, that the definition is simply overstated as it would 
define ORCs generally.377 Given that the requirements contained in paragraph 5 aim 
to prevent trade barriers in relation to non-members from being raised while those in 
paragraph 8 aim to facilitate trade between RTA members {i.e. paragraph 4 
objectives), I propose that the term ORCs should have different meanings under the 
two paragraphs.378
In order not to impose an impossible burden on developing-country CU 
members, the term ORCs under subparagraph 8(a)(ii) should be defined narrowly. As 
for paragraph 5, the broad definition of ORCs held by the Panel in Turkey-Textiles 
can be adopted. This would widen the scope of non-tariff barriers/measures that must 
not become more restrictive after the formation of an RTA. As a result, RTA 
members would have to be more careful during the negotiating and implementing
375 See Panel Report, Turkey-Textiles, para. 9.120.
376 See WTO Appellate Body Report, Turkey-Textiles, para. 50.
377 See Mathis, pp. 251-2.
378 This approach is in line with what the Appellate Body in Japan—Alcohol suggested for the term like 
products contained in subparagraphs 2 and 4 of GATT Article III. It held that “[T]he concept of 
“likeness” is a relative one that evokes the image of an accordion. The accordion of “likeness” stretches 
and squeeze in different places as different provisions of the WTO Agreement are applied. The width of 
the accordion in any of those places must be determined by the particular provision in which the term 
“like” is encountered as well as by the context and the circumstances that prevail in any given case to 
which that provision may apply.” See WTO Appellate Body Report, Japan—Alcohol, 
WT/DS8,10,11/AB/R, adopted 4 October 1996, p. 21. See also R Hudec, '"Like Product": The 
Differences in Meaning in GATT Articles I and III' in T Cottier, PC Mavroidis and P Blatter (eds), 
Regulatory Barriers and the Principle o f  Non-discrimination in World Trade Law (University of 
Michigan Press, Ann Arbor 2000), pp. 101-23.
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stages in order not to violate this requirement. The broad definition would offer non­
member developing countries greater protection.
Nevertheless, as discussed in the context of paragraph 4, it is important to note 
that the third-party obligation only deals with trade and investment diversion to a 
limited extent due to its stand-still nature. Any further mitigation of trade and 
investment diversion will have to be achieved at the multilateral level or unilaterally. 
For example, if WTO Members decide to cut their MFN tariff rates further, the 
margin of preference between RTA members and non-members will be less. This will 
automatically reduce trade and investment diversion. Alternatively, Srinivasan has 
proposed at the 1999 WTO high-level symposium on trade and development that a 
sunset clause be introduced to RTAs whereby preferences available to the member 
countries would be extended to all WTO Members after a certain period of time.379 
Although such a clause would significantly protect non-members’ interests, the 
proposal is likely to be strongly opposed by RTA members. In addition, it would 
make RTA negotiations much more complex as prospective members would have to 
contemplate the effects of multilateralizing RTA preferences at the end of the sunset 
period. Thus, multilateral/unilateral trade liberalization seems to be the most viable 
option to further mitigate the adverse effects of trade and investment diversion.
Given that non-tariff barriers/measures change over time, it is arguably very 
difficult to have a one-off examination conducted by the CRTA that would offer non­
members perpetual protection from the adverse effects of ORCs being more 
restrictive after the formation of an RTA.380 It may well be the case that an affected 
non-member would have to resort to the DSM in order to protect its interests on a 
case-by-case basis. The broad definition of ORCs under paragraph 5 would widen the 
basis of a legal claim in the DSM. It is noteworthy that subparagraphs 5(a) and (b) do 
not specify a timeframe for the requirements therein. This supports the idea of 
perpetual protection for non-members through the DSM and stresses the problem with 
a one-off examination under the CRTA.
Another limitation of the third-party obligation is that it is not clear whether 
rules of origin fall within the definition of the term ORCs. As discussed in Chapter 2,
379 See World Trade Organization, The Report o f  the WTO high-level symposium on trade and 
development (1999), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/summhl_e.htm (last 
accessed 23 July 2010). Currently, the life of an RTA is permanent until the member countries decide 
to dissolve it, and Article XXIV does not impose any time limit on exclusive RTA preferences.
380 The mechanisms of the CRTA and DSM will be discussed in Chapter 7.
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such rules are necessary in FTAs as they prevent trade deflection. Essentially, rules of 
origin imply constraints on firms as to from where they can source their intermediate 
inputs. By restricting firms’ choices on sourcing of intermediates, rules of origin can 
be used as protectionist devices to extend protection from high-tariff members of an 
FTA to low-tariff members.381 This would lessen trade-creating effects and worsen 
trade-diverting effects. Furthermore, extremely detailed rules of origin can also 
generate cumbersome paperwork for exporters that becomes increasingly costly as 
multiple agreements are signed, each with unique rules at the product level. Thus, if 
the term ORCs covered rules of origin, RTA members would be required to ensure 
that they are not more restrictive after the formation of an RTA.
However, there is disagreement among WTO Members on whether rules of 
origin can be classified within the meaning of ORCs. For example, the United States 
has argued that rules of origin in an FTA merely deal with intra-RTA trade and 
determine the eligibility for the preferences granted by it, and in this sense they do not 
fall within the meaning of ORCs in terms of external trade of the FTA.383 By contrast, 
the Republic of Korea was of the view that in order to benefit from preferential 
treatment provided under an FTA, companies within it will naturally tend to increase 
local sourcing, which is bound to be injurious to the suppliers of non-members 
irrespective of their efficiency.384
Given the effects of rules of origin on trade and the broad definition of the 
term ORCs held by the Panel in Turkey-Textiles, i.e. “any regulation having an impact 
on trade”, one could argue that they should be captured by the term ORCs. Doing so 
would offer non-members further protection from trade diversion.
Unfortunately, the term corresponding in subparagraph 5(b) seems to 
presuppose that ORCs must exist at the pre-formation stage. Prior to the formation of
381 The rules of origin of the US-Canada FTA and NAFTA for ketchup demonstrate the effect that 
overly restrictive rules of origin can have. Under the applicable CUSFTA rule of origin, ketchup made 
in the United States or Canada from tomato paste imported from non-members {e.g. Chile) was 
considered of CUSFTA origin and therefore enjoyed the CUSFTA preferential tariff. After NAFTA 
rules o f origin replaced those of CUSFTA, only ketchup made from tomato paste from a NAFTA 
country could receive the NAFTA preferential tariff. As a result, after the creation of NAFTA Chile 
ceased being the leading exporter of tomato paste to the United States and was overtaken by Mexico. 
See Annex 401, NAFTA, available at www.nafta-sec-alena.org (last accessed 27 July 2010). See also 
D Palmeter, The WTO as a Legal System: Essays on International Trade Law and Policy (Cameron 
May, London 2003), pp. 142-3.
382 See Chapter 2.
383 See Committee on Regional Trade Agreements, ‘Note on the Meetings of 27 November and 4-5 
December 1997’, WT/REG/M/15 (13 January 1998), para. 59.
384 See Committee on Regional Trade Agreements, ‘Note on the Meetings of 6-7 and 10 July 1998’, 
WT/REG/M/18 (22 July 1998), para. 23.
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an FTA, a common regime of rules of origin between the member countries may or 
may not exist. For example, if an existing FTA is enlarged to another, more expansive 
FTA (such as the transformation of the Canada-US FTA (CUSFTA) into NAFTA), 
the comparison is between the common rules of origin at the time of CUSFTA and 
that of NAFTA. However, there is no common rule of origin in the case of the 
formation of a new FTA. As can be seen from Chapter 1, countries tend to form new 
(bilateral) FTAs rather than expand existing ones. Thus, there are more cases where a 
common regime of rules of origin between the member countries does not exist prior 
to the formation of an FTA. Thus, due to the wording of paragraph 5, an attempt to 
regulate rules of origin through the term ORCs does not seem to provide a good 
solution. This reinforces the limited extent that the third-party obligation can deal 
with trade and investment diversion.
A few innovative solutions have been put forward at the 2007 WTO 
Conference on Multilateralizing Regionalism.385 However, to date, no progress has 
been made at the multilateral level. Given that the potential misuse of these rules as 
protectionist devices is real, it is important that WTO Members make serious efforts 
to deal with them.
4.4 Conclusion
Although WTO Members may disagree on how to improve GATT Article 
XXIV, they can easily agree that the current situation is less than satisfactory as the 
provisions therein are plagued by many ambiguities. Although efforts made on the 
part of WTO Members have resulted in the 2006 Mechanism, it is procedural in 
nature.386 Substantive reforms have yet to emerge.
385 See M Gasiorek, P Augier and C Lai-Tong, 'Multilateralising Regionalism: Relaxing Rules of 
Origin or Can Those PECS be Flexed?' (Conference on Multilateralising Regionalism, WTO, Geneva 
2007) and A Estevadeordal, J Harris and K Suominen, Multilateralizing Preferential Rules of Origin 
around the World' (Conference on Multilateralising Regionalism, WTO, Geneva 2007), both available 
at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/conference_sept07_e.htm (last accessed 23 July 
2010).
386 The 2006 Mechanism will be discussed in Chapter 7.
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The chapter attempts to clarify some of these ambiguities in such a way that 
would address the challenges facing developing countries amid the current RTA 
proliferation. For example, the high threshold of and tight timeframe for the duty half 
of the SAT requirement is proposed for developed countries so that developing 
countries can negotiate their RTAs more effectively. On the other hand, special and 
differential treatment is proposed for the latter so that they have the flexibility to 
promote the potential benefits and manage the potential costs induced by the 
formation of an RTA.
Textually, there is, however, a limit to the extent that GATT Article XXIV can 
be used to protect non-member developing countries. The requirements contained in 
paragraph 5 as read in light of paragraph 4 second objective can only tackle trade and 
investment diversion in a limited fashion. This illustrates the inadequacy of GATT 
Article XXIV in protecting non-members’ interests. To correct this inadequacy, 
efforts have to be made at the multilateral level or unilaterally, for example a 
commitment to further reduce MFN tariff rates.
Nevertheless, given that trade and investment diversion depends on how RTA 
members design and implement their agreements, the proposals made in relation to 
paragraph 8 which encourage trade creation and discourage trade diversion should, to 
some extent, help protect the interests of non-member developing countries.
Nothing in GATT Article XXIV appears to deal with the constraints on 
developing countries’ analytical and negotiating capacities as identified in Chapter 2, 
however. Although some of the proposals could help neutralize asymmetries of the 
bargaining power between developed and developing countries, they do not directly 
foster the development of both capacities. Given their importance to the success of 
RTA negotiations (and those at the multilateral level), more efforts should be made to 
help developing countries build analytical and negotiating capacities. This will be 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 7.
As far as goods RTAs are concerned, GATT Article XXIV is not the only set 
of applicable rules. The Enabling Clause also contains provisions which govern how 
South-South RTAs are to be formed. Although a number of such agreements have 
been notified under GATT Article XXIV, the majority of them are notified under the 
Enabling Clause. Consequently, Chapter 5 will examine the Enabling Clause in light 
of the challenges facing developing countries amid the current RTA proliferation.
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Chapter 5
The Enabling Clause: South-South RTAs
5.1 Introduction
As more and more developing countries joined the GATT, the issue of equal 
treatment of countries at different stages of economic development had become more 
and more controversial.387 Developing countries claimed that the GATT and its 
framework concerned only with the interests of developed countries and were geared 
towards the solution of their problems.388 As the issue started to attract the attention of 
the CONTRACTING PARTIES, the GATT ministerial decision on 29 November 
1957 noted, inter alia, that the failure of the trade of less-developed countries to 
develop as rapidly as that of industrialized countries was a major problem for 
international trade.389
In response to the concerns among many developing countries that they were 
not benefiting from the GATT regime, the CONTRACTING PARTIES began to 
debate ways to assist with their efforts to integrate into the global economy and 
achieve economic development. These include trade preferences granted by 
developed to developing countries and preferences granted among developing 
countries. Such preferential arrangements are however contrary to the MFN 
obligation contained in GATT Article I. In 1979, the CONTRACTING PARTIES 
enacted the Enabling Clause, which waived the application of the MFN obligation to 
preferential tariff concessions granted by developed to developing countries in the
387 For further discussion on the changes in international economic order occurred during this period, 
see EP Reubens, 'An Overview of the NIEO' in EP Reubens (ed) The Challenge o f  the New 
International Economic Order (Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado 1981), pp. 1-18.
388 See A Yusuf, Legal Aspects o f  Trade Preferences fo r  Developing States: a Study in the Influence o f  
Development Needs on the Evolution o f  International Law (Nijhoff, The Hague 1982), p. 10.
389 See GATT, 'Trends in International Trade' (GATT, Geneva 1958), Terms of Reference. The 
document is also known as the Haberler Report.
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form of the GSP and those granted among developing countries in the form of South- 
South RTAs. It is rules concerning the latter which are the main focus of this chapter.
The rules governing the formation of South-South RTAs under the Enabling 
Clause have never been tested in the GATT/WTO DSM. Nor has there been any in- 
depth examination carried out on the part of the CTD with regard to South-South 
RTAs notified to it.390 Thus, in order to understand the provisions therein and how 
they should operate in relation to the challenges facing developing countries amid the 
current RTA proliferation, it is important that one looks at the history of the Enabling 
Clause and rationale behind it.
As will be discussed in more detail below, the rules concerning South-South 
RTAs under the Enabling Clause are much more lenient than those under GATT 
Article XXIV. It will be my argument in this chapter that they are so lenient that they 
result in excess flexibility, which may not necessarily translate into trade/economic 
benefits in practice. Furthermore, since the Enabling Clause only applies to South- 
South RTAs, and is not available to developing countries forming RTAs with their 
developed-country trade partners, the existence of the Enabling Clause creates, in my 
view, undesirable complication and inconsistency in the treatment of RTAs which 
have developing-country Members as parties. The two sets of rules may create two 
types of South-South RTAs, namely, those notified under GATT Article XXIV and 
those under the Enabling Clause, the legal consequences of which are not clear and 
may result in discrepancy. I thus propose that there should be a single set of rules for 
the formation of goods RTAs, i.e. GATT Article XXIV, but only if the special and 
differential treatment proposed in Chapter 4 is incorporated into it.
The chapter is divided into three sections. The first section discusses the 
history of the Enabling Clause and the rationale why the rules concerning South- 
South RTAs were included. The second section presents the existing framework of 
the Enabling Clause with regard to these agreements. The third section examines the 
relevant provisions in order to determine the extent to which they address the 
challenges facing developing countries amid the current RTA proliferation and 
whether there are any ways to improve them so that the challenges can be better 
addressed.
390 The WTO surveillance mechanisms for RTAs will be discussed in Chapter 7.
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5.2 History and Rationale
The origin of the Enabling Clause can be traced back to the demand made by 
developing countries that the fundamental principles of MFN and reciprocity 
underpinned the GATT should be challenged as they were heavily biased in favour of 
developed countries and hindered the former’s efforts to achieve economic 
development through trade.391 Essentially, developing countries argued that under the 
MFN and reciprocity principles, they were treated the same as their developed- 
country counterparts even though their economies and economic realities were much 
different from the latter’s.392 Such “equal treatment of unequal development” was 
deemed inequitable by developing countries.393 Throughout the 1950s, developing 
countries made several attempts to adapt the GATT to their specific development 
needs, many of which led to modifications and additions to the legal text.394
In the 1960s, they looked further afield and turned to the United Nations for 
renewed inspiration. The first United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
was convened in Geneva in 1964 at the insistence of developing countries in order to 
discuss “all vital questions relating to international trade, primary commodity trade, 
and economic relations between developed and developing countries”.395 One of the 
most important documents which were submitted to the Conference was the Report by 
the then Secretary-General, Mr. Raul Prebisch, entitled “Towards a New Trade Policy 
for Development”.396 This report clearly spelled out the demands and proposals of 
developing countries for restructuring international economic relations. The 
dissatisfaction of developing countries with the existing trade patterns and principles 
was expressed by the report in the following way:
The imposing code of rules and principles, drawn up at Havana and partially embodied in 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), does not reflect a positive
391 See JH Jackson, Economic Policies Towards Less-Developed Countries (Allen and Unwin, London 
1967), p. 237
392 See Yusuf, pp. 8-10.
393 Ibid.
394 For example, GATT Article XVIII (Governmental Assistance to Economic Development).
395 See Declaration issued at the end of the Cairo Conference on Problems of Developing Countries, 
U.N., Doc/A/5162. See also D Cordovez, 'The Making of UNCTAD' (1967) 1 Journal of World Trade 
Law 259, p. 259.
396 See Report by the Secretary-General of UNCTAD, 1964, U.N., Doc/E/Conf.46/3.
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conception of economic policy in the sense of a rational and deliberate design for 
influencing economic forces so as to change their spontaneous course of evolution and 
attain clear objectives. On the contrary, it seems to be inspired by a conception of policy 
which implies that the expansion of trade to the natural advantage of all merely requires 
the removal of the obstacles which impede the free play of these forces in the world 
economy. These rules and principles are also based on an abstract notion of economic 
homogeneity which conceals the great structural differences between industrial centres 
and peripheral countries with all their important implications. Hence, GATT has not 
served the developing countries as it has the developed ones. In short, GATT has not
helped to create the new order which must meet the needs of development, nor has it
397been able to fulfil the impossible task of restoring the old order.
The report then went on to draw up a manifesto of developing countries aimed 
at the establishment of a dynamic international trade policy which could favour the 
increase of the volume of their trade, the diversification of its components, and the 
assurance for their primary commodities of fair and remunerative export prices. It 
called for a three-pronged approach to the solution of development problems:
a) International commodity agreements to give less-developed producers of primary 
products the same sort o f price support and price-stabilization assistance as was enjoyed 
by the farmers of the developed countries;
b) Preferential access for manufacturers and semi-manufacturers from developing 
countries to the markets o f the developed countries, to enable them to compete on equal 
terms with the manufacturers of those countries, their preferential advantage over the 
other advanced countries manufacturers compensating them for the competitive 
disadvantage of underdevelopment; and
c) Preferential arrangements among developing countries, falling short o f  the GATT
requirements fo r  customs unions and free-trade areas, to permit them to gain the
398advantages o f specialization in a larger market (emphasis added).
Meanwhile, some progress was made in the GATT. After the adoption of the 
non-reciprocity principle at the GATT ministerial meeting of 1963, it was decided 
that a legal and institutional framework should be elaborated within the GATT in such 
a way that would enable the CONTRACTING PARTIES to discharge their
responsibilities towards the development objectives of developing countries. This 
decision led to the incorporation of a new Part IV into GATT 1947, entitled “Trade 
and Development”, which introduces for the first time in the GATT framework a clear 
differentiation between developed and developing countries, and the idea of non- 
reciprocity between them.399
More central to the purposes of this chapter, GATT CONTRACTING 
PARTIES were supportive to the idea of preferential arrangements among developing 
countries.400 Although it was not clear as to how such arrangements could be 
conducted, the GATT Working Party on preferences reported in 1964 that “there is no 
disagreement on the principle involved in the granting of preferences between less- 
developed countries” 401 Subsequently, the CTD endorsed the conclusion that “the 
establishment of preferences among less-developed countries, appropriately 
administered and subject to the necessary safeguards, can make an important 
contribution to the expansion of trade among these countries and to the attainment of 
the objectives of the General Agreement.”402
In 1971, the Protocol Relating to Trade Negotiations among Developing 
Countries (the 1971 Protocol) was negotiated and agreed among GATT 
CONTRACTING PARTIES.403 Its origin can be traced back to the agreement 
between India, Yugoslavia, and the United Arab Republic, concluded in 1967, 
providing for an exchange of tariff preferences between the three signatories.404 The 
CONTRACTING PARTIES granted a waiver for the tripartite agreement,405 and then 
created a negotiating committee, under the Chairmanship of the Director General, to 
conduct negotiations among developing countries generally.406 After four years, the 
negotiations produced the 1971 Protocol covering an exchange of tariff preferences 
between sixteen developing countries.407
399 For further discussion on the legal effect o f Part IV, see K Kock, International Trade Policy and the 
GATT, 1947-1967 (Almqvist and Miksell, Stockholm 1969), p. 243 and Jackson, World Trade and the 
Law o f  GATT, p. 661.
400 See Dam, p. 251.
401 See GATT BISD (1965) 13 S/100-104.
402 See GATT BISD (1966) 14S/129-136.
403 See GATT BISD (1972) 18S/11-18.
404 See GATT, L/2950/Add.l (4 March 1968).
405 See GATT BISD (1969) 16S/17-19.
406 See MA-B Hamaz,'Guidebook for the GSTP: the Global System of Trade Preferences Among 
Developing Countries- Origins, Dimensions, Negotiations and Prospects' (UNCTAD, Geneva 1987),
pp. 2-8.
407 Thirteen were GATT CONTRACTING PARTIES: Brazil, Chile, Egypt (replacing the United Arab 
Republic), Greece, India, Israel, the Republic of Korea, Pakistan, Peru, Spain, Turkey, Uganda, and
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However, it should be noted that the 1971 Protocol was not further developed 
nor joined by other developing countries despite the permanent legal status given to it 
by the Enabling Clause.408 Instead, UNCTAD captured the initiative and launched its 
own negotiations on preferential arrangements among developing countries, which 
later resulted in the Global System of Trade Preferences (GSTP) 409 Within the GATT 
framework, the GSTP was notified under the Enabling Clause in 1989 and currently 
has 43 members 410
Fundamentally, the concept of preferences among developing countries is 
incompatible with the MFN principle under the GATT as they are not extended to the 
rest of the GATT membership. This is why in 1971 the CONTRACTING PARTIES 
adopted a decision which waived the application of the MFN obligation to preferential 
tariff concession granted among developing countries under the 1971 Protocol411 In 
1979, the waiver was made permanent by the Enabling Clause, which was later 
incorporated into GATT 1994 412 Not only did the Enabling Clause make permanent 
the waiver, but it also effectively created a new route within the GATT/WTO 
framework for the formation of South-South RTAs in addition to GATT Article 
XXIV.413
Yugoslavia. Mexico, the Philippines, and Tunisia were not GATT CONTRACTING PARTIES at the 
beginning, but became CONTRACTING PARTIES subsequently. Subsequent additions to the 
membership were Bangladesh, Paraguay, and Romania. Greece and, later Spain withdrew upon their 
accession to the EU.
408 See R Hudec, Essays on the Nature o f  International Trade Law (Cameron May, London 1999), pp. 
333-4. See also http://rtais.wto.org/UI/CRShowRTAIDCard.aspx?enc=qOoqsxtwKtAGhWmLC54zKF 
qWApNLPat07zIvM5KRdXE= (last accessed 17 September 2010).
4 9 See R Hudec, Developing Countries in the G AIT Legal System (Thames Essays, No50, Gower for 
the Trade Policy Research Centre, Aldershot 1987), pp. 109-12. The GSTP currently has 43 members 
and is open to accession by members of the G77. For more detail, see http://www.unctadxi.org 
/Secured/GSTP/Legallnstruments/gstp en.pdf (last accessed 2 August 2010). It should be noted that 
members of the GSTP grant trade preferences to one another with no intention to create a fully-fledged 
CU or FTA.
410 The GSTP currently has 43 members and is open to accession by members of the G77. See 
http://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicShowMemberRTAIDCard.aspx?enc=qOoqsxtwKtAGhWmLC54zKERaz 
v356zD7+srNPPl/q8c= (last accessed 29 August 2010). See also http://www.unctadxi.org/Secured/ 
GSTP/LegalInstruments/gstp_en.pdf (last accessed 2 August 2010). It should be noted that members of 
the GSTP grant trade preferences to one another with no intention to create a fully-fledged CU or FTA.
411 See Trade Negotiations among Developing Countries, Decision of 26 November 1971, L/3636. For 
further discussion on the 1971 Protocol, see Hudec, Essays on the Nature o f  International Trade Law, 
p. 333 and GATT BISD (1972) S I8/11-18.
12 See GATT 1994, Article l(b)(iii). For more detail on the history of the Enabling Clause, see NB dos 
Santos, Rr Farias and R Cunha, 'Generalized System of Preferences in General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade/World Trade Organization: History and Current Issues' (2005) 39 Journal of World Trade 
637.
413 See Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of 
Developing Countries (Enabling Clause), Decision of 28 November 1979, L/4903.
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It can be seen from the discussion so far that South-South RTAs are a part of 
the broader objective which is to create a more favourable international trade 
environment for developing countries so that they can pursue their economic 
development. How do South-South RTAs contribute to such objective? Traditionally 
during the first period of RTA proliferation, South-South RTAs were generally 
formed among neighbouring developing countries, i.e. regional South-South RTAs.414 
Even though Viner’s theory suggests that the formation of an RTA does not 
necessarily improve the members’ welfare, policy makers in developing countries as 
well as many scholars dealing with regional integration among developing countries 
dismissed Viner’s conclusion as irrelevant for conditions prevailing in these countries, 
for example idle capacities 4,5 They assessed intra-regional trade expansion as per se 
beneficial and even advocated trade diversion 416 Gains from economies of scale were 
considered as the key benefit of a (regional) South-South RTA as most developing 
countries at the time had relatively small domestic and export markets, which might 
not allow economies of scale to take place.417 According to this school of thought, 
economies of scale made possible by the formation of a (regional) South-South RTA 
would foster and facilitate infant industries in the member countries.418 This, in turn, 
would promote intra-industrial specialization through product diversification and 
improve their international competitiveness 4,9 In other words, the formation of a 
(regional) South-South RTA was seen as a means for developing countries to achieve 
industrialization as they transformed their economies 420 This was, in fact, referred to
414 For example, the Latin American Integration Association (LAIA), the Economic Community of 
West African States (ECOWAS), and ASEAN. For the survey of South-South RTAs before the 1990s, 
see RJ Langhammer and U Hiemenz, Regional Integration among Developing Countries: 
Opportunities, Obstacles and Options (J.C.B. Mohr (P. Siebeck), Tubingen 1990).
415 See Ibid., p. 5.
4,6 For example, see SB Linder, 'Customs Unions and Economic Development' in MS Wionczek (ed) 
Latin American Economic Integration (Praeger, New York 1966) and TA Jaber, The Relevance of 
Traditional Integration Theory to Less Developed Countries' (1970) 9 Journal of Common Market 
Studies 254.
417 For more detail, see Vaitsos, and the discussion on economies of scale in Chapter 2. For an 
empirical study, see J Haldi and D Whitcomb, 'Economies of Scale in Industrial Plants' (1967) 75 
Journal o f Political Economy 373.
418 For further discussion on infant industry, see M Shafaeddin, 'Friedrich List and the Infant Industry 
Argument' in KS Jomo (ed) The Pioneers o f  Development Economics: Great Economists on 
Development (Tulika Books, New Delhi 2005), pp. 42-61.
419 For further discussion, see D Morawetz, 'Extra-Union Exports of Industrial Goods from Customs 
Unions among Developing Countries' (1974) 1 Journal of Development Economics.
420 Industrialization was considered by almost, if not all, developing countries as desirable. See R 
Prebisch, 'Commercial Policy in the Underdeveloped Countries' (1959) 49 The American Economic 
Review 251, pp. 251-4. See also C Cooper and B Massell, 'Towards a General Theory of Customs 
Unions for Developing Countries' (1965) 73 Journal of Political Economy 461.
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in the Report submitted by Mr. Raul Prebisch in the first UNCTAD cited earlier, and 
was widely supported by GATT CONTRACTING PARTIES.42'
Past experiences (up until the early 1990s), however, show that many of these 
South-South RTAs were not as successful as they were expected to be.422 They never 
became fully-fledged RTAs and ended up merely partial scope agreements as they 
were not followed by genuine liberalization commitments. Moreover, measures such 
as import-substitution were adopted and trade barriers remained very high even 
between the member countries 423 Consequently, potential gains from utilization of 
idle capacities and infant industries were not realized 424
It is also found that governments in these countries were either subject to the 
pressure of strong domestic vested interests which opposed trade liberalization that 
would expose inefficient import substitution activities to regional competition; or 
politicians and bureaucrats themselves may benefit from import substitution policies 
through their stake in inefficient public or private enterprises or their control over 
NTBs such as import quotas, licenses, and foreign exchange allocations.425 A number 
of studies find that the subordination of government decisions under individual 
welfare considerations had manifested itself in the dependence of politicians on 
influential businessmen in many Latin American and African countries 426 Thus, it 
seems that there is a strong link between domestic vested interests and the failure of 
integration efforts in these South-South RTAs.
Based on their structure and scale of production, small developing countries 
often produce similar products and are not able to supply all of their partners’ needs 
for imports. If such countries form an RTA between themselves, each member will
421 See supra note 396, and Dam, p. 252.
422 See RC York, Regional Integration and Developing Countries (OECD, Paris 1993), pp. 66-7.
423 See Langhammer and Hiemenz, pp. 64-5.
424 For a review of South-South RTAs in this period, see RJ Langhammer and U Hiemenz,'Regional 
Integration among Developing Countries: Survey of Past Performance and Agenda for Future Policy 
Action' (World Bank, Washington, DC 1991). The RTAs reviewed include the Latin American Free 
Trade Association, the Latin American Integration Association, the Adean Pact, the Central American 
Common Market, the Caribbean Community, the West African Economic Community, the Central 
African Customs and Economic Union, the East African Community, and the ASEAN. The report 
concludes that the results of these agreements are unsatisfactory and may have harmed the members’ 
economies.
425 See Langhammer and Hiemenz, Regional Integration among Developing Countries: Opportunities, 
Obstacles and Options, pp. 70-1.
426 For example, see D Morawetz, Why the Emperor's New Clothes are not Made in Colombia: a Case 
Study in Latin American and East Asian Manufactured Exports (Oxford University Press; Published for 
the World Bank, Washington, DC 1981), pp. 98-9 and R Jackson and C Rosberg, Personal Rule in 
Black Africa (University of California Press, Berkeley 1982), p. 84.
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have to continue importing some quantity of most goods from the rest of the world 
which are still subject to high tariffs. As discussed in Chapter 2, this is likely to 
generate primarily trade diversion and little trade creation.427 This would arguably 
have contributed to the failure of a number of South-South RTAs in the past, 
particularly those in Sub-Saharan Africa 428
Regional South-South RTAs formed and/or revised since the early 1990s,429 
notably in Latin America and Southeast Asia, have shown some success in terms of 
intra-RTA liberalization as well as extra-RTA trade.430 However, it is important to 
note that other factors such as adoption of export-oriented trade policies and unilateral 
liberalization may have contributed to their success as well as their efforts on regional 
integration.431 In other words, South-South RTAs (any RTAs for that matter) are only 
one of many trade policies that developing countries can adopt as a means to achieve 
economic development. The key is for them to promote the potential gains and 
manage the potential costs if they choose to adopt such trade policy. More recent 
studies find that an RTA between developing countries is more likely to be welfare- 
improving if it promotes trade with non-members as well as between themselves, and 
minimizes discrimination against non-members.432
Besides trade/economic gains, developing countries can also benefit from 
regional South-South RTAs because members may become stronger as a group at the
427 See Chapter 2.
428 For more detail, see AJ Yeats, W hat Can Be Expected from African Regional Trade Arrangements? 
Some Empirical Evidence1 (Policy Research Working Paper, World Bank, Washington, DC 1999). One 
way to avoid this is for developing countries to form a multilateral South-South RTA, like the GSTP 
notified under the Enabling Clause in 1989. The more members a South-South RTA has, the less its 
members have to rely on imports from non-members. However, it should be noted that this also 
depends on the breadth and depth of its coverage. As will be discussed in more detail below, the 
Enabling Clause does not require RTA members to liberalize much of the intra-RTA trade. Members 
only have to reduce or eliminate tariffs and non-tariff measures on a mutual basis.
429 See Chapter 1.
430 For South-South RTAs in Latin America, see R Echandi, 'Regional Trade Integration in the 
Americas during the 1990s: Reflections of Some Trends and Their Implication for the Multilateral 
Trade System' (2001) 4 Journal of International Economic Law 367, pp. 376-95. For an RTA among 
the ASEA N countries, see LH Tan, 'Will ASEAN Economic Integration Progress Beyond a Free Trade 
Area?' (2004) 53 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 935, pp. 939-43.
431 For further discussion, see RD Fischer and P Meller,'Latin American Trade Regime Reforms and 
Perceptions' (Docmentos de Trabajo No65, Centro de Economia Aplicada, Universidad de Chile, 
1999), available at http://www.webmanager.cl/prontus_cea/cea_1999/site/asocfile/ASOCFILE1200 
30402113742.pdf (last accessed 19 July 2010) and A Krueger, 'Asian Trade and Growth Lessons' 
(1990) 80 The American Economic Review 108.
432 For example, see M Kreinin and MG Plummer, Economic Integration and Development (Edward 
Elgar, Cheltenham 2002), pp. 4-5 and chapter 6.
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multilateral level.433 Developing countries often face severe disadvantages in dealing 
with the rest of the world because of their low bargaining power and high negotiation 
costs 434 Multilateral trade negotiations often require substantial financial resources, 
time, and expert knowledge, which are limited in many developing countries. As the 
global economy has become more integrated and the number of issues to be dealt with 
in the international arena has grown, there are arguably more incentives for these 
countries to cooperate with their neighbours. Thus, small and low-resources countries 
can substantially reduce their negotiation costs and at the same time increase their 
market and negotiating power by pooling their resources and acting together to 
articulate shared interests.435 A good example of this is ASEAN in the WTO whereby 
the member countries pool their resources together to attend meetings and provide 
regular briefings for each other. If they agree on an issue, their representatives may 
speak for the group; if not, individual countries look after their own national 
interests.436 In addition, a South-South RTA among neighbouring developing 
countries can serve as a vehicle for consensus building on political and security issues 
as it offers a forum for mutual consultations and dialogues.437 This can be very 
beneficial for a region where conflicts between neighbouring countries are
438prevalent.
It is noteworthy that such cooperation does not have to involve trade 
preferences and economic integration inherent in an RTA. In other words, developing 
countries can cooperate without having to form a preferential trade area. For example, 
they may form a coalition during multilateral trade negotiations and/or create a 
regional forum for political and security discussion. Nevertheless, when such 
cooperation involves trade preferences and economic integration, there is arguably 
more at stake if members want to reverse the cooperation. Thus, this may be why
433 See Langhammer and Hiemenz, Regional Integration among Developing Countries: Opportunities, 
Obstacles and Options, pp. 9-10.
434 See York, p. 26.
435 See S Andriamananjara and M Schiff, 'Regional Cooperation among Microstates' (2001) 9 Review 
of International Economics 42, pp. 42-4.
436 See Schiff and Winters, Regional Integration and Development, p. 204. In addition, from my 
personal experience in the ASEAN-EU and ASEAN-Republic of Korea RTA negotiations, the ASEAN 
countries also pool resources together and arrange pre-negotiation meetings among themselves to 
establish common positions.
437 ASEAN provides a good example as it was initially created for security and political stability in the 
region. For more detail, see M Leifer, ASEAN and the Security o f  South-East Asia (Routledge, London 
1989).
438 See Langhammer and Hiemenz, Regional Integration among Developing Countries: Opportunities, 
Obstacles and Options, pp. 10-1.
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regional cooperation often includes a creation of preferential trade area among the 
member countries.
While it is acknowledged that there are indirect trade/economic and 
political/security merits offered by a regional South-South RTA for its members, 
these benefits must be balanced against the costs imposed by the RTA on members 
and non-members, especially non-member developing countries.439 One of the central 
claims advanced in this thesis is that the WTO’s rules governing the formation of 
RTAs should not allow the member countries to ignore the trade/economic 
consequences created by such agreements which can adversely affect themselves as 
well as non-members.440 This is also supported by the fact that the political and 
security benefits are often illusory and not realized in practice. The experiences with 
many South-South RTAs formed among Sub-Saharan African countries, for example, 
show that the formation of an RTA added little to political stability and poor 
economic consequences of the formation led to further conflicts.441 An RTA, 
particularly a CU, entails a certain loss of sovereignty for each member country. It has 
been argued that this is an important factor why many RTAs between young 
independent developing countries were not successful as governments of these 
countries were extremely reluctant to forego even minor parts of their newly acquired 
political independence 442 Consequently, the implementation of integration policies 
was often sacrificed for nationalist and protectionist ones, which in turn contributed to 
poor economic performances of these countries 443
So far, this section has looked at the drafting history of the Enabling Clause 
and the rationale behind the inclusion of the rules concerning the formation of an 
RTA among developing countries. The object and purpose of the Enabling Clause is 
arguably to, inter alia, provide developing countries with special and differential 
treatment deviating from GATT Article XXIV. The next section will explore the 
existing framework of these rules.
439 See Introduction.
440 If a cooperation, which violates WTO rules, is deemed so politically important that trade/economic 
consequences should be put aside, the WTO Members in question should attempt to obtain an Article 
XXV waiver rather than trying to justify it through the rules governing the formation of an RTA.
441 See York, pp. 35-52.
442 See Langhammer and Hiemenz, Regional Integration among Developing Countries: Opportunities, 
Obstacles and Options, pp. 60-1.
443 For further discussion, see Ibid., pp. 64-8.
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5.3 Existing Framework
Unlike GATT Article XXIV, the Enabling Clause does not deal exclusively 
with rules concerning the formation of goods RTAs. In fact, it also contains rules that 
govern how the GSP is to operate within the WTO framework. Thus, it is important to 
distinguish between the two and identify which provisions are relevant to the 
formation of South-South RTAs. At the outset, paragraph 1 allows the MFN 
obligation in GATT Article I to be violated under certain arrangements specified in 
paragraph 2:444
[Notwithstanding the provisions of Article I of the General Agreement, contracting
445parties may accord differential and more favourable treatment to developing countries, 
without according such treatment to other contracting parties.
Subparagraph 2(c) states that the provision of paragraph 1 applies to:
[R]egional or global arrangements entered into amongst less-developed contracting 
parties for the mutual reduction or elimination of tariffs and, in accordance with criteria 
or conditions which may be prescribed by the CONTRACTING PARTIES, for the 
mutual reduction or elimination of non-tariff measures, on products imported from one 
another.
On the face of it, subparagraph 2(c) does not seem to contain operative or 
purposive language as it does not contain the word shall or should. It simply 
describes what type of arrangement paragraph 1 applies. However, given that 
paragraph 1 provides WTO Members with an exception to the MFN obligation, the 
arrangement described by subparagraph 2(c) effectively sets out the parameters for 
the WTO Members wishing to rely on paragraph 1. In other words, if they do not 
satisfy subparagraph 2(c), they will not be qualified to rely on the MFN exception
444 Both the Panel and the Appellate Body in EC-Tariff Preferences held that the Enabling Clause 
provided an exception to the MFN obligation under GATT Article I. See WTO Panel Report, EC- 
Tariff Preferences, WT/DS246/R, adopted 20 April 2004, paras. 7.31-9 and WTO Appellate Body 
Report, EC-Tariff Preferences, WT/DS246/AB/R, adopted 20 April 2004, paras. 91-9.
445 Footnote omitted.
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under paragraph l.446 Thus, the only RTAs permitted under the Enabling Clause are 
those “entered into amongst less developed contracting parties”, and only where they 
are entered into “for the mutual reduction or elimination of tariffs and ... non-tariff 
measures”.
It should be noted that the terms less developed countries and developing 
countries are not defined under the GATT/WTO framework. Countries announce for 
themselves whether they are developed or developing countries. However, other 
members can challenge the decision of a member to make use of provisions available 
only to developing countries 447
Paragraph 3 sets out a number of requirements which WTO Members wishing 
to rely on the MFN exception need to meet. It reads:
Any differential and more favourable treatment provided under this clause:
(a) shall be designed to facilitate and promote the trade of developing countries and not 
to raise barriers to or create undue difficulties for the trade of any other contracting 
parties;
(b) shall not constitute an impediment to the reduction or elimination of tariffs and other 
restrictions to trade on a most-favoured-nation basis;
(c) shall in the case of such treatment accorded by developed contracting parties to 
developing countries be designed and, if necessary, modified, to respond positively to the 
development, financial and trade needs of developing countries (emphasis added).
Although the Appellate Body in EC-Tariff Preferences held that “[Paragraph 3 
identifies three conditions that must also be satisfied by any measure under the 
Enabling Clause”,448 as far as South-South RTAs under subparagraph 2(c) are 
concerned, only subparagraphs 3(a) and (b) are relevant. This is because subparagraph
446 This is in line with the way in which the Panel in EC-Tariff Preferences determined whether the 
Drug Arrangements were justified under the Enabling Clause. It considered whether the Drug 
Arrangements were consistent with subparagraph 2(a), particularly the requirement of non- 
discriminatory in footnote 3 to the subparagraph. See WTO Panel Report, EC-Tariff Preferences, 
paras. 7.61-5.
7 See http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/dlwho_e.htm (last accessed 17 September 2010). 
See also Cui.
448 See WTO Appellate Body Report, EC-Tariff Preferences, para. 112.
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3(c) obviously applies only to the GSP since it mentions developed contracting 
parties.
As to subparagraph 3(a), at first glance, one may see the similarities between 
this and the wording of GATT Article XXIV:4. Nevertheless, the word shall is used 
here instead of the word should which is used in the latter.449 Thus, it can reasonably 
be argued that subparagraph 3(a) sets out two requirements (as opposed to the two 
objectives under GATT Article XXIV:4): the first is that an RTA falling within 
subparagraph 2(c) must be “designed to facilitate and promote trade of developing 
countries”; and secondly, it must not be designed to “raise barriers to or create undue 
difficulties for the trade of any other [WTO Members]”. Subparagraph 3(b), on the 
other hand, requires that the RTA in question “shall not constitute an impediment to 
the reduction or elimination of tariffs and other restrictions to trade on a most­
favoured-nation basis.”
Paragraph 4 sets forth procedural conditions for the introduction, modification, 
or withdrawal of a preferential measure for developing countries.450 The member 
countries shall:
(a) notify the CONTRACTING PARTIES and furnish them with all the information 
they may deem appropriate relating to such action;
(b) afford adequate opportunity for prompt consultations at the request o f any interested 
contracting parties with respect to any difficulty or matter that may arise. The 
CONTRACTING PARTIES shall, if requested to do so by such contracting party, consult 
with all contracting parties concerned with respect to the matter with a view to reaching 
solutions satisfactory to all such contracting parties.
Similar to paragraph 7 of GATT Article XXIV, it imposes notification obligations on 
the part of RTA members (note the changes made by the 2006 Mechanism).451
The existing framework for South-South RTAs under the Enabling Clause 
therefore does provide some basis on which the WTO is required to scrutinize and 
discipline RTAs formed between developing countries. Although subparagraph 2(c) 
describes the type of the arrangement paragraph 1 applies, it effectively sets out a 
number of requirements for RTA Members to meet in terms of the trade between
449 See Chapter 4.
450 See WTO Appellate Body Report, EC-Tariff Preferences, para. 112.
451 This will be discussed in Chapter 7.
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themselves. I will call this intra-RTA obligation. It is reinforced by subparagraph 3(a) 
first requirement, which obliges the member countries to design their agreements in 
such a way that facilitates and promotes the intra-RTA trade. Subparagraph 3(a) 
second requirement, on the other hand, can be considered as third-party obligation 
since it aims to protect non-members’ interests.
It is noteworthy that unlike GATT Article XXIV:5(c), the Enabling Clause 
does not distinguish between an RTA and an interim agreement. Nor does it require 
developing-country members to carry out the requirements under subparagraphs 2(c) 
and 3(a) within a specific timeframe. Unlike anything under GATT Article XXIV, 
subparagraph 3(b) contains a requirement that aims at preserving multilateral trade 
liberalization through the reduction or elimination of MFN tariff rates and other 
restrictions to trade. In addition, the intra-RTA and third-party obligations under the 
Enabling Clause do not distinguish between CUs and FTAs although the member 
countries generally specify which form they want their RTAs to take. Furthermore, 
the wording of subparagraph 2(c) suggests that South-South RTAs notified under the 
Enabling Clause are not required to be fully-fledged CUs or FTAs and can be merely 
partial scope agreements, which are not allowed under GATT Article XXIV.452
Due to the absence of case law on these provisions, it is not clear how the 
rules pertaining South-South RTAs under the Enabling Clause are to operate in 
practice. Examinations of South-South RTAs by the CTD do not amount to any 
meaningful clarification of the rules either.453 For example, in the examination of the 
goods RTA between Chile and India notified under the Enabling Clause, the United 
States raised, inter alia, the issue whether the RTA met subparagraph 3(a) 
requirements since duties on those goods that were most highly traded between the 
parties were not eliminated under the agreement454 In response, Chile and India 
argued that a significant amount of trade between them was included in the 
agreement: 94.8 per cent of Indian exports to Chile and 75.7 per cent of Chilean
452 According to the RTA database created by the WTO Secretariat at the beginning of 2009, of 31 
RTAs notified under the Enabling Clause: six are notified as CUs; ten are notified as FTAs; and 15 are 
notified as partial scope agreements. See http://rtais.wto.org/UI/publicsummarytable.aspx (last 
accessed 27 August 2010).
453 On the review process by the CTD, see http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/regcom 
e.htm (last accessed 20 July 2010).
454 See Committee on Trade and Development, ‘Dedicated Session on Regional Trade Agreements- 
Preferential Trade Agreement between Chile and India (Goods)’, WT/COMT/RTA/4/2 (4 May 2010), 
para. 2.
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exports to India were subject to either reduction or elimination commitments.455 
Furthermore, they contended that since there was no requirement under the Enabling 
Clause for agreements negotiated by developing countries to cover “substantially all 
the trade” as it was the case of GATT Article XXIV, they were not obliged to do 
so.456 Other examinations by the CTD are similar to this where interested third-party 
WTO Members raise questions and the member countries answer them 457 Ultimately, 
the member countries can always defend their RTAs due to the leniency of the 
requirements under the Enabling Clause.
Although there is no case law on these provisions, the judgments in EC-Tariff 
Preferences, albeit made in the context of the GSP, may shed some light on their 
interpretation and application. The Appellate Body agreed with the EC that special 
and differential treatment was critical to achieving one of the fundamental objectives 
of the WTO Agreement, as identified in its Preamble- ensuring that developing 
countries “secure a share in the growth in international trade commensurate with the 
needs of their economic development”.458 It is noteworthy that both the Panel and the 
Appellate Body held that the Enabling Clause provided an exception to the MFN 
obligation under GATT Article I.459 To put this in the RTA context, the object and 
purpose of the rules under the Enabling Clause is to provide developing-country 
Members with an easier route, as compared to GATT Article XXIV, to form South- 
South RTAs so that they can use them as a means to pursue economic development. 
This is consistent with what discussed in the previous section.
Nevertheless, given the unsuccessful experiences with South-South RTAs in 
the first period of RTA proliferation and the non-guaranteed benefits of these 
agreements, it is important that one examines the rules in order to determine the 
extent to which they address the challenges facing developing countries amid the 
current RTA proliferation, identified in Chapters 2 and 3, and whether there are any 
ways to improve them so that the challenges can be better addressed.
455 Ibid., para. 3.
456 Ibid.
457 For example, see Committee on Trade and Development, ‘Dedicated Session on Regional Trade 
Agreements- Free Trade Agreement between Egypt and Turkey (Goods)’, WT/COMTD/RTA/1/2 (7 
October 2008).
458 See WTO Appellate Body Report, EC-Tariff Preferences, paras. 15 and 111. See also the second 
recital of the Preamble to the Marakesh Agreement and GATT Article XXXVI, including in particular 
paragraph 3.
59 See supra note 444.
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5.4 The Enabling Clause and the Challenges Facing Developing Countries
Recall from Chapters 2 and 3 that the key challenges facing developing 
countries from the perspective of a prospective RTA member include domestic vested 
interests, high implementation and adjustment costs, and their lack of analytical and 
negotiating capacities.460 On the other hand, the key challenge facing non-member 
developing countries is the adverse effects caused by trade and investment 
diversion.461 Given that the Enabling Clause only applies to South-South RTAs, it is 
also important to consider whether the fact that all RTA members are developing 
countries would affect the nature and extent of these problems at all.
First, with regard to the challenge of domestic vested interests, the argument 
should still hold since the theories do not distinguish between developed and 
developing countries.462 As discussed earlier, a number of empirical studies, in fact, 
support the position that domestic vested interests play an important role in the failure 
o f South-South RTAs formed in the first period of RTA proliferation 463
Second, as far as implementation and adjustment costs are concerned, all 
depends on the actual commitments made in an RTA and the trade relationship 
between the member countries. For example, if competition from the RTA partner is 
fierce and domestic producers can only compete as a result of tariff and/or NTBs, a 
commitment to reduce or eliminate the barriers will imply high implementation and 
adjustment costs for the home country. However, since the Enabling Clause only 
requires developing-country members to mutually reduce or eliminate tariffs and non­
tariff measures, the costs will also depend on the breadth and depth of commitments 
actually made.
Third, in absolute terms, developing countries will still face the constraints on 
their analytical and negotiating capacities in South-South RTAs. However, in relative 
terms, they may find that the gap of these capacities among themselves is generally 
smaller than in the case of North-South RTAs. As will be seen below, nothing in the 
Enabling Clause directly deals with the constraints on developing countries’ analytical
460 See Chapter 2.
461 See Chapter 3.
462 For example, see Grossman and Helpman, and Krishna, 'Regionalism and Multilateralism: A 
Political Economy Approach'.
463 See Langhammer and Hiemenz, Regional Integration among Developing Countries: Opportunities, 
Obstacles and Options, pp. 64-5.
- 142-
and negotiating capacities. Given the importance of analytical and negotiating 
capacities to the success of RTA negotiations (and those at the multilateral level), 
more efforts should be made to help developing countries build analytical and 
negotiating capacities. This will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 7.
Fourth, the challenge of trade and investment diversion should still hold 
although their magnitude may be less significant if the developing-country members 
in question are small and do not provide export markets for non-member developing 
countries.
5.4.1 The Intra-RTA Obligation and the Challenges Facing Developing Countries 
from the Perspective o f  a Prospective Member
Under the Enabling Clause, the intra-RTA obligation is comprised of the 
requirements contained in subparagraph 2(c) and the first requirement contained in 
subparagraph 3(a). Essentially, RTA members have to make sure that they liberalize 
trade between themselves on a mutual basis, and the agreement must be designed to 
facilitate and promote the trade of developing countries.
Subparagraph 2(c) requires developing-country members to reduce or 
eliminate tariffs and non-tariff measures on products from one another. On the one 
hand, these requirements are similar to the substantially all the trade requirement 
under GATT Article XXIV: 8 in the sense that they oblige RTA members to liberalize 
their intra-RTA trade. On the other hand, they are different in the sense that they do 
not specify the amount of trade to be liberalized. It is true that the SAT requirement 
does not precisely specify the amount either but at least it implies a very high 
percentage or amount of intra-RTA trade.
The normal reading of subparagraph 2(c) in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning of the terms therein and in the context of South-South RTAs suggests that 
developing-country members simply have to reduce or eliminate tariffs and non-tariff 
measures on a mutual basis.464 They may satisfy this by mutually reducing or
464 According to Article 3.2 of the DSU, the covered agreements must be read in light of customary 
rules of interpretation of public international law, which is codified in the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaty 1969 (the Vienna Convention). See the Vienna Convention, Article 31(1), which
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eliminating tariffs and/or non-tariff measures on a limited number of tariff lines or 
five per cent of goods traded among themselves, for example. This is, in fact, the case 
of the 1971 Protocol, for which the 1971 waiver was passed to accommodate. The 
preferential tariff concessions agreed under the 1971 Protocol covered only about 740 
tariff lines in total, with a 1972 trade value of about $25 million.465 In addition, the 
preferential rates were often not a significant improvement on the members’ existing 
MFN rates.466 Given that the Enabling Clause was agreed, inter alia, in order to make 
permanent the 1971 waiver and drawing from the commitments made in the 1971 
Protocol, it is clear that subparagraph 2(c) is intended to be more lenient compared to 
the SAT requirement under GATT Article XXIV and does not specify how much 
intra-RTA trade that the member countries have to liberalize.
Such reading is consistent with the object and purpose of the Enabling Clause 
held by the Appellate Body in EC-Tariff Preferences.467 This object and purpose is 
supported by the recognition among GATT CONTRACTING PARTIES that 
developing countries should be permitted to form South-South RTAs falling short of 
the requirements under GATT Article XXIV so that they may gain the advantages of 
specialization in a larger market.468 Furthermore, it is also supported by Mr. Raul 
Prebisch’s Report,469 which could be considered as the circumstances of the 
conclusion of the 1971 waiver and/or the rules governing the formation of South- 
South RTAs under the Enabling Clause.470
requires that “[A] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to 
be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.”
465 See MA-B Hamza,'Guidebook for the GSTP: the Global System o f Trade Preferences Among 
Developing Countries- Origins, Dimensions, Negotiations and Prospects' (UNCTAD, Geneva 1987), 
po. 27-31.
For more detail, see RJ Langhammer, 'Multilateral Trade Liberalization among Developing 
Countries' (1980) 14 Journal of World Trade 508.
467 See WTO Appellate Body Report, EC-Tariff Preferences, para. 92.
468 See GATT BISD (1965) 13S/100-104.
469 See supra note 396.
470 Article 32 of the Vienna Convention states that recourse may be had to supplementary means of 
interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in 
order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of Article 31, or to determine the meaning 
when the interpretation according to Article 31: (a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or (b) 
leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable. Under the WTO jurisprudence, the Panel 
in EC-Chicken Classification held that a particular event, acts, or other instrument could qualify as part 
of the circumstances of conclusion as long as it was relevant to the treaty in question. See WTO Panel 
Report, EC-Chicken Classification, WT/DS269/R,WT/DS286/R, adopted 27 September 2005, para. 
7.343. From the history of the Enabling Clause discussed earlier, it is arguable that Mr. Raul Prebisch’s 
Report is relevant to both the 1971 Waiver and the rules under the Enabling Clause as it explicitly 
considered South-South RTAs falling short of GATT Article XXIV requirements as part of the solution 
to development problems.
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It is noteworthy that the term non-tariff measures is used here instead of the 
term other restrictive regulations o f commerce under GATT Article XXIV:8. 
Although the use of the term non-tariff measures is conceptually simpler, it is rather 
immaterial due to the fact that it is not linked to the SAT requirement but only to a 
requirement to mutually reduce or eliminate.471
On the whole, the requirements in subparagraph 2(c) are not difficult to meet, 
particularly when there is no time limit to comply as well. This is possibly why many 
South-South RTAs notified under the Enabling Clause tend to fall short of a fully- 
fledged CU or FTA and can only be considered as partial scope agreements. In 
addition, given that the Enabling Clause does not distinguish between CUs and FTAs, 
there is no requirement for the member countries to create a regime of CETs and to 
harmonize external trade policy.472 Such lenient requirements allow developing- 
country Members to form RTAs among themselves more easily than if they are to do 
it under GATT Article XXIV. This is in line with the Appellate Body’s judgment in 
EC-Tariff Preferences, which held albeit in the context of the GSP that WTO 
Members were encouraged to pursue special and differential treatment for developing 
countries under the Enabling Clause.473 However, it also cautioned in the same case 
that such deviation was “encouraged only to the extent that it complies with the series 
of requirements set out in the Enabling Clause”.474 The EC, in fact, failed to meet the 
requirements with regard to the GSP under the Enabling Clause.475 If one were to take 
the same approach in the context of South-South RTAs, one would find that the 
requirements contained in subparagraph 2(c) are so lenient that the supervision of 
such agreements is almost rendered meaningless.
While, such leniency is consistent with the intention of the drafters of the 
Enabling Clause to permit developing countries considerable flexibility in the 
conclusion of South-South RTAs, in my view this leniency is excessive. As discussed
471 It should be noted that with regard to non-tariff measures, subparagraph 2(c) states that they should 
be mutually reduced or eliminated “in accordance with criteria or conditions which may be prescribed 
by the CONTRACTING PARTIES”. To date, no criteria or conditions have been prescribed by WTO 
Members (and the GATT CONTRACTING PARTIES before them). See Hafez, pp. 901-2.
472 It should be noted that the absence of such a requirement does not mean that the member countries 
cannot choose to do so of their own accord. Mercosur provides a good example where the member 
countries notified the agreement under the Enabling Clause and after operating as an FTA for a few 
years successfully created CETs and became a CU. See http://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicShowMember 
RTAIDCard.aspx?enc=cxlE/jplQ6QlzkwaDSyvyGjCyds4F92CgtQ6tuKRLk= (last accessed 29 July 
2010).
473 See WTO Appellate Body Report, EC-Tariff Preferences, para. 111.
474 Ibid.
475 Ibid., paras. 187-9.
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in Chapter 2 and in the context of GATT Article XXIV, if a developing-country 
partner is allowed too much discretion to pick and choose which products or 
industries to protect, domestic vested interests tend to be able to lobby the government 
to exclude those that would result in trade-creating effects. RTAs are likely to be 
politically viable exactly when they are trade-diverting, and hence welfare-reducing. 
Too much flexibility can therefore undermine the commitments made by developing- 
country members, which can harm both themselves and non-member developing 
countries.476 As discussed earlier, a number of studies have shown that domestic 
vested interests did contribute to the failure of many South-South RTAs formed 
during the first period of RTA proliferation, for example the Latin American Free 
Trade Association (LAFTA) and the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) 477 In addition, with a wide discretion on the part of developing-country 
members, non-members will find it much more difficult to anticipate or predict the 
outcome of RTA negotiations, hence handicapping their ability to react.
Thus, I argue that as in the case of the proposed special and differential 
treatment for developing countries under GATT Article XXIV, the flexibility afforded 
for developing countries should be provided within certain limits. But can this be 
achieved on the basis of the existing text? One could try to reinforce the requirements 
in subparagraph 2(c) with subparagraph 3(a) first requirement- that is the member 
countries also have to design their RTA to “facilitate and promote the trade of 
developing countries.” However, the application of this requirement is unclear.
One possible interpretation is that the use of the word designed implies that 
the requirement is about the intention and not the actual effects of an RTA. The 
Oxford English dictionary defines the word to design as to draw plans or to plan 
something.478 To put it in the context of subparagraphs 2(c) and 3(a) first requirement, 
RTA members must draw plans or plan to facilitate and promote the intra-RTA trade 
through mutual reduction or elimination of tariffs and/or non-tariff measures. If this is 
accepted, as long as the agreement intends to facilitate and promote the intra-RTA 
trade, subparagraph 3(a) first requirement would be met. This approach gains some 
support from the decision of the GATT Working Party which was established to
476 See Hudec, Developing Countries in the GATT Legal System, pp. 228-30.
477 See Langhammer and Hiemenz, Regional Integration among Developing Countries: Opportunities, 
Obstacles and Options, pp. 70-2.
478 See Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary, p. 358. For more detail on the use of dictionaries to 
obtain an ordinary meaning of a treaty term, see RK Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford 2008), pp. 166-9.
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examine the provisions of the Agreement on ASEAN Preferential Trading 
Arrangements. One may draw some insights from this since it could be considered as 
the circumstances of the conclusion of the mles under the Enabling Clause.479 The 
decision reads:
(1) the parties to the agreement had good intentions- intended to promote economic 
development through a continuous process o f  trade expansion among member 
countries o f  ASEAN without raising barriers to the trade o f  other contracting parties 
(emphasis added),
(2) the parties promised to be cooperative- are prepared ... to consider the possibility of 
participating in mutually beneficial trading arrangements with other developing 
countries, and
(3) were not really doing anything anti-GATT- the Agreement should not constitute an 
impediment to the reduction or elimination of tariffs and other trade barriers on a 
most-favoured-nation basis,
the CONTRACTING PARTIES decide that:
Notwithstanding the provisions of Article I o f the General Agreement the participating
contracting parties may implement the agreement in accordance with the conditions and
procedures set out hereunder 480
It is clear that the Working Party placed the emphasis on the intention of the 
member countries rather than the actual effects of the RTA in question. Although the 
agreement itself only covered a total of 826 tariff lines at the time of the examination, 
the Working Party was of the view that it “had good intentions”.481 Thus, the decision 
lends support to the interpretation that subparagraph 3(a) first requirement is about the
479 See supra note 470.
480 See GATT BISD (1978-79) 26S/321-326.
481 The agreement provided the framework for a system of preferential trading arrangements involving 
i) long-term quantity contracts, ii) purchase finance supported at preferential interest rates, iii) 
preferences in government procurement, iv) preferential tariffs, and v) preferential non-tariff barriers. 
The agreement itself provided only a framework for exchanging preferences on any of these 
instruments: there was no plan or schedule, but by the time the Working Party was established, the 
member countries had agreed to two batches of tariff concessions, covering a total of 826 tariff lines. 
See also JM Finger, 'GATT's Influence on Regional Arrangements' in J de Melo and A Panagariya 
(eds), New Dimensions in Regional Integration (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1993), pp. 
141-2.
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intention and not the actual effects of an RTA.482 This would also be in line with the 
object and purpose of the Enabling Clause which is to provide developing-country 
Members with an easier route to form South-South RTAs. On this approach, 
subparagraph 3(a) would impose a rather lax requirement on the part of RTA 
members and would not add much to the requirements contained in subparagraph 
2(c).
On the other hand, if subparagraph 3(a) first requirement is about the actual 
effects of an RTA, it may be used to reinforce the requirements in subparagraph 2(c). 
However, such interpretation would require the measurement of the actual effects of 
an RTA, which can be very complex. More importantly, the formation of an RTA 
may take time to have an impact on trade. A review of actual effects would have to be 
conducted after years of implementation, by which time it would be very difficult to 
reverse the process of integration and adverse effects would have taken place. This 
seems to be contrary to the notification obligation contained in subparagraph 4(b) 
which requires the member countries to “afford adequate opportunity for prompt 
consultations at the request of any interested contracting party”.483 Thus, the inherent 
difficulties with this interpretation suggest that the interpretation of subparagraph 3(a) 
first requirement must be about the intention and not the actual effects of an RTA.
Nevertheless, although it is argued that subparagraph 3(a) first requirement is 
about the intention of an RTA, that intention might be inferred from the commitments 
made by the member countries and the likely effects these commitments may have on 
the intra-RTA trade. For example, in the examination of the RTA between Pakistan 
and Malaysia, the member countries- responding to the EC and the United States’ 
concerns over subparagraph 3(a) first requirement,484 contended that the Enabling 
Clause permitted developing-country RTA members simply to reduce MFN tariff 
rates between themselves and that this would promote bilateral trade, hence satisfying
482 Other decisions of working parties established to review South-South RTAs prior to the passage of 
the Enabling Clause contain similar discussion where members of the working parties sympathized 
with developing-country RTA members and placed emphasis on their intentions rather than whether 
they met the requirements under GATT Article XXIV. For example, see the decision o f the Working 
Party for CARICOM, GATT BISD (1976-77) 24S/68-72.
483 See the Enabling Clause, para. 4(b).
484 The EC and the United States pointed out that only 64.7 per cent o f Malaysia’s top 25 dutiable 
exports to Pakistan and 34.6 per cent o f Pakistan’s top 25 dutiable exports to Malaysia remained 
dutiable under the agreement. They were concerned whether subparagraph 3(a) first requirement was 
met. See Committee on Trade and Development, ‘Dedicated Session on Regional Trade Agreements- 
Closer Economic Partnership Agreement between Pakistan and Malaysia (Goods)’, 
WT/COMTD/RTA/3/2 (2 September 2009), paras. 11 and 20, respectively.
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the requirement.485 Given that this answer was not further challenged by the members 
of the CTD, it is possible that such a response may be enough to meet subparagraph 
3(a) first requirement.
It is important to note that any reduction and elimination of tariffs between the 
member countries is likely to have the effects of facilitating and promoting the intra- 
RTA trade in the sense that goods can be traded more cheaply, which in turn may lead 
to an increase in trade volume. However, this does not necessarily result in trade 
creation or improvement in the welfare of the member countries. Thus, given that 
subparagraph 3(a) first requirement is unlikely to be about the actual effects of an 
RTA, it would add little to the requirements in subparagraph 2(c).
A further difficulty is that although the Enabling Clause distinguishes between 
developing countries and least-developed countries, it does not distinguish between 
countries within the former group.487 As discussed in the previous chapters, the term 
developing countries encompasses a range of countries at various stages of 
development and with different economic backgrounds. Thus, in order to deal with 
this heterogeneity of developing countries, a more nuanced approach to special and 
differential treatment should be developed here.
For example, developing-country WTO Members could be further divided into 
three subgroups as suggested in Chapter 4, namely, LDCs, LMIDCs, and UMIDCs. 
These three subgroups would be subject to different thresholds and transitional 
periods with regard to how much of the intra-RTA trade the member countries are 
required to liberalize and over how long 488 The more country-specific special and 
differential treatment would level the playing field between developing countries 
whose analytical and negotiating capacities are vastly different. This is also in line 
with paragraph 7 which states:
“... [L]ess-developed contracting parties expect that their capacity to make contributions 
or negotiated concessions or take other mutually agreed action under the provisions and 
procedures of the General Agreement would improve with the progressive development 
of their economies and improvement in their trade situation and they would accordingly 
expect to participate more fully in the framework of rights and obligations under the 
General Agreement.”
485 Ibid.
486 See Chapter 2.
487 See the Enabling Clause, paragraphs 6 and 8.
488 See Chapter 4.
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In other words, the more advanced a developing country is, the more it is expected to 
participate more fully and should not be entitled to the same special and differential 
treatment as countries that are less advanced than itself. However, the problem with 
this approach is that the intra-RTA obligation under the Enabling Clause specifies 
neither a threshold nor a timeframe for intra-RTA trade liberalization. Consequently, 
such a more nuanced approach to special and differential treatment does not seem to 
have a textual basis under the Enabling Clause.
To sum up, although the intra-RTA obligation under the Enabling Clause does 
provide an easier route for developing countries to form RTAs with one another 
compared to that of GATT Article XXIV, the requirements set out therein are so 
lenient that virtually no control can be placed over the member countries. As can be 
seen in the previous chapters, the formation of an RTA is not necessarily beneficial to 
the member countries. The functions of the rules should be to encourage the member 
countries to promote the potential benefits and at the same time allow them to manage 
the potential costs induced by the formation of an RTA. Given that they may be 
contradictory at times, one has to strike a balance between the two functions. In my 
view, the intra-RTA obligation under the Enabling Clause fails to do so. It is so 
lenient that it results in excess flexibility, which may not necessarily translate into 
trade/economic benefits in practice. Something similar to the SAT requirement under 
GATT Article XXIV would arguably strike a better balance as developing-country 
members would have to liberalize a reasonable percentage/amount of the intra-RTA 
trade. This would ensure that domestic vested interests and governments would find it 
more difficult to exclude trade-creating products and industries from the RTA 
coverage. In addition, since the member countries would have less discretion, it would 
be easier for non-members to predict the final content of the RTA.
5.4.2 The Third-party Obligation and the Challenge o f Trade and Investment 
Diversion
The third-party obligation contained in subparagraph 3(a) second requirement 
demands that South-South RTAs under subparagraph 2(c) are designed “not to raise 
barriers to or create undue difficulties for the trade of any other contracting parties.”
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As in the case of subparagraph 3(a) first requirement, the third-party obligation 
contained in subparagraph 3(a) second requirement is arguably to do with the 
intention and not the actual effects of an RTA. This interpretation can be supported by 
the decision of the Working Party established to examine the ASEAN Preferential 
Trading Arrangements cited earlier, and the same arguments apply.489
If this interpretation is accepted, RTA members would only be required to 
show that they do not intend to raise trade barriers or create undue difficulties in 
relation to non-members. Trade barriers are raised if the member countries increase 
their tariffs or impose quantitative restrictions in relation to their trade with non­
members, for example. Consequently, as long as the member countries express in the 
agreement that they intend to keep trade barriers in relation to non-members 
unchanged, the first half of the third-party obligation should be met. This is supported 
by the examinations conducted by the CTD cited earlier where the member countries 
always explicitly stated that they had no plan to raise trade barriers in relation to non- 
members whenever subparagraph 3(a) second requirement was raised.490 Such a 
lenient requirement is unlikely to address the challenge of trade and investment 
diversion. As discussed in Chapter 4, even the more demanding and elaborative 
requirements contained in GATT Article XXIV: 5 as read in light of paragraph 4 
second objective only deal with the challenge in a limited fashion 491 However, one 
might be able to use the second half of the third-party requirement, i.e. not to create 
undue difficulties, to protect non-members’ interests in a more meaningful way.
For the ordinary meaning of the word difficulty, the Oxford English dictionary 
defines it as “a problem, a thing or situation that causes problems”.492 According to 
this, one can reasonably hold the adverse effects caused by trade and investment 
diversion on non-members as falling within the meaning of the word difficulties under 
subparagraph 3(a). The provision however does not aim at disallowing all difficulties. 
Only undue ones are not to be created.. This is in line with the inherent discriminatory 
nature of (South-South) RTAs. Since these agreements are contrary to the MFN 
principle, difficulties (caused by trade and investment diversion) on the part of non­
members are expected from these discriminatory regimes. The key question is what 
considers as undue.
489 See the previous section.
490 For example, see supra note 454, para. 3 and supra note 384, paras. 11 and 20.
491 See Chapter 4.
492 See Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary, p. 367. See also the Vienna Convention, Article 31(1).
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According to the Oxford English dictionary, the word undue is an adjective 
which describes something that is “more than reasonable or necessary”.493 Are 
adverse effects caused by trade and investment diversion more than reasonable or 
necessary? This is an extremely difficult question. As discussed earlier in this chapter 
and previously, in an ideal world where governments considered national welfare as a 
top priority, there would be no need for any rules on the formation of an RTA- only 
trade-creating products and industries would be included. Anything more than 
minimal trade diversion would be deemed unreasonable and unnecessary. Investment 
diversion, on the other hand, might still exist since it is triggered purely by tariff 
preferences. Given that tariff preferences are inherent in RTAs, there will inevitably 
be some investment diversion 494 Thus, in an ideal world essentially all trade diversion 
would be considered as creating undue difficulties while some investment diversion 
could be tolerated.
Since the real world is less than ideal, there is likely to be trade diversion 
induced by the formation of an RTA.495 Is it possible for one to distinguish between 
acceptable and undue trade diversion? As discussed in Chapter 2, trade diversion 
occurs when the production is shifted away from the lower-cost producers located 
outside to the higher-cost producers located within the preferential area. There does 
not seem to be any criteria that would qualify certain trade diversion as acceptable and 
other undue. Any form of trade diversion is undesirable, but rather inherent in the 
formation of an RTA (in the real world where domestic vested interests can influence 
governments and the rules governing the formation of an RTA can only deal with it in 
a limited fashion). In the absence of such criteria, it would be difficult to apply the 
second half of the third-party obligation to the adverse effects caused by trade 
diversion. Given that the object and purpose of the Enabling Clause is to provide 
developing-country WTO Members with an easier route to form RTAs among 
themselves, adverse effects caused by trade diversion is bound to be acceptable under 
subparagraph 3(a). Otherwise, the requirement will never be met.
Despite this interpretation, it is important to note that trade diversion can be 
very damaging to non-member developing countries. To illustrate this point, consider 
a hypothetical example where Thailand and Vietnam export almost exclusively to
493 See Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary, p. 1471.
494 See Chapters 2 and 4.
495 Indeed, one of the objectives of Chapter 4 and the current chapter is to examine how trade diversion 
can be minimized under the existing framework.
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China although Thai goods are generally cheaper than Vietnamese counterparts. If 
China decides to form an RTA with Vietnam and reduce tariffs on Vietnamese goods, 
the RTA is likely to result in severe trade diversion away from Thailand. Since 
Thailand exports almost exclusively to the Chinese market, the formation of the RTA 
may create real difficulties for its economy. On what basis would one rely to argue 
that such difficulties are unduel After all, China and Vietnam are permitted, under the 
Enabling Clause, to form an RTA with each other. In addition, although the fact that 
Thailand exports almost exclusively to the Chinese market causes the severe trade 
diversion, China and Vietnam are not responsible for that. They could easily argue 
that Thailand should have diversified its export markets or even formed an RTA with 
China itself.
Thus, the challenge of adverse effects caused by trade and investment 
diversion on the part of non-members can be of great magnitude where non-members 
trade heavily with one of the partners and export similar goods to that country as the 
other RTA partner.496 However, at best, the third-party obligation under the Enabling 
Clause only deals with this challenge in a limited fashion. That is, as in the case of 
GATT Article XXIV, it only requires the member countries not to raise trade barriers 
in relation to non-members.497 At worst, due to the use of the word designed, its 
application could be merely about the intention of an RTA as inferred from the 
commitments made by the member countries. On this basis, as long as the member 
countries do not have plans to raise any trade barriers in relation to non-members, 
their RTA would meet the first half of the third-party obligation. As for the second 
half, it is difficult to see how the member countries could be held legally responsible 
for any difficulties on the part of non-members that may cause by trade and 
investment diversion. Although such difficulties are real and can worsen non- 
members’ competitive conditions, they are arguably not undue. This reinforces the 
importance of using the intra-RTA obligation to curb trade and investment diversion 
to the greatest extent possible.
Nevertheless, the phrase not to create undue difficulties might be used to 
regulate rules of origin.498 With regard to such rules, the problem with GATT Article 
XXIV is that there is disagreement among WTO Members whether they can be
496 See Chapter 3.
497 See Chapter 4.
498 On the effects of rules o f origin, see Chapter 2.
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captured by the term other regulations o f commerce under paragraph 5, which 
concerns external trade, since rules of origin deal with intra-RTA trade and 
determined the eligibility for the preferences granted by an FTA.499 Even it can be 
accepted that the term ORCs captures rules of origin, the word corresponding 
contained in subparagraph 5(b) appears to make this approach unworkable.500 Without 
the complication created by the term ORCs and the word corresponding, the phrase 
not to create undue difficulties should be flexible enough to be used to regulate how 
FTA members design their rules of origin. If they are overly restrictive, they can be 
regarded as creating undue difficulties for the trade of non-members.
For example, if rules of origin take the form of value-added content- that is it 
specifies a minimum percentage of domestic value added in one of the member 
countries before the product in question can be exported within the preferential area 
duty-free, the percentage should be set as low as possible,501 and the verification 
process should be transparent and simple so as to allow domestic firms to source their 
inputs in the most efficient way.502 This, in turn, would lessen the adverse effects on 
the part of non-members caused by trade diversion. One caveat to this interpretation is 
that it could make subparagraph 3(a) second requirement very difficult to meet, which 
may be contrary to the object and purpose of the Enabling Clause.
Besides the third-party obligation, subparagraph 3(b) contains a requirement 
that aims at preserving multilateral trade liberalization through the reduction or 
elimination of MFN tariff rates and other restrictions to trade. Unlike subparagraph 
3(a), there is nothing to suggest that the requirement is about the intention and not the 
actual effects of an RTA. Otherwise, the provision would have read “shall not be 
designed to constitute an impediment to the reduction or elimination of tariffs and 
other restrictions to trade on a most-favoured-nation basis”. However, the problem is 
how one determines whether the requirement is met or not.
As discussed in Chapter 3, the question whether RTAs complement or 
undermine the WTO is such that it does not lend itself easily to testing. This is 
because at any point in time, only a single realization of WTO negotiations is
499 See Chapter 4.
500 See Ibid.
501 For example, in AFTA, the value-added content is set at 40 per cent. See M Manchin and AO 
Pelkmans-Balaoing, 'Rules o f Origin and the Web of East Asian Free Trade Agreements' (Policy 
Research Working Paper No4273, World Bank, Washington, DC 2007), pp. 9-10.
502 For further discussion on how to make rules of origin less restrictive, see Gasiorek, Augier and Lai- 
Tong, pp. 21-4.
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observed. It is therefore very difficult to prove that multilateral trade negotiations 
would have been any faster (or easier), had there been fewer (or more) RTAs.503 After 
all, how can one empirically prove that an RTA constitutes an impediment to the 
reduction or elimination of tariffs and other restrictions to trade on a MFN basis? 
Other factors which may have undermined multilateral trade liberalization will have 
to be identified and distinguished from the effects of the RTA. Such endeavour will 
be extremely difficult, if at all possible. Furthermore, the literature on the relationship 
between RTAs and the multilateral trading system explored in Chapter 3 is not 
conclusive and being developed.
Thus, it will be very difficult to give effect to subparagraph 3(b) requirement 
in practice. Such difficulty may result in non-implementation of subparagraph 3(b) 
requirement, which seems to be the case given the absence of case law and in-depth 
examination by the CTD.504 Consequently, the requirement should not present much 
difficulty to RTA members in practice. On the one hand, this is in line with the object 
and purpose of the Enabling Clause. On the other hand, it highlights the fact that little 
control can be placed on the member countries. As argued throughout this chapter, 
such excess flexibility may not be beneficial to either developing-country members or 
non-members.
5.4.3 Two Sets o f  Rules Governing the Formation o f  Goods RTAs?
Does it make sense to have two separate sets of rules governing the formation 
of goods RTAs? While GATT Article XXIV applies to all goods RTAs, the Enabling 
Clause creates a separate and more lenient set of rules for those formed among 
developing countries. As discussed in the previous sections, the leniency of the rules
503 See Chapter 3.
504 In EC-Tariff Preferences, the Panel mentioned subparagraph 3(b) briefly in relation to GATT 
Article XX(b). It held that “tariff preferences should not be lightly assumed to be an appropriate means 
to achieve health objectives under Article XX(b) because any tariff preferences deviating from 
obligations assumed in the multilateral framework would necessarily have a direct and negative impact 
on the multilateral system. Even under the Enabling Clause, where tariff preferences are authorized 
within the multilateral framework as a deviation from Article 1:1, paragraph 3(b) prohibits GSP 
schemes that “constitute an impediment to the reduction or elimination of tariffs... on a most-favoured­
nation basis”.” See WTO Panel Report, EC-Tariff Preferences, para. 7.209 However, it did not 
elaborate as to under what circumstances a GSP scheme would violate the requirement under 
subparagraph 3(b).
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may not translate into trade/economic benefits in practice and may even result in 
severe trade diversion which is harmful to both developing-country members and 
non-members alike.
Even if one holds the view that developing countries should be provided with 
unfettered flexibility when they form RTAs, under the existing framework, 
developing-country partners in North-South RTAs are however not eligible to the 
special and differential treatment available under the Enabling Clause since they are 
subject to the same requirements as their developed-country counterparts under 
GATT Article XXIV. As illustrated in Chapters 2 and 4, special and differential 
treatment is arguably even more necessary in the case of North-South RTAs so as to 
level the playing field and allow developing-country partners to deal with the 
potential costs more freely. Thus, if the object and purpose of the Enabling Clause is 
to provide developing countries with special and differential treatment that will allow 
them to use RTAs as a means to achieve industrialization and economic development, 
it is deficient because it is not available to developing-country partners in North-South 
RTAs.
This lacuna where developing-country partners in North-South RTAs are not 
eligible to the special and differential treatment offered by the Enabling Clause might 
have been created due to the fact that at the time of its drafting, RTAs between 
developed and developing countries were not envisaged. The focus was on either 
North-North RTAs, particularly those in Europe, or South-South RTAs in Africa and 
Latin America.505
The separate sets of rules also create two types of South-South RTAs, namely, 
those notified under GATT Article XXIV and those under the Enabling Clause.506 It is 
not clear whether they have the same legal consequences within the WTO framework. 
For example, reversing the Panel’s decision that GATT Article XXIV could be used 
as a defence only against GATT Article I, the Appellate Body in Turkey-Textiles held 
that “Article XXIV may, under certain conditions, justify the adoption of a measure 
which is inconsistent with certain other GATT provisions, and may be invoked as a
505 See Carpenter, pp. 17-20.
506 From the practice of WTO Members (and GATT CONTRACTING PARTIES before them), it 
appears that the member countries of an RTA only notify their agreement to the WTO once, either 
under GATT Article XXIV or the Enabling Clause. See http://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicAllRTAList.aspx 
(last accessed 31 August 2010).
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possible defence to a finding of inconsistency (emphasis added).”507 Even though the 
RTA in question was formed between the EU and Turkey, i.e. a North-South RTA, it 
should be safe to assume that the judgment will apply to South-South RTAs notified 
under GATT Article XXIV as well. However, it is not clear whether the Enabling 
Clause can be used as a defence against other GATT violations apart from the MFN 
obligation contained in GATT Article I. This issue was raised by the EU and the 
United States in Brazil-Tyres although it was not clarified either by the Panel or the 
Appellate Body.508
The Appellate Body in Turkey-Textiles came to its conclusion by considering 
the chapeau of GATT Article XXIV:5, which reads:
[Accordingly, the provisions of this Agreement shall not prevent, as between the 
territories of contracting parties, the formation of a customs union or of a free-trade area 
or the adoption of an interim agreement necessary for the formation of a customs union 
or of a free-trade area... (emphasis added).
On the other hand, paragraph 1 of the Enabling Clause only and specifically refers to 
the provisions of GATT Article I. Thus, a discrepancy between the two types of 
South-South RTAs may have been created here- that is GATT Article XXIV may 
provide a better defence for members of South-South RTAs. If this is true, it may give 
an incentive for developing countries to notify their South-South RTAs under GATT 
Article XXIV rather than the Enabling Clause although they will have to comply with 
the more demanding set of rules.
It is noteworthy that more and more South-South RTAs are notified under 
GATT Article XXIV. For example, in the case of China, of its eight RTAs with other 
developing countries formed since its accession to the WTO in 2001, six were notified 
under GATT Article XXIV and two under the Enabling Clause. Of the two 
agreements, only the Asia Pacific Trade Agreement (APTA) (entry into force 17 June 
1976, China’s accession 1 January 2002) is a partial scope agreement. The ASEAN- 
China RTA (entry into force 1 January 2005) is, inter alia, intended to cover all tariff 
lines, which will be eliminated by 2012 between the six original ASEAN countries
507 See WTO Appellate Body Report, Turkey-Textiles paras. 42-5. In the case, the other GATT 
provisions in question were Articles XI and XIII.
See WTO Panel Report, Brazil-Tyres, paras. 4.449-52 and 5.155-7, respectively.
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and China, and by 2018 by the remaining parties.509 Thus, it can be seen that apart 
from the APTA which was formed in 1976, all China's South-South RTAs- even the 
one with ASEAN that was notified under the Enabling Clause- are intended to be 
fully-fledged FTAs.510 Such practice supports the proposal to have only one set of 
rules for the formation of goods RTAs.511
5.5 Conclusion
Having examined both GATT Article XXIV and the rules governing the 
formation of South-South RTAs under the Enabling Clause, and the latter’s drafting 
history, it is clear that the rules contained in the latter were created in order to provide 
a more flexible alternative to the vague yet demanding GATT Article XXIV. 
However, the rules were drafted in such a way that renders it very difficult to impose 
any limits to the resulting flexibility. Although this is in line with the drafting history 
and objective of the Enabling Clause, the leniency of the rules may not translate into 
trade/economic benefits in practice and may even result in severe trade diversion 
which is harmful to both developing-country members and non-members alike. 
Furthermore, the existing two separate sets of rules for the formation of a goods RTA 
can result in the lacuna where developing-country partners in North-South RTAs are 
not eligible to any special and differential treatment and the discrepancy between two 
types of South-South RTAs.
Thus, given the excess flexibility, the lacuna, and the discrepancy, I propose 
that there should be a single set of rules for the formation of goods RTAs, i.e. GATT
509 See http://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicSearchByMemberResult.aspx?enc=BGNDAo9ilu5NEK0fWo0Yn 
7u86VXlYA8JFWG+eFcVR+o= (last accessed 2 September 2010). In addition, from the interview 
conducted, the representatives from the ASEAN Secretariat said that their practice was to aim for the 
standard of GATT Article XXIV even where the agreement was notified under the Enabling Clause. 
However, it should be noted that the representatives assumed that the coverage of 90 per cent o f tariff 
lines would satisfy the SAT requirement under GATT Article XXIV.
5,0 For more detail of the ASEAN-China RTA, see http://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicShowMemberRTAID 
Card.aspx?enc=xFQ67iMMzAdiCuzI+VZHgm8iKAnW/GSa6DUBsnbXXmE= (last accessed 2 
September 2010).
511 Similar trends can be seen elsewhere, for example, the Panama-Chile FTA, the Mexico-Guatemala 
FTA, and the Peru-Singapore FTA. See http://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicSearchByMember.aspx (last 
accessed 2 September 2010).
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Article XXIV, but only if special and differential treatment is incorporated into it. 
This could be achieved through what I propose in Chapter 4. Alternatively, WTO 
Members could amend GATT Article XXIV and include built-in special and 
differential treatment provisions which would be available for developing-country 
partners in both North-South and South-South RTAs. In addition, the more nuanced 
approach to special and differential treatment whereby developing countries are 
further divided into subgroups- each subject to different threshold levels and 
transitional periods for the SAT requirement, could also be adopted. Furthermore, the 
new GATT Article XXIV should contain provisions which are capable of dealing with 
rules of origin.
Something closer to this approach is adopted in respect of services RTAs 
where GATS Article V is the sole set of rules.512 As will be seen in the next chapter, it 
contains provisions that incorporate special and differential treatment for developing 
countries regardless of whether they are forming their RTAs with developed-country 
trade partners or among themselves. It also contains a provision that restricts what 
RTA members can do with regard to rules of origin. Chapter 6 will therefore examine 
GATS Article V in the context of the challenges facing developing countries amid the 
current RTA proliferation.
512 See Chapter 6.
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Chapter 6
GATS Article V
6.1 Introduction
In Chapters 4 and 5, two sets of rules concerning goods RTAs were examined 
and discussed in light of the challenges facing developing countries amid the current 
RTA proliferation. However, as can be seen in Chapter 1, recent RTAs tend to include 
chapters or protocols on trade in services as well as those on trade in goods.513 When 
this is the case, the member countries have to notify their agreements under GATS 
Article V as well as either under GATT Article XXIV or the Enabling Clause. These 
services RTAs (or to be more precise, their chapters or protocols on trade in services) 
are subject to the requirements contained in GATS Article V.
Like the other two sets of rules, GATS Article V provides a defence to the 
MFN principle formally inserted in GATS Article II, and possibly other GATS 
provisions.514 Under it, WTO Members can give trade preferences to one another 
without having to extend them to the rest of the WTO membership. While GATT 
Article XXIV has been subject to years of debates and negotiations, albeit little 
agreement reached, GATS Article V is relatively novel given that services entered the 
multilateral trade agenda as late as the mid-1980s.515 At first, most developing
5,3 See Chapter 1.
514 The Panel in Canada-Autos held that “Article V provides legal coverage for measures taken 
pursuant to economic integration agreements, which would otherwise be inconsistent with the MFN 
obligation in Article II.” See WTO Panel Report, Canada-Autos, WT/DS139/R, WT/DS 142/R, 
adopted 19 June 2000, para. 10.271. From this, it is not clear whether or not GATS Article V can be 
used as a defence against other violations of GATS.
515 See M Krajewski, 'Services Liberalization in Regional Trade Agreements: Lessons for GATS 
Unfinished Business'?' in L Bartels and F Ortino (eds), Regional Trade Agreements and the WTO 
Legal System (Oxford University Press, Oxford; New York 2006), p. 175. As noted in Chapters 2 and 
3, the majority of theoretical and empirical studies concerning RTAs focus primarily on trade in goods. 
While new research is being conducted on services RTAs and their effects on members, non-members, 
and the multilateral trading system, it is not as comprehensive as studies on goods RTAs. In addition, 
data on trade in services are often incomplete, particularly in developing countries. This adds to the 
complexity involved in such research.
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countries were very reluctant to discuss services liberalization because they were 
uncertain whether they would benefit from it and the comparative advantage would lie 
with developed countries. However, towards the end of the 1980s, there was a shift in 
attitude by many developing countries, in services as in other areas of the Uruguay 
Round, away from defensive positions and towards an active search for solutions that 
would allow them to participate fully in whatever gains the negotiations might 
bring.516
GATS Article V, entitled “Economic Integration”, is part of the multilateral 
framework agreement on trade in services negotiated during the Uruguay Round. 
Initially, a draft provision on preferential trade for services was introduced by the EU 
and supported by Switzerland, Australia, and New Zealand. Economic integration 
agreements only became an issue in the negotiations at the end of 1988, when 
ministers agreed at the Montreal Mid-Term Review to include this discussion in the 
services negotiations.517 In December 1989, a text was circulated by the chairman of 
the negotiating group on services that included a provision for a derogation to the 
non-discrimination principle, “under conditions to be negotiated [for example, 
regional integration arrangements, free-trade areas, preferential trading arrangements 
among developing countries]. Such arrangements shall, inter alia, not create any new, 
or raise existing, barriers to trade in services in relation to other signatories and shall 
in this respect be subject to multilateral discipline and surveillance.”518
It was generally felt that certain criteria were needed to apply to services 
RTAs in order to allow the member countries to deviate from the non-discrimination 
principle. The debate on the derogation for services RTAs evolved around two 
distinct approaches. While some delegations argued that it should be related to the 
degree of liberalization of trade in services under the economic integration agreement 
itself, others were of the view that it should apply to services agreements concluded in 
the context of an RTA falling under GATT Article XXIV. In the end, a rather opaque 
compromise was reached. That is, a services RTA is to be examined under specific 
criteria with respect to services trade only but account is to be given to “wider process 
of economic integration” which refers to the liberalization of trade in goods in the
516 See J Croome, Reshaping the World Trading System: a History o f  the Uruguay Round (2 edn 
Kluwer Law International, London 1999), p. 207.
517 See TP Stewart, The GATT Uruguay Round: a Negotiating History (1986-1992): Volume II (Kluwer 
Law International, Boston 1993), p. 2368.
518 See Background Note by the Secretariat, ‘Systemic Issues Related to ‘Substantially All Trade” , 
WT/REG/W/21/Rev.l (5 February 1998).
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terms of GATT Article XXIV:5.519 In addition, the criteria were drafted based on 
GATT Article XXIV, in an effort to keep the services framework agreement as 
parallel to GATT as possible.520
To date, GATS Article V has yet to be seriously tested under the WTO DSM. 
Neither has the CRTA satisfactorily clarified how the provisions should be 
implemented in practice.521 Instead, the CRTA has merely cited the issues raised by 
Members during its meetings and pointed out how their views differed on these 
provisions.522 Given the prevalence of services chapters and protocols in recent RTAs 
whose members include developing countries, this chapter attempts to examine the 
provisions therein within the premises of the discussion conducted in Chapters 1, 2, 
and 3 and in light of the challenges facing them.
As will be discussed in more detail below, it will be my argument in this 
chapter that the adoption of the criteria which were based on GATT Article XXIV 
may have resulted in undesirable complication due to services-specific problems, and 
have made the implementation of GATS Article V extremely difficult. Given the 
nature of barriers to trade in services and rules of origin, the magnitude of trade 
diversion induced by the formation of a services RTA may not be as major a concern 
as in the case of goods RTAs. This renders the criteria which in the case of goods 
RTAs aim at minimizing trade diversion somewhat less significant. In addition and 
more importantly, services liberalization- may it be at the bilateral/regional or 
multilateral level- raises unique challenges (besides those identified in Chapters 2 and 
3) for developing countries, particularly those concerning regulation and movement of 
natural persons. In my view, GATS Article V fails to deal with them explicitly 
although its existing architecture, namely, provisions on special and differential 
treatment and rules of origin, could be used to help developing countries tackle these 
unique challenges as well as those identified in Chapters 2 and 3, at least to a certain 
extent. With regard to services RTAs, the constraints on developing countries’ 
analytical and negotiating capacities may be even more severe than in the case of
5,9 Ibid.
520 Ibid.
521 See Note by the Secretariat, ‘Synopsis of “Systemic” Issues Related to Regional Trade 
Agreements’, WT/REGAV/37 (2 March 2000), paras. 70-103.
522 For examples of the issues raised, see Communication from Hong Kong, China to the CRTA, 
‘Systemic Issues Arising from Article V of the GATS, WT/REG/W/34 (19 February 1999)’ and 
Communication from the European Communities and their Member States to the CRTA, ‘Article V of 
the GATS: Systemic Issues’, WT/REG/W/35 (21 September 1999).
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goods RTAs given the services-specific problems and unique challenges. As will be 
seen below, GATS Article V does not contain any provisions which directly deal with 
this challenge.
The chapter is divided into two sections. The first section presents the existing 
framework of GATS Article V, and the second section examines the article in order to 
determine the extent to which it addresses the challenges facing developing countries 
amid the current RTA proliferation and whether there are any ways to improve the 
provisions so that the challenges can be better addressed.
6.2 Existing Framework
The chapeau of paragraph 1 of GATS Article V states that “[T]his Agreement 
[GATS] shall not prevent any of its Members from being a party to or entering into an 
agreement liberalizing trade in services between or among the parties to such an 
agreement One may recall similar language in the chapeau of GATT Article 
XXIV: 5. Deriving its decision from the chapeau of paragraph 5, the Appellate Body 
in Turkey-Textiles held that “[GATT] Article XXIV may, under certain conditions, 
justify the adoption of a measure which is inconsistent with certain other GATT 
provisions, and may be invoked as a possible defence to a finding of 
inconsistency.”523 On this basis, the wording of the chapeau of paragraph 1 suggests 
that GATS Article V can be construed as providing a defence against a violation of 
the MFN obligation under GATS Article II as well as other GATS provisions.524
The rest of paragraph 1 sets out the requirements in relation to trade between 
RTA members. Accordingly, a services RTA is WTO-compatible if it:
(a) has substantial sectoral coverage (footnote omitted), and
523 See WTO Appellate Body Report, Turkey-Textiles, paras. 42-5.
524 It should be noted that the Panel in Canada-Autos only held that GATS Article V could be used as a 
defence against a violation of GATS Article II although it did not refer to other possible GATS 
violations. See WTO Panel Report, Canada-Autos, para. 10.271.
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(b) provides for the absence or elimination of substantially all discrimination, in the 
sense of Article XVII, between or among the parties, in the sectors covered under 
subparagraph (a), through:
(i) elimination of existing discriminatory measures, and/or
(ii) prohibition of new or more discriminatory measure,
either at the entry into force of that agreement or on the basis of a reasonable time­
frame, except for measures permitted under Articles XI, XII, XIV and XIV bis.
Subparagraph 1(a) requires the agreement to have “substantial sectoral coverage” 
while subparagraph 1(b) requires the agreement to provide for “the absence or 
elimination of substantially all discrimination, in the sense of Article XVII [national 
treatment], between or among the parties, in the sectors covered under subparagraph 
1(a).” According to footnote 1 of GATS, the substantial sectoral coverage 
requirement is to be understood in terms of “number of sectors, volume of trade 
affected and modes of supply” and that in order to meet this requirement, agreements 
“should not provide for the a priori exclusion of any mode of supply.”525 According 
to the text, subparagraph 1(b) requirement can be achieved through “elimination of 
existing discriminatory measures,” and/or “prohibition of new or more discriminatory 
measures.” In addition, paragraph 1 requirements are to be met “either at the entry 
into force of that agreement or on the basis of a reasonable time-frame, except for 
measures permitted under Articles XI, XII, XIV and XIV bis,”526
In evaluating whether the conditions under subparagraph 1(b) are met, 
paragraph 2 states that “consideration may be given to the relationship of the 
agreement to a wider process of economic integration or trade liberalization among 
the countries concerned (emphasis added).”527 It is understood that a wider process o f 
economic integration refers to the liberalization of trade in goods in the terms of 
GATT Article XXIV:5.528 The provision does not, however, specify precisely how the 
relationship between integration in goods and services should be considered.
Paragraph 3 contains built-in special and differential treatment provisions for 
developing countries. Subparagraph 3(a) reads:
525 See footnote 1 of GATS.
526 It should be noted that there is no agreement as to what constitutes a reasonable time-frame under 
subparagraph 1 although in the context of the CRTA, WTO Members have suggested periods ranging 
from five to tern years. See supra note 521, para. 84.
527 See GATS Article V:2.
528 See supra note 521, para. 85. See supra note 522, para. 11.
- 164-
[W]here developing countries are parties to an agreement of the type referred to in 
paragraph 1, flexibility shall be provided for regarding the conditions set out in paragraph 
1, particularly with reference to subparagraph (b) thereof, in accordance with the level of 
development of the countries concerned, both overall and in individual sectors and 
subsectors (emphasis added).
Unlike subparagraph 2(c) of the Enabling Clause, subparagraph 3(a) is not limited to 
South-South RTAs.529 It also applies to North-South RTAs. It should be noted that the 
mandatory language featured by subparagraph 3(a), i.e. “flexibility shall be 
provided”, suggests a greater degree of deference to developing countries’ positions in 
services RTAs than the language used in paragraph 2, i.e. “consideration may be 
given” in the context of a wider process of economic integration. Subparagraph 3(b) 
grants further flexibility to members of South-South services RTAs. It reads:
[Notwithstanding paragraph 6, in the case of an agreement of the type referred to in 
paragraph 1 involving only developing countries, more favourable treatment may be 
granted to juridical persons owned or controlled by natural persons of the parties to such 
an agreement.
Developing countries are allowed to have more restrictive rules of origin for juridical 
persons than those required by GATS Article V:6. Thus, they can restrict preferential 
treatment to services providers owned or controlled by their citizens.
Paragraph 4 states that:
“[A]ny services RTA referred to in paragraph 1 shall be designed to facilitate trade between 
the parties to the agreement and shall not in respect of any Member outside the agreement 
raise the overall level of barriers to trade in services within the respective sectors or 
subsectors compared to the level applicable prior to such an agreement.”
At first glance, one may see the similarities between the wording here and that of 
subparagraph 3(a) of the Enabling Clause.530 It is important to note that the word shall 
is used twice here: the first one is followed by the phrase be designed to; but, the 
second one is not. This suggests that paragraph 4 of GATS Article V sets out two
529 See Chapter 5.
530 Ibid.
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requirements which may be subject to two different interpretative standards- one is 
more restrictive than the other.
Similar to paragraph 6 of GATT Article XXIV, paragraph 5 stipulates that:
“[I]f in the conclusion, enlargement or any significant modification of any agreement 
under paragraph 1, a Member intends to withdraw or modify a specific commitment 
inconsistently with the terms and conditions set out in its Schedule, it shall provide at 
least 90 days advance notice of such modification or withdrawal and the procedure set 
forth in paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of [GATS] Article XXI shall apply.”
In other words, paragraph 5 establishes a procedure that aims to promote transparency 
and allow RTA members and non-members to deal with effects of the formation of a 
services RTA.
Unlike anything in GATT Article XXIV or the Enabling Clause, paragraph 6 
of GATS Article V restricts what RTA members can do with regard to rules of origin. 
The provision states that “[A] service supplier of any other Member that is a juridical 
person constituted under the laws of a party to an agreement referred to in paragraph 1 
shall be entitled to treatment granted under such agreement, provided that it engages 
in substantive business operations in the territory of the parties to such agreement.”
Similar to GATT Article XXIV:7 and paragraph 4 of the Enabling Clause, 
paragraph 7 imposes notification obligations on the part of RTA members (note the 
changes made by the 2006 Mechanism).531 It states:
(a) Members which are parties to any agreement referred to in paragraph 1 shall 
promptly notify any such agreement and any enlargement or any significant 
modification of that agreement to the Council for Trade in Services. They shall also 
make available to the Council such relevant information as may be requested by it.
The Council may establish a working party to examine such an agreement or 
enlargement or modification of that agreement and to report to the Council on its 
consistency with this Article.
(b) Members which are parties to any agreement referred to in paragraph 1 which is 
implemented on the basis of a time-frame shall report periodically to the Council for 
Trade in Services on its implementation. The Council may establish a working party 
to examine such reports if it deems such a working party necessary.
531 This will be discussed in Chapter 7.
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(c) Based on the reports of the working parties referred to in subparagraphs (a) and (b), 
the Council may make recommendations to the parties as it deems appropriate 
(emphasis added).
The last provision under GATS Article V is paragraph 8 which clarifies that 
“[A] Member which is a party to any agreement referred to in paragraph 1 may not 
seek compensation for trade benefits that may accrue to any other Member from such 
agreement.” It should be noted that the provision does not find an equivalent in GATT 
Article XXIV although paragraph 6 of the 1994 Understanding contains similar 
wording.532
As mentioned earlier, to date, GATS Article V has yet to be seriously tested 
under the WTO DSM. One case that touched upon GATS Article V is Canada-Autos. 
The Panel in Canada-Autos considered GATS Article V in response to the United 
States’ third-party submission in which it claimed that the Canadian legislation533 at 
issue, to the extent that they provided more favourable treatment to service suppliers 
of the United States, were subject to the exception to GATS Article II conferred by 
GATS Article V:l. The United States argued that the more favourable treatment the 
complainants sought to condemn was accorded by a member of an economic 
integration agreement of the type specified by GATS Article V :l, i.e. NAFTA, to the 
service suppliers of another member of that agreement.
The Panel rejected this argument. In doing so, it found that the legislation at 
issue was implemented unilaterally by Canada even before the conclusion of NAFTA, 
and consequently could not be considered as part of the NAFTA provisions. It noted 
instead that “NAFTA members have agreed to allow their continued implementation 
through specific exceptions granted to Canada.”534 In addition, the Panel held that 
even assuming the legislation could be brought within the scope of services 
liberalization provisions of NAFTA, the exemption was accorded only to a small 
number of manufacturers and wholesalers of the United States, to the exclusion of all 
other manufacturers and wholesalers of the United States and Mexico.535 In other
532 Paragraph 6 of the 1994 Understanding reads: “GATT 1994 imposes no obligation on Members 
benefiting from a reduction of duties consequent upon the formation of a customs union, or an interim 
agreement leading to the formation of a customs union, to provide compensatory adjustment to its 
constituents.” One can reasonably argue that the word Members refers to WTO Members not party to 
the CU in question and the phrase its constituents refers to members of the CU.
533 The Motor Vehicles Tariff Order 1998 and the Special Remission Orders.
534 See WTO Panel Report, Canada-Autos, para. 10.268.
535 Ibid, para. 10.269.
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words, any favourable treatments accorded among the members of a services RTA 
must be granted on an MFN basis within the RTA in question. This is arguably the 
limited extent which Canada-Autos contributes to the interpretation of GATS Article 
V. It should be noted that on appeal, the issue concerning GATS Article V was not 
brought up by any of the parties and therefore was not dealt with by the Appellate 
Body.536
It can be seen that the existing framework of GATS Article V provides some 
basis for RTA supervision. Paragraph 1 sets out a number of requirements for RTA 
Members to meet in terms of the trade between themselves. I will call this intra-RTA 
obligation. It is arguably reinforced by paragraph 4 first requirement, which obliges 
the member countries to design their agreements in such a way that facilitates trade 
between the member countries. Paragraph 4 second requirement, on the other hand, 
can be considered as third-party obligation since it aims to protect non-members’ 
interests. Distinct from GATT Article XXIV, paragraph 3 of GATS Article V 
contains built-in special and differential treatment provisions for developing 
countries. Paragraphs 5 and 7 establish procedures that promote transparency and 
allow RTA members and non-members to deal with effects of the formation of a 
services RTA. Unlike both GATT Article XXIV and the Enabling Clause, paragraph 
6 explicitly restricts what members of services RTAs can do with regard to rules of 
origin. Finally, paragraph 8 explicitly prevents RTA members from seeking 
compensation from non-members if the latter benefit from the formation of their 
services RTA.
It is noteworthy that GATS Article V does not distinguish between CU and 
FTA. This is because a CU and an FTA only differ where the members of the former 
are required to establish CETs while the members of the latter are not. Since services 
are typically not subject to tariffs, a distinction based on tariffs would not make much 
sense for trade in services. Thus, GATS Article V adopts the term economic 
integration instead.
Given the absence of case law, debates among and proposals made by WTO 
Members, coupled with the relative novelty of services trade in general and services 
RTAs in particular, it is not clear how the rules contained in GATS Article V are to
536 Canada did challenge the Panel’s finding that the measures at issue fell within the scope of GATS. 
See WTO Appellate Body Report, Canada-Autos, WT/DS139/AB/R, WT/DS 142/AB/R, adopted 19 
June 2000, paras. 147-84.
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operate in practice. Can one turn to the discourse on GATT Article XXIV for 
guidance? Although GATS Article V was drafted based on GATT Article XXIV, in 
an effort to keep the services framework agreement as parallel to GATT as 
possible,537 it is not clear to what extent the discourse on the latter can be extrapolated 
into the former. The differences between goods and services trade may imply 
different interpretations and applications of seemingly similar terms such as 
substantial and substantially all contained in GATS Article V and GATT Article 
XXIV.538 Furthermore, services-specific problems may even render these terms 
inoperable.
The next section will examine the article in order to determine the extent to 
which it addresses the challenges facing developing countries amid the current RTA 
proliferation as well as the unique challenges arising in the context of services RTAs, 
and whether there are any ways to improve the provisions so that the challenges can 
be better addressed.
6.3 GATS Article V and the Challenges Facing Developing Countries
Before one looks at GATS Article V in light of the challenges facing 
developing countries, it is important that one put them into the context of services 
trade. As noted in Chapters 2 and 3, the majority of theoretical and empirical studies 
concerning RTAs focus primarily on trade in goods and research on services RTAs 
and their impact on members, non-members, and the multilateral trading system is 
being developed. Although the existing literature on services RTAs may not be as 
comprehensive as studies on goods RTAs, it should shed some light on the extent to 
which GATS Article V addresses the challenges and whether there are ways to 
improve the provisions in order to deal with them.
537 See supra note 518.
538 For further discussion on the WTO jurisprudence on goods and services provisions, see F Smith and 
L Woods, Distinction without a Difference: Exploring the Boundary between Goods and Services in 
the World Trade Organization and the European Union' (2005) 12 Columbia Journal o f European Law
1, pp. 8-26.
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The starting point is the object and purpose of GATS itself. The Preamble
reads:
Members,
Recognizing the growing importance of trade in services for the growth and 
development of the world economy;
Wishing to establish a multilateral framework of principles and rules for trade in 
services with a view to the expansion of such trade under conditions of transparency and 
progressive liberalization and as a means of promoting the economic growth of all 
trading partners and the development of developing countries;
Desiring the early achievement of progressively higher levels of liberalization of 
trade in services through successive rounds of multilateral negotiations aimed at 
promoting the interests of all participants on a mutually advantageous basis and at 
securing an overall balance of rights and obligations, while giving due respect to national 
policy objectives;
Recognizing the right o f Members to regulate, and to introduce new regulations, 
on the supply of services within their territories in order to meet national policy 
objectives and, given asymmetries existing with respect to the degree of development of 
services regulations in different countries, the particular need of developing countries to 
exercise this right;
Desiring to facilitate the increasing participation of developing countries in trade 
in services and the expansion of their service exports including, inter alia, through the 
strengthening of their domestic services capacity and its efficiency and competitiveness;
As far as trade liberalization is concerned, the baselines of GATT and GATS 
are different. While WTO Members (and GATT CONTRACTING PARTIES before 
them) have made a lot of progress in the area of trade in goods since 1947, their 
commitments in the area of trade in services are much less ambitious. For example, 
although the MFN obligation under GATS Article II is drafted as a general 
obligation/discipline, Members were allowed to maintain inconsistent measures as
- 170-
long as they listed them as exemptions.539 On the other hand, market access (Article 
XVI) and national treatment (Article XVII) obligations are drafted as specific 
commitments found in Part III of GATS. What this means is that WTO Members 
have to comply with these obligations only in services sectors/subsectors which they 
have inscribed in their respective GATS Schedules of specific commitments and the 
obligations are subject to the terms, limitations, and conditions set out therein. WTO 
Members may make more commitments in the present and future rounds of 
multilateral trade negotiations.540
Compared to GATT where the MFN and national treatment principles are 
drafted as general obligations, i.e. applying to all trade barriers, GATS affords 
considerable flexibility to WTO Members in the area of trade in services. This is 
understandable given the relative novelty of services trade. From the Preamble and as 
exemplified in its architecture, GATS aims to provide WTO Members with a 
framework agreement which they can use as a starting point for future negotiations 
and to further their services liberalization.541 Drawing from the experience with trade 
in goods, one may expect that there will be many more years of ongoing negotiations 
on services concessions before GATS reaches the same level of comprehensiveness as 
that of current GATT.542
Unlike barriers to trade in goods where border measures like tariffs and tariff 
quotas are the major concerns, barriers to trade in services are primarily in the form of 
domestic regulations.543 According to Feketekuty,544 the closest analog with goods 
trade is the GATT rules which are designed to curb the trade-distorting effects of
539 See GATS Article 11:2. It should be noted that as the word maintains indicates paragraph 2 only 
covers measures in existence before the entry into force of the WTO Agreement. However, the relevant 
lists subsequently submitted by individual Members contain not only existing measures, but also a few 
exemptions that might prove necessary in future, for example, in the context of advancing regional 
integration projects. For further discussion, see R Adlung,'The GATS Turns Ten: A Preliminary 
Stocktaking' (Staff Working Paper ERSD-2004-05, WTO, Geneva 2004), pp. 3-4.
540 See http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/s_negs_e.htm (last accessed 14 August 2010). This 
is in line with the Preamble of GATS. See also M Footer, The General Agreement on Trade in 
Services: Taking Stock and Moving Forward' (2002) 29 Legal Issue of Economic Integration 7, pp. 10- 
5.
541 For the discussion on how GATS contains a built-in agenda that aim to address unfinished business 
left over from the Uruguay Round, see Ibid., pp. 15-25.
542 See JH Jackson, The World Trading System: Law and Policy o f International Economic Relations 
(2nd edn MIT Press, Cambridge, MA 1997), pp. 306-7.
543 For further discussion on the distinction between goods and services and their trade barriers, see 
Smith and Woods.
544 See G Feketekuty, ’Assessing and Improving the Architecture of GATS' in P Sauve and R Stem 
(eds), GATS 2000, New Directions in Services Trade Liberalization (The Brookings Institutes, 
Washington, DC 2000), p. 92.
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domestic standards that pursue other social objectives.545 To achieve services 
liberalization, WTO Members are encouraged to make commitments with regard to 
market access and national treatment. These require them to change their domestic 
regulations so that foreign services and services providers may enter the domestic 
market and are treated no less favourably than domestic services and services 
providers. This is seldom easy and often takes time to implement.546 Given that these 
are specific commitments, Members are free to pick and choose whichever 
sectors/subsectors they wish to open. Thus, one of the main objectives of GATS must 
be to persuade Members to bind as many services sectors/subsectors as much as 
possible under their GATS Schedules so that they are subject to market access and 
national treatment obligations.547
Studies conducted a few years after GATS was concluded, however, show that 
barring a few exceptions in basic telecommunications and financial services, the 
commitments inscribed in Members’ Schedules were essentially confined, in the best 
of cases, to binding existing regimes in a limited number of sectors.548 In addition, 
despite the generally modest starting point for the negotiations under the Doha 
Development Agenda (DDA), after two rounds of GATS offers549 and several years 
of discussions, the DDA has so far showed little promise of further improvements in 
liberalization commitments.550
545 See the Agreement on Technical Barriers, Article 2.2, which requires that domestic standards should 
neither create unnecessary obstacles to international trade nor be more trade-restrictive than necessary 
to fulfill a legitimate objective (health, safety, environmental, etc.), taking account of the risks non­
fulfillment would create.
546 From the interviews conducted, one of the Thai trade negotiators involved in the Japan-Thailand 
EPA said that he had much more trouble persuading representatives from professional unions and 
associations such as those of engineers and architects to grant market access to Japanese firms 
providing similar services than in the case of goods trade. This is because prior to the Japan-Thailand 
EPA, Japanese firms providing engineering services, for example, did not have access to the Thai 
market; whereas, Japanese goods had already entered the Thai market and became household names.
547 It should be noted that the extent of liberalization also depends on the terms, limitations, and 
conditions Members insert in their GATS Schedules.
548 For example see BM Hoekman, 'Assessing the General Agreement on Trade in Services' in W 
Martin and A Winters (eds), The Uruguay Round and Developing Countries (Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge 1996), p. 101 and R Snape, ^teaching Effective Agreements Covering Services' in A 
Krueger (ed) The WTO as an Institutional Organization (Chicago of University Press, Chicago 1998), 
pp. 287-9.
9 GATS offers are offers made by WTO Members with regard to their GATS Schedules of specific 
commitments. These can be found at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/s_negs_e.htm (last 
accessed 15 August 2010).
550 See JA Marchetti and M Roy, 'Services Liberalization in the WTO and in PTAs' in JA Marchetti and 
M Roy (eds), Opening Markets fo r  Trade in Services: Countries and Sectors in Bilateral and WTO 
Negotiations (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2008), pp. 69-72.
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Away from the WTO, services RTAs have been formed among WTO 
Members and commitments made therein have been found to go beyond their GATS 
commitments, i.e. GATS-plus commitments. For example, Roy, Marchetti, and Lim 
find that countries tend to bind more sectors/subsectors under services RTAs than 
under their GATS Schedules and GATS offers as well as to make deeper 
commitments with regard to market access and national treatment obligations.551 
More recent studies confirm this position.552 It is also found that a number of the 
developing countries under review have made more spectacular GATS-plus 
commitments in their services RTAs, but only because their existing GATS 
commitments and GATS offers are much more moderate. This, at least in general 
terms, lends some support to the suggestion that some WTO Members may be holding 
off on their GATS offers so as to have something to offer in RTA negotiations.553 On 
the other hand, a number of countries are found to make limited GATS-plus 
commitments. Marchetti and Roy argue that these more limited commitments may be 
due to the fact that the RTA negotiations took place before the last DDA offer; what 
was conceded in the RTA later found its way into the GATS offers.554 These findings 
suggest that the sequence of trade negotiations at different levels, i.e. WTO prior to 
RTA and vice versa, may be relevant and can determine the extent to which countries 
make commitments in services trade.
So, if countries tend to make GATS-plus commitments in services RTAs, is 
this not desirable? After all, the Panel in Canada-Autos held that “[T]he purpose of 
Article V [GATS] is to allow for ambitious liberalization to take place at a regional 
level, while at the same time guarding against undermining the MFN obligation by 
engaging in minor preferential arrangements.”555 As discussed in Chapter 2, the 
formation of an RTA is not necessarily economically beneficial to the member 
countries. All depends on the aggregation of static and dynamic effects of the 
formation.556 Recall, traditionally, studies on RTAs are conducted on the basis of 
trade in goods. Can their insights be extended to trade in services as well?
551 See Roy, Marchetti and Lim. It should be noted that this study only deals with modes 1 and 3 and 
does not look at modes 2 and 4 of services.
552 For example, see Marchetti and Roy, pp. 75-91.
553 For further discussion, see M Roy, J Marchetti and H Lim, 'Services Liberalization in the New 
Generation of Preferential Trade Agreements: How Much Further than GATS?' (2007) 6 World Trade 
Review 155.
554 See Marchetti and Roy.
555 See WTO Panel Report, Canada-Autos, para. 10.271.
556 See Chapter 2.
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As far as the static effects are concerned, the focus is on trade creation and 
trade diversion. The formation of an RTA will be beneficial to the member countries 
if  it results in net trade creation, other things being equal. However, this is far from 
certain in the area of trade in goods since governments, as influenced by domestic 
vested interests, have the tendency to exclude trade-creating products and industries 
while include trade-diverting ones.557 With regard to services RTAs, Mattoo and Fink 
find that compared to the status quo, a country is likely to gain from preferential 
liberalization of services trade at a particular point of time since trade creation is more 
likely.558 This is because barriers to trade in services are often so high or restrictive 
that foreign services providers cannot enter the domestic market, in other words, no or 
little trade among the home country, the prospective RTA partner, and non-members. 
Once the member countries decide to reduce or eliminate the barriers between 
themselves, i.e. forming a services RTA, trade is created when supplies of services are 
switched to the most efficient services providers in the preferential area. However, 
there is no or little trade diversion since trade between the member countries and non- 
members does not exist in the first place. For example, Costa Rica agreed to dismantle 
its public monopolies in insurance and telecommunications under the FTA between 
the United States, the Central American countries, and the Dominican Republic.559 
Consequently, more efficient firms from the RTA partners can enter the Costa Rica’s 
market in these sectors/subsectors while nothing has changed as far as non-member 
firms are concerned. In addition, non-member firms may be able to enter the market if 
they satisfy the rules of origin set out under the agreement (see the next paragraph) 
and/or if Costa Rica subsequently decides to extend these preferences to the rest of the 
world.
Apart from the prohibitively high barriers, by their nature, rules of origin for 
trade in services differ from those for trade in goods. In the latter case, rules of origin 
restrict exporters’ use of imported intermediate inputs. Taking advantage of RTA 
preferences requires ongoing proof that exported products meet origin rules. Different
557 See Chapter 2.
558 See A Mattoo and C Fink, Regional Agreements and Trade in Services: Policy Issues (Policy 
Research Working Paper 2852, World Bank, Washington, DC 2002), pp. 6-14.
559 See http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/cafta-dr-dominican-republic- 
central-america-fta (last accessed 15 August 2010). See also R Echandi, 'The DR-CAFTA-US FTA 
Negotiations in Financial Services: the Experience of Costa Rica' (Background paper commissioned by 
the Finance, Private Sector and Infrastructure Department of the Latin America and Caribbean Region, 
World Bank, Washington, DC 2006).
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origin rules for different RTA partners may prevent countries from reaping economies 
o f scale, as products with one set of imported intermediate inputs may qualify under 
the rules of one agreement but not others.560 In the case of services trade, rules of 
origin deal primarily with the origin of services providers rather than the origin of the 
traded services.561 Services exporters are free to rely on the import of intermediate 
inputs of goods and services from anywhere in the world.562 Generally, exporters face 
a one-time certification process that is unlikely to noticeably affect a supplier’s 
production costs.563 Thus, rules of origin for trade in services are less likely to 
significantly contribute to trade diversion. Moreover, GATS Article V:6 restricts what 
RTA members can do with regard to rules of origin.
Another factor that may favour trade creation is that it is more difficult to 
discriminate against non-members. This is because barriers to trade in services are 
generally in the form of domestic regulations that affect services and services 
providers. Discrimination in the application of such measures is much more difficult 
compared to tariffs and may not always be feasible. Fink, in fact, finds that many 
governments opt for non-discriminatory implementation of their RTA 
commitments.564 Given these factors, it appears that services RTAs may not be prone 
to trade diversion to the same extent as goods RTAs. Not only does this make trade 
diversion less of a concern for RTA members, but it may also reduce the adverse 
effects caused by trade diversion on the part of non-members.
With regard to the dynamic effects, it is found that as in the case of goods 
trade, the formation of a services RTA can promote efficiency gains from increased 
competition and exploitation of scale economies, as well as knowledge and 
technology transfer.565 The formation of a services RTA is likely to attract more FDI
560 See Chapter 2.
561 See C Fink and M Molinuevo, 'East Asian Free Trade Agreements in Services: Roaring Tigers or 
Timid Pandas?' (Policy Research Paper No40175, World Bank, Washington, DC 2007).
562 One might argue that RTAs establish a rule of origin for services supplied through modes 1 and 2. 
For example, cross-border trade in services is typically defined as the supply of a service from the 
territory o f one party into the territory of another party. At what point is a service supplied from outside 
the territory of a party if a service supplier relies on the import of intermediate service inputs from a 
non-party? While legal questions of this type may well arise at some point, they still appear to be 
academic at the moment. For further discussion, see Ibid.
563 For more detail, see C Fink, 'PTAs in Services: Friends or Foes of the Multilateral Trading System?' 
in J Marchetti and M Roy (eds), Opening Markets fo r  Trade in Services: Countries and Sectors in 
Bilateral and WTO Negotiations (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2008), p. 141.
564 For further discussion, see Ibid., pp. 116-24.
565 See Chapter 2 and Mattoo and Fink, pp. 16-8.
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if, inter alia, it requires the member countries to reduce or eliminate barriers to mode- 
3 services (commercial presence).566
Thus, trade diversion may be less of a major concern for services RTAs than 
in the case of goods RTAs, and the potential benefits from the dynamic effects also 
apply. However, one caveat is that the sequence of liberalization matters more in 
services trade than in the case of goods trade. In particular, the benefits of eventual 
multilateral liberalization at the WTO may be different if it is preceded by preferential 
liberalization. This is because location-specific sunk costs of production are important 
in many services.567 So, even temporary privileged access for an inferior supplier can 
translate into a long-term advantage in the market. Thus, while the elimination of 
preferences may lead to a relatively painless switch to more efficient sources of goods 
supply, the entry of more efficient services providers may be durably deterred if their
C/LQ
competitive advantage does not offset the advantages conferred by incumbency. 
These considerations are particularly relevant for developing countries that export 
mainly goods and import many services. Nevertheless, it is also important to note two 
qualifications to this caveat. First, entry by the more efficient firm could take place 
through acquisition- circumventing some of the problems of first-mover advantage, 
but this would require symmetry of information about the value of assets and no direct 
costs of transferring assets.569 Secondly, in certain services sectors/subsectors, firms 
could learn by doing.570 Thus, given time the relatively inefficient firms which were 
able to enter the market due to RTA preferences could become as efficient as the 
initially more efficient non-member firms.
Do any of these factors affect the challenges facing developing countries amid 
the current RTA proliferation? Recall, the key challenges from the perspective of a 
prospective RTA member include domestic vested interests, high implementation and
566 Mode-3 services directly concerns FDI. See G Karsenty, 'Assessing Trade in Services by Mode of 
Supply' in P Sauve and R Stem (eds), GATS 2000: New Directions in Services Trade Liberalization 
(Brookings Institution Press, Washington, DC 1999), pp. 43-8.
567 Sunk costs include costs of building headquarter, reputation/brand name, and so on. Suck costs 
matter because they have commitment value and can be used strategically by those who are allowed to 
enter the market first. A firm that establishes a telecommunications or transport network today signals 
that it will be around tomorrow if it cannot easily resell the equipment. The commitment value is 
stronger the more slowly capital depreciates and the more specific it is to the firm. Then if some firms 
are allowed to enter the market early, these incumbents may accumulate a quantity of capital sufficient 
to limit the entry of other firms. For further discussion, see J Tirole, The Theory o f  Industrial 
Organization (MIT Press, Cambridge, MA 1988), pp. 314-22.
568 See Mattoo and Fink, pp. 14-6.
569 Ibid.
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adjustment costs, and their lack of analytical and negotiating capacities.571 On the 
other hand, the key challenge facing non-member developing countries is the adverse 
effects caused by trade and investment diversion.572
As far as the challenge of domestic vested interests is concerned, the existing 
studies, which are based primarily on goods trade, may not be readily applicable. 
Although the argument that domestic vested interests would prefer to exclude trade- 
creating sectors/subsectors from a services RTA should still hold, this position can be 
influenced by cross-bargaining between goods and services. Countries rarely aim to 
liberalize services trade with each other on a bilateral/regional basis without having 
already or simultaneously achieved a significant degree of integration in the area of 
trade in goods. In fact, many RTAs, particularly those formed between developed and 
developing countries, set out to liberalize both goods and services.573 Countries with a 
comparative advantage in services may be willing to open their highly protected 
agricultural sectors, for example, in the exchange of their RTA partners’ commitment 
to liberalize their services trade. Such trade-offs are quite common where the 
developed-country partners have lucrative, markets, which are attractive to the 
developing-country partners whose comparative advantage lies in agricultural and 
manufacturing goods.574 Consequently, domestic vested interests which are against 
services liberalization will be confronted with by not only those which will gain from 
services liberalization but also those which will gain from preferential access to such 
(goods) markets.575
Besides the cross-bargaining between goods and services, the challenge of 
domestic vested interests may also be influenced by the extent to which it is possible 
to discriminate against non-members. As discussed earlier, discrimination in the 
application of barriers to trade in services is much more difficult compared to tariffs 
and may not always be feasible. In addition, it would not be as effective as in the case 
of goods trade for domestic vested interests to use rules of origin as protectionist
571 See Chapter 2.
572 See Chapter 3.
573 For example, see the Thailand-Australia and Thailand-New Zealand FTAs, and the Thailand-Japan 
EPA.
574 This is certainly the case in the RTA negotiations in which I had an opportunity to take part. For 
example, the representatives from the Republic of Korea firmly demanded that the ASEAN countries 
offered a better protection to Korean investors under the ASEAN-Republic of Korea FTA and referred 
to the Republic of Korea’s willingness to open its car and electronic industries in exchange.
575 There is evidence of such dynamics during the Japan-Thailand EPA negotiations, in which I was 
involved as a member of the Thai delegation.
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devices, especially when such rules are subject to GATS Article V:6. Furthermore, in 
some sectors/subsectors, the nature of liberalization measures may be such that it is 
the first liberalization step- for example, the break-up of a monopoly or the admission 
of foreign branches- that faces the most political opposition. Once a government has 
taken that step, there may be little remaining opposition for extending the measure to 
third countries, especially if the RTA partner is a large economy with a large pool of 
competitive services providers.576 In other words, domestic firms already have to 
compete with a lot of competitors from the partner country and additional competition 
from non-members may no longer be perceived as a major threat.
With regard to implementation and adjustment costs, the one that becomes less 
relevant here is tariff revenue losses since barriers to trade in services are often not 
revenue-generating.577 However, as discussed at some length in Chapter 2, 
comprehensive services liberalization requires robust regulatory frameworks for the 
sectors/subsectors covered by the agreement. Establishing such frameworks often 
involve high implementation and adjustment costs.578 Other implementation and 
adjustment costs will depend on the actual commitments made in the services RTA in
* S70question and the trade relationship between the member countries.
The constraints on analytical capacity on the part of developing countries are 
arguably more severe than in the case of goods trade. One reason for this is that data 
on services trade are not readily available and their collection requires specialized set 
of economic analytical skills and responsible institutions.580 The availability of data is 
often noted as a major limitation in the literature on trade in services. Consequently, 
the negotiating capacity on the part of developing countries is likely to be undermined 
due to this lack of analytical capacity as they may not know exactly what they can and 
cannot commit in the negotiations. Furthermore, given that successful services 
liberalization demands robust regulatory frameworks, analytical capacity with regard 
to necessary regulations and how to put them in place is crucial. For example, 
financial liberalization requires extremely complex and difficult regulatory
576 See Fink, TTAs in Services: Friends or Foes of the Multilateral Trading System?1, p. 125.
577 See Mattoo and Fink, pp. 9-11.
578 See Chapter 2.
579 For example, if  competitions from the RTA partner are fierce and domestic services providers can 
only compete as a result o f trade barriers, a commitment to reduce or eliminate such barriers will imply 
high implementation and adjustment costs for the home country.
580 From the interviews conducted, a Thai trade negotiator revealed that Thailand has only started 
collecting data on services since the end of 2000.
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frameworks to be established prior to or at the time of liberalization. It also involves 
close monitoring after the opening of the market, which entails well-functioning 
regulatory bodies. The vitality and complexity of such regulatory frameworks can be 
seen from the 2008 financial crisis which is originated in the United States’ financial 
sector/subsectors.581 If the world’s most advanced economy fails to do it, there are 
significant impediments to developing countries having the capacity to succeed.582
The challenge of trade and investment diversion should still hold although 
their magnitude may be mitigated by the factors which lessen trade-diverting effects. 
Thus, non-members may not be adversely affected to the same extent as in the case of 
goods RTAs. It should be noted that paragraph 8 explicitly prevents RTA members 
from seeking compensation from non-members if the latter benefit from the formation 
of their services RTA. This suggests that non-members may actually gain from the 
formation of a services RTA.
In addition to the challenges identified in Chapters 2 and 3, there are two other 
unique challenges arising in the context of trade in services that are worth discussing. 
The first is whether developing countries, when making commitments in services 
RTAs, are capable of establishing appropriate and effective regulatory frameworks, 
which can vary from one sector/subsector to another. This is rather different from, 
although linked to, the implementation and adjustment costs discussed earlier. The 
starting point is that services liberalization is much more complicated than the case of 
goods trade. Even though the standard benefits from liberalization are similar to those 
of goods liberalization- i.e. the static and dynamic gains,583 the costs are much more 
sector-specific due to the diversity of services.584 Each sector/subsector tends to have 
its own characteristics and problems. These are generally and necessarily dealt with 
through various domestic regulations. Although putting in place appropriate and 
effective regulatory frameworks for all the sectors/subsectors covered by the 
agreement is very important, it is far from easy.
581 For further discussion, see JB Taylor, 'The Financial Crisis and the Policy Responses: An Empirical 
Analysis o f What Went Wrong' (Working Paper No 14631, National Bureau o f Economic Research, 
2009).
582 An example of the failure to put in place financial regulatory framework and monitor business 
activities on the part o f developing countries is the Southeast Asian financial crisis o f 1997. See G 
Corestti, PA Pesenti and N Roubini.'What Caused the Asian Curreny and Financial Crisis? Part I: A 
Macroeconomic Overview' (Working Paper No6833, National Bureau of Economic Research, 1998).
583 See Chapter 2.
584 See O Cattaneo and others, 'Assessing the Potential o f Services Trade in Developing Countries: An 
Overview' in O Cattaneo and others (eds), International Trade in Services: New Trends and 
Opportunities fo r  Developing Countries (World Bank, Wasington, DC 2010), p. 2.
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In financial sector and subsectors, for example, while liberalization would 
promote competition and efficiency as well as FDI, regulations on excessive risk- 
taking behaviours and in/outflow of capital are necessary for financial stability and 
protection of small depositors.585 However, this is not easy to accomplish as can be 
seen from the fact that many developing countries suffered financial crises during the 
mid to late 1990s, e.g. Thailand in 1997, often several years after they had begun to 
carry out financial reforms and liberalize their banking sectors.586 This suggests that 
although financial liberalization may result in efficiency and competitive gains 
derived from a more open market, it can increase the vulnerability of financial 
systems to financial crisis as well. In addition, the sequence of internal (domestic) and 
external (international) liberalization is said to have significant effects on the success 
o f financial liberalization. Edwards argues, in the context of Latin American 
countries, that any external liberalization of financial sector/subsectors should take 
place after internal liberalization because premature opening of capital markets can 
lead to volatile financial flows that can magnify domestic instability, particularly in 
terms of real exchange rate followed by capital flight.587 In other words, domestic 
financial sector/subsectors must not suffer from non-competitive structure and 
inadequate regulation prior to international liberalization. This is a crucial point as 
many developing are faced with underdeveloped regulatory frameworks for financial 
sector/subsectors, and may not yet be ready for external liberalization, including that 
achieved through services RTAs.588
Other services sectors/subsectors have different characteristics and are 
confronted with different problems. For example, in water services, although it is 
typically more efficient to have a single supplier of piped services to any particular 
area due to natural monopoly and significant network economies of scale, 
liberalization of water services can offer potential benefits in terms of investment,
585 See G Stiglitz, The Role of the State in Financial Markets' (Proceedings of the World Bank 
Conference on Development Economics, World Bank, Washington, DC 1994).
586 See M Brownbridge and C Kirkpatrick, 'Financial Regulation in Developing Countries' (2000) 37 
Journal o f Development Studies 1, pp. 7-8.
587 See S Edwards, 'The Sequencing of Economic Reform: Analytical Issues and Lessons from Latin 
American Experience' (1990) 13 The World Economy 1.
588 For example, see J Wahba and M Mohieldin, 'Liberalizing Trade in Financial Services: The 
Uruguay Round and the Arab Countries' (1998) 26 World Development 1331, pp. 1341-2.
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technology and management expertise.589 However, successful liberalization would 
require a well-functioning regulatory framework. Not only are regulations important 
in dealing with market failures such as natural monopoly and asymmetric 
information,590 they are also crucial to ensure positive externalities as water is both 
essential for life/health of the population and the livelihoods of farmers in the rural 
areas.591 These characteristics of water services provide additional arguments for 
regulation on social as well as economic grounds. Where a service is regarded as 
meeting a basic need or entitlement, regulation will be needed to ensure universal 
access, for example. This is vital for developing countries as it is estimated that 1.1 
billion people in these countries do not have access to safe water supplies and 2.4 
billion lack access to basis sanitation.592 Thus, developing countries forming a 
services RTA that covers water services must put in place a regulatory framework 
which is able to secure access to safe, reliable, and reasonably priced water services, 
particularly for the poor and those who live in the rural areas.
Establishment of appropriate and effective regulatory frameworks for services 
sectors/subsectors requires significant resources, both in terms of human capital and 
domestic institutions. It is also likely to take time for regulatory bodies to build up 
their expertise in monitoring services and services providers and in obtaining 
economic and social objectives set by the government. In order to maximize the 
potential benefits and minimize the potential costs induced by the formation of a 
services RTA, developing countries cannot simply open their markets. They have to 
ensure that they are capable of establishing appropriate and effective regulatory 
frameworks in the sectors/subsectors covered by the agreement. The stage of 
development of a developing country is therefore relevant here as the more advanced 
ones are likely to already have relatively well-established regulatory frameworks in 
important services sectors/subsectors and better analytical capacity (due to better 
human capital and domestic institutions) to maintain or improve them.
589 See N Johnstone and L Wood, 'Introduction' in N Johnstone and L Wood (eds), Private Firms and 
Public Water: Realising Social and Environmental Objectives in Developing Countries (Edward Elgar, 
Cheltenham 2001), pp. 10-1.
590 Asymmetric information occurs where one party to a transaction has more information than the 
other about the quantity or quality of the outputs to be transacted and on that basis acts 
opportunistically to exploit its superior knowledge and gain at the expense of the other party.
591 See C Kirkpatrick and D Parker, 'Domestic Regulation and the WTO: The Case of Water Services 
in Developing Countries' (2005) 28 The World Economy 1491, p. 1497.
592 See Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.,Water Partnerships: Striking a 
Balance' (OECD, Paris 2003).
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Another unique challenge facing developing countries concerns movement o f  
natural persons or mode-4 services. In general terms, developed countries are capital 
abundant and will benefit from free movement of capital while most developing 
countries are labour abundant and will benefit from free movement of labour. In other 
words, developing countries generally have comparative advantage in this factor of 
production. However, unlike free movement of capital, which is often promoted by 
bilateral investment treaties and/or investment chapters in RTAs, free movement of 
natural persons is usually met with less enthusiasm.593 For example, although the 
number of RTAs covering services is growing rapidly, the willingness to incorporate 
meaningful provisions on labour mobility as part of a service package is limited- most 
agreements contain only modest market access opportunities for foreign workers.594
Potential gains from free movement of natural persons are very important to 
developing countries. The most evident way in which mode-4 services benefit them is 
through the provision of a steady and continuous inflow of remittances. In 2008, such 
remittances amounted to about $330 billion.595 Studies have shown that these 
remittances significantly reduce the level, depth, and severity of poverty in 
developing countries.596
In the context of services RTAs, a developing country is likely to gain if its 
partners, particularly developed-country ones in North-South agreements, make 
commitments that allow freer movement of natural persons in services 
sectors/subsectors in which the developing country has abundant supply of qualified 
workers. For example, the Philippines has been exporting nurses and other health care 
workers to English-speaking countries;597 whereas, India has benefited from its 
exports of financial and IT workers.598
593 See S Stephenson and G Hufbauer, ’Increasing Labor Mobility: Options for Developing Countries' 
in O Cattaneo and others (eds), International Trade in Services: New Trends and Opportunities fo r  
Developing Countries (World Bank, Washington, DC 2010), p. 29.
594 Ibid.
595 See IMF database, available at http://www.imf.org/extemal/pubs/ft/fandd/2009/12/ratha.htm (last 
accessed 4 October 2010). It should be noted that the total amount of resources remitted may be two or 
three times greater since a large number of transactions are affected through informal channels.
596 For example, see RH Adams and J Page, 'Do International Migration and Remittances Reduce 
Poverty in Developing Countries?' (2005) 33 World Development 1645, pp. 1652-5.
597 See M Mashayekhi, M Julsaint and E Tuerk, 'Strategic Considerations for Developing Countries: 
The Case of GATS and Health Services' in C Blouin, N Drager and R Smith (eds), International Trade 
in Health Services and the GATS: Current Issues and Debates (World Bank, Washington, DC 2006), p. 
22 .
598 See Cattaneo and others, p. 9. For further discussion on movement of natural persons and how 
mode-4 liberalization can affect developing countries, see Stephenson and Hufbauer, 'Increasing Labor 
Mobility: Options for Developing Countries', pp. 29-66.
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The following sections will examine GATS Article V in light of these two 
unique challenges arising in the context o f services trade in addition to the challenges 
facing developing countries amid the current RTA proliferation identified in Chapters 
2 and 3.
6.3.1 Intra-RTA Obligation and the Challenges Facing Developing Countries from  
the Perspective o f a Prospective Member
Under GATS Article V, it can be argued that the intra-RTA obligation is 
comprised of the requirements contained in paragraph 1 and the first requirement 
contained in paragraph 4. As far as subparagraph 1(a) is concerned, a services RTA 
notified under GATS Article V must have substantial sectoral coverage. The footnote 
to the provision explains that this requirement “is understood in terms of number of 
sectors, volume of trade affected, and modes of supply.” Subparagraph 1(a) is based 
on, and imports into GATS, the key concept of substantially all the trade in GATT 
Article XXIV:8.599 On the face of it, the wording of the provision and of the footnote 
clarifies that the requirement entails both qualitative and quantitative components.600 
As can be seen in the context of GATT Article XXIV, the notion of what is 
substantial is controversial and has been subject to years of debates among WTO 
Members (and GATT CONTRACTING PARTIES before them). Things are arguably 
much more complicated under GATS Article V due to services-specific problems.
With regard to the qualitative component, it is not at all clear how the 
requirement of substantial sectoral coverage should be met. For example, can entire 
sectors be excluded from a services RTA or at what level of detail should the 
determination of included and excluded services be made, i.e. at the level of 
individual services, subsectors or whole sectors? The footnote uses the term sectors, 
which arguably suggests that the requirement is inter alia based on the concept of 
entire sectors, and that inclusion of substantially all of these sectors is necessary in
599 See supra note 518. See also R Wolfrum, P-T Stoll and C Feinaugle, WTO-Trade in Services (Max 
Planck Commentaries on World Trade Law: 6, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden 2008), p. 130.
600 See Hudec and Southwick, Hegionalism and WTO Rules: Problems in the Fine Art of 
Discrimination Fairly', pp. 75-6. For the discussion on this point in relation to GATT Article XXIV, see 
Chapter 4.
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order to comply with subparagraph 1(a). The Appellate Body held in Turkey-T'extiles 
that substantially all the trade is “not the same as all the trade”, and that it is 
“something considerably more than merely some of the trade”.601 If the same 
reasoning were to be adopted here, subparagraph 1(a) would not require all sectors to 
be covered but that the agreement excludes no more than a very limited number of 
sectors. Although at first glance such interpretation is straightforward, it still does not 
specify when exactly the requirement is met. Does the inclusion of eight out of the 11 
current services sectors identified by the Services Sectoral Classification List count as 
substantial sectoral coverage?602 Furthermore, in assessing the relevance of 
exclusions, should the economic importance of the sector in terms of international 
exchange be taken into account? It has been suggested that the exclusion of major 
sectors, which represent great economic value, would in itself prevent a services RTA 
from passing the requirement of substantial sectoral coverage.603 It also remains 
unclear how those sectors that are only partially covered by a services RTA should be 
computed- that is those sectors in which one or more subsectors have been 
excluded.604
As for the quantitative component, the reference to volume of trade in the 
footnote to subparagraph 1(a) could imply that RTA members must liberalize those 
services which amount to substantial trade volumes between themselves in terms of 
both current and potential trade.605 According to this interpretation, the 
sectors/subsectors or even particular services where limitations are maintained, cannot 
be those where significant trade between the member countries occurs or would have 
occurred but for the limitations. However, it is extremely difficult, if at all possible, to 
accurately assess volumes of services trade, particularly potential trade which would
601 See WTO Appellate Body Report, Turkey-Textiles, para. 48.
602 See http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/serv_sectors_e.htm (last accessed 18 August 2010). 
See also Note by the Secretariat, ‘Services Sectoral Classification List’, MTN.GNS/W/120.
603 See Committee on Regional Trade Agreements, ‘Note on the Meetings of 29-30 April and 3 May 
1999’, WT/REG/M/22 (4 April 1999), para. 16.
604 Practice reveals that some services RTAs do fully exclude some service sectors from their coverage, 
as is the case of financial services in the Republic of Korea-Chile FTA. In addition, the exclusion of 
some subsectors is a common practice, in particular with the transport sectors for the air and maritime 
transport subsectors. See Wolfrum, Stoll and Feinaugle, p. 131.
605 See Ibid., p. 132. It should be noted that the concept of “volume of trade” is of limited significance 
in the realm of international trade in services as covered by GATS. The mere idea of volume is at odds 
with the intangible nature of services. Moreover, international trade in services may occur without 
international transactions taking place, as is the case when services are provided through a locally 
established commercial presence, which also interferes with the assessment of the “volume of trade” in 
services between two countries in terms of international transactions.
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have occurred but for the existing trade barriers.606 Not only do statistical data on 
trade in services currently fall short in amount and quality compared to those 
available for trade in goods, but there are also difficulties involved in different 
methodological approaches on how to collect them.607
Given that few services RTAs are likely to have 100 per cent sectoral 
coverage, the question- when exactly the substantial sectoral coverage requirement is 
satisfied?- is likely to come up repeatedly in the CRTA. For example, members of the 
NAFTA Working Party questioned whether the NAFTA’s exclusion of aviation and 
maritime services and its grandfathering of state and local measures meant that it had 
less than substantial sectoral coverage.608 In the end, different views were noted by 
the Working Party on the extent to which activity reservations could result in a de 
facto  sectoral exclusion but no firm conclusion was reached.609 It is noteworthy that in 
response to a Member’s request for information on the economic value of the 
unbound sectors, the NAFTA members themselves noted the difficulty in deriving 
meaningful statistical information for trade in services.610
Since the substantial sectoral coverage requirement determines the ambit of 
the requirement under subparagraph 1(b), its interpretation is very crucial. As 
discussed earlier, one unique challenge facing developing countries is the capacity to 
establish appropriate and effective regulatory frameworks for the sectors/subsectors 
covered in a services RTA. If the requirement is interpreted very strictly, developing 
countries will be obliged to include sectors/subsectors that they may not yet have 
well-functioning regulatory frameworks in place. This can arguably do them more 
harm than good. The function of the SAT requirement in the case of goods RTAs is to 
promote the inclusion of trade-creating products and industries. However, since trade 
diversion is less of a major concern in the case of services RTAs, the substantial 
sector coverage requirement may not be as important here.
606 See Stephenson, 'Regional Agreements on Services in Multilateral Disciplines: Interpreting and 
Applying GATS Article V', pp. 91-2.
On the problems related to the collection of precise data on services trade, see BM 
Hoekman,Tentative First Steps: An Assessment of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Services' (Policy 
Research Working Paper No 1455, World Bank, Washington, DC 1995), S Stephenson, 'GATS and 
Regional Integration' in P Sauve and R Stem (eds), GATS 2000-New Directions in Services Trade 
Liberalisation (Brookings Institution Press, Washington, DC 2002), pp. 514-6.
608 See Committee on Regional Trade Agreements, ‘Note on the Meeting 24 February 1997-
Examination of the North American Free Trade Agreement’, WT/REG4/M/4 (April 16, 1997), para.
26.
One way to get around this is for developing countries to rely on subparagraph 
3(a), which provides special and differential treatment for paragraph 1 requirements. 
Nevertheless, it is not clear how far they can do so. For example, would the 
substantial sector coverage requirement still be met if a developing country relies on 
subparagraph 3(a) to exclude six out of the 11 services sectors in its services RTA? 
Surely, in such situation, the number of sectors covered (less than half) would cease to 
be substantial. This interpretative problem suggests that it may have been a 
fundamental mistake to import into GATS the key concept of substantially all the 
trade in GATT Article XXIV: 8 in this fashion.
In my view, developing countries should liberalize their services 
sectors/subsectors only to the extent that they are able to establish appropriate and 
effective regulatory frameworks.611 On the basis of the wording of subparagraph 1(a), 
I believe that a compromise can be made. Developing countries may be required to 
include substantial sectoral coverage (whatever that may be, e.g. eight out of 11 
sectors) but they should be allowed to insert conditions and reservations with regard 
to the covered sectors/subsectors, which could be tied with their ability to establish 
appropriate and effective regulatory frameworks and/or other social objectives. For 
example, in the financial sector/subsectors, firms from RTA partners may operate 
only in subsectors which are adequately regulated (subjectively determined by the 
developing country) and/or as long as they also provide financial products which help 
the poor, e.g. microloans, for example.612 This way, there is no need to amend 
subparagraph 1(a), the substantial sectoral coverage requirement. It is noteworthy that 
although the CRTA and panels/the Appellate Body have yet to clarify this point, 
WTO Members seem to have adopted the practice where most sectors are covered but 
subject to horizontal exceptions.613 Developing countries should be able to rely on
611 For example, Indonesia only made moderate GATS-plus commitments in its services RTA with 
Japan on the ground of the need to establish regulatory frameworks. However, it should be noted that 
Indonesia did not rely on GATS Article V:3(a) for this. See Committee on Regional Trade Agreements, 
‘Economic Partnership Agreement between Japan and Indonesia (Goods and Services)- Questions and 
Replies’, WT/REG241/2 (7 September 2009), para. 15.
612 Microloans are extremely small loans, compared to the Western standard, which are given to those 
in poverty and designed to spur entrepreneurship among the very poor. For example, in Thailand, 
microloans valued between £50-200 are only offered by the state-owned bank to those below the 
poverty line without requiring evidence of steady employment or verifiable credit history. On general 
discussion on microloans and their role in development, see DR Snow, G Woller and TF Buss, 
Microcredit and Development Policy (Nova Science Publishers, Huntington, New York 2001).
613 Horizontal exceptions are inserted at the beginning of covered sectors in order to set out exceptions 
which apply to all subsectors within the respective sectors. These exceptions allow RTA members to 
exempt themselves from subparagraph 1(b) requirement. For example, see the services chapter of the
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subparagraph 3(a) to justify this. In addition, some form of technical assistance on 
how to put in place appropriate and effective regulatory frameworks for the 
sectors/subsectors covered should be available for them in order to deal with this 
challenge from all fronts.614
Subparagraph 1(b) requires that a services RTA provides the absence or 
elimination of substantially all discrimination. This is understood in terms of GATS 
Article XVII, which requires that treatment granted to services providers from the 
partner country be no less favourable than that accorded to domestic services 
providers. Granting unqualified national treatment among the member countries 
would be the equivalent of providing free trade for services- that is no discriminatory 
barriers (except possibly those of a quantitative non-discriminatory nature) would 
exist to the establishment of member firms or to cross-border sales of services by 
member firms.615 The key question is how to determine whether subparagraph 1(b) 
requirement is satisfied.
According to the text, subparagraph 1(b) requirement can be achieved through 
two channels, namely, “elimination of existing discriminatory measures,”616 and/or 
“prohibition of new or more discriminatory measures.”617 The former entails an 
obligation to liberalize as it requires the elimination of existing discriminatory 
measures; whereas, the latter features only a limited liberalization as it requires 
conditions of competition between domestic and partner services providers not to be 
worsened, i.e. a standstill obligation. The adoption of one “and/or” the other means 
under subparagraph 1(b) raises the question whether or not these two channels can be 
considered to be two self-standing and independent ways of fulfilling the requirement 
therein. In other words, can RTA members freely choose between either of the two 
channels, so that the mere inclusion of a stand-still obligation would ensure 
compliance with the requirement under subparagraph 1(b)?
To answer this question one is required to construe subparagraph 1(b) as a 
whole. From the wording, one could argue that the main objective of subparagraph 
1(b) is to ensure the absence or elimination of substantially all discrimination (in the
Thailand-Australia FTA, available at http://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/negotiations/aust-thai/ (last accessed 
5 October 2010).
614 See Chapter 7.
615 See Stephenson, 'Regional Agreements on Services in Multilateral Disciplines: Interpreting and 
Applying GATS Article V', p. 93.
6lg GATS Article V:l(b)(i).
617 GATS Article V:l(b)(ii).
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sense of national treatment obligation) between or among the member countries in the 
sectors covered in the agreement. The two channels are merely means to achieve this 
objective. For sectors in which discriminatory measures exist, the member countries 
must eliminate them to the extent that substantially all discrimination no longer exists. 
Instead, in sectors that are being liberalized or have previously been subject to 
unilateral liberalization, the stand-still obligation ensures that the absence of 
discrimination will be maintained. Thus, in my view, the two channels set out in 
subparagraph l(b)(i) and (ii) are not independent alternatives. Rather, they are to be 
adopted in accordance with the situations that exist in the covered sectors.
As mentioned in the previous section, paragraph 1 requirements are to be met 
either at the entry into force of that agreement or on the basis of “a reasonable time­
frame”. In the case of goods RTAs notified under GATT Article XXIV, the 1994 
Understanding elaborates that “a reasonable length of time” contained in GATT 
Article XXIV:5(c) is taken to mean no longer than ten years.618 Unfortunately, it is 
not clear what is to be considered reasonable in the case of services RTAs. WTO 
Members have suggested periods ranging from five to ten years for the phrase 
reasonable tim e-fram ed  I think that a reasonable timeframe should be linked to the 
ability on the part of the developing-country partner to put in place appropriate and 
effective regulatory frameworks for the sectors/subsectors covered by the RTA. In 
addition, reasonable timeframes for developed and developing countries should be 
different, which can be justified under subparagraph 3(a). However, it is also 
important not to overdo this. As argued in Chapters 4 and 5, the flexibility granted to 
developing countries should be subject to certain limits and should not be excessive. 
Perhaps, the CRTA could review the existing and newly notified services RTAs in 
order to find out an appropriate length of time for developing countries to liberalize 
their services trade through RTAs. The difficulty with this is that developing countries 
are not homogeneous and each country may have different strengths and weaknesses 
in different services sectors/subsectors. The issue of heterogeneity of developing 
countries in relation to the built-in special and differential provisions are discussed 
further below.
So far, it can be seen that there are a number of unresolved interpretative 
ambiguities with subparagraph 1(b). In addition and more importantly, the question
618 See the 1994 Understanding, para. 3.
619 See supra note 21, para. 84.
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remains- when is the requirement to eliminate substantially all discrimination 
satisfied? Can one apply a numerical benchmark to the requirement? For example, if 
there were 100 discriminatory measures in a covered sector, would the elimination of 
90 measures account for substantially all discrimination being eliminated? Such an 
approach would have the benefit of simplicity, but it might not make much sense 
given that the remaining ten measures could restrict more intra-RTA services trade in 
the sector even more than the 90 measures eliminated collectively did. Or should the 
requirement be considered on the basis of trade volume being restricted by the 
existing measures. That is, the requirement would be met if, say, 90 per cent of trade 
volume within a covered sector was free of discriminatory measures. This approach 
would be more effective at ensuring services liberalization, but it would encounter the 
same problem as the quantitative component of subparagraph 1(a) with regard to data 
on services trade.
Noticeably, the difficulties with regard to subparagraph 1(b) are quite similar 
to those discussed in the context of other restrictive regulations o f  commerce. They 
may be even more problematic due to the lack of data on and the novelty of trade in 
services. In the case of ORRCs, I argue that it would make more sense to separate the 
ORRC half from the duty half for the application of the SAT requirement. That is, 
RTA members would be subject to the demanding definition of and tight timeframe 
for the duty half of the SAT requirement, albeit the proposed special and differential 
treatment available for developing countries, while the ORRC half would be enforced 
separately with less rigour.620 This proposal would still allow the intra-RTA (goods) 
trade to be sufficiently facilitated (GATT Article XXIV:4 first objective) because 
NTBs are subject to other WTO commitments, hence limiting trade distortion caused 
by discriminatory measures.621
However, things are different under GATS. First, given that the primary type 
of barriers to trade in services is non-tariff measures, subparagraph 1(b) requirement 
is crucial for intra-RTA services liberalization. Secondly and more importantly, 
market access and national treatment obligations are specific commitments under 
GATS. WTO Members have to comply with these obligations only in services 
sectors/subsectors which they have inscribed in their respective GATS Schedules of 
specific commitments and the obligations are subject to the terms, limitations, and
620 See Chapter 4.
621 Ibid.
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conditions set out therein. This means that if a WTO Member has inscribed few 
services sectors/subsectors in its GATS Schedule, it can freely maintain or impose 
discriminatory measures in the unbound sectors/subsectors, which may cause severe 
trade distortion. On this basis, the implementation of both subparagraphs 1(a) and (b) 
is very important to promote trade creation and the gains from dynamic effects. 
However, given the lack of data on and the novelty of trade in services, it is extremely 
difficult to implement these provisions in practice. This raises the question whether 
GATS Article V is at all effective in achieving the object and purpose of GATS, and 
for the purposes of the thesis, the challenges facing developing countries amid the 
current RTA proliferation.
Due to the nature of these difficulties, it will take time for WTO Members and 
experts to agree on how the requirements under paragraph 1 should be interpreted; 
and it will also take time for them to come up with suitable methodological 
approaches for data collection with regard to services trade and actually carry it out so 
that the requirements can be implemented in practice. Until then, not much can be 
done as far as the interpretation of these requirements is concerned. However, it is 
also important not to exaggerate the consequences of the current situation.
As discussed in Chapter 2, the functions of the WTO rules should be to 
encourage the member countries to promote the potential benefits and at the same 
time allow them to manage the potential costs induced by the formation of an RTA. 
For example, the SAT requirement under GATT Article XXIV is there to indirectly 
force RTA members, which may be influenced by domestic vested interests, to 
include trade-creating products and industries as well as to enhance the dynamic 
effects resulted from the formation. Although the requirements under paragraph 1 of 
GATS Article V arguably aim to achieve these also, the magnitude of trade diversion, 
which is a major concern in the case of goods RTAs, may be mitigated by the nature 
of barriers to trade in services and rules of origin.622 Consequently, the proposition 
that “some liberalization is better than none” is arguably more valid in the case of 
services RTAs.623 Since negotiations on GATS provisions and Members’ specific 
commitments are still ongoing and not yet comprehensive, services RTAs may 
provide a means to liberalize trade in services, albeit on a bilateral/regional basis.
622 See earlier discussion.
623 A keen advocate of this proposition is Lawrence Summers, who was very influential under the 
Clinton Administration. See Summers.
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Given the difficulties involved in the requirements set out in paragraph 1 and the 
rising number of services RTAs, perhaps it might be more fruitful to direct Members’ 
resources and attention to elaborating GATS Article V:6 in order to ensure liberal 
rules of origin, which allow non-members to benefit from RTA commitments- 
effectively multilateralizing them.624 In addition, given the complexity of services 
liberalization and the need for appropriate and effective regulatory frameworks, 
greater efforts should be made to provide developing-oountry Members with 
necessary technical assistance when negotiating services RTAs. Technical 
assistance is arguably even more important here than in the case of goods RTAs.
As far as developing countries are concerned, GATS Article V:3 contains 
built-in special and differential treatment provisions. With regard to the requirements 
contained in paragraph 1, subparagraph 3(a) requires that flexibility must be provided 
in accordance with the level of development of developing-country partners, both 
overall and in individual sectors and subsectors. In principle, this should mean that 
developing countries are subject to the more lenient interpretation of the requirements 
under paragraph 1 in terms of the threshold levels of substantial sectoral coverage and 
substantially all discrimination, and the maximum period foi reasonable timeframe. 
Assuming that WTO Members can agree on these issues and it is possible to collect 
quality and adequate data on services trade to implement paragraph 1 requirements, 
developing countries should be able to better manage the potential costs induced by 
the formation of a services RTA, given the flexibility afforded under subparagraph 
3(a).
One desirable consequence of holding developed countries to the more 
demanding interpretation of paragraph 1 requirements is that they could be indirectly 
forced to make meaningful commitments on mode-4 services. In other words, if 
developed countries are required to include more sectoral coverage and they cannot a 
priori exclude any mode of supply (subparagraph 1(a))), and substantially all 
discrimination (in the sense of national treatment) in these cowered sectors/subsectors 
must be eliminated (subparagraph 1(b)), they would have less room to manoeuvre. 
Thus, developing countries would be able to negotiate more effectively. Since they 
can legally liberalize less, developing countries may be able to use this as a leverage 
to demand their developed-country counterparts to liberalize mode-4 services. This is
624 This will be discussed in the next section.
625 See Chapter 7.
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in line with what I propose in Chapter 4 where developed-country RTA members are 
subject to higher threshold level of and stricter transitional period for the SAT 
requirement.626 After all, the outcome of an RTA depends on the preceding 
negotiations where bargaining powers play a crucial role.627 Since bargaining power is 
linked with market power and/or other non-economic factors (such as security) and 
little can be done about it, to textually oblige developed countries to liberalize more 
should improve developing countries’ negotiating capacity, and hence leveling the 
playing field in RTA negotiations.
It is noteworthy that the wording of subparagraph 3(a) implies a more country- 
specific approach to special and differential treatment, which should avoid cases 
where advanced developing countries like the Republic of Korea, Singapore, and 
Taiwan, or big developing countries like Brazil, China, and India are given the same 
flexibility as less advanced and smaller developing countries, both in North-South and 
South-South RTAs. However, there could be a disadvantage in having such a 
tailored-fit special and differential treatment for GATS Article V (as well as GATT 
Article XXIV and the Enabling Clause for that matter).
The disadvantage is that a tailored-fit special and differential treatment 
demands one to specify the threshold levels and transitional periods after having 
reviewed the circumstances of RTA members. This would arguably involve a review 
of an individual RTA member in absolute terms and in relation to its RTA partner: 
while the former could be carried out periodically similar to those produced under the 
TPRM, the latter would have to be conducted after an RTA is notified to the CRTA. 
The review of an individual RTA member in relation to its RTA partner is arguably as 
important as its review in absolute terms. For example, the flexibility afforded to 
Thailand in an RTA with Japan should not be the same as its RTA with Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic. The differences lie in the partner countries and the level of 
integration envisaged in each individual RTA. Since a tailored-fit special and 
differential treatment would require such reviews, predictability is compromised. 
Prospective RTA members would have to guess what threshold levels and transitional 
periods they would be subject to during RTA negotiations. This would make it
See Chapter 4.
627 See Chapter 2.
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extremely difficult, if at all possible, to negotiate an RTA.628 Thus, I believe that the 
more nuanced approach to special and differential treatment proposed in Chapters 4 
and 5 (whereby developing countries are further divided into subgroups and different 
threshold levels and transitional periods are agreed in advance) would strike a better 
balance between the individual needs of developing countries and predictability (and 
indeed practicality) of RTA negotiations.629 Nevertheless, a tailored-fit special and 
differential treatment can be provided to developing countries in the form of technical 
assistance.630
The other part of the intra-RTA obligation is paragraph 4 first requirement. 
That is, services RTAs must be designed to facilitate intra-RTA trade. As discussed in 
the previous chapter in the context of subparagraph 3(a), the use of the word designed 
implies that the requirement is about the intention and not the actual effects of an 
RTA.631 This should be reasonably easy for the member countries to satisfy. Given 
that the requirements contained in paragraph 1 are already onerous, albeit the 
difficulties involved in implementing them, I propose that a services RTA would 
intend to facilitate the intra-RTA trade if it satisfied paragraph 1 requirements. Such 
interpretation should simplify the intra-RTA obligation without watering down its 
objective.632
6.3.2 Third-party Obligation and the Challenge o f  Trade and Investment Diversion
The third-party obligation contained in paragraph 4 second requirement 
demands that a services RTA does not in relation to non-members raise the overall 
level of barriers to trade in services within the respective sectors or subsectors 
compared to the level applicable prior to its formation. How can such a requirement 
be tested in practice?
628 From the interviews I conducted, a representative from the ASEAN Secretariat told me that ASEAN 
adopts 90 per cent of the tariff lines as a numerical benchmark in its RTA negotiations to satisfy the 
SAT requirement under GATT Article XXIV.
629 See Chapters 4 and 5.
630 This will be discussed in Chapter 7.
631 See Chapter 5.
632 It is noteworthy that the conditions set out in paragraph 1 are already very onerous- unlike the 
requirements contained in subparagraph 2(c) of the Enabling Clause which are arguably very lenient, 
and as argued in the previous chapter, need to be read in light of subparagraph 3(a) first requirement.
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In order to implement this requirement, one has to calculate the overall level 
o f barriers to services trade in effect before the formation of a services RTA. This is 
an extremely difficult task. Given that barriers to trade in services are present in laws, 
decrees, and regulatory practices, their qualitative nature makes it very challenging to 
attach to them a quantitative value.633 Calculating tariff or price equivalents for the 
trade-restrictive effect of most domestic regulations has proved extremely 
complicated and most likely will continue to run into data and methodological 
difficulties, greater for some sectors than for others.634 This will be made worse where 
RTA members choose to avoid discrimination by harmonizing or creating a common 
regulatory regime (primarily in CUs) in a covered sector/subsector as non-members 
may find such a harmonized or common regulatory regime more restrictive than prior 
to the formation in one or more member countries.635 It should be noted that similar 
difficulties arise in the case of other regulations o f  commerce under GATT Article 
XXIV: 5(a) where one is required to determine whether on the whole ORCs have 
become more restrictive than prior to the formation of a CU.636
Thus, the difficulties in quantifying restrictiveness that may be qualitative in 
nature coupled with the lack of precise statistical data on trade in services pose 
important obstacles in the practical application of paragraph 4 second requirement. 
Furthermore, the raising of the level of barriers must be attributable to the services 
RTA in a causal relationship between the agreement and the new level of barriers.637 
Arguably, new restrictions introduced unilaterally by one of the member countries are 
to be evaluated on their own terms, unless they are directly or indirectly related to the 
change of circumstances induced by the services RTA in question. Otherwise, the 
member countries would violate paragraph 4 second requirement every time they
633 See Stephenson, Regional Agreements on Services in Multilateral Disciplines: Interpreting and 
Applying GATS Article V', pp. 95-6.
634 Ibid.
635 See Hudec and Southwick, 'Regionalism and WTO Rules: Problems in the Fine Art of 
Discrimination Fairly', p. 78. The GATS negotiators, in fact, considered a formulation that would have 
steered RTA members towards adopting the least restrictive regime in any of the members in the event 
that RTAs included harmonized or common measures. The 1990 draft text o f what became GATS 
Article V stated: “[Regional arrangements] shall not in respect to other Parties raise overall levels of 
barriers to trade in services within the respective sectors/subsectors. Parties to an agreement should 
seek to implement any common measures with respect to other Parties at the least restrictive level 
existing prior to entering into such an agreement.” However, this was rejected in the drafting of the 
final text o f GATS Article V. For more detail, see S Terrence, The GATT Uruguay Round: a 
Negotiating History (1986-1992): Volume II (Kluwer Law International, Boston 1993), pp. 2383-4 and 
2414.
636 See Chapter 4 and the 1994 Understanding, para. 2.
637 See Wolfrum, Stoll and Feinaugle, pp. 144-5.
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unilaterally impose new domestic regulations that are more restrictive even though 
they have nothing to do with the services RTA and are necessary due to changes in 
technology or business practices.638
Despite the unresolved problems with the implementation of paragraph 4 
second requirement, it is important to note that the extent of trade diversion induced 
by the formation of a services RTA may be mitigated as a result of the nature of 
barriers to trade in services and rules of origin. With regard to investment diversion, 
all depends whether tariff-jumping investment exceeds other types of investment.639 
Given that FDI and investment in general will be influenced by liberalization of trade 
in services as well as trade in goods, it is almost impossible to prevent investment 
diversion only through paragraph 4 second requirement.640 In addition, if mode-3 
services is liberalized as a result of a services RTA, more FDI is likely to be attracted 
to the preferential area, other things being equal.
As mentioned earlier, although it will take time for WTO Members and 
experts to solve the services-specific problems discussed both in the contexts of the 
intra-RTA and third-party obligations, I believe that the clarification of GATS Article 
V:6 would address the challenge of trade and investment diversion (benefiting 
members and non-members alike) and could be done within a relatively shorter 
timeframe.
Paragraph 6 sets out a conditional right of a juridical person constituted under 
the laws of a party to an RTA to favourable treatments accorded by the RTA: the 
condition being that the juridical person must engage in substantive business 
operations (SBO) in the territory of the parties to the RTA.641 Essentially, it restricts 
what RTA members can do with regard to rules of origin.642 However, paragraph 6 
does not define the meaning of the term substantive business operations. Given that 
firms and companies are juridical persons, the SBO requirement is very important. 
One way to look at the requirement is to think of it as an integral part of the MFN 
principle in the sense that only legitimate service providers established in a services
638 It should be noted that such unilateral imposition of barrier to trade in services will also be subject 
to the country’s commitments inscribed in its GATS Schedule.
639 See Chapter 2.
640 As noted in the Chapters 4 and 5, the rules contained in GATT Article XXIV and the Enabling 
Clause are likely to deal with investment diversion in a limited fashion. See Chapters 4 and 5.
641 See GATS Article V:6.
642 For further discussion on general (as opposed to preferential) rules on origin of services under 
GATS Article XXVIII(f), see H Wang, 'WTO Origin Rules for Services and the Defects: Substantial 
Input Test as One Way Out?' (2010) 44 Journal of World Trade 1083.
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RTA are entitled to the benefits from its provisions.643 In other words, the SBO 
requirement is to ensure that the link between service providers and RTA members is 
genuine.
Given that paragraph 6 contains the SBO requirement and it is a necessary 
condition for juridical persons to enjoy RTA favourable treatments, one might expect 
RTAs to contain some provisions which elaborate on the requirement. However, the 
majority of services RTAs contain provisions which define the term juridical person 
rather than the term substantive business operations,644 Although some contain the 
term substantive business operations, only China’s Economic Partnership 
Arrangements (CEPAs) with Hong Kong and Macao attempt to define the scope of 
the term substantive business operations,645 These two RTAs provide the criteria for 
the SBO requirement that include the nature and scope of business, years of operation, 
payment of taxes, business premises, and employment of staff.
The definition of the term substantial business operations is therefore crucial 
and determines how easy non-member firms can enter the preferential area. On the 
one hand, if it is restrictively defined, non-member firms will find it difficult to 
benefit from the services liberalization achieved through a services RTA.646 This, in 
turn, may result in greater trade diversion. On the other hand, if it is broadly defined, 
non-member firms may free-ride the preferences. This, in turn, may discourage the 
member countries from making liberalization commitments in the first place. In my 
view, the balance should be struck in favour of a broad definition given the services- 
specific problems which make it very difficult to apply the intra-RTA and third-party 
obligations contained in paragraphs 1 and 4.
Thus, I argue that WTO Members and experts in services trade should allocate 
their resources and attention to elaborate and clarify the SBO requirement under 
paragraph 6. If WTO Members could agree on an unrestrictive definition of the term
643 See A Emch, 'Services Regionalism in the WTO: China's Trade Agreements with Hong Kong and 
Macao in the light of Article V(6) GATS' (2006) 33 Legal Issues of Economic Integration 351, pp. 
351-378.
644 For example, in the Panama-Singapore FTA, the term enterprise is used instead of juridical person 
and defined as an entity constituted or organized under applicable law, whether or not for profit, and 
whether privately or govemmentally owned or controlled, including a corporation, trust, partnership, 
sole proprietorship, joint venture, association, or similar organization and a branch of an enterprise. See 
article 10.1(2).
645 For more detail of the CEPAs, see http://www.imprensa.macau.gov.mo/edicoes/en/dse/cepa/, and 
http://www.tid.gov.hk/english/cepa/ (last accessed 1 August 2009). See also FG Snyder, 'China, 
Regional Trade Agreements and WTO Law' (2009) 43 Journal of World Trade 1.
646 For further discussion on how non-members’ firms/companies may fail restrictive definitions of 
juridical person and/or substantive business operation, see Emch, pp. 364-377.
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substantial business operations, hence promoting liberal rules of origin for services 
RTAs, trade diversion induced by the formation of a services RTA would be further 
mitigated, which would benefit both members and non-members alike.647 For 
example, RTA members should not be allowed to impose a temporal requirement, i.e. 
years of operation required before the SBO requirement can be met, which exceeds 
three years. In other words, any services provider which has been registered as a 
juridical person under the laws of a party to an RTA for three years or more would be 
considered as engaging in substantive business operation and entitled to the 
preferences.648 Under this criterion, the shorter the time period required is, the more 
liberal the rule of origin will be.
It should be noted that subparagraph 3(b) does afford some flexibility to 
developing countries forming South-South RTAs which allows them to grant 
preferential treatment to firms owned or controlled by natural persons of the member 
countries. Developing countries could rely on this provision to foster their local firms 
through exploitation of scale economies and shielding them against competition from 
non-member firms. Such special and differential treatment is in line with the idea of 
infant industry widely proposed in goods trade.649 Thus, a clarified SBO requirement 
that produces liberal rules of origin would circumvent the difficulties involved in the 
application of paragraphs 1 and 4, and at the same time address some of the 
challenges facing developing countries amid the current RTA proliferation.
6.4 Conclusion
Throughout this chapter, it can be seen that GATS Article V is anything but 
simple. Besides the interpretative ambiguities plagued the provisions, the main
647 For further discussion on the restrictiveness of services rules o f origin, see C Fink and D 
Nikomborirak, 'Rules of Origin in Services: A Case Study o f Five ASEAN Countries' (Policy Research 
Working Paper No4130, World Bank, Washington, DC 2007).
648 In the two China’s RTAs, Article 3.1.2(2) requires that for construction and related engineering 
services, banking and other financial services, insurance and related services, and air transport services, 
a Hong Kong [or Macao] services provider must be registered in Hong Kong [or Macao] and have 
engaged in substantive business operation for five years or more. This is contrast to services providers 
in real estate services which are not subject to any temporal requirement at all.
649 See Chapter 5.
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problem lies with how they can be applied in practice. The limited data on trade in 
services and the difficulties involved in the methodological approaches to data 
collection and evaluation make it extremely challenging to implement the intra-RTA 
and third-party obligations.
Does GATS Article V serve the object and purpose of GATS then? According 
to most studies, it is clear that WTO Members do make commitments in their services 
RTAs that go beyond those that they have made in their GATS Schedules or pledged 
in their GATS offers. Although this does not necessarily enhance the multilateral 
progress in the short-run, over time the nature of barriers to trade in services and rules 
of origin will arguably weaken domestic oppositions to services liberalization and 
may create opportunities to further multilateral services liberalization. By the same 
token, compared to the status quo, a country is likely to gain from preferential 
liberalization of services trade at a particular point of time since trade creation is more 
likely, which in turn, implies less adverse effects on non-members. Thus, services 
RTAs are more likely to enhance welfare of the member countries as compared to 
goods RTAs assuming that appropriate and effective regulatory frameworks are in 
place to deal with market failures and undesirable consequences of services 
liberalization.
As far as developing countries are concerned, they should be able to use 
subparagraph 3(a) to afford themselves some flexibility, with regard to the 
requirements contained in paragraph 1, either during RTA negotiations or the 
reviewing process conducted by the CRTA. The provision could be used to ensure 
that developing countries have sufficient flexibility to establish appropriate and 
effective regulatory frameworks in the covered sectors/subsectors. Furthermore, the 
implied different standards that are applied to developed and developing countries 
could be used to indirectly force the former to liberalize their mode-4 services, in 
which the latter have comparative advantage. Nevertheless, as long as the 
interpretative ambiguities plagued paragraph 1 and tlhe problem with its 
implementation still exist, subparagraph 3(a) is likely to have limited application.
Having examined GATS Article V, one cannot help bint notice that it is quite a 
distance away from being implementable in a meaningful way to regulate the 
formation of services RTAs. To circumvent this in the short-run, I argue that WTO 
Members and experts in services trade should allocate their resources and attention to 
elaborate and clarify the SBO requirement under paragraph 6. If they can agree on a
definition of substantial business operation which results in liberal rules of origin, 
more efficient services providers from outside the preferential area will be able to 
enter and compete in the members’ markets. This, in turn, will mitigate trade 
diversion further which is beneficial to both members and non-members alike.
It should be noted that nothing in GATS Article V appears to directly deal 
with the constraints on developing countries’ analytical and negotiating capacities, as 
identified in Chapter 2. Nevertheless, to the extent that the built-in special and 
differential treatment provisions contained in paragraph 3 afford flexibility to 
developing countries, GATS Article V should reasonably level the playing field 
between partners with different analytical and negotiating capacities. However, a 
possible tailored-fit special and differential treatment which may be implied by the 
wording of subparagraph 3(a) would not give due weight to the predictability and 
practicality of RTA negotiations. Thus, I argue for a similar approach to the more 
country-specific special and differential treatment proposed in Chapters 4 and 5 
whereby developing countries are further divided into subgroups and different 
threshold levels and transitional periods are agreed in advance. A tailored-fit special 
and differential treatment can be given to developing countries in the form technical 
assistance, which is arguably even more important for developing countries in 
services than in goods RTAs. This will be discussed in the next chapter.
So far, the thesis has looked at the WTO rules governing the formation of 
RTAs, including GATT Article XXIV, the Enabling Clause, and GATS Article V. 
What they have in common is that they are vague and in need o f clarification. Since 
almost all WTO Members are a party to one or more RTAs, there is a conflict of 
interests here. While non-members would benefit if these rules were clarified and 
enforced strictly and rigorously, their own current and future RTAs would be at risk 
of violating it. In other words, the status quo where the provisions are unclear and 
their enforcement is weak is preferred by those Members whose RTAs would 
potentially have been WTO-incompatible otherwise. As a result, it is unlikely that 
there will be enough political will on the part of WTO Members to clarify the existing 
rules in the near future. Thus, Chapter 7 will explore whether there are other less 
contentious means that may complement and strengthen the existing WTO rules and 
practices with regard to RTA supervision. These include promulgation of code of best 
practices, revision of the WTO surveillance mechanisms, and technical assistance for 
developing countries in relation to RTA negotiations.
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Chapter 7
Proposals and Implementation
7.1 Introduction
In the previous chapters, a number of proposals are made in relation to the 
WTO rules, namely GATT Article XXIV, the Enabling Clause, and GATS Article V, 
in the attempt to address the challenges facing developing countries amid the current 
RTA proliferation, as identified in Chapters 2 and 3. It can be seen that the rules are 
plagued with ambiguities and often very difficult to apply in practice. The proposals 
are made with the primary aim to offer ways in which the rules can be used to better 
address the challenges. However, it is recognized that substantive reforms may be 
required if these proposals are to be implemented.
According to Article IX:2 of the Marrakesh Agreement, a decision to adopt an 
interpretation of the WTO agreements can only be decided by a three-fourths majority 
of the Members while Article X requires a two-thirds majority of the Members in 
order for an amendment to be approved of.650 Such requirements are very onerous 
and difficult to meet.651 Given the conflicting interests and the resulting lack of 
political will on the part of WTO Members, it might not be easy and will take time to 
bring about the necessary changes to the texts and/or the ways in which they are 
interpreted. This chapter therefore explores whether there are other less contentious 
means that may complement and/or strengthen the existing WTO rules and 
mechanisms pertaining RTA supervision. These include promulgation of code of best 
practices, revision of the WTO surveillance mechanisms, and technical assistance for 
developing countries in relation to RTA negotiations.
650 Note that in practice it is understood that the decision will only be taken by a qualified majority vote 
where consensus cannot be reached. See Footer, An Institutional and Normative Analysis o f  the World 
Trade Organization, p. 264.
651 See Ibid., pp. 206-21.
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The chapter is divided into three sections. The first section examines a 
possible utility of promulgation of code of best practices. The second section 
considers a revision of the WTO surveillance mechanisms. The third section looks at 
whether provision of technical assistance can be offered to developing countries with 
regard to their RTA negotiations.
7.2 Code of Best Practices
Alternative to substantive reforms to the existing rules, a code of best practices 
for the formation of an RTA can be published by the WTO.652 An example of such a 
code is the Best Practice fo r  RTAs/FTAs o f Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation. 
This document sets out certain RTA characteristics on which APEC members should 
base their RTA negotiations in order to achieve the APEC Bogor Goals.654 The 
document is however three-paged long, which only contains broad principles and does 
not set out any substantive trade commitments.655 What are the effects of such 
documents?
A code of best practices can arguably be defined as a document that contains 
practices which are considered to be most effective in achieving intended goals in a 
particular context. Such codes are prevalent in various areas of businesses, for 
example financial regulation.656 The key difference between the WTO rules and the 
APEC code of best practices is that the former are legally binding and the latter is not.
652 Non-legally binding instruments already exist under the WTO framework. See M Footer,'The Role 
of "Soft" Law Norms in Reconciling the Antinomies of WTO Law' (Working Paper No54/08, Society 
of International Economic Law, Geneva 2008), pp.4-8.
653 See the Appendix. Good practices for the formation of RTAs are discussed elsewhere in the context 
o f their economic implications, but not as an alternative to substantive reforms to the existing WTO 
rules. Nor are the discussions on the relationship between code of best practices and the existing rules. 
For example, see M Plummer, 'Best Practices in Regional Trading Agreements: an Application to Asia' 
(2007) 30 The World Economy 1771.
654 See http://www.apec.org/apec/leaders declarations/1994.html (last accessed 1 August 2009).
655 See http://www.apec.org/etc/medialib/apec_media_library/downloads/ministerial/annual/ 2004.Par. 
0004.File.tmp/04_amm_003.pdf (last accessed 1 August 2009). Besides this, APEC members have also 
published a number of codes of best practices with regard to RTA negotiations in other areas of trade 
liberalization such as rules of origin, SPS provisions, and competition policy. See http://www.apec.org/ 
apec/apec_groups/other_apec_groups/FTA_RTA.html (last accessed 1 August 2009).
656 For example the Basel Accords, see http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsca.htm (last accessed 1 August 
2009).
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APEC members, for example, do not have to comply with the code. The regime is 
voluntary and merely seeks cooperation from the members. In other words, the WTO 
rules are considered as hard law whereas the APEC code of best practices is 
considered as soft law. Given the focus of this thesis and the limited space herein, the 
discourse on hard law-soft law distinction is not fully investigated in this chapter.657 
The discussion is conducted only to the extent necessary to determine whether a code 
of best practices may provide an alternative means of RTA supervision and/or 
complement the existing rules.
Snyder presents a short and comprehensive definition of soft law. He defines it 
as “rules of conduct which, in principle, have no legally binding force but which, 
nevertheless, may have practical effect.”658 Abbott and Snidal offer a conceptual 
framework for distinguishing hard and soft law that includes three elements, namely 
obligation, precision, and delegation.659 Obligation refers to whether the instrument in 
question is legally binding or not; precision refers to how specific the provisions in 
the instrument are; and delegation refers to the extent to which states delegate power 
and authority to an independent third party to clarify and manage disputes arising 
from violations of the instrument.660 It is argued here that obligation is the key 
element which determines whether an instrument is hard or soft law. Nevertheless, the 
other elements are useful for the understanding of the hard law-soft law distinction. It 
is also important to note that the interaction of these three elements can be very 
complex. For example, a hard law instrument may be very ambiguous while a soft law 
instrument very precise; and both of which may or may not be complemented with a 
strong and independent third-party judicial body. In any case, the common features of 
soft law instruments are their voluntary participation and their consensus-based 
mechanisms. Enforcement is usually not delegated to an independent judicial body,
657 For general discussion on soft law, see U Morth (ed), Soft Law in Governance and Regulation: An 
Interdisciplinary Analysis (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham 2004), BR Quillin, The Effects o f  International 
Soft Law on State Behaviour: Understanding Degrees o f  Compliance with the Basel Accord, 1988- 
2000 (London School of Economics and Political Science, London 2004), and D Shelton, Commitment 
and Compliance: the Role o f  Non-binding Norms in the International Legal System (Oxford University 
Press, Oxford 2003).
658 See FG Snyder, 'The Effectiveness of EC Law' in T Daintith (ed) Implementing EC Law in the 
United Kingdom: Structures fo r  Indirect Rule (Wiley/Chancery Law Publishing, Chichester 1995), p. 
64.
659 See KW Abbott and D Snidal, 'Hard and Soft Law in International Governance' (2000) 54 
International Organization 421.
660 Ibid., pp. 441-3.
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but instead tends to be left to a non-intrusive system based on cooperation.661 Thus, it 
seems that codes of best practices correspond to these soft law features.
If the key difference between the WTO rules and a code of best practices is the 
legally binding force behind each instrument (or the lack thereof), one then has to 
examine what circumstances or conditions are unfavourable to the former while the 
latter may have a role to play. Without claiming to be exhaustive, it is argued here that 
there are two conditions under which hard law instruments such as GATT Article 
XXIV may not be suitable. The first condition is diverse interests. Diverse interests 
on the part of the states involved are likely to result in a failure to agree on the content 
of hard law instrument in the first place. This, in turn, may lead to broad and 
ambiguous provisions in the instrument as states are not prepared to forego their 
vested, yet diverse, interests and be legally bound by it. The broad and ambiguous 
provisions then provide a compromise and room for flexibility. Consequently, despite 
it legally binding obligations, such an imprecise hard law instrument will be difficult 
to enforce.
The second condition is uncertainty- be it economic or political. Given that a 
hard law instrument has the legally binding force over the states involved, its content 
must supposedly be discussed and agreed on in light of a set of fixed conditions based 
on prior knowledge.663 However, there can be situations where conditions vary and 
prior knowledge is insufficient. Such situations of uncertainty may sometimes 
demand constant experimentation and adjustment. Thus, if states are not certain that 
what they are negotiating will subsequently be beneficial, or at least not 
disadvantageous, they are less likely to agree to be legally bound by a precise and 
restrictive hard law instrument. They will prefer room for flexibility, with which the 
ambiguous wording may provide. Consequently, like diverse interests, uncertainty is 
likely to result in a broad and ambiguous hard law instrument, which will be difficult 
to enforce. It should be noted that in some cases diverse interests and uncertainty may
661 See JJ Kirton and MJ Trebilcock, Hard Choices, Soft Law: Voluntary Standards in Global Trade, 
Environment, and Social Governance (Global Environmental Governance, Ashgate, Aldershot 2004), 
pp. 22-3.
2 See DM Trubek, P Cottrell and M Nance, 'Soft Law, Hard Law, and European Integration: Toward 
a Theory o f Hybridity' (Research Paper No 1002, University of Wisconsin Legal Studies, 2005), p. 13.
663 Ibid., p. 4.
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lead to the absence of hard law instrument in the entirety and an emergence of soft 
law instrument instead. Global forestry-related problems provide a good example.664
To put this in the RTA context, WTO Members have vastly diverse interests 
when it comes to RTAs since their positions differ as members and non-members.665 
This may have resulted in the vague terms such as substantially all the trade and 
substantial business operation since the drafters traded precision for flexibility.666 So, 
there is no surprise that the existing rules are confusing and have hardly been tested in 
the WTO DSM.667 As far as uncertainty is concerned, RTA commitments can have 
unexpected consequences, both economic and political, which may require 
subsequent changes in trade policies. On this basis, WTO Members are less likely to 
be in favour of precise and restrictive rules on how they may form their RTAs. Like 
diverse interests, uncertainty can also explain the ambiguous wordings of the existing 
WTO rules.
Thus, due to the diverse interests and uncertainty revolving around the 
formation of an RTA, WTO Members may prefer a soft-law approach to RTA 
supervision. Despite their legally binding force, the rules are very ambiguous, and 
even though in principle they can be clarified and enforced by panels and the 
Appellate Body, in practice they are not. The absence of case law coupled with 
panels/the Appellate Body’s exercise of judicial economy make any clarification 
almost impossible. While the WTO rules may satisfy the obligation element 
introduced by Abbott and Snidal, they seem to score lowly on the precision element. 
As for the delegation element, despite the availability of the WTO DSM, cases 
concerning the three sets of rules are hardly brought before panels and the Appellate 
Body.
In sum, soft law instruments such as codes of best practices may be useful in 
those cases where hard law is not feasible as states are not yet willing to commit 
themselves to binding international obligations either because they have diverse 
interests or because they are not certain as to the consequences of such obligations.
664 See S Bernstein and B Cashore, 'Non-state Global Governance: Is Forest Certification a Legitimate 
Alternative to a Global Forest Convention' in JJ Kirton and MJ Trebilcock (eds), Hard Choices, Soft 
Law: Voluntary Standards in Global Trade, Environment, and Social Governance (Ashgate, Aldershot 
2004), pp. 33-63.
665 See Chapters 2 and 3.
666 See Chapters 4 and 6.
667 See Chapters 4-6.
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So, if it is accepted that hard law instruments are not suitable when confronted 
with diverse interests and uncertainty, the question is can soft law instruments provide 
a better alternative. The main advantage of soft law instruments such as codes of best 
practices is its lack of legally binding force. When states see an instrument as non­
binding, they may be more willing to agree on its content since subsequent violations 
will not result in legal action. This does not necessarily mean that negotiations on a 
code of best practices for the formation of an RTA will be an easy task as diverse 
interests and uncertainty are still present. Nevertheless, the fact that the resulting 
document will not be legally binding may considerably lessen the fear of subsequent 
legal action among WTO Members, and hence increasing the political will on their 
part. By the same token, the content can be more precise than those of the existing 
rules. Furthermore, future changes to a code of best practices can be made more easily 
as compared to substantive reforms of the rules, which have to meet the requirements 
contained in Articles IX and X of the Marrakesh Agreement. This is useful in the face 
of uncertainty and future development of RTAs.
Thus, to adopt Abbott and Snidal’s conceptual framework, a code of best 
practices for the formation of an RTA will score zero on the first element, obligation, 
but it may score highly on the second element, precision. As far as the third element, 
delegation, is concerned, it is likely to be in the form of peer review or consensus- 
based mechanism rather than through an independent third-party judicial body with 
legal authority, i.e. through the CRTA/CTD reviewing process rather than the DSM.
As much as a code of best practices for the formation of an RTA may mitigate 
the lack of political will, it is important to recognize that it also has some 
limitations.668 The first is its impact. It is not clear how much impact such a code may 
have on WTO Members forming RTAs with one another. Having reviewed the APEC 
code of best practices, it is apparent that the code only contains guiding principles 
rather than substantive RTA commitments. Thus, one may wonder how effective the 
code is. Given that it is not legally binding, APEC members do not have to comply 
with the code. Its principles are more like guidelines rather than international 
obligations. Consequently, if the best practices are not adopted, the code will not have 
much impact on RTA supervision.
668 For general discussion on limitations of soft law, see Trubek, Cottrell and Nance, p. 3.
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The second limitation is enforceability. This follows the first limitation. When 
a code of best practices is ignored, there is no way to enforce it. Again, the very same 
non-binding feature, which may have played a role in creating such a code in the first 
place, presupposes that there is no way the provisions therein can be legally enforced. 
Thus, soft law instruments can be a double-edged sword which cuts both ways.
Nevertheless, I believe that there may be some differences between a code of 
best practices published by APEC and one by the WTO. The latter may have 
significant dynamic effects on how RTAs are supervised and negotiated. First, the 
reach of such a code published by the WTO would be greater than the APEC’s as 
WTO membership is much wider. Secondly, while the APEC code of best practices 
may only provide its members with the guiding principles, the proposed code 
published by the WTO could be used not only by the Members but also by the 
CRTA/CTD when reviewing an RTA as well as by panels and the Appellate Body 
when confronted with a case concerning the rules. Notably, APEC lacks both 
mechanisms. Finally, if the WTO code of best practices contained, besides guiding 
principles, some form of a model RTA and/or specific RTA commitments, which 
favour developing countries (e.g. lower thresholds of and longer transitional periods 
for the SAT requirement),669 it would have more impact than the APEC code. 
Developing countries could use the code as a starting point for their RTA negotiations 
and refer to the code when their developed-country counterparts appear to depart from 
its suggestions. This should have some political or practical effects on the 
negotiations.
For example, in the ASEAN-EU FTA negotiations, the EU initially tabled a 
draft which it argued ought to be used as a starting point of negotiation. The ASEAN 
countries were caught by surprise and had to agree to use the draft although they 
emphasized that it had no official/legal status whatsoever. Nevertheless, given that the 
negotiations were premised on this document, the ASEAN countries found it very 
difficult to depart from what contained in the draft. In the following round of 
negotiations, the ASEAN Secretariat produced a counter non-paper draft of its own. 
This was not well received by the EU delegation as the parties had to revisit 
provisions which were already agreed, at least in principle, basing on the EU’s 
document. Thus, if there were a WTO code of best practices, the ASEAN countries
669 See Chapter 4.
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could rely on the code as a starting point- assuming that the code would contain 
guiding principles as well as specific commitments which favour developing 
countries.
Assuming that the code would contain practices which maximize the potential 
benefits and minimize the potential costs induced by the formation of an RTA, if 
prospective RTA members use it as a starting point of negotiation, their RTA 
commitments are likely to be shaped in such a way that should lead to genuine trade 
liberalization, and hence benefiting the members’ economies. Furthermore, if this 
results in lesser trade and investment diversion, non-members will also benefit.
Besides its own utilities, the proposed code of best practices may have effect 
on the existing WTO rules as well. It has been argued that soft law can have a positive 
relationship with its hard law counterpart.670 For example, the proposed code of best 
practices may have elaborative effect. In other words, it can provide guidance to the 
interpretation, elaboration, or application of the rules.671
Another possible effect is that it can act as a catalyst for renegotiations of the 
existing rules. If WTO Members manage to agree on a code of best practices which 
contain a model RTA and/or specific RTA commitments, given time they may find 
the code useful and beneficial. As a result, renegotiations of the rules may 
subsequently be possible, hence a transformation of soft to hard law instrument. Due 
to the non-legally binding feature, states can experiment with a soft law instrument 
without having to worry about subsequent legal action for its violation. If states are 
content with their compliance with the soft law instrument, they can then move on to 
discuss the possibility of turning it into a hard law version.672 Such practices are 
common in the EU where soft law instruments, such as regulatory standards, are 
turned into hard law instruments or given legal effect by the European courts.673 By 
the same token, panels and the Appellate Body could give some legal effect to the 
proposed code of best practices and the CRTA/CTD’s recommendations.674 Thus, the
670 See Shelton, pp. 30-31.
671 See Footer, 'The Role of "Soft" Law Norms in Reconciling the Antinomies of WTO Law', pp. 11-2.
672 For advantages and disadvantages of soft law and hard law instruments, see K Raustiala, 'Form and 
Substance in International Agreements' (2005) 99 American Journal o f International Law 581, pp. 591 - 
614.
673 See I Osterdahl, 'The ECJ and Soft Law: Who's Afraid of the EU Fundamental Rights Charter?' in U 
Morth (ed) Soft Law in Governance and Regulation: an Interdisciplinary Analysis (Edward Elgar, 
Cheltenham 2004), p. 37.
674 This is further discussed below. It should be noted that the process o f rule referencing does not 
necessarily turn soft law instruments into rules that are binding on WTO Members. See WTO
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proposed code would provide guidance to the interpretation, elaboration, and 
application of the WTO rules as well as facilitate their reforms.
7.3 Revision of the WTO surveillance mechanisms for RTAs
The WTO surveillance mechanisms for RTAs are very important as they bring 
them into the WTO regulatory framework. In a nutshell, RTAs are to be notified to 
the WTO and then subject to a reviewing process. It is noteworthy that by the time an 
RTA is notified and subject to this process, it will have been signed and/or ratified by 
its members already. As a result, changes to the content are difficult to bring about. 
Historically, exposure of RTA texts and information to the rest of the GATT/WTO 
membership did not have much impact on the contents of these agreements partly 
because the meanings and applications of the relevant rules could not be agreed on. 
This is supported by the absence of recommendations on the part of the CRTA/CTD 
(and GATT working parties before them in relation to GATT Article XXIV).675 
Alternatively, an RTA member may be taken before a panel by an affected third party, 
hence subjecting the RTA in question to WTO scrutiny.
The first real test to the WTO regulatory framework was the notification in 
1957 of the Treaty of Rome establishing the EEC. An ad hoc working party set up to 
consider whether the agreement was compatible with GATT Article XXIV could not 
reach a clear-cut decision. In retrospect, the inconclusive nature of the deliberations 
on the establishment of the Treaty of Rome came to symbolize a continuing de facto 
recognition of the inoperability of the requirements contained in GATT Article 
XXIV.676 The subsequent examination of CUs and FTAs notified to the GATT did not 
yield any clearer assessments of full consistency with the rules, and friction arising 
between GATT CONTRACTING PARTIES in these areas was largely dealt with in a 
pragmatic fashion. That is, the CONTRACTING PARTIES simply formed RTAs
Appellate Body Report, EC-Hormones, WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R, adopted 13 February 1998, 
para. 165.
675 See Finger, pp. 134-5.
676 See R Fiorentino, J-A Crawford and C Toqueboeuf, 'The Landscape of Regional Trade Agreements 
and WTO Surveillance' in R Baldwin and P Low (eds), Multilateralizing Regionalism: Challenges fo r  
the Global Trading System (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2009), p. 55.
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with one another despite the lack of affirmative recommendation from the working 
parties.677
The surge in the number of RTAs during the late 1980s and early 1990s 
started to create administrative blockages in the newly established WTO, since 
according to GATT practice, an ad hoc working party was set up for each notified 
RTA mandated for examination. To amend this situation, WTO Members agreed to 
establish the Committee on Regional Trade Agreements, in which all Members may 
participate,678 with the mandate to verify the WTO-compatibility of notified RTAs, 
and inter alia to consider the systemic implications of such agreements and regional 
initiatives for the multilateral trading system.679 However, at the time of the launch of 
the Doha Round in November 2001, the CRTA had made no progress on its mandate 
of consistency assessment, owing to the ambiguities in GATT Article XXIV. This 
raised concerns and resulted in negotiations on the WTO rules pertaining RTA 
supervision being included under the DDA.
The Doha Ministerial Declaration contains two references to RTAs.681 
Paragraph 4 of the Preamble reaffirms Members’ commitment to the WTO as the 
unique forum for global trade rule-making and liberalization, while acknowledging 
the role that RTAs can play in promoting the liberalization and expansion of trade and 
in fostering development.682 The negotiation mandate is contained in Paragraph 29 of 
the Declaration, which calls for the clarification and improvement of the disciplines 
and procedures under existing WTO provisions applying to RTAs, taking due account 
of the development aspects of these agreements.683
The objective of these negotiations is to clarify and improve the relevant RTA 
disciplines and procedures under the existing WTO provisions with a view to 
resolving the impasse in the CRTA, exercising better control of RTA dynamics, and 
minimizing the risks to the integrity of the multilateral trading system associated with
677 Only four arrangements had been formally declared to be compatible with GATT Article XXIV. 
These are the South Africa-Rhodesia CU, the Nicaragua-El Salvador FRTA, Nicaraguan participation 
in the CACM, and the CARICOM. See J Schott, Free Trade Areas and U.S. Trade Policy (Institute for 
International Economics, Washington, DC 1989), pp. 376-83.
678 See Footer, An Institutional and Normative Analysis o f  the World Trade Organization, pp. 62-3.
679 The working o f the CRTA will be discussed in more detail below.
680 Neither have there been any affirmative recommendations with regard to GATS Article V.
681 See supra note 275.
682 See http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_e.htm (last accessed 1 August 
2009).
683 Ibid.
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the current RTA proliferation.684 Despite their efforts, WTO Members could not agree 
on the substantive clarification of the existing rules. Nevertheless, they could agree on 
those issues which were more procedural in nature. As a result, in December 2006 the 
Decision on the Transparency Mechanism for Regional Trade Agreements was 
adopted. It is noteworthy that the 2006 Mechanism, which applies to all RTAs- 
whether notified under GATT Article XXIV, the Enabling Clause, or GATS Article 
V, is being implemented on a provisional basis in accordance with Paragraph 47 of 
the Doha Ministerial Declaration, and will be replaced by a permanent mechanism to 
be adopted as part of the Doha Round of trade negotiations.
The 2006 Mechanism introduces a number of important procedural changes to 
the way in which RTAs are treated within the WTO regulatory framework.685 One is 
the concept of an early announcement for RTAs, either under negotiation or signed, 
but not yet in force. According to this, WTO Members participating in RTA 
negotiations are encouraged to provide basic information in the form of a press 
release or the likes which are made available on the WTO website.686 Once the RTA 
has been signed, members are to convey information, such as the scope and date of 
signature, relevant contact points, and/or website addresses to the WTO.687 The idea 
of a system of early announcements aims to increase the transparency of RTAs, 
allowing WTO Members and the public to make use of a centralized source of 
information on RTAs under negotiation or signed, but not yet in force. It should be 
noted that only about a third of the RTAs under negotiation or already signed have 
been announced early to the WTO.688 Thus, in order to make this information as 
comprehensive as possible, greater effort is expected from WTO Members engaging 
in RTA negotiations.
Besides the concept of early announcement, the 2006 Mechanism also 
strengthens existing provisions on notification by stipulating that notification is to 
take place “as early as possible... no later than directly following the parties’ 
ratification of the RTA or any party’s decision on application of the relevant parts of 
an agreement, and before the application of preferential treatment between the
684 See Fiorentino, Crawford and Toqueboeuf, p. 57.
685 See the Decision on Transparency Mechanism for Regional Trade Agreements 2006, WT/L/671, 
adopted 14 December 2006.
686 See the 2006 Mechanism, Articles 1 and 2.
687 Ibid, Article 1(b).
688 See Fiorentino, Crawford and Toqueboeuf, p. 60.
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parties.” As in the case of early announcement, there is still room for improvement 
on the part of WTO Members to fully comply with the new obligations relating to 
notification.690
Another important change introduced by the 2006 Mechanism is factual 
presentation. A factual presentation, prepared by the WTO Secretariat, is a detailed 
summary of and contains data on the trade environment of the RTA parties, a 
description of the RTA’s regulatory features, and details of the tariff, trade, and 
regulatory liberalization envisaged over the transitional period of the RTA. The 
Secretariat is responsible for producing a factual presentation, in full consultation with 
the parties, and it cannot be used as a basis for dispute settlement procedures or to 
create new rights and obligations for the RTA members.691 Notably, this differs from 
the practice prior to the 2006 Mechanism where information on the notified RTA was 
prepared by the members themselves.692 The purpose of the factual presentation is to 
produce objective, homogeneous reports containing no value judgments which are 
used by WTO Members in their consideration of an RTA under review. In addition, 
the 2006 Mechanism imposes an obligation on the part of the Secretariat to establish 
and maintain an updated electronic database on individual RTAs which is easily 
accessible to the public.693
Although the 2006 Mechanism introduces important changes to the WTO 
regulatory framework for RTAs, the main body responsible for RTA supervision, 
particularly the reviewing process of RTAs notified under GATT Article XXIV and 
GATS Article V, is still the CRTA (while those notified under the Enabling Clause 
are reviewed by the CTD). Thus, it is important that the CRTA’s existing framework 
as reformed by the 2006 Mechanism and its criticisms are analysed in order to 
determine whether improvements are possible.
The CRTA was established in February 1996 by the WTO General Council.694 
Its two principal responsibilities are to examine individual agreements; and to 
consider their systemic implications for the multilateral trading system and the
689 See the 2006 Mechanism, Article 3.
690 O f the 20 notifications of RTAs made during 2007, only five were received before the RTA entered 
into force. For more detail, see Fiorentino, Crawford and Toqueboeuf, p. 60.
691 See the 2006 Mechanism, Articles 5-13.
692 This resulted in many shortcomings such as inadequate information. This is discussed below in the 
context o f the CRTA.
693 See the 2006 Mechanism, Article 21.
694 See Committee on Regional Trade Agreements, the Decision of 6 February 1996, WT/L/127.
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relationship between them.695 Prior to the 2006 Mechanism, the examination process 
was different for RTAs falling under each of the three main sets of rules. RTAs falling 
under GATT Article XXIV were to be notified to the Council for Trade in Goods 
(CTG) which would then adopt the terms of reference and transferred the agreements 
to the CRTA for examination. RTAs falling under GATS Article V, on the other 
hand, were to be notified to the Council for Trade in Services (CTS) which had an 
option whether to pass the agreements on to the CRTA for examination since it was 
not mandatory to do so, unlike in the case of the CTG. The notifications of RTAs 
falling under the Enabling Clause were to be made to the Committee for Trade and 
Development. The agreements would be placed in the agenda of the CTD meeting 
where debates were to be held, but generally the CTD did not transfer the agreements 
to the CRTA for in-depth examination.696
The notification to and examination by the CRTA served two purposes: it 
ensured the transparency of RTAs and allowed Members to evaluate the WTO- 
compatibility of the RTA in question. It should be noted that the examination was 
conducted on the basis of information provided by RTA members themselves, 
through written replies to written questions posed by WTO Members or through oral 
replies to questions posed at CRTA meetings.697 Once the factual examination was 
concluded, the Secretariat drafted the examination report. Thereafter, consultations 
were conducted and once the report was agreed by the CRTA, it was submitted to the 
relevant superior body for adoption.
Since the passage of the 2006 Mechanism, the CRTA is now the WTO body 
responsible for RTAs notified under GATT Article XXIV or GATS Article V; 
whereas RTAs notified under the Enabling Clause are the responsibility of the CTD, 
convening in a dedicated session.698 Consequently, compared to the previous process, 
there are fewer administrative bodies involved. This streamlining of WTO bodies 
responsible for the implementation of reviewing process should reduce the procedural 
time lags and enhance the process of transparency. Furthermore, as discussed earlier, 
factual presentations are to be carried out by the WTO Secretariat rather than relying 
on RTA members to provide information. This should ensure that the information is 
more comprehensive and accessible by WTO Members and the general public.
695 See http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/regcom_e.htm (last accessed 1 August 2009).
696 Ibid.
697 Ibid.
698 See the 2006 Mechanism, Article 18.
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It is noteworthy that the 2006 Mechanism also emphasizes on consideration 
rather than examination.6"  This stems from the fact that since its establishment the 
CRTA has not produced a single examination report which is to be approved by all 
members of the committee- although no RTAs have explicitly been disapproved by 
the CRTA either.700 It is, however, not clear how this new emphasis on consideration 
will reduce the tension between the committee’s members when reviewing RTAs. 
According to the new procedure, consideration of a notified RTA is to be concluded 
within one year of the date of notification of the RTA in a single formal meeting. Any 
additional exchange of information is to take place in written form.
As far as systemic issues relating to RTAs are concerned, the CRTA still 
remains responsible. The committee deals with them under a three-pronged approach, 
encompassing i) legal analyses of relevant WTO provisions; ii) horizontal 
comparisons of RTAs; and iii) a debate on the context and economic aspects of RTAs. 
To date research has been carried out and a number of documents have been 
published by the CRTA.701
Figure 9: WTO process for RTAs according to the 2006 Mechanism
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Source: Fiorentino, Crawford and Toqueboeuf, p. 63
699 Compare Ibid., Articles 6, 7, 12, and 13 to the Decision o f 6 February 1996, WT/L/127.
700 See http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/regcom_e.htm (last accessed 1 August 2009).
701 For links to the documents, see http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/regcom_e.htm (last 
accessed 1 August 2009).
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During the GATT years, the deficiencies which caused the absence of 
affirmative decisions are twofold: one is substantive; and the other is institutional. 
The substantive deficiency is to do with GATT Article XXIV itself. There are a 
number of ambiguities in the article which had resulted in disagreements among the 
CONTRACTING PARTIES on how to apply the provisions in the reviews.702
The institutional deficiency, on the other hand, is to do with the requirement of 
consensus. As the GATT operated on a consensual basis, any reports made by the 
working parties would be adopted by the CONTRACTING PARTIES only when 
consensus was reached. Consequently, it was inevitable that a recommendation 
disapproving an RTA would be rejected by the RTA members. The ambiguities of the 
wording of GATT Article XXIV would certainly provide a basis on which RTA 
members could rely to strike down such reports. The requirement of consensus might 
also have plagued the progress on substantive reforms on the article as well as the 
surveillance mechanisms themselves.
Have things been different since the establishment of the CRTA? Although, 
the ambiguities in GATT Article XXIV have been clarified to some extent by the 
1994 Understanding and Turkey-Textiles,703 the requirement o f consensus seems to 
continue to defect the CRTA much the same way it did the working parties during the 
GATT years. Over the first few years of its operation, there was solid progress made 
in outlining the systemic issues.704 Unfortunately, while the committee members 
could identify which aspects required clarification, they nevertheless continued to 
disagree on the substance of the answers that would free the process of evaluating 
particular agreements.705 Given this outcome, one is bound to ask oneself why the 
situation has not improved. Arguably, the main reason underlying both deficiencies is 
something to do with conflict of interests.
With the exception of Mongolia, all WTO Members are a party to one or more 
RTAs.706 There is therefore a conflict of interests here. While non-members would 
benefit if GATT Article XXIV (and the other sets of rules) were to be clarified and 
enforced strictly and rigorously, their own existing and future RTAs would be at risk 
of violating it. This in turn results in a lack of political will on the part of WTO
702 See Chapter 4.
703 These are discussed in more detail in Chapter 4.
704 For example, see supra note 521.
705 See Mathis, p. 131.
706 See http://rtais.wto.org/ui/PublicSearchByMember.aspx (last accessed 8 September 2010).
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Members as a whole to amend the deficiencies. In other words, the status quo where 
the provisions are unclear and their enforcement is weak is preferred by those 
Members whose RTAs would potentially have been WTO-incompatible otherwise. 
This has not been changed by the establishment of the CRTA, nor the 2006 
Mechanism.
As long as the conflict of interests exists, so does the lack of political will on 
the part of WTO Members as a whole to make the system work. This means that only 
less contentious issues can be solved by the CRTA, whose operation is rather political 
in nature due to the consensus-based approach.707 The progress on less contentious 
issues has been made as can be seen from the adoption of the 2006 Mechanism.
With regard to more contentious ones such as substantive reforms to GATT 
Article XXIV, the lack of political will on the part of WTO Members is likely to 
make it difficult for any progress to be made. Nevertheless, the decision in Turkey- 
Textile may have increased the stake which RTA members have in obtaining the 
CRTA’s approval, hence a possible increase in the political will. RTA members may 
try harder to comply with the requirements set out in GATT Article XXIV. For 
example, given the ambiguities plagued the article, the members may adopt the 
interpretations which are more acceptable to non-members. This can result in higher 
level of intra-RTA trade liberalization. In addition, panels and the Appellate Body 
may be forced to clarify the phrases in GATT Article XXIV in future cases. This can 
benefit the CRTA’s reviewing process.
The relationship between the CRTA and the DSM is perhaps the key to 
improve the lack of political will on the part of CRTA’s members. Arguably, the 
CRTA with its expertise and institutional structure is a more suitable WTO body to 
assess the overall WTO-compatibility of an RTA compared to panels and the 
Appellate Body. The lack of political will can be changed if the operation of the 
CRTA is reinforced and supported by the DSM. The relationship between the CRTA 
and the DSM was not relevant until Turkey-T'extiles because before then, there was no 
reason why one should discuss the issue. Turkey-Textiles is the only WTO case which 
directly concerns GATT Article XXIV. Prior to the case, RTA matters had been dealt 
with mostly by the CRTA (and the working parties during the GATT years).
707 Under the current WTO framework is arguably inevitable. See Footer, An Institutional and 
Normative Analysis o f  the World Trade Organization, pp. 62-3.
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The Panel in Turkey-Textiles noted that “the issue regarding the WTO 
compatibility of a customs union, as such, is generally a matter for the CRTA since it 
involves a broad multilateral assessment of any such customs union, i.e. a matter 
which concerns the WTO membership as a whole.”708 Consequently, the Panel 
assumed arguendo that the arrangement between Turkey and the EC was compatible 
with the requirements in paragraphs 8(a) and 5(a). It was of the view that:
[...] the terms of reference of panels must refer explicitly to the “measures” to be 
examined by panels. We consider that regional trade agreements may contain numerous 
measures, all o f which could potentially be examined by panels, before, during or after 
the CRTA examination, if the requirements laid down in the DSU are met. However, it is
arguable that a customs union (or a free-trade area) as a whole would logically not be a
709“measure” as such, subject to challenge under the DSU.
The Appellate Body, however, disagreed. In its obiter dictum, the Appellate 
Body held that panels and itself may assess whether an RTA is compatible in 
accordance with GATT Article XXIV.710 In other words, the overall WTO- 
compatibility of RTAs is within the jurisdiction of panels and the Appellate Body. 
This is very important as it is the first part of the two-step test introduced by the 
Appellate Body in the case:
[FJirst, the party claiming the benefit of this defence [Article XXIV] must demonstrate
that the measure at issue is introduced upon the formation of a customs union that fully
meets the requirements o f subparagraphs 8(a) and 5(a) of Article XXIV. And, second,
that party must demonstrate that the formation of that customs union would be prevented
711if it were not allowed to introduce the measure at issue.
The test would presumably apply to free trade agreement/area mutatis mutandis.
Such an approach adopted by the Appellate Body has arguably changed the 
dynamic between the CRTA and the DSM. For one thing, the first part of the two-step 
test may have increased the stake on the part of RTA members in obtaining an 
affirmative recommendation from the CRTA. It is interesting to see how panels and
708 See WTO Panel Report, Turkey-Textiles, para. 9.52.
709 Ibid., para. 9.53.
710 See WTO Appellate Body Report, Turkey-Textiles, para. 60.
711 Ibid., para. 58.
I
I
the Appellate Body will apply the two-step test if the RTA member at trial has 
obtained an approval from the CRTA. As highlighted earlier, the underlining problem 
with the CRTA is the lack of political will on the part of WTO Members, which in 
turn results in little progress made towards improvement of the current situation. 
Nevertheless, the Appellate Body’s judgment may have paved the way in which a 
relationship between the CRTA and the DSM can be created. I believe that if the 
relationship between the two is constructed in a specific way, the operation of the 
CRTA, hence its effectiveness, can be improved.
The root of the problems arising out of GATT Article XXIV (and the other 
sets of rules) is that the formation of an RTA does not necessarily benefit its members 
while non-members are likely to be adversely affected by it. Consequently, the rules 
set out requirements which aim at maximizing the potential benefits and minimizing 
the potential costs induced by the formation. This can be seen in paragraphs 5 and 8 
of GATT Article XXIV as read in light of the objectives set out in paragraph 4.712 As 
discussed in Chapter 4, the requirements under paragraphs 5 and 8 are not always 
consistent with one another. For example, members of a CU may choose to harmonize 
their domestic regulations in order to satisfy the requirement under subparagraph 
8(a)(ii). However, such harmonization effort may result in the rise of the overall trade 
barriers in relation to non-members.713 Consequently, the member countries will have 
to strike an appropriate balance between these provisions.
In Turkey-Textiles, the Appellate Body introduced the two-step test possibly 
in order to deal with this balancing exercise in a legalistic manner. According to the 
Appellate Body, first the party invoking GATT Article XXIV defence must 
demonstrate that its RTA complies with the requirements of paragraphs 8 (a 
commitment to liberalize intra-RTA trade) arid 5 (a commitment not to raise trade 
barriers in relation to non-members), respectively; and secondly, it must demonstrate 
that the measure at issue is necessary for the formation of the RTA in question.714
One could argue that the second part of the test is something that panels and 
the Appellate Body are familiar with. One might even hold that it is not so much 
different from the necessity test under GATT Article XX jurisprudence as one is 
asking whether the measure at issue is necessary for the achievement of the Member’s
712 See Chapter 4.
7,3 See Ibid.
714 See WTO Appellate Body Report, Turkey-Textiles, para. 58.
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particular policy objective.715 Thus, panels/the Appellate Body are arguably the most 
suitable WTO body to deal with this part of the test. Can the same be held with regard 
to the first part?
According to the Panel and the Appellate Body in Turkey-Textiles, an 
assessment of whether an RTA is WTO-compatible is an economic test.716 On this 
point, it has been argued that the CRTA- with the support of economists and 
statisticians- will be better able to offer parameters for the first part of the test; 
whereas, the DSM, due to its adjudicatory nature and composition, even given the use 
of experts by a panel, will perform this assessment with greater difficulties.717 One 
may disagree with the first part of this statement since panels and the Appellate Body 
can always obtain information, including economic/statistical data and experts, if they 
deem necessary.718 However, it is perhaps right that the adjudicatory nature of the 
DSM may not best accommodate debates on and the assessment of WTO- 
compatibility of an RTA.
Unlike the second part of the test, an assessment of whether an RTA is WTO- 
compatible is more political and controversial in nature, and may have a very wide 
implication since it can affect existing and future RTAs. Consequently, such an 
assessment may be better conducted in an environment where all stakeholders can 
offer inputs to the debates.719 Not only will this enrich the debates, but it is also likely 
to result in a more acceptable and legitimate outcome, which in turn will have a long­
term effect on its enforcement. For example, during the reviewing process, WTO 
Members can post questions and concerns to the RTA members, and as a result, 
useful dialogues can be made between them. This arguably provides the rules with a 
form of soft-law enforcement mechanism, i.e. open-forum and peer review. A similar 
forum has been used in the context of the SPS Agreement and WTO Members have 
used the forum provided by the SPS Committee to air grievances over measures when
715 See WTO Appellate Body and Panel Reports, Korea-Beef, WT/DS/161/AB/R, WT/DS169/AB/R, 
WT/DS161/R, WT/DS169/R, adopted 10 January 2001; WTO Appellate Body Report, EC-Asbestos, 
WT/DS/135/AB/R, adopted 5 April 2001; WTO Appellate Body Report, US-Gambling, 
WT/DS285/AB/R, adopted 20 April 2005; and WTO Appellate Body Report, Dominican Republic- 
Cigarettes, WT/DS302/AB/R, adopted 19 May 2005.
716 See WTO Panel Report, Turkey-Textiles, para. 9.120 and WTO Appellate Body Report, Turkey- 
Textiles, para. 55, respectively.
7,7 See G Marceau and C Reiman, When and How Is a Regional Trade Agreement Compatible with 
the WTO?' (2001) 28 Legal Issues of Economic Integration 297, p. 320.
718 The DSU, Article 13, “Right to Seek Information”.
7,9 For example, third parties have limited roles in the WTO DSM.
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bilateral technical exchanges have reached an impasse.720 The opportunity to elucidate 
the details of an SPS regulation and its enforcement before other Members has 
sometimes led to the correction of erroneous accounts of trade barriers reported by 
industry sources.721 In other cases, these discussions have served to pinpoint the 
source of disagreement between trade partners.722 The CRTA can provide such a 
forum for RTA-related matters.
The WTO agreements also divide decision-making power between many 
different bodies for a reason. The assignment of decision-making authority to each of 
these bodies may reflect legitimate and negotiated policy objectives agreed by WTO 
Members when the organization was established. Each body must therefore determine 
its jurisdiction with due regard for the powers conferred on the other bodies and 
resolve conflicts of jurisdiction in a manner that reconciles those objectives to the 
maximum.723 Accordingly, in my view the CRTA with its open-forum and peer- 
pressure nature coupled with its RTA expertise is a more suitable WTO body to 
conduct the first part of the two-step test than panels and the Appellate Body.
If this position is accepted, the concurrent-jurisdiction judgment held by the 
Appellate Body is the key to improve the operation of the CRTA. As mentioned 
earlier, the concurrent jurisdiction of the CRTA and the DSM on the WTO- 
compatibility assessment raises the stake which RTA members have in obtaining an 
approval from the former. In other words, a possible litigation brought to the DSM 
acts as a threat or incentive on the part of RTA members to obtain CRTA’s approval 
on which the respondent can rely as a defence. Without such a threat/incentive, the 
lack of political will on the part of WTO Members to improve RTA supervision will 
not change. However, the concurrent jurisdiction may not be sufficient to increase the 
political will to obtain an affirmative recommendation from the CRTA. I therefore 
propose that the CRTA should have a primary jurisdiction on the WTO-compatibility 
assessment; whereas, the DSM will have a secondary jurisdiction where the former 
fails or does not have an opportunity to exercise its jurisdiction.
720 For more detail, see D Roberts, 'Preliminary Assessment of the Effects of the WTO Agreement on 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Trade Regulations' (1998) 1 Journal of International Economic Law.
721 Ibid., p. 397.
722 Ibid. For discussion on SPS more generally, see J Scott, The WTO Agreement on Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures: a Commentary (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2007).
723 See F Roessler, The Institutional Balance of WTO' in MCEJ Bronckers, R Quick and JH Jackson 
(eds), New directions in International Economic Law: Essays in Honour o f  John H  Jackson (Kluwer 
Law International, Boston 2000).
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In order to achieve the primary-secondary jurisdiction, panels and the 
Appellate Body must give more weight to an affirmative recommendation made by 
the CRTA. Not only that the CRTA is a more suitable organ to assess WTO- 
compatibility of an RTA, but the necessity test applied in the second part may also 
have a danger of shaping RTAs in such a way that RTA members just do enough to 
satisfy the requirements under GATT Article XXIV, i.e. resulting in minimalist 
RTAs. In other words, the necessity test does not necessarily strike the right balance 
between the measure at issue and the overall trade liberalization induced by the 
formation of an RTA. Panels and the Appellate Body only ask whether the measure at 
issue is necessary for the formation of the RTA in question. There can be a situation 
where even though the measure is deemed unnecessary due to the availability of a less 
restrictive alternative, the RTA may still strike an appropriate balance between the 
objectives, i.e. the extra trade restriction induced by the measure in question is 
compensated for with trade liberalization elsewhere as the RTA has resulted in lower 
barriers in relation to non-members overall.724 Thus, I argue that if the party invoking 
GATT Article XXIV defence has obtained an affirmative recommendation from the 
CRTA, panels and the Appellate Body should apply the necessity test very cautiously.
It is acknowledged, however, that giving due weight to a CRTA’s approval in 
the two-step test is not straightforward. Essentially, panels and the Appellate Body 
have to make it more difficult for an affected non-member to challenge the legality of 
such measures where the RTA has been approved by the CRTA. Although the 
proposed primary-secondary jurisdiction may be more complicated to implement, it 
will ensure that the balancing of potential benefits and potential costs induced by the 
formation of an RTA is conducted by the CRTA, the more suitable WTO body. Thus, 
the question is how panels and the Appellate Body can achieve such a result, 
especially on the basis of the existing jurisprudence.
As mentioned earlier, the second part of the two-step test is arguably not so 
much different from the necessity test under GATT Article XX. Both tests require 
panels and the Appellate Body to determine whether the challenged measure is 
necessary for the achievement of an intended policy objective pursued by the Member 
invoking the defence: for GATT Article XX, protection of human, animal or plant life 
or health, for example; and for GATT Article XXIV, the formation of an RTA.
724 Indeed the measure at issue may necessarily be trade restrictive precisely because other measures 
already result in lower trade barriers in relation to non-members overall.
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Under GATT Article XX jurisprudence, it has been held that WTO Members 
have the right to determine their own level of protection- be it the protection of 
human, animal or plant life or health, or the security of compliance with laws or 
regulations.725 Although WTO Members have the right to determine their own level 
of protection, the measures adopted must be the least trade restrictive.726 It is 
noteworthy that even there is a less restrictive measure available, the Member may not 
be required to adopt it where the administrative or enforcement costs involved are 
excessive.727 Thus, a measure is held necessary for the achievement of a GATT 
Article XX objective when there is no less trade restrictive alternative which will 
achieve the same level of protection.728
If it is accepted that the second part of the two-step test is similar to the 
necessity test under GATT Article XX, it follows that a measure will be necessary for 
the formation of an RTA when there is no less trade restrictive alternative which will 
achieve the same level of integration intended by the member countries. If one applies 
such a test to the facts of Turkey-Textiles, one might reach a different conclusion 
from those of the Panel and the Appellate Body. This is because the certification-of- 
origin alternative to the Turkey’s quantitative restriction suggested by the Panel 
would simply fail to achieve the CU envisaged by the EC and Turkey, i.e. free 
movement of goods without border controls. In other words, there is no less trade 
restrictive alternative which would achieve the intended level of integration. This is 
where an affirmative recommendation by the CRTA can be given due weight to.
When applying the second part of the test, panels and the Appellate Body can 
refer to a CRTA’s affirmative recommendation of the RTA at trial in order to 
determine the precise level of integration intended by the member countries. This 
way, the regulatory autonomy of the RTA members is preserved. Thus, on this basis, I 
propose that panels and the Appellate Body should consult a recommendation made 
by the CRTA in order to determine the intended level of integration.
Given that no affirmative or inconsistency recommendations have been made 
by the CRTA, the proposal can be rather academic. Nevertheless, thank to the 2006
725 See WTO Appellate Body Report, Korea-Beef, para. 176; and also GATT Article XX:(b) and (d), 
respectively.
726 See WTO Appellate Body Report, Korea-Beef, para. 165.
727 See WTO Appellate Body Report, US-Gambling, WT/DS2/AB/R, adopted 20 May 1996, para. 306.
728 For further discussion on GATT Article XX jurisprudence, see DH Regan, 'The Meaning of 
"Necessary" in GATT Article XX and GATS Article XIV: the Myth of Cost-benefit Balancing' (2007) 
6 World Trade Review 347.
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Mechanism, factual presentations are now available. In time, the WTO Secretariat 
should be able to produce such reports for all RTAs notified to the WTO. Thus, in lieu 
of CRTA’s recommendations, panels and the Appellate Body can use factual 
presentations to determine the level of integration intended by the RTA members for 
the second part of the test.729
It is important to note that the changes introduced by the 2006 Mechanism {i.e. 
early announcement, notification, and factual presentation) only facilitate the 
operation of the CRTA in terms of procedural transparency. They do not alter the 
conflicting interests, hence the lack of political will on the part of WTO Members. 
Arguably, the proposed primary-secondary jurisdiction for the CRTA and the DSM 
can improve the current situation. The higher stake in obtaining an affirmative 
recommendation will encourage the RTA members and third-party WTO Members to 
carry out the CRTA examination/consideration. The secondary jurisdiction on the part 
of panels and the Appellate Body should act as a last-resort threat as they can decide 
whether an RTA is WTO-compatible or not. The open-forum and consensus-based 
nature of the CRTA should be preferred by both the RTA members and the other 
WTO Members to the adversarial and adjudicatory nature of the DSM. Consequently, 
while third-party WTO Members will scrutinize the RTA content ever more 
thoroughly during the reviewing process in fear of its subsequent use in the DSM, in 
anticipation the RTA members will also be more careful not to include RTA 
commitments which have clear detrimental effects on non-members in the first place.
In any case, if the CRTA still fails to produce a recommendation, panels and 
the Appellate Body can exercise their secondary jurisdiction and determine, to the 
extent necessary, whether the RTA in question is WTO-compatible or not. Factual 
presentations will also be useful to panels and the Appellate Body in applying the first 
part of the two-step test. It is hoped that in future cases, panels and the Appellate 
Body will take the opportunity to create a working relationship between them and the 
CRTA. If what proposed here is adopted in subsequent case law, I believe that the 
operation of the CRTA can be improved.
729 It is acknowledged that factual presentations are less likely to provide the rules with a soft law 
enforcement mechanism to the same extent as the CRTA would. Given that factual presentations are 
rather factual and neutral in nature, panels and the Appellate Body may find them less useful for the 
purpose of determining the intended level of integration than recommendations by the CRTA, which 
are supposed to contain a particular position taken by the CRTA.
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An effective reviewing process for RTAs is crucial if the WTO is to supervise 
these agreements in such a Way that addresses the challenges facing developing 
countries amid the current RTA proliferation as it is used to enforce the rules, albeit in 
a soft-law fashion. Without a reviewing process, RTA members can only be made 
accountable through the DSM, which may not be the best body to deal with RTA- 
related issues.
Given the diverse interests on the part of WTO Members with regard to RTA 
supervision, the current situation where the emphasis is placed on the procedural 
rather than substantive requirements is rather inevitable. Proceduralization is a normal 
response to situations like this. The primary-secondary jurisdiction coupled with the 
additional procedural requirements imposed by the 2006 Mechanism should help 
improve the current ineffective reviewing process. However, it must be recognized 
that as much as procedural requirements are useful and necessary, they can only do so 
much. Without the rules which address the challenges facing developing countries, it 
would be difficult to supervise RTAs in such a way that benefits them. Thus, it is vital 
that the proposed solutions regarding the rules are considered seriously. This includes 
the possible utility of code of best practices discussed earlier.
Together with the proposed code of best practices, the procedural 
requirements imposed by the 2006 Mechanism can have significant and dynamic 
effects on the contents of RTAs. For example, assuming that the proposed code of 
best practices exists, during the reviewing process third-party WTO Members may 
ask the RTA members why they did not follow the code. They may need to provide 
reasons for their departures. Such a peer review can arguably make prospective RTA 
members think twice before departing from the proposed code of best practices. 
Furthermore, the CRTA can guarantee an affirmative recommendation if the RTA 
members have adopted the proposed code of best practices. In other words, the 
proposed code will have the same function as international standards in the context 
of the SPS Agreement whereby an SPS measure is deemed to be WTO-consistent if it 
conforms to an international standard.730 Such presumption should encourage 
prospective RTA members to adopt the model RTA and/or specific RTA 
commitments contained in the proposed code of best practices. This way, not only can 
the code of best practices and the reviewing process provide a form of soft-law
730 See the SPS Agreement, Article 3.
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enforcement mechanism for the existing rules, but they may also result in a 
convergence of RTAs towards the model RTA contained in the proposed code.
It is important to note that the proposed primary-secondary jurisdiction shared 
between the CRTA and panels/the Appellate Body is based on the judgments in 
Turkey-Textiles, particularly the Appellate Body’s two-step test. Consequently, it is 
not clear whether the proposal would have any legal basis in the case of RTAs 
notified under the Enabling Clause and GATS Article V. Nevertheless, I believe that 
such a relationship between these WTO bodies should be developed in all RTA cases 
so as to increase the political will on the part of WTO Members to seek affirmative 
recommendations from the CRTA (and the CTD in the case of RTAs notified under 
the Enabling Clause). In addition, the proposed primary-secondary jurisdiction would 
be more readily applicable if the proposal of having a single set of rules for the 
formation of goods RTAs is adopted as the CTD would have no role in the reviewing 
process and the CRTA would be the sole responsible body.731
7.4 Technical Assistance
Given that the main problem with RTA supervision is the conflicting interests 
and the resulting lack of political will on the part of WTO Members as a whole, there 
is no surprise that any reforms to the existing rules and mechanisms will be complex 
and faced with opposition. One way to circumventing the lack of political will is to 
provide developing countries with some form of technical assistance. This is crucial 
to the lack of analytical and negotiating capacities on the part of developing countries 
since the WTO rules do not address this challenge at all.732 As discussed in the 
previous chapter, the lack of analytical capacity is particularly important in services 
RTAs.
It is legitimate to ask whether the WTO should provide developing countries 
with technical assistance in relation to RTA negotiations. On the one hand, many 
critics argue that RTAs weaken the MFN principle and the multilateral trading
731 See Chapter 5.
732 See Chapters 2 ,4 , 5, and 6.
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system.733 Thus, it would be self-destructive if the WTO were to encourage 
developing countries to form such agreements, either with their developed-country 
trade partners or among themselves, by providing them with technical assistance. On 
the other hand, given the dramatic rise in the number of RTAs notified to the WTO 
and the parallel serge in the number of developing countries participating in these 
agreements, the WTO cannot afford to act as an innocent bystander and arguably has 
a role to play in regulating their contents. After all, is it not why GATT Article XXIV, 
the Enabling Clause, and GATS Article V exist in the first place? Furthermore, 
despite of the concern that RTAs are undermining the multilateral trading system, 
WTO Members are engaging in RTA negotiations regardless. Would it not be more 
constructive if the WTO took the opportunity to ensure that these agreements 
complied with the rules and developing-country Members were not rendered 
disadvantaged?
The position that the WTO has a role to play in RTA supervision can be 
supported by paragraphs 4 and 29 of the Doha Declaration adopted on 14 November 
2001, which read:
4. We [WTO Members] stress our commitment to the WTO as the unique forum for 
global trade rule-making and liberalization, while also recognizing that regional trade 
agreements can play an important role in promoting the liberalization and expansion o f  
trade and in fostering development (emphasis added).
29. We also agree to negotiations aimed at clarifying and improving disciplines and 
procedures under the existing WTO provisions applying to regional trade agreements.
The negotiations shall take into account the developmental aspects o f  regional trade 
agreements (emphasis added).734
From the declaration, it is apparent that WTO Members see RTAs as compatible with 
the multilateral trade liberalization and as a means to achieve economic development. 
Since developing countries face a number of challenges amid the current RTA 
proliferation, the WTO arguably has the responsibility to help them utilize these 
agreements. Besides the proposals made in the previous chapters and in the earlier 
sections, technical assistance should be provided in order to improve the analytical
733 For example, see Bhagwati, 'Regionalism and Multilateralism: an Overview', pp. 38-45.
734 See http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_e.htm (last accessed 9 
September 2010).
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and negotiating capacities on the part of developing-country Members with regard to 
their RTA negotiations, particularly those with low income or fall within the group of 
LDCs.
For example, Cambodia, Myanmar, and the Lao’s People Democratic 
Republic (not yet a WTO Member) only sent a very small group of trade officials 
(three or less) to the RTA negotiations between: ASEAN and the EU, ASEAN and the 
Republic of Korea, and ASEAN and India.735 In addition, the trade officials hardly 
contributed to the discussion both among the ASEAN countries and between ASEAN 
and its trade partners.
The WTO does recognize that technical assistance and capacity building are 
core elements of the development dimension of the multilateral trading system. 
With the WTO Secretariat, trade-related technical assistance (TRTA) is coordinated 
by the Institute for Training and Technical Cooperation (ITTC). The CTD is the 
regular body overseeing all TRTA activities.737 These activities can be divided into 
five categories: i) general WTO-related technical assistance and training; ii) 
specialized and advanced technical assistance and training; iii) academic support for 
training and capacity building; iv) trainee programmes and internships; and v) E- 
leaming.738 Thus, it can be seen that the WTO already has the basic infrastructure and 
bodies to provide technical assistance to developing-country Members. However, 
although these TRTA activities are no doubt useful and beneficial to developing- 
country Members, they do not necessarily nor directly help them with their RTA 
negotiations.
What I propose here is for these existing bodies and TRTA activities to shift 
some focus to technical assistance in the context of RTA negotiations. This should not 
require a huge amount of resources on the part of the WTO to do it. The TRTA 
activities can be designed to train trade officials from developing-country Members to
735 It should be noted that these countries sent the same trade officials to all three RTAs whose 
negotiations overlapped. The author recognized them on various occasions over the period between 
2006 and 2010. This is a sharp contrast to the practice of Singapore where different teams of trade 
officials are assigned to different RTAs. The fewer number of trade officials suggests severe 
constraints on negotiating capacity on the part of Cambodia, Myanmar, and the Lao’s People 
Democratic Republic.
736 See supra note 275, paras. 38-41.
737 See http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/teccop_e/tct_e.htm (last accessed 9 September 
2010).
738 See http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/train_e/products_e.htm (last accessed 9 September 
2010). For more detail, see G Shaffer, 'Can WTO Technical Assistance and Capacity-Building Serve 
Developing Countries?' in E-U Petersmann (ed) Reforming the World Trading System: Legitimacy, 
Efficiency, and Democratic Governance (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2005), pp. 261-8.
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negotiate more effectively in a bilateral/regional context. In addition, specialized and 
advanced technical assistance and training should include sophisticated economic 
analytical skills that are required for ex ante preparatory research prior to RTA 
negotiations.739 Such programmes should help improve the human capital of 
developing-country Members specifically for RTA preparation and negotiations. 
Furthermore, advice should also be given with regard to how to create and/or organize 
domestic institutions, which will enable a country to gather, distribute, and analyse 
information relating to its trade, economic and business performance as well as 
similar information about other countries. Well-functioning domestic institutions will 
improve both analytical and negotiating capacities of developing countries, not only 
in the context of RTAs but also multilateral trade negotiations.
Given that human capital and institutional capacity may take time to develop, 
the WTO could go one step further and provide developing-country Members with 
economic and legal advice on their plans to form RTAs. Thus, while a developing- 
country Member’s human capital and institutional capacity are being built, it could 
seek consulting services from the WTO. For example, if requested, the CRTA/CTD 
could provide economic advice to a developing-country Member whether to form an 
RTA with its developed-country trade partner and if it should, what commitments it 
should make. It could also advise the developing country on the legal implications of 
the RTA and how to make the agreement WTO-compatible. The provision of 
economic and legal advice would level the playing field between RTA partners whose 
analytical and negotiating capacities differ significantly.
The proposed economic and legal advice is also ex ante in nature. That is, 
RTA contents would be influenced before the member countries negotiate, sign, or 
ratify the agreements. Such ex ante approach to RTA supervision would complement 
the reviewing process conducted in the CRTA/CTD and the possible resort to the 
DSM, which are ex post in nature. In addition, as prospective developing-country 
Members sought advice, they would have to reveal their plans and supply the 
CRTA/CTD with necessary information at an early stage of their negotiations. This 
would indirectly help with the notification and reviewing process, which is in line 
with the concept of early announcement under the 2006 Mechanism. With such 
information, the CRTA/CTD could give economic advice which takes into account
739 See Chapter 2.
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not only potential costs and benefits from the perspective of a prospective member but 
also from the perspectives of a non-member as well.
Another added benefit of this proposed economic and legal advice is that it 
would be provided on a country-specific basis as opposed to the more generic training 
(with the emphasis on RTA negotiations) of trade officials/negotiators from 
developing-country Members discussed earlier. In other words, the services could be 
tailored in accordance with the specific circumstances and needs of the developing 
country in question. This would be one way to offer a tailored-fit special and 
differential treatment for developing-country Members with regard to RTA 
negotiations and complement the more nuanced approach to special and differential 
treatment proposed in the context of the WTO rules (whereby developing countries 
are further divided into subgroups and different threshold levels and transitional 
periods are agreed in advance).740
In terms of specialization, over time the CRTA/CTD would be able to build up 
the expertise in RTA-related issues and develop a standardized ex ante analytical 
framework for the formation of an RTA. Furthermore, as far as efficiency is 
concerned, the CRTA/CTD could exploit economies of scale as the number of 
developing-country Members requesting for such services increases.
The problem with this proposal is whether the WTO has sufficient resources to 
provide such consulting services to its developing-country Members. For example, the 
economic advice would require well-trained economists and statisticians to work out 
the aggregation of potential benefits and potential costs induced by the formation of 
the RTA in question. The same applies to legal advice.741 It is not clear whether the 
WTO can afford to hire these experts. One way to deal with this problem is to require 
the developing-country Member requesting the services to partially pay for them. 
Alternatively or in addition to partial payment, developed-country Members could 
make contributions to a trust fund which would be used to subsidize these services.742 
This is similar to the Aid for Trade funds agreed at the Hong Kong WTO Ministerial
740 See Chapters 4, 5, and 6.
741 It should be noted that the WTO Secretariat does provide additional legal advice and assistance to 
developing countries in respect o f dispute settlement at their request. According to DSU Article 27.2, it 
has to make available a qualified legal expert from the WTO technical cooperation services to any 
developing country which so requests. However, this is different from what suggested here, which 
primarily aims at the pre-DSM stage.
742 Bilateral donors would be more difficult to orchestrate since there is more likely to be a conflict of 
interests if the donors are negotiating RTAs with the beneficiaries.
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Conference in December 2005.743 If these means still do not provide sufficient 
funding for in-house services, one may need to look further afield.
As far as legal advice is concerned, the Advisory Centre of WTO Law could 
provide an answer.744 The ACWL is a Geneva-based intergovernmental organization 
which was established in 2001 by an international agreement signed by 29 WTO 
Members in Seattle on 1 December 1999. It is separate and independent from the 
WTO. The ACWL’s main sources of financing are the revenues from its Endowment 
Fund, fees levied for support in dispute settlement proceedings and voluntary 
contributions.745 Not only does the ACWL provide legal assistance in WTO dispute 
settlement proceedings but it also provides legal advice on matters that are not yet the 
subject of the DSM.746 The latter service helps the country seeking the legal assistance 
to realize its trade policy objectives in a manner consistent with WTO law. Thus, it 
may be possible for developing countries to obtain pre-DSM-stage legal advice in 
relation to the formation of their RTAs from the ACWL. It is however not clear 
whether the centre does in fact possess the necessary expertise in RTA-related issues 
and/or is willing to develop it.
With regard to the proposed economic advice, UNCTAD might be able to 
offer such services. Established in 1964, it promotes the development-friendly 
integration of developing countries into the world economy. It has progressively 
evolved into “an authoritative knowledge-based institution whose work aims to help 
shape current policy debates and thinking on development, with a particular focus on 
ensuring that domestic policies and international action are mutually supportive in 
bringing about sustainable development.”747
The organization works to fulfil this mandate by carrying out three key 
functions: first, it functions as a forum for intergovernmental deliberations, supported 
by discussions with experts and exchanges of experience, aimed at consensus
743 See http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/a4t_e/aid4trade_e.htm (last accessed 11 
September 2010). See also S Prowse, 'The Role of International and National Agencies in Trade- 
Related Capacity Buidling' (2002) 25 World Economy 1235, p. 1242.
744 See http://www.acwl.ch/e/index_e.aspx (last accessed 1 August 2009). For further discussion, see K 
Van der Borght, 'The Advisory Centre on the WTO Law: Advancing Fairness and Equality' (1999) 2 
Journal o f International Economic Law 723.
745 See http://www.acwl.ch/pdf/QuickQuide_2008.pdf (last accessed 1 August 2009).
746 See Ibid.
747 See http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=1530&lang=l (last accessed 1 August
2009). For further discussion, see M Shah, Developing Countries and UNCTAD (United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development) (1st edn Vora, Bombay, 1968) and WR Malinowski and M 
Zammit Cutajar, UNCTAD and the South-North Dialogue: the First Twenty Years: Essays in Memory 
o f WR. Malinowski (Pergamon, Oxford 1985).
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building; secondly, it undertakes research, policy analysis and data collection for the 
debates of government representatives and experts; and finally, it provides technical 
assistance tailored to the specific requirements of developing countries, with special 
attention to the needs of the least developed countries and of economies in transition. 
When appropriate, it cooperates with other organizations and donor countries in the 
delivery of technical assistance.748
More importantly, UNCTAD has been taking on RTA-related issues more 
seriously and focusing on their development dimension in the recent years.749 
Furthermore, it views itself as having “an important role to play in helping developing 
countries to deal with the interface between multilateralism and regionalism, and the 
interplay among RTAs, under a new trade, development and cooperation 
paradigm.”750 Thus, with developing countries at its heart and its available resources, 
UNCTAD is arguably capable of providing developing countries with advice on the 
economic impact of their RTAs.
Nevertheless, like the ACWL, UNCTAD is separate and independent from the 
WTO. This means that there may be a need for these international institutions to 
cooperate and coordinate their policy objectives and resources in order to assist 
developing countries participating in the current RTA proliferation. It should be noted 
that the existing WTO framework for technical assistance does accommodate 
cooperation and coordination between international organizations to some extent. For 
example, the Integrated Framework for Trade-Related Technical Assistance to Least- 
Developed Countries, coordinated out of the WTO, brings together six international 
organizations, namely, UNCTAD, the International Trade Centre (ITC), the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the WTO, the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), and the World Bank.751 Consequently, cooperation and coordination 
between the WTO and other international organizations should not be too difficult to 
achieve.
749 See for example, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. Secretariat, Trade and 
development report, 2007 (United Nations, New York; Geneva 2007), and United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development, Handbook o f  Economic Integration and Cooperation Groupings o f  
Developing Countries (United Nations, New York 1996).
750 See the Summary prepared by the UNCTAD Secretariat for Forum on Multilateralism and 
Regionalism: the New Interface, 8 June 2004, Rio de Janeiro, TD/L.369, para. 9.
751 See http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/teccop_e/if_e.htm (last accessed 10 September
2010). See also Shaffer, pp. 263-4.
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It is noteworthy that the provision of consulting services could be made 
available by a new international institution. For example, Rollo proposes that there is 
a case for an Advisory Centre on Regional Trade Agreements, which are composed of 
economists and lawyers specialized in RTA-related issues.752 It would be modelled 
after the ACWL with moderate consulting fees. Such a specialized institution would 
certainly benefit developing countries and help level the playing field between RTA 
partners with different analytical and negotiating capacities.
7.5 Conclusion
Given the conflicting interests and the resulting lack of political will on the 
part of WTO Members, it might not be easy and will take time to bring about the 
necessary changes to the rules and/or the ways in which they are interpreted. Thus, I 
propose to improve the status quo somewhat by adopting less contentious means 
which can be used to strengthen and complement the existing rules and mechanisms. 
These include promulgation of code of best practices, revision of the WTO 
surveillance mechanisms, and technical assistance for developing countries in relation 
to RTA negotiations.
Noticeably, the WTO rules (including code of best practices), the existing 
mechanisms, and the provision of technical assistance are dynamically intertwined 
and linked with one another. For example, the reviewing process is in a sense a 
mechanism to enforce the rules. Without it, the only way the rules can be enforced is 
through the DSM. On the other hand, if the rules are ambiguous and do not give due 
account to the challenges facing developing countries amid the current RTA 
proliferation, the reviewing process alone cannot do much to address them. In 
addition, without technical assistance, developing countries would be disadvantaged 
as they are constrained by their lack of analytical and negotiating capacities.
752 See J Rollo, 'The Challenge of Negotiating RTAs for Developing Countries' in R Baldwin and P 
Low (eds), Multilateralizing Regionalism: Challenges fo r  the Global Trading System (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge 2009), pp. 692-4.
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RTA supervision requires a systemic approach as regulatory measures 
reinforce one another. In order to improve its RTA supervision, the WTO has to 
tackle the problems from different fronts. Some regulatory measures are less 
contentious than others and may take less time and resources- be they financial or 
political- to implement. Thus, perhaps in the short-run, the WTO should channel its 
resources and attention to less contentious regulatory means such as a code of best 
practices and provision of technical assistance. By strengthening such means, the 
WTO may be able to loosen the gridlock on the part of its Members to reform the 
existing rules and make RTA supervision more effective. Notably, the 2006 
Mechanism is a good example of a shift in that direction. Nevertheless, substantive 
reforms to the rules still remain very important if one is to effectively address the 
challenges facing developing countries amid the current RTA proliferation.
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Conclusions & Concluding Remarks
The thesis set out to accomplish two tasks: the first was to find out what 
specific challenges do developing countries face amid the current RTA proliferation 
when they negotiate and form such trade arrangements with their developed-country 
trade partners and among themselves?; and the second task was to determine to what 
extent do the existing WTO rules pertaining RTA supervision address these 
challenges and are there any ways to improve the rules and mechanisms so that the 
challenges can be better addressed?
The thesis started off with a survey of the current RTA proliferation. Two key 
features have emerged, namely, the rate of proliferation and the participation of 
developing countries. The current rate at which RTAs proliferate is very rapid 
compared to those during the GATT years, and markedly continues unabated. 
Consequently, more and more international trade is taking place through such 
arrangements. This raises the importance of the way in which these agreements are 
designed and negotiated. That is, they should be supervised so that benefits are 
maximized and costs minimized. More importantly, developing countries are 
increasingly taking part in the current RTA proliferation, both in North-South and 
South-South RTAs. Thus, not only should these agreements be supervised, but the 
existing WTO rules and mechanisms pertaining RTA supervision should also address 
the challenges facing developing countries when forming such trade arrangements.
Having examined the three bodies of literature and supplemented them with 
the interviews conducted during and personal exposure to a number of Thailand and 
ASEAN’s RTA negotiations, Chapter 2 identified three major challenges facing 
developing countries amid the current RTA proliferation from the perspective of a 
prospective RTA member. These are domestic vested interests, high implementation 
and adjustment costs, and the lack of analytical and negotiating capacities on the part 
of developing countries.
Chapter 3, on the other hand, investigated whether there are any challenges 
that developing countries may face from two other perspectives, namely, as a non­
member and as a WTO Member amid the current RTA proliferation. It was found that 
as a non-member, the main challenge facing developing countries is the adverse
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effects caused by trade and investment diversion. However, if left to themselves, it is 
very unlikely that prospective RTA members will take into account such adverse 
effects. Furthermore, by its very nature, an RTA is designed and negotiated between 
the member countries while non-members are excluded from this process and will be 
discriminated against as a result of trade preferences granted between the member 
countries. Consequently, there is little, if anything, non-member developing countries 
can do to curb trade and investment diversion. They can only either attempt to form 
RTAs of their own with their main trade partners or apply for a membership of the 
existing ones. In doing so, they may be pressured by their trade partners, particularly 
those of developed-country status, to accept commitments that are not suitable for 
their stage of development. Thus, it was argued that the WTO has a role to play here.
From the bodies of literature reviewed in Chapter 3, the challenge facing 
developing countries from the perspective of a WTO Member is not clear, however. 
While the theoretical and empirical work on how RTAs affect the multilateral trading 
system and multilateral trade liberalization has generated a number of interesting 
insights, it remains largely inconclusive. It can be argued both ways. That is, RTAs 
may complement or undermine the multilateral trading system and multilateral trade 
liberalization depending on what factors one takes into consideration. Further research 
and time is needed on this front.
Although developing countries may have a stake in the smooth functioning of 
the WTO- to the extent that RTAs undermine the multilateral trading system and 
multilateral trade liberalization- their immediate concerns are likely to lie in the 
adverse effects caused by trade and investment diversion and/or how they can make 
the most out of the RTA that they have decided to form. Consequently, as far as the 
challenges facing developing countries amid the current RTA proliferation are 
concerned, attention should be given to those they face from the perspectives of a 
prospective member and a non-member.
Chapters 4, 5, and 6 embarked upon the second task as they examined the 
three sets of rules, namely, GATT Article XXIV, the Enabling Clause, and GATS 
Article V, respectively, in light of the challenges facing developing countries 
discussed and identified in Chapters 2 and 3. The main requirements contained in 
each set of rules can be divided into two categories: the intra-RTA and third-party
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obligations.753 As discussed in these chapters, the intra-RTA obligation is relevant to 
the challenges facing developing countries from the perspective of a prospective RTA 
member while the third-party obligation, from the perspective of a non-member. A 
common finding with regard to the third-party obligation in all three sets is that the 
WTO regulatory framework does tolerate the adverse effects of trade and investment 
diversion on the part of non-members to a certain extent. This is because the rules, i.e. 
GATT Article XXIV:5, subparagraph 3(a) second requirement of the Enabling 
Clause, and the second requirement of GATS Article V:4, only demand that trade 
barriers in relation to non-members are not raised.754 Such a requirement can only 
deal with the adverse effects of trade and investment diversion on the part of non­
members in a limited fashion. As far as the intra-RTA obligation is concerned, the 
three sets of rules differ from one another and as a result, different proposals were 
made in response to the shortcomings revealed from the evaluation.
The main proposal made in Chapter 4 with regard to the intra-RTA obligation 
was to incorporate some form of special and differential treatment into GATT Article 
XXIV:8. This could be achieved by setting different threshold levels of and 
timeframes for the SAT requirement: developed countries would be subject to higher 
threshold level and shorter timeframe than developing countries; in addition, 
developing countries could be further divided into subgroups, i.e. into LDCs, 
LMIDCs, and UMIDCs, and would be subject to different threshold levels and 
timeframes. This is a more nuanced approach to special and differential treatment and 
arguably would deal with the heterogeneity of developing countries more 
satisfactorily than at present. It was later discussed in Chapter 6 that a tailored-fit 
special and differential treatment for the intra-RTA obligation would not strike the 
right balance between the individual needs of developing countries and predictability 
(and practicality) of RTA negotiations. A tailored-fit approach could, nevertheless, be 
adopted with regard to technical assistance, which was discussed in Chapter 7.
It is important to note that the proposed special and differential treatment 
should not result in excess flexibility. Otherwise, domestic vested interests could 
lobby the government to exclude trade-creating products and industries from the RTA 
coverage.
753 It should be noted that each set o f the rules also contains provisions which establish certain 
procedures and promote transparency pertaining the formation of RTAs.
754 It is noteworthy that subparagraph 3(a) second requirement is slightly different as it contains the 
phrase undue difficulties. See Chapter 5.
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With the proposed incorporation of special and differential treatment into 
GATT Article XXIV, it was argued that developing countries should have the 
flexibility to promote the potential benefits and manage the potential costs induced by 
the formation of an RTA. In addition, such incorporation could help neutralize 
asymmetries of the bargaining power between developed and developing countries. 
Furthermore, it was also proposed that the duty and ORRC halves of the SAT 
requirement should be separated and subject to different standards of enforcement so 
as to make the SAT requirement operable and at the same time sufficiently promote 
the potential gains- be they static or dynamic- induced by the formation of an RTA.
In Chapter 5, it was found that the intra-RTA obligation under the Enabling 
Clause significantly differs from that of GATT Article XXIV as it grants (excess) 
flexibility to developing countries forming an RTA among themselves. Although this 
is understandable given the former’s drafting history and the sentiments towards 
developing countries at the time of its enactment, it was argued that the leniency of 
the rules may not translate into trade/economic benefits in practice and may even 
result in severe trade diversion which is harmful to both developing-country members 
and non-members alike. In addition, the chapter discussed how the existing two 
separate sets of rules for the formation of goods RTAs may result in the lacuna where 
developing-country partners in North-South RTAs are not eligible to any special and 
differential treatment and the discrepancy between two types of South-South RTAs, 
one notified under GATT Article XXIV and the other the Enabling Clause. It was 
therefore argued that given the excess flexibility, the lacuna, and the discrepancy, 
there should be a single set of rules for the formation of goods RTAs, i.e. GATT 
Article XXIV, but only if the proposed special and differential treatment is 
incorporated into the provisions therein.755
Similar to the other two sets of rules, Chapter 6 found that GATS Article V is 
plagued with a number of ambiguities. The application of the provisions therein is 
also made more difficult due to the limited data on trade in services and the 
difficulties involved in the methodological approaches to data collection and 
evaluation. Furthermore, the attempt by GATT CONTRACTING PARTIES to import 
into GATS the key concept of substantially all the trade in GATT Article XXIV: 8 is
755 Alternatively, WTO Members could negotiate altogether a new set of rules governing the formation 
of goods RTAs, which is not bound by the wording of GATT Article XXIV and better equipped to deal 
with rules of origin.
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arguably a fundamental mistake and may have made GATS Article V even more 
complicated. Nevertheless, the nature of barriers to trade in services and rules of 
origin, which makes it more difficult to discriminate against non-members, may 
mitigate the potential adverse effects induced by services RTAs to some extent.
Given that GATS commitments are still far from comprehensive and countries 
do make GATS-plus commitments in services RTAs, it was argued that these 
agreements may complement the multilateral process rather than undermine it. Over 
time, the nature of barriers to trade in services and rules of origin is likely to weaken 
domestic oppositions to services liberalization and may create opportunities to further 
liberalization at the multilateral level. In order to maximize the potential benefits from 
services RTAs, it was also argued that WTO Members should allocate their resources 
and attention to elaborate and clarify the SBO requirement under paragraph 6. If they 
can agree on a definition of substantial business operation which results in liberal 
rules of origin, more efficient services providers from outside the preferential area 
will be able to enter and compete in the members’ markets. This, in turn, will mitigate 
trade diversion further which is beneficial to both members and non-members alike.
As far as developing countries are concerned, services liberalization- may it be 
at the bilateral/regional or multilateral level- presents them with two additional 
challenges to the ones identified in Chapters 2 and 3, namely those concerning 
regulation and movement of natural persons. It was proposed that subparagraph 3(a) 
could be used to ensure that developing countries have sufficient flexibility to 
establish appropriate and effective regulatory frameworks in the covered 
sectors/subsectors. It was also proposed that the implied different standards that are 
applied to developed and developing countries could be used to indirectly force the 
former to liberalize their mode-4 services, in which the latter have comparative 
advantage.
Having examined GATT Article XXIV, the Enabling Clause, and GATS 
Article V, nothing in these rules appears to deal directly with the constraints on 
developing countries’ analytical and negotiating capacities. Although some of the 
proposals could help neutralize asymmetries of the bargaining powers between 
developed and developing countries, they would not directly foster the development 
of both capacities. Given their importance to the success of RTA negotiations (and 
those at the multilateral level), more efforts should be made to help developing
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countries build analytical and negotiating capacities. The way in which this might be 
achieved was proposed in Chapter 7.
As discussed in the previous chapter, the main obstacle to any substantive 
reforms of the existing rules is the underlying conflict of interests among WTO 
Members, which in turn results in the lack of political will to make reforms in this 
area. This is because almost all WTO Members are a party to at least one or more 
RTAs. As a result, they are likely to prefer the status quo where the rules are 
ambiguous and Members hardly bring disputes to the WTO DSM. On this basis, a 
number of proposals were made in order to improve the status quo somewhat by 
adopting less contentious means which can be used to strengthen and complement the 
existing rules. These include promulgation of code of best practices, revision of the 
WTO surveillance mechanisms, and technical assistance for developing countries in 
relation to RTA negotiations. It was argued that the rules (including code of best 
practices), the surveillance mechanisms, and the provision of technical assistance are 
dynamically intertwined and linked with one another. Thus, RTA supervision requires 
a systemic approach as regulatory measures reinforce one another.
Throughout this thesis, it can be seen that the WTO regulatory framework for 
RTAs is rather reactive in nature as prospective members are allowed to design and 
negotiate their agreements without having to consult with the rest of WTO Members. 
Although the 2006 Mechanism has introduced new procedural requirements which 
hopefully will improve the current situation, the early announcement concept, the 
notification obligation, and the factual presentations are still after-the-fact 
examinations. However, it is acknowledged that this reactive nature is perhaps 
necessary for RTA negotiations because they are based on reciprocal exchange of 
trade preferences, which will be undermined if they are to be disclosed to other WTO 
Members and the public prior to agreement.
Effects of WTO rules are often considered most visible when they are 
formally enforced through the DSM and/or the reviewing process conducted by 
relevant WTO bodies. However, they can also affect the process of national decision­
making- the process that takes place prior to the actual adoption of a trade measure.756 
Although the WTO does not formally interfere at this stage, its rules often do exert a
756 For further discussion, see J de Melo and A Panagariya (eds), New Dimensions in Regional 
Integration (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1993), pp. 151-3.
- 23 8-
major influence on shaping the measure.757 This earlier stage in the process is 
particularly important when it comes to RTAs since the WTO’s ability to regulate 
once governments have decided to make certain commitments in these 
bilateral/regional agreements is tenuous. This is because government decisions 
usually require extensive bargaining that is difficult to reopen- in the case of RTA 
negotiations, the bargaining is arguably even more complex since it involves more 
than one government. Consequently, reopening the process of decision on such 
agreements is anything but possible. This perhaps explains why GATT working 
parties and the CRTA/CTD have failed to make recommendations with regard to 
RTAs notified to the GATT/WTO.
The proposals made in this thesis aim to change this reactive nature as well as 
to address the challenges facing developing countries amid the current RTA 
proliferation. Subtly, the reformed rules should help shape subsequent RTAs towards 
a trade environment where developing countries are not so disadvantaged and at the 
same time not given excess flexibility. In addition, the proposed code of best practices 
will provide WTO Members with guiding principles and a model RTA and/or specific 
RTA commitments. Furthermore, while developing countries can rely on such 
specific RTA commitments as a starting point of negotiation, other WTO Members 
can also use them as a basis to scrutinize the RTA members during the reviewing 
process in the CRTA/CTD, which will be strengthened if the proposed primary- 
secondary jurisdiction is adopted. Over time, prospective RTA members will design 
and negotiate their RTAs in contemplation of such practices. In other words, the 
proposals on the substantive reforms of the rules should affect the way in which WTO 
Members design and negotiate RTAs. Moreover, the proposed provisions of technical 
assistance will help developing countries respond to the current RTA proliferation in a 
more proactive way as they will be better equipped with economic and legal expertise.
Last but not least, attention should be given to the idea of multilateralizing 
certain aspects of the current RTA proliferation.758 Such approach, although still 
reactive, is positively tackling it. Under this approach, benefits gained from the 
formation of RTAs with regard to regulatory measures for example, can be 
multilateralized. This will extend the benefits to the rest of the WTO membership and
757 Ibid.
758 See R Baldwin and P Low (eds), Multilateralizing Regionalism: Challenges fo r  the Global Trading 
System (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2009).
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at the same time curb the adverse effects of trade and investment diversion. However, 
it is important that any process of multilateralization gives due account to the 
development dimension of these agreements and how they can be used by developing 
countries to pursue their economic development.
It is hoped that this thesis has contributed to how to respond to the current 
RTA proliferation in such a way that addresses the challenges facing developing 
countries when forming RTAs both with their developed-country trade partners and 
among themselves. To deal with the current RTA proliferation is already an extremely 
challenging task. To do this with developing countries in mind is even more so. 
Nevertheless, as an international organization whose majority of its members are 
developing countries, it is vital that the WTO accommodates their needs and 
difficulties and does not allow countries with power and influence to use the 
organization as a vehicle to serve their self interests. Failing to do so would be the 
first step towards marginalization of the WTO in the global trading system.
Appendix
Article XXIV of GATT
Territorial Application — Frontier Traffic — Customs Unions 
and Free-trade Areas
1. The provisions of this Agreement shall apply to the metropolitan customs territories 
of the contracting parties and to any other customs territories in respect of which this 
Agreement has been accepted under Article XXVI or is being applied under Article 
XXXIII or pursuant to the Protocol of Provisional Application. Each such customs 
territory shall, exclusively for the purposes of the territorial application of this 
Agreement, be treated as though it were a contracting party; Provided that the 
provisions of this paragraph shall not be construed to create any rights or obligations 
as between two or more customs territories in respect of which this Agreement has 
been accepted under Article XXVI or is being applied under Article XXXIII or 
pursuant to the Protocol of Provisional Application by a single contracting party.
2. For the purposes of this Agreement a customs territory shall be understood to mean 
any territory with respect to which separate tariffs or other regulations of commerce 
are maintained for a substantial part of the trade of such territory with other territories.
3. The provisions of this Agreement shall not be construed to prevent:
(a) Advantages accorded by any contracting party to adjacent countries in 
order to facilitate frontier traffic;
(b) Advantages accorded to the trade with the Free Territory of Trieste by 
countries contiguous to that territory, provided that such advantages are not in 
conflict with the Treaties of Peace arising out of the Second World War.
4. The contracting parties recognize the desirability of increasing freedom of trade by 
the development, through voluntary agreements, of closer integration between the 
economies of the countries parties to such agreements. They also recognize that the 
purpose of a customs union or of a free-trade area should be to facilitate trade 
between the constituent territories and not to raise barriers to the trade of other 
contracting parties with such territories.
5. Accordingly, the provisions of this Agreement shall not prevent, as between the 
territories of contracting parties, the formation of a customs union or of a free-trade 
area or the adoption of an interim agreement necessary for the formation of a customs 
union or of a free-trade area; Provided that:
{a) with respect to a customs union, or an interim agreement leading to a 
formation of a customs union, the duties and other regulations of commerce 
imposed at the institution of any such union or interim agreement in respect of
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trade with contracting parties not parties to such union or agreement shall not 
on the whole be higher or more restrictive than the general incidence of the 
duties and regulations of commerce applicable in the constituent territories 
prior to the formation of such union or the adoption of such interim agreement, 
as the case may be;
(b) with respect to a free-trade area, or an interim agreement leading to the 
formation of a free-trade area, the duties and other regulations of commerce 
maintained in each of the constituent territories and applicable at the formation 
of such free-trade area or the adoption of such interim agreement to the trade 
of contracting parties not included in such area or not parties to such 
agreement shall not be higher or more restrictive than the corresponding duties 
and other regulations of commerce existing in the same constituent territories 
prior to the formation of the free-trade area, or interim agreement as the case 
may be; and
(c) any interim agreement referred to in sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) shall 
include a plan and schedule for the formation of such a customs union or of 
such a free-trade area within a reasonable length of time.
6. If, in fulfilling the requirements of sub-paragraph 5 (a), a contracting party 
proposes to increase any rate of duty inconsistently with the provisions of Article II, 
the procedure set forth in Article XXVIII shall apply. In providing for compensatory 
adjustment, due account shall be taken of the compensation already afforded by the 
reduction brought about in the corresponding duty of the other constituents of the 
union.
7. (a) Any contracting party deciding to enter into a customs union or free-trade 
area, or an interim agreement leading to the formation of such a union or area, shall 
promptly notify the Contracting Parties and shall make available to them such 
information regarding the proposed union or area as will enable them to make such 
reports and recommendations to contracting parties as they may deem appropriate.
(b) If, after having studied the plan and schedule included in an interim 
agreement referred to in paragraph 5 in consultation with the parties to that agreement 
and taking due account of the information made available in accordance with the 
provisions of sub-paragraph (a), the Contracting Parties find that such agreement is 
not likely to result in the formation of a customs union or of a free-trade area within 
the period contemplated by the parties to the agreement or that such period is not a 
reasonable one, the Contracting Parties shall make recommendations to the parties to 
the agreement. The parties shall not maintain or put into force, as the case may be, 
such agreement if they are not prepared to modify it in accordance with these 
recommendations.
(c) Any substantial change in the plan or schedule referred to in paragraph 5(c) 
shall be communicated to the Contracting Parties, which may request the contracting 
parties concerned to consult with them if the change seems likely to jeopardize or 
delay unduly the formation of the customs union or of the free-trade area.
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8. For the purposes of this Agreement:
(<a) A customs union shall be understood to mean the substitution of a single 
customs territory for two or more customs territories, so that
(i) duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce (except, where 
necessary, those permitted under Articles XI, XII, XIII, XIV, XV and XX) are 
eliminated with respect to substantially all the trade between the constituent 
territories of the union or at least with respect to substantially all the trade in 
products originating in such territories, and,
(ii) subject to the provisions of paragraph 9, substantially the same duties and 
other regulations of commerce are applied by each of the members of the 
union to the trade of territories not included in the union;
(b) A free-trade area shall be understood to mean a group of two or more 
customs territories in which the duties and other restrictive regulations of 
commerce (except, where necessary, those permitted under Articles XI, XII, 
XIII, XIV, XV and XX) are eliminated on substantially all the trade between 
the constituent territories in products originating in such territories.
9. The preferences referred to in paragraph 2 of Article I shall not be affected by the 
formation of a customs union or of a free-trade area but may be eliminated or adjusted 
by means of negotiations with contracting parties affected.* This procedure of 
negotiations with affected contracting parties shall, in particular, apply to the 
elimination of preferences required to conform with the provisions of paragraph 8
(a)(i) and paragraph 8 (b).
10. The Contracting Parties may by a two-thirds majority approve proposals which do 
not fully comply with the requirements of paragraphs 5 to 9 inclusive, provided that 
such proposals lead to the formation of a customs union or a free-trade area in the 
sense of this Article.
11. Taking into account the exceptional circumstances arising out of the establishment 
of India and Pakistan as independent States and recognizing the fact that they have 
long constituted an economic unit, the contracting parties agree that the provisions of 
this Agreement shall not prevent the two countries from entering into special 
arrangements with respect to the trade between them, pending the establishment of 
their mutual trade relations on a definitive basis.*
12. Each contracting party shall take such reasonable measures as may be available to 
it to ensure observance of the provisions of this Agreement by the regional and local 
governments and authorities within its territories.
Ad Article XXIV
Paragraph 9
It is understood that the provisions of Article I would require that, when a product 
which has been imported into the territory of a member of a customs union or free- 
trade area at a preferential rate of duty is re-exported to the territory of another 
member of such union or area, the latter member should collect a duty equal to the 
difference between the duty already paid and any higher duty that would be payable if 
the product were being imported directly into its territory.
Paragraph 11
Measures adopted by India and Pakistan in order to carry out definitive trade 
arrangements between them, once they have been agreed upon, might depart from 
particular provisions of this Agreement, but these measures would in general be 
consistent with the objectives of the Agreement.
Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade 1994
Members,
Having regard to the provisions of Article XXIV of GATT 1994;
Recognizing that customs unions and free-trade areas have greatly increased in 
number and importance since the establishment of GATT 1947 and today cover a 
significant proportion of world trade;
Recognizing the contribution to the expansion of world trade that may be made by 
closer integration between the economies of the parties to such agreements;
Recognizing also that such contribution is increased if the elimination between the 
constituent territories of duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce extends 
to all trade, and diminished if any major sector of trade is excluded;
Reaffirming that the purpose of such agreements should be to facilitate trade between 
the constituent territories and not to raise barriers to the trade of other Members with 
such territories; and that in their formation or enlargement the parties to them should 
to the greatest possible extent avoid creating adverse effects on the trade of other 
Members;
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Convinced also of the need to reinforce the effectiveness of the role of the Council for 
Trade in Goods in reviewing agreements notified under Article XXIV, by clarifying 
the criteria and procedures for the assessment of new or enlarged agreements, and 
improving the transparency of all Article XXIV agreements;
Recognizing the need for a common understanding of the obligations of Members 
under paragraph 12 of Article XXIV;
Hereby agree as follows:
1. Customs unions, free-trade areas, and interim agreements leading to the formation 
of a customs union or free-trade area, to be consistent with Article XXIV, must 
satisfy, inter alia, the provisions of paragraphs 5, 6, 7 and 8 of that Article.
Article XXIV: 5
2. The evaluation under paragraph 5(a) of Article XXIV of the general incidence of 
the duties and other regulations of commerce applicable before and after the 
formation of a customs union shall in respect of duties and charges be based upon an 
overall assessment of weighted average tariff rates and of customs duties collected. 
This assessment shall be based on import statistics for a previous representative 
period to be supplied by the customs union, on a tariff-line basis and in values and 
quantities, broken down by WTO country of origin. The Secretariat shall compute the 
weighted average tariff rates and customs duties collected in accordance with the 
methodology used in the assessment of tariff offers in the Uruguay Round of 
Multilateral Trade Negotiations. For this purpose, the duties and charges to be taken 
into consideration shall be the applied rates of duty. It is recognized that for the 
purpose of the overall assessment of the incidence of other regulations of commerce 
for which quantification and aggregation are difficult, the examination of individual 
measures, regulations, products covered and trade flows affected may be required.
3. The "reasonable length of time" referred to in paragraph 5(c) of Article XXIV 
should exceed 10 years only in exceptional cases. In cases where Members parties to 
an interim agreement believe that 10 years would be insufficient they shall provide a 
full explanation to the Council for Trade in Goods of the need for a longer period.
Article XXIV: 6
4. Paragraph 6 of Article XXIV establishes the procedure to be followed when a 
Member forming a customs union proposes to increase a bound rate of duty. In this 
regard Members reaffirm that the procedure set forth in Article XXVIII, as elaborated 
in the guidelines adopted on 10 November 1980 (BISD 27S/26-28) and in the 
Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXVIII of GATT 1994, must be 
commenced before tariff concessions are modified or withdrawn upon the formation 
of a customs union or an interim agreement leading to the formation of a customs 
union.
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5. These negotiations will be entered into in good faith with a view to achieving 
mutually satisfactory compensatory adjustment. In such negotiations, as required by 
paragraph 6 of Article XXIV, due account shall be taken of reductions of duties on the 
same tariff line made by other constituents of the customs union upon its formation. 
Should such reductions not be sufficient to provide the necessary compensatory 
adjustment, the customs union would offer compensation, which may take the form of 
reductions of duties on other tariff lines. Such an offer shall be taken into 
consideration by the Members having negotiating rights in the binding being modified 
or withdrawn. Should the compensatory adjustment remain unacceptable, negotiations 
should be continued. Where, despite such efforts, agreement in negotiations on 
compensatory adjustment under Article XXVIII as elaborated by the Understanding 
on the Interpretation of Article XXVIII of GATT 1994 cannot be reached within a 
reasonable period from the initiation of negotiations, the customs union shall, 
nevertheless, be free to modify or withdraw the concessions; affected Members shall 
then be free to withdraw substantially equivalent concessions in accordance with 
Article XXVIII.
6. GATT 1994 imposes no obligation on Members benefiting from a reduction of 
duties consequent upon the formation of a customs union, or an interim agreement 
leading to the formation of a customs union, to provide compensatory adjustment to 
its constituents.
Review o f Customs Unions and Free-Trade Areas
7. All notifications made under paragraph 7(a) of Article XXIV shall be examined by 
a working party in the light of the relevant provisions of GATT 1994 and of 
paragraph 1 of this Understanding. The working party shall submit a report to the 
Council for Trade in Goods on its findings in this regard. The Council for Trade in 
Goods may make such recommendations to Members as it deems appropriate.
8. In regard to interim agreements, the working party may in its report make 
appropriate recommendations on the proposed time-frame and on measures required 
to complete the formation of the customs union or free-trade area. It may if necessary 
provide for further review of the agreement.
9. Members parties to an interim agreement shall notify substantial changes in the 
plan and schedule included in that agreement to the Council for Trade in Goods and, 
if so requested, the Council shall examine the changes.
10. Should an interim agreement notified under paragraph 7(a) of Article XXIV not 
include a plan and schedule, contrary to paragraph 5(c) of Article XXIV, the working 
party shall in its report recommend such a plan and schedule. The parties shall not 
maintain or put into force, as the case may be, such agreement if they are not prepared 
to modify it in accordance with these recommendations. Provision shall be made for 
subsequent review of the implementation of the recommendations.
11. Customs unions and constituents of free-trade areas shall report periodically to the 
Council for Trade in Goods, as envisaged by the CONTRACTING PARTIES to
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GATT 1947 in their instruction to the GATT 1947 Council concerning reports on 
regional agreements (BISD 18S/38), on the operation of the relevant agreement. Any 
significant changes and/or developments in the agreements should be reported as they 
occur.
Dispute Settlement
12. The provisions of Articles XXII and XXIII of GATT 1994 as elaborated and 
applied by the Dispute Settlement Understanding may be invoked with respect to any 
matters arising from the application of those provisions of Article XXIV relating to 
customs unions, free-trade areas or interim agreements leading to the formation of a 
customs union or free-trade area.
Article XXIV: 12
13. Each Member is fully responsible under GATT 1994 for the observance of all 
provisions of GATT 1994, and shall take such reasonable measures as may be 
available to it to ensure such observance by regional and local governments and 
authorities within its territory.
14. The provisions of Articles XXII and XXIII of GATT 1994 as elaborated and 
applied by the Dispute Settlement Understanding may be invoked in respect of 
measures affecting its observance taken by regional or local governments or 
authorities within the territory of a Member. When the Dispute Settlement Body has 
ruled that a provision of GATT 1994 has not been observed, the responsible Member 
shall take such reasonable measures as may be available to it to ensure its observance. 
The provisions relating to compensation and suspension of concessions or other 
obligations apply in cases where it has not been possible to secure such observance.
15. Each Member undertakes to accord sympathetic consideration to and afford 
adequate opportunity for consultation regarding any representations made by another 
Member concerning measures affecting the operation of GATT 1994 taken within the 
territory of the former.
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Differential and More Favourable Treatment Reciprocity and Fuller 
Participation of Developing Countries
Decision o f 28 November 1979 
(L/4903)
Following negotiations within the framework of the Multilateral Trade Negotiations, 
the CONTRACTING PARTIES decide as follows:
1. Notwithstanding the provisions of Article I of the General Agreement, contracting 
parties may accord differential and more favourable treatment to developing countries , 
without according such treatment to other contracting parties.
2. The provisions of paragraph 1 apply to the following:
(a) Preferential tariff treatment accorded by developed contracting parties to 
products originating in developing countries in accordance with the Generalized 
System of Preferences,3
(b) Differential and more favourable treatment with respect to the provisions of 
the General Agreement concerning non-tariff measures governed by the provisions 
of instruments multilaterally negotiated under the auspices of the GATT;
(c) Regional or global arrangements entered into amongst less-developed 
contracting parties for the mutual reduction or elimination of tariffs and, in 
accordance with criteria or conditions which may be prescribed by the 
CONTRACTING PARTIES, for the mutual reduction or elimination of non-tariff 
measures, on products imported from one another;
(d) Special treatment on the least developed among the developing countries in 
the context of any general or specific measures in favour of developing countries.
3. Any differential and more favourable treatment provided under this clause:
(a) shall be designed to facilitate and promote the trade of developing countries 
and not to raise barriers to or create undue difficulties for the trade of any other 
contracting parties;
(b) shall not constitute an impediment to the reduction or elimination of tariffs and 
other restrictions to trade on a most-favoured-nation basis;
1 The words “developing countries” as used in this text are to be understood to refer also to developing 
territories.
2 It would remain open for the CONTRACTING PARTIES to consider on an ad hoc basis under the 
GATT provisions for joint action any proposals for differential and more favourable treatment not 
falling within the scope of this paragraph.
3 As described in the Decision of the CONTRACTING PARTIES of 25 June 1971, relating to the 
establishment of “generalized, non-reciprocal and non discriminatory preferences beneficial to the 
developing countries” (BISD 18S/24).
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(c) shall in the case of such treatment accorded by developed contracting parties 
to developing countries be designed and, if necessary, modified, to respond 
positively to the development, financial and trade needs of developing countries.
4. Any contracting party taking action to introduce an arrangement pursuant to 
paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 above or subsequently taking action to introduce modification or 
withdrawal of the differential and more favourable treatment so provided shall:4
(a) notify the CONTRACTING PARTIES and furnish them with all the 
information they may deem appropriate relating to such action;
(b) afford adequate opportunity for prompt consultations at the request of any 
interested contracting party with respect to any difficulty or matter that may arise. 
The CONTRACTING PARTIES shall, if requested to do so by such contracting 
party, consult with all contracting parties concerned with respect to the matter with 
a view to reaching solutions satisfactory to all such contracting parties.
5. The developed countries do not expect reciprocity for commitments made by them 
in trade negotiations to reduce or remove tariffs and other barriers to the trade of 
developing countries, i.e., the developed countries do not expect the developing 
countries, in the course of trade negotiations, to make contributions which are 
inconsistent with their individual development, financial and trade needs. Developed 
contracting parties shall therefore not seek, neither shall less-developed contracting 
parties be required to make, concessions that are inconsistent with the latter's 
development, financial and trade needs.
6. Having regard to the special economic difficulties and the particular development, 
financial and trade needs of the least-developed countries, the developed countries shall 
exercise the utmost restraint in seeking any concessions or contributions for 
commitments made by them to reduce or remove tariffs and other barriers to the trade 
of such countries, and the least-developed countries shall not be expected to make 
concessions or contributions that are inconsistent with the recognition of their particular 
situation and problems.
7. The concessions and contributions made and the obligations assumed by developed 
and less-developed contracting parties under the provisions of the General Agreement 
should promote the basic objectives of the Agreement, including those embodied in the 
Preamble and in Article XXXVI. Less-developed contracting parties expect that their 
capacity to make contributions or negotiated concessions or take other mutually agreed 
action under the provisions and procedures of the General Agreement would improve 
with the progressive development of their economies and improvement in their trade 
situation and they would accordingly expect to participate more fully in the framework 
of rights and obligations under the General Agreement.
8. Particular account shall be taken of the serious difficulty of the least-developed 
countries in making concessions and contributions in view of their special economic 
situation and their development, financial and trade needs.
4 Nothing in these provisions shall affect the rights of contracting parties under the General Agreement.
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9. The contracting parties will collaborate in arrangements for review of the operation 
of these provisions, bearing in mind the need for individual and joint efforts by 
contracting parties to meet the development needs of developing countries and the 
objectives of the General Agreement.
Article V of GATS
Economic Integration
1. This Agreement shall not prevent any of its Members from being a party to or 
entering into an agreement liberalizing trade in services between or among the parties 
to such an agreement, provided that such an agreement:
(a) has substantial sectoral coverage1, and
(b) provides for the absence or elimination of substantially all
discrimination, in the sense of Article XVII, between or among the 
parties, in the sectors covered under subparagraph (a), through:
(i) elimination of existing discriminatory measures, and/or
(ii) prohibition of new or more discriminatory measures,
either at the entry into force of that agreement or on the basis of a
reasonable time-frame, except for measures permitted under
Articles XI, XII, XIV and XIV bis.
2. In evaluating whether the conditions under paragraph 1(b) are met,
consideration may be given to the relationship of the agreement to a wider process of 
economic integration or trade liberalization among the countries concerned.
3. (a) Where developing countries are parties to an agreement of the type
referred to in paragraph 1, flexibility shall be provided for regarding the conditions set 
out in paragraph 1, particularly with reference to subparagraph (b) thereof, in 
accordance with the level of development of the countries concerned, both overall and 
in individual sectors and subsectors.
(b) Notwithstanding paragraph 6, in the case of an agreement of the type 
referred to in paragraph 1 involving only developing countries, more favourable 
treatment may be granted to juridical persons owned or controlled by natural persons 
of the parties to such an agreement.
4. Any agreement referred to in paragraph 1 shall be designed to facilitate trade 
between the parties to the agreement and shall not in respect of any Member outside 
the agreement raise the overall level of barriers to trade in services within the 
respective sectors or subsectors compared to the level applicable prior to such an 
agreement.
1 This condition is understood in terms of number of sectors, volume o f trade affected and modes of 
supply. In order to meet this condition, agreements should not provide for the a priori exclusion of any 
mode of supply.
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5. If, in the conclusion, enlargement or any significant modification of any 
agreement under paragraph 1, a Member intends to withdraw or modify a specific 
commitment inconsistently with the terms and conditions set out in its Schedule, it 
shall provide at least 90 days advance notice of such modification or withdrawal and 
the procedure set forth in paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of Article XXI shall apply.
6. A service supplier of any other Member that is a juridical person constituted 
under the laws of a party to an agreement referred to in paragraph 1 shall be entitled 
to treatment granted under such agreement, provided that it engages in substantive 
business operations in the territory of the parties to such agreement.
7. (a) Members which are parties to any agreement referred to in paragraph 1 
shall promptly notify any such agreement and any enlargement or any significant 
modification of that agreement to the Council for Trade in Services. They shall also 
make available to the Council such relevant information as may be requested by it. 
The Council may establish a working party to examine such an agreement or 
enlargement or modification of that agreement and to report to the Council on its 
consistency with this Article.
(b) Members which are parties to any agreement referred to in paragraph 
1 which is implemented on the basis of a time-frame shall report periodically to the 
Council for Trade in Services on its implementation. The Council may establish a 
working party to examine such reports if it deems such a working party necessary.
(c) Based on the reports of the working parties referred to in 
subparagraphs (a) and (b), the Council may make recommendations to the parties as it 
deems appropriate.
8. A Member which is a party to any agreement referred to in paragraph 1 may 
not seek compensation for trade benefits that may accrue to any other Member from 
such agreement.
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TRANSPARENCY MECHANISM FOR 
REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS
Decision o f 14 December 2006 
(WT/L/671)
The General Council,
Having regard  to paragraph 1 of Article DC of the Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization ("WTO Agreement");
Conducting the functions of the Ministerial Conference in the interval 
between meetings pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article IV of the WTO Agreement;
Noting  that trade agreements of a mutually preferential nature ("regional trade 
agreements" or "RTAs") have greatly increased in number and have become an 
important element in Members' trade policies and developmental strategies;
Convinced that enhancing transparency in, and understanding of, RTAs and 
their effects is of systemic interest and will be of benefit to all Members;
Having regard also to the transparency provisions of Article XXIV of GATT 
1994, the Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV of GATT 1994 ("GATT 
Understanding"), Article V of GATS and the 1979 Decision on Differential and More 
Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries 
("Enabling Clause");
Recognizing the resource and technical constraints of developing country 
Members;
Recalling that in the negotiations pursued under the terms of the Doha 
Ministerial Declaration1, in accordance with paragraph 47 of that Declaration, 
agreements reached at an early stage may be implemented on a provisional basis;
Decides:
A. Early Announcement
1. Without prejudging the substance and the timing of the notification required
under Article XXIV of the GATT 1994, Article V of the GATS or the Enabling 
Clause, nor affecting Members' rights and obligations under the WTO agreements in 
any way:
(a) Members participating in new negotiations aimed at the conclusion of 
an RTA shall endeavour to so inform the WTO.
1 WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1.
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(b) Members parties to a newly signed RTA shall convey to the WTO, in 
so far as and when it is publicly available, information on the RTA, 
including its official name, scope and date of signature, any foreseen 
timetable for its entry into force or provisional application, relevant 
contact points and/or website addresses, and any other relevant 
unrestricted information.
2. The information referred to in paragraph 1 above is to be forwarded to the 
WTO Secretariat, which will post it on the WTO website and will periodically 
provide Members with a synopsis of the communications received.
B. Notification
3. The required notification of an RTA by Members that are party to it shall take 
place as early as possible. As a rule, it will occur no later than directly following the 
parties' ratification of the RTA or any party's decision on application of the relevant 
parts of an agreement, and before the application of preferential treatment between the 
parties.
4. In notifying their RTA, the parties shall specify under which provision(s) of 
the WTO agreements it is notified. They will also provide the full text of the RTA (or 
those parts they have decided to apply) and any related schedules, annexes and 
protocols, in one of the WTO official languages; if available, these shall also be 
submitted in an electronically exploitable format. Reference to related official 
Internet links shall also be supplied.
C. Procedures to Enhance Transparency
5. Upon notification, and without affecting Members' rights and obligations
under the WTO agreements under which it has been notified, the RTA shall be 
considered by Members under the procedures established in paragraphs 6 to 13 below.
6. The consideration by Members of a notified RTA shall be normally concluded 
in a period not exceeding one year after the date of notification. A precise timetable 
for the consideration of the RTA shall be drawn by the WTO Secretariat in 
consultation with the parties at the time of the notification.
7. To assist Members in their consideration of a notified RTA:
(a) the parties shall make available to the WTO Secretariat data as 
specified in the Annex, if possible in an electronically exploitable 
format; and
(b) the WTO Secretariat, on its own responsibility and in full consultation 
with the parties, shall prepare a factual presentation of the RTA.
8. The data referred to in paragraph 7(a) shall be made available as soon as
possible. Normally, the timing of the data submission shall not exceed ten weeks -  or
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20 weeks in the case of RTAs involving only developing countries -  after the date of 
notification of the agreement.
9. The factual presentation provided for in paragraph 7(b) shall be primarily 
based on the information provided by the parties; if necessary, the WTO Secretariat 
may also use data available from other sources, taking into account the views of the 
parties in furtherance of factual accuracy. In preparing the factual presentation, the 
WTO Secretariat shall refrain from any value judgement.
10. The WTO Secretariat's factual presentation shall not be used as a basis for 
dispute settlement procedures or to create new rights and obligations for Members.
11. As a rule, a single formal meeting will be devoted to consider each notified 
RTA; any additional exchange of information should take place in written form.
12. The WTO Secretariat's factual presentation, as well as any additional 
information submitted by the parties, shall be circulated in all WTO official languages 
not less than eight weeks in advance of the meeting devoted to the consideration of 
the RTA. Members' written questions or comments on the RTA under consideration 
shall be transmitted to the parties through the WTO Secretariat at least four weeks 
before the corresponding meeting; they shall be distributed, together with replies, to 
all Members at least three working days before the corresponding meeting.
13. All written material submitted, as well as the minutes of the meeting devoted 
to the consideration of a notified agreement will be promptly circulated in all WTO 
official languages and made available on the WTO website.
D. Subsequent Notification and Reporting
14. The required notification of changes affecting the implementation of an RTA, 
or the operation of an already implemented RTA, shall take place as soon as possible 
after the changes occur. Changes to be notified include, inter alia, modifications to 
the preferential treatment between the parties and to the RTA's disciplines, The 
parties shall provide a summary of the changes made, as well as any related texts, 
schedules, annexes and protocols, in one of the WTO official languages and, if 
available, in electronically exploitable format.2
15. At the end of the RTA's implementation period, the parties shall submit to the 
WTO a short written report on the realization of the liberalization commitments in the 
RTA as originally notified.
16. Upon request, the relevant WTO body shall provide an adequate opportunity 
for an exchange of views on the communications submitted under paragraphs 14 and 
15.
2 In their notification, Members may refer to official Internet links related to the agreement where the 
relevant information can be consulted in full, in one of the WTO official languages.
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17. The communications submitted under paragraphs 14 and 15 will be promptly 
made available on the WTO website and a synopsis will be periodically circulated by 
the WTO Secretariat to Members.
E. Bodies Entrusted with the Implementation o f the Mechanism
18. The Committee on Regional Trade Agreements ("CRTA") and the Committee 
on Trade and Development ("CTD") are instructed to implement this Transparency 
Mechanism.3 The CRTA shall do so for RTAs falling under Article XXIV of GATT 
1994 and Article V of GATS, while the CTD shall do so for RTAs falling under 
paragraph 2(c) of the Enabling Clause. For purposes of performing the functions 
established under this Mechanism, the CTD shall convene in dedicated session.
F. Technical Support fo r Developing Countries
19. Upon request, the WTO Secretariat shall provide technical support to 
developing country Members, and especially least-developed countries, in the 
implementation of this Transparency Mechanism, in particular -  but not limited to - 
with respect to the preparation of RTA-related data and other information to be 
submitted to the WTO Secretariat.
G. Other Provisions
20. Any Member may, at any time, bring to the attention of the relevant WTO 
body information on any RTA that it considers ought to have been submitted to 
Members in the framework of this Transparency Mechanism.
21. The WTO Secretariat shall establish and maintain an updated electronic 
database on individual RTAs. This database shall include relevant tariff and trade- 
related information, and give access to all written material related to announced or 
notified RTAs available at the WTO. The RTA database should be structured so as to 
be easily accessible to the public.
H. Provisional Application o f the Transparency Mechanism
22. This Decision shall apply, on a provisional basis, to all RTAs. With respect to 
RTAs already notified under the relevant WTO transparency provisions and in force, 
this Decision shall apply as follows:
3 The Director-General is invited to ensure consistency in the preparation of the WTO Secretariat 
factual presentations for the different types of RTAs, taking into account the variations in data provided 
by different Members.
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(a) RTAs for which a working party report has been adopted by the GATT 
Council and those RTAs notified to the GATT under the Enabling 
Clause will be subject to the procedures under Sections D to G above.
(b) RTAs for which the CRTA has concluded the "factual examination" 
prior to the adoption of this Decision and those for which the "factual 
examination" will have been concluded by 31 December 2006, and 
RTAs notified to the WTO under the Enabling Clause will be subject 
to the procedures under Sections D to G above. In addition, for each of 
these RTAs, the WTO Secretariat shall prepare a factual abstract 
presenting the features of the agreement.
(c) Any RTA notified prior to the adoption of this Decision and not 
referred to in subparagraphs (a) or (b) will be subject to the procedures 
under Sections C to G above.
/. Reappraisal o f the Mechanism
23. Members will review, and if necessary modify, this Decision, in light of the 
experience gained from its provisional operation, and replace it by a permanent 
mechanism adopted as part of the overall results of the Round, in accordance with 
paragraph 47 of the Doha Declaration. Members will also review the legal 
relationship between this Mechanism and relevant WTO provisions related to RTAs.
ANNEX
Submission o f  Data by RTA Parties
24. RTA parties shall not be expected to make available the information required 
below if the corresponding data has already been submitted to the Integrated Data 
Base (IDB),4 or has otherwise been provided to the Secretariat in an adequate format.5
25. For the goods aspects in RTAs, the parties shall submit the following data, at 
the tariff-line level:6
4 Trade and tariff data submissions in the context of an RTA notification can subsequently be included 
in the IDB, provided that their key features are appropriate. In this respect, see document 
G/MA/IDB/W/6 (dated 15 June 2000) for the Guidelines for Supplying PC IDB Submissions and . 
documents G/MA/115 (dated 17 June 2002) and G/MA/115/Add.5 (dated 13 January 2005) for WTO 
Policy regarding the dissemination of IDB data.
5 Data submissions can be furnished in PC database formats, spreadsheet formats, or text-delimited 
formats; the use of word-processing formats should be avoided, if possible.
6 References to "tariff-line level" shall be understood to mean the detailed breakdown of the national 
customs nomenclature (HS codes with, for example, 8, 10 or more digits). It is crucial that all data 
elements supplied use the same national customs nomenclature or are associated with corresponding 
conversion tables.
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(a) Tariff concessions under the agreement:
(i) a full listing of each party’s preferential duties applied in the
year of entry into force of the agreement; and
(ii) when the agreement is to be implemented by stages, a full
listing of each party's preferential duties to be applied over the
transition period.
(b) MFN duty rates:
(i) a full tariff listing of each RTA party's MFN duties applied on
the year of entry into force of the agreement;7 and
(ii) a full tariff listing of each RTA party's MFN duties applied on
the year preceding the entry into force of the agreement.
(c) Where applicable, other data (e.g., preferential margins, tariff-rate 
quotas, seasonal restrictions, special safeguards and, if available, ad 
valorem equivalents for non-ad valorem duties).
(d) Product-specific preferential rules of origin as defined in the
agreement.
(e) Import statistics, for the most recent three years preceding the
notification for which they are available:
(i) each party's imports from each of the other parties, in value;
and
(ii) each party's imports from the rest of the world, broken down by
country of origin, in value.
26. For the services aspects in RTAs, the parties shall submit the following data, if 
available, for the three most recent years preceding the notification: trade or balance 
of payments statistics (by services sector/subsector and partner), gross domestic 
product data or production statistics (by services sector/subsector), and relevant 
statistics on foreign direct investment and on movement of natural persons (by 
country and, if possible, by services sector/subsector).
27 . For RTAs involving only developing countries, in particular w hen these comprise 
least-developed countries, the data requirem ents specified above will take into account the 
technical constraints o f  the parties to the agreement.
7 In the case of a customs union, the MFN applied common external tariff.
Best Practice for RTAs/FTAs1 in APEC
16th APEC Ministerial Meeting 
Santiago, Chile 
17-18 November 2004
RT As/FT As involving APEC economies can best support the achievement of the 
APEC Bogor Goals by having the following characteristics:
Consistency with APEC Principles and Goals
• They address the relevant areas in Part I (Liberalization and Facilitation) of the 
Osaka Action Agenda (OAA) and they are consistent with its General 
Principles. In this way they help to ensure that APEC accomplishes the free 
trade and investment goals set out in the 1994 Bogor Leaders Declaration.
• They build upon work being undertaken by APEC
• Consistent with APEC goals, they promote structural reform among the parties 
through the implementation of transparent open and non-discriminatory 
regulatory frameworks and decision-making processes.
Consistency with the WTO
• They are fully consistent with the disciplines of the WTO, especially those 
contained in Article XXIV of the GATT and Article V of the GATS.
• When they involve developing economies to whom the Enabling Clause
applies, they are, wherever possible, consistent with Article XXIV of the
GATT and Article V of the GATS.
Go beyond WTO commitments
• In areas that are covered by the WTO, they build upon existing WTO 
obligations. They also explore commitments related to trade and investment 
in areas not covered, or only partly covered, by the WTO. By so doing, APEC 
economies are in a better position to provide leadership in any future WTO 
negotiations on these issues.
1 Regional Trade Arrangements (RTAs), Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), and other Preferential 
Arrangements.
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Comprehensiveness
• They deliver the maximum economic benefits to the parties by being 
comprehensive in scope, and providing for liberalization in all sectors. They 
therefore eliminate barriers to trade and investment between the Parties, 
including tariffs and non-tariff measures, and barriers to trade in services.
• Phase-out periods for tariffs and quotas in sensitive sectors are kept to 
minimum, and take into account the different levels of development among 
the parties. Thus, they are seen as an opportunity to undertake liberalization in 
all sectors as a first step towards multilateral liberalization at a later stage.
Transparency
• By making the texts of RTAs/FTAs, including any annexes or schedules, 
readily available, the Parties ensure that business is in the best position to 
understand and take advantage of liberalized trade conditions. Once they have 
been signed, agreements are made public, in English wherever possible, 
through official websites as well as through the APEC Secretariat website.
• Member economies notify and report their new and existing agreements in 
line with WTO obligations and procedures.
Trade Facilitation
• Recognizing that regulatory and administrative requirements and processes 
can constitute significant barriers to trade, they include practical measures and 
cooperative efforts to facilitate trade and reduce transaction costs for boniness 
consistent with relevant WTO provisions and APEC principles.
Mechanisms for consultation and dispute settlement
• Recognizing that disputes over implementation of RTAs/FTAs can be costly 
and can raise uncertainty for business, they include proper mechanisms to 
prevent and resolve disagreements in an expeditious manner, such as through 
consultation, mediation or arbitration, avoiding duplication with the WTO 
dispute settlement mechanism where appropriate.
Simple Rules of Origin that facilitate trade
• To avoid the possibility of high compliance costs for business, Rules of Origin 
(ROOs) are easy to understand and to comply with. Wherever possible, an 
economy’s ROOs are consistent across all of its FTAs and RTAs.
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• They recognize the increasingly globalized nature of production and the 
achievements of APEC in promoting regional economic integration by 
adopting ROOs that maximize trade creation and minimize trade distortion.
Cooperation
• They include commitments on economic and technical cooperation in the 
relevant areas reflected in Part II of the OAA by providing scope for the 
parties to exchange views and develop common understandings in which 
future interaction will help ensure these agreements have maximum utility and 
benefit to all parties.
Sustainable Development
• Reflecting the inter-dependent and mutually supportive linkages between the 
three pillars of sustainable development- economic development, social 
development and environmental protection- of which trade is an integral 
component, they reinforce the objectives of sustainable development.
Accession of Third Parties
• Consistent with APEC’s philosophy of open regionalism and as a way to 
contribute to the momentum for liberalization throughout the APEC region, 
they are open to the possibility for accession of third parties on negotiated 
terms and conditions.
Provisions for periodic review
• They allow for periodic review to ensure full implementation of the terms of
the agreement and to ensure the terms continue to provide the maximum 
possible economic benefit to the parties in the face of changing economic 
circumstances and trade and investment flows. Periodic review^ helps to 
maintain the momentum for domestic reform and further liberalization by 
addressing areas that may not have been considered during the original 
negotiations, promoting deeper liberalization and introducing more 
sophisticated mechanisms for cooperation as the economies of the Parties 
become more integrated.
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